Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Tommie Patterson was injured in a hit-and-run accident and sued his car insurance company claiming it had breached his insurance contract by failing to reasonably compensate him for his injuries. He later moved to amend his complaint to include racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, and bad faith claims, but the superior court denied the motion. A jury returned a liability verdict that was smaller than the insurance company's offer of judgment. The superior court ruled that the insurance company was the prevailing party and awarded attorney's fees and costs. Patterson appealed the denial of his motion to amend, the awarding of attorney's fees and costs, and several of the court's other procedural and evidentiary rulings. Finding no abuse of discretion in the court's rulings, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Patterson v. GEICO General Insurance Company" on Justia Law

An adult passenger in a car was injured in a single-car accident. The passenger and his family brought suit against the vehicle’s unlicensed minor driver, the minor’s mother, the owner of the car, the insurance policy holder, the insurer, and the insurance adjuster who handled the claims arising from the accident. The passenger’s father attempted to raise a contractual interference claim, but the superior court concluded that the complaint did not state such a claim on his behalf. The superior court dismissed the father’s only other claim (intentional infliction of emotional distress), removed the father’s name from the case caption, and ordered the father to cease filing pleadings on behalf of other parties. After the superior court judge dismissed him from the action, the passenger’s father attempted to file a first amended complaint, which expressly stated his contractual interference claim on the theory that he was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between his son and his son’s doctors. But the superior court denied the father leave to amend the complaint because the father had already been dismissed from the case. Following a settlement among all of the other plaintiffs and defendants (which the father did not join) the superior court granted final judgment to the insurer. The insurer moved for attorney’s fees against the father under Alaska Civil Rule 82, but the father never responded to that motion. The superior court granted the award without soliciting a response from the father, and the father appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the father’s claims and denying leave to amend the complaint because the proposed first amended complaint was futile. But because the superior court had barred the father from filing any further pleadings in the case and had removed his name from the caption, the superior court had a responsibility to inform the self-represented father that he was permitted to file an opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees. Therefore, the Court vacated the fee award and remanded the case to the superior court to afford the father an opportunity to respond to the insurer’s motion for reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Bush v. Elkins" on Justia Law

A worker was left a paraplegic after a 1976 work-related motor vehicle accident. He suffered a number of medical complications related to his injuries. In 2007, his employer controverted some aspects of his medical care, and he filed a written workers’ compensation claim. Shortly before the hearing on the claim, the employer withdrew most of its controversions. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that some of the controversions were frivolous, unfair, or in bad faith. It imposed a statutory penalty and reported its findings about frivolous or unfair controversions to the Alaska Division of Insurance. The employer appealed, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission reversed the Board in part, deciding as a matter of law that the Board could not impose a penalty for some of the controversions. The Commission decided that other appeal points were moot. The worker appeals the Commission’s decision reversing the penalties and some attorney’s fees; the employer cross-appeals the Commission’s decisions about preservation of the controversion issues and mootness. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision that the controversion issue was properly before the Board, but reversed regarding the penalties issue. View "Harris v. M-K Rivers" on Justia Law

A firefighter developed prostate cancer when he was in his mid-fifties, after working for nearly 30 years. He filed a workers’ compensation claim under a new statute creating a presumption that certain diseases in firefighters, including prostate cancer, are work related when specific conditions are met. The employer contended that the firefighter could not attach the presumption of compensability because he had not strictly complied with statutory and regulatory medical examination requirements. The employer also wanted to present expert testimony that the cause of prostate cancer was unknown. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board heard the claim and refused to consider parts of the expert’s testimony, deciding that the firefighter was eligible for benefits because he had attached the presumption of compensability by substantially complying with the statutory requirements and the employer had not rebutted the presumption. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission agreed, but reversed the Board’s decision disallowing the expert testimony. The Commission decided that the employer could rebut the presumption through its expert’s testimony that the cause of prostate cancer was unknown, and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. Because the employer also contended that the firefighter-presumption statute violated the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection guarantee, the State of Alaska intervened on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision that the firefighter attached the presumption by substantially complying with the applicable requirements. However, the Court reversed the Commission’s decision that the employer could rebut the presumption through expert testimony that there was no known cause of prostate cancer. View "Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

When Appellant Todd Christianson was sued by a former employee for severe personal injuries suffered while working for appellant's landscaping business, appellant tendered his defense to his general liability insurer. It did not accept his tender - instead, it sent him a letter that told him he should defend himself, noting an exclusion for claims of employees. Appellant then began to incur defense expenses. No insurer on the policies obtained by appellant's insurance broker, Conrad-Houston Insurance (CHI), ever defended him in the lawsuit. Nearly four years after receiving the insurer’s letter, appellant sued CHI for malpractice. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the superior court applied the discovery rule and dismissed the malpractice lawsuit because it was filed after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had run. The superior court ruled that because the insurer’s letter put appellant on notice he might have a claim against CHI, the statute of limitations had begun to run more than three years before appellant sued CHI. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court.View "Christianson v. Conrad-Houston Insurance" on Justia Law

In 2007, appellant Brent McCormick suffered a back injury while pushing a net reel aboard the F/V CHIPPEWA, owned by Chippewa, Inc. The day after his injury McCormick was treated with ibuprofen. Later that night rough seas caused him to fall out of his bunk and hit his head. McCormick continued to suffer back pain and dizziness and later was treated by medical specialists. In 2010, McCormick filed a complaint against Chippewa, Inc. and Louis Olsen (the vessel’s captain), alleging “unseaworth[i]ness” of the F/V CHIPPEWA and negligence in failing to ensure workplace safety and provide proper medical care. Chippewa had a liability insurance policy with a $500,000 per occurrence limit, including a “cannibalizing” provision specifying that costs and expenses spent “investigating and/or defending any claim” would be deducted from the policy limit. The parties ultimately agreed to settle the case for the "policy limit," but were unable to agree on what "policy limit" meant. Each side sought to enforce the agreement based on their respective understandings of the term. During summary judgment proceedings, one party asked for time to conduct discovery regarding the parties’ intent. The superior court granted summary judgment to the other party and denied the discovery request as moot. Because it was an abuse of discretion not to allow discovery before ruling on the summary judgment motion, the Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment order and remanded the case so that appropriate discovery could be conducted. View "McCormick v. Chippewa, Inc." on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied a death benefit claim filed by the decedent's same-sex partner because the death benefit statute grants benefits only to a worker’s "widow or widower" as defined by statute. The Board construed these terms by applying the Marriage Amendment to the Alaska Constitution, which defined marriage as "only between one man and one woman," thus excluding a decedent's same-sex partner. Because this exclusion lacked a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that this restriction on the statutory definition of "widow" violated the surviving partner's right to equal protection under the law. View "Harris v. Millennium Hotel" on Justia Law

A highly paid worker suffered a debilitating stroke while traveling for his employer. The employer did not think the stroke was work related, but it later accepted the claim and paid workers' compensation benefits. The statutory maximum compensation rate at the time of the injury was $700 a week. A little more than five months after the employee's stroke, an amended version of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act took effect. Instead of an absolute maximum compensation rate, the amended statute set a variable rate indexed to the statewide average weekly wage. The employee asked for an increased rate of compensation, arguing that the law in effect at the time he was recognized as being permanently and totally disabled should govern his benefit amount. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board, with one panel member dissenting, decided that the version of the statute in effect at the time of the injury was the applicable statute and consequently capped the employee's benefits at $700 a week for life. The dissenting panel member would have construed the statute as permitting increased benefits. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision. The employee appealed, arguing that the amount of his benefits did not fairly compensate him for lost wages during the period of his disability so that the date of his disability, rather than the date of his injury, should have been used to determine the version of the statute governing his claim. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision.View "Louie v. BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc." on Justia Law

Jennifer Lockwood was injured in a car accident caused by an uninsured drunk driver. Lockwood had car insurance through Geico General Insurance Company. After exhausting her policy's medical payments coverage, Lockwood sought payment under her uninsured motorist coverage. Geico offered $750 to settle the uninsured motorist claim, and Lockwood declined. Geico questioned Lockwood's "high" medical bills and refused to make additional medical payments outside of a total settlement of Lockwood's uninsured motorist claim. The parties eventually settled Lockwood's uninsured motorist claim for $25,000. Lockwood brought a tort claim against Geico for alleged breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in her insurance contract, arguing that Geico unreasonably delayed payment of Lockwood's uninsured motorist claim. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Geico on the bad-faith tort claim and awarded attorney's fees. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court: because there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Geico lacked a reasonable basis for delaying payment on Lockwood's uninsured motorist claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Lockwood v. Geico General Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Garold Charles was in an accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle belonging to Tara and Anthony Stout. He brought negligence claims against the Stouts and Credit Union 1, the lienholder of the Stouts’ vehicle. Credit Union 1 moved for summary judgment. Charles opposed the motion, relying on testimony from Tara’s deposition and contending in part that he was a third-party beneficiary of an alleged contract between Credit Union 1 and the Stouts by which the credit union agreed to provide liability insurance. The superior court struck Tara’s testimony and granted summary judgment to Credit Union 1. Charles appealed. Finding no error in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Charles v. Stout" on Justia Law