Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State Commission for Human Rights brought an action on behalf of an employee who alleged that her employer’s racist and insensitive remarks created a hostile work environment. The Commission ultimately found that the employee did not suffer a hostile work environment, but it denied the employer’s request for attorney’s fees. The employer appealed on the issue the fees, arguing that it was entitled to fees as the prevailing party and because it raised affirmative defenses under the Alaska and United States Constitutions. After review of the specific facts entered on the Commission's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Commission’s denial of fees. View "Ace Delivery & Moving, Inc. v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

A man working at a concrete-pouring job was assaulted by another worker at the job site. The injured man filed a lawsuit against the assailant and both the concrete-pouring company and its owner. Although the company’s commercial general liability insurer initially provided a defense attorney in the negligence action, the insurer later brought a declaratory judgment action alleging that the incident fell within the policy’s employee-exclusion clause. The superior court granted summary judgment to the insurance company. The Supreme Court affirmed. "[B]ecause courts look to workers’ compensation law to give meaning to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment' in workers’ compensation/employers’ liability policies, and because commercial general liability policies are designed to avoid the existence of an overlap or a gap between workers’ compensation/employers’ liability and commercial general liability policies, sister jurisdictions interpret the same phrase in employee-exclusion clauses in commercial general liability policies in light of the identical language in workers’ compensation statutes. We have found no case law holding that the contractual phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment' in commercial general liability exclusions should be interpreted differently from the identical phrase in workers’ compensation statutes. For purposes of this appeal, we will use workers’ compensation case law to interpret the meaning of the commercial general liability policy’s exclusion of coverage for bodily injury "arising out of and in the course of employment.'" The employer did not purchase workers' compensation coverage. And in reading the general liability policy in question, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in determining that the incident here fell within the employee-exclusion claim. View "Devine v. Great Divide Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A police officer’s employment was terminated for abuse of alcohol, sexually offensive remarks made to two female officers, and alleged dishonesty during the subsequent police investigation. An arbitrator concluded that terminating the officer’s employment was an excessive penalty and ordered the officer’s reinstatement. The superior court affirmed the arbitration decision and the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court based on the deference that must be given to an arbitration decision. However, the Alaska Police Standards Council revoked the officer’s police certificate after concluding that the officer was not of good moral character and was dishonest. The superior court reversed the decision to revoke, substituting its judgment for the Council’s. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court, holding that the Council’s decision, like that of the arbitrator, was entitled to deference. The Court therefore affirmed the Council’s decision to revoke the officer’s police certificate. View "Alaska Police Standards Council v. Parcell" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board fined an uninsured employers Titan Enterprises, LLC, Titan Topsoil, Inc. and CCO Enterprises (collectively, "Titan," all owned by Todd Christanson) a substantial amount because they had operated for a significant period of time without carrying statutorily required workers’ compensation insurance. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed part of the Board’s decision, but it reversed the Board on the amount of the fine and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. The employer then asked the Commission for an award of attorney’s fees as a successful party on appeal. The State, Division of Workers’ Compensation, which had initiated the Board proceedings, opposed the award on the basis that it, too, had been successful on a significant issue. The Commission awarded the employer full fees of approximately $50,000. The Division petitioned for review of the fee award, and the Supreme Court granted review. Because the Commission failed to consider the Division’s partial success in the appeal, it reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alaska Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

Dillip Mullings owned a NAPA auto-parts store in Seward called Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. Mullings hired Dennis Alder to be the store manager, a position Alder held from 2006 to 2010, when he was terminated. Alder did not keep a time card, but it was undisputed that he typically worked from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Monday through Friday. The extent of Alder’s overtime was not at issue on appeal; Mullings conceded that Alder worked over 40 hours a week. It was also undisputed that Alder was paid a salary and did not receive overtime pay. Once terminated, Alder sought unemployment compensation from the State. The Department of Wage and Hour determined that Alder was entitled to overtime pay, and attempted to negotiate a settlement on his behalf with Resurrection Bay. Alder later sued seeking overtime pay. The employer claimed the Alder was exempt from the overtime laws, but the superior court found he was not and awarded overtime pay and liquidated damages. The employer appealed. Because the employer failed to show that the manager satisfied all four requirements of the overtime laws’ exemption for executive employees, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the manager was owed overtime pay under Alaska and federal law. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the superior court’s award of liquidated damages, because the employer failed to carry his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in good faith. View "Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. v. Alder" on Justia Law

A pilot who worked at a remote fishing lodge filed a claim under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) for unpaid overtime wages. The Superior Court concluded that the pilot was a "professional employee" who was exempt from the overtime requirement. But the legislature amended AWHA in 2005 to adopt the federal definition of this exemption. The federal definition restricted the exemption to employees in "professions where specialized academic training is a standard prerequisite." Applying this definition, the Supreme Court concluded that the pilot was not exempt under AWHA and reversed. View "Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge" on Justia Law

Fred Becker V, a loss prevention manager employed by Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., was terminated in 2012. He sued his former employer, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful termination. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Fred Meyer, concluding: (1) that Fred Meyer’s loss prevention policy manual did not create a contract between Becker and Fred Meyer and Becker’s employment was terminable at will; and (2) Becker had presented no evidence that he was treated differently from similarly situated employees with respect to the good faith and fair dealing claim. But because the record presented genuine issues of material fact regarding both claims, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment ruling. View "Becker v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an employee was entitled to temporary total disability benefits after he left employment under disputed circumstances. The employee injured his back at work but returned after being cleared for lighter duty. His employment soon ended (for reasons the parties dispute), and he moved with his family to Nevada, where he later had back surgery. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board found his injury compensable and ordered the employer to pay medical costs and disability benefits from the surgery onward; however, the Board denied temporary total disability benefits from the end of his employment to the surgery, finding the employee had voluntarily left his job for reasons that were not injury-related. The employee appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, which affirmed the decision on disability but remanded to the Board for clarification of its attorney’s fees award. The employee appealed the Commission’s decision regarding temporary total disability benefits and its denial of his request for attorney’s fees for the appeal. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision that the employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits, reversed its denial of attorney’s fees for the appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Humphrey v. Lowe's Home Improvement Warehouse, Inc." on Justia Law

A firefighter developed prostate cancer when he was in his mid-fifties, after working for nearly 30 years. He filed a workers’ compensation claim under a new statute creating a presumption that certain diseases in firefighters, including prostate cancer, are work related when specific conditions are met. The employer contended that the firefighter could not attach the presumption of compensability because he had not strictly complied with statutory and regulatory medical examination requirements. The employer also wanted to present expert testimony that the cause of prostate cancer was unknown. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board heard the claim and refused to consider parts of the expert’s testimony, deciding that the firefighter was eligible for benefits because he had attached the presumption of compensability by substantially complying with the statutory requirements and the employer had not rebutted the presumption. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission agreed, but reversed the Board’s decision disallowing the expert testimony. The Commission decided that the employer could rebut the presumption through its expert’s testimony that the cause of prostate cancer was unknown, and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. Because the employer also contended that the firefighter-presumption statute violated the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection guarantee, the State of Alaska intervened on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision that the firefighter attached the presumption by substantially complying with the applicable requirements. However, the Court reversed the Commission’s decision that the employer could rebut the presumption through expert testimony that there was no known cause of prostate cancer. View "Adamson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

A patient at a health clinic learned that a clinic employee, who was not authorized to access the patient’s medical record, had discussed the patient’s pregnancy with a clerical worker at the clinic. The patient complained to a supervisor, accusing the clinic employee of breaching medical confidentiality. Shortly afterward, the clinic operator fired the employee, citing a breach of confidentiality. The employee then sued the patient for defamation. The patient counterclaimed for invasion of privacy and abuse of process, the latter claim being based on the employee’s filing and withdrawing an earlier petition for a protective order. At some point the clinic investigated the patient’s complaint and determined that it was unsubstantiated. It was later revealed that the patient herself was the source of the employee’s knowledge about the patient’s pregnancy. At trial the patient claimed that she had an absolute privilege to accuse the employee of breaching medical confidentiality. The superior court rejected that argument and determined that the patient had only a conditional privilege. The superior court also denied the patient’s motion for summary judgment and made several challenged evidentiary rulings. After a three-day jury trial, the superior court granted a directed verdict on the patient’s abuse-of-process counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict for the employee on her defamation claim, awarding one dollar in nominal damages; the jury rejected the patient’s counterclaim of invasion of privacy. Finding the employee to be the prevailing party, the superior court awarded her partial attorney’s fees. The patient appealed the superior court’s ruling on conditional privilege, its denial of her motion for summary judgment, and its evidentiary rulings. She also argued the trial court erred in giving jury instructions, in its decision to grant a directed verdict on her abuse-of-process counterclaim, and in its award of attorney’s fees to the employee. She claimed various violations of her state and federal constitutional rights. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not err in any of its legal or evidentiary rulings or in its instructions to the jury, and it therefore affirmed the superior court in all respects. View "Greene v. Tinker" on Justia Law