Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers on an attorney’s contingency fee agreement concerning legal representation for heirs of an Alaska Native allotment. After the attorney successfully represented the heirs in a federal lawsuit against the government for mismanagement of oil and gas leases, a fee dispute arose. The attorney sued one heir in federal court, claiming unpaid fees under the agreement. That heir moved to compel arbitration of the fee dispute pursuant to Alaska Bar Rules, and the federal court stayed the litigation pending arbitration.An Alaska Bar Association arbitration panel was convened. Bar Counsel advised the panel to limit its review to whether the amount of the attorney’s fee was reasonable, excluding issues of enforceability of the agreement, such as claims of duress or illegality under federal Indian law. The panel accepted this narrowed scope and ultimately found the attorney’s fee reasonable, declining to address other challenges. The panel also chose not to refer any ethical concerns to Bar Counsel for disciplinary review.The heir petitioned the Alaska Superior Court (Second Judicial District, Utqiaġvik) to vacate the arbitration award, arguing the panel exceeded its authority, was not impartial, and that the fee agreement was unenforceable. The superior court confirmed the arbitration panel’s decision, finding the panel’s scope limitation a reasonably possible interpretation of its authority under the Bar Rules. The court also awarded the attorney enhanced attorney’s fees for costs incurred in the post-arbitration proceedings, citing Alaska Civil Rule 82.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court’s decision. The court held that a fee arbitration panel’s decision to narrow its review to the reasonableness of a fee is proper if it is a reasonably possible interpretation of the panel’s authority. Additionally, it held that attorney’s fees may be awarded under Civil Rule 82 for post-arbitration proceedings governed by the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. View "Koponen v. Romanov" on Justia Law

A dispute arose from a contingency fee agreement between the heirs of an Alaska Native allotment and an attorney who helped them recover substantial compensation from the federal government for mismanagement of oil and gas leases on their land. After a settlement was reached, years later, one of the heirs was sued by the attorney in federal court for allegedly failing to make required payments under the fee agreement. The heir then invoked mandatory fee arbitration under Alaska Bar Association rules, which prompted the federal court to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of arbitration.The arbitration was conducted before an Alaska Bar Association panel, which, following guidance from Bar Counsel, limited its review to whether the amount of the attorney’s fee was reasonable, and declined to address broader challenges to the enforceability of the fee agreement, including claims of duress and illegality under federal Indian law. The panel ultimately found the fee amount reasonable. Dissatisfied, the heir petitioned the Alaska Superior Court to vacate the panel’s decision, arguing that the panel exceeded its authority by not deciding enforceability issues and raising other statutory grounds under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA). The Superior Court denied the petition, confirmed the arbitration award, and granted enhanced attorney’s fees to the attorney for post-arbitration litigation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the Superior Court’s confirmation of the arbitration award. The Supreme Court held that a fee arbitration panel’s decision to narrow the scope of review is subject to a “reasonably possible” standard and that the panel did not exceed its authority in this case. The court also held that awards of attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82 are permissible in post-arbitration proceedings governed by the RUAA and found no abuse of discretion in the Superior Court’s award. View "Oenga v. Givens" on Justia Law

A creditor and a debtor’s law firm both claimed settlement funds held by the superior court. The creditor had a charging order against the debtor’s distributions from a limited liability company (LLC), while the law firm had an attorney’s lien on the funds. In a previous appeal, the attorney’s lien was deemed valid, but the case was remanded to determine if the funds were LLC distributions subject to the charging order and the value of the attorney’s lien.The superior court ruled that the funds were LLC distributions and subject to the charging order. It also found that the debtor failed to prove any money was owed to the law firm for work performed, thus invalidating the attorney’s lien. The court mistakenly released the funds to the creditor, who returned them within two days, but was sanctioned with attorney’s fees for temporarily keeping the funds.The debtor appealed, and the creditor cross-appealed the attorney’s fee award. The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s rulings on the merits but reversed the attorney’s fee award. The court held that the funds were indeed LLC distributions subject to the charging order and that the debtor and law firm failed to prove the value of the attorney’s lien. The court also vacated the second final judgment and the attorney’s fee award against the creditor, finding no rule violation by the creditor. View "Baker v. Duffus" on Justia Law

A woman sued her former attorneys for malpractice, alleging they failed to advocate for her interests during mediation, resulting in an unfavorable settlement for her and her business. The superior court granted summary judgment to the attorneys, concluding that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations and denied her motion to amend her complaint.The superior court ruled that the statute of limitations for the malpractice claim had expired, as the woman filed her suit more than three years after her injury occurred. The court also rejected her argument for tolling the limitations period under the continuous representation rule, concluding that her communications with the attorneys did not show continued representation in her personal capacity. Additionally, the court rejected her equitable estoppel argument, reasoning that the alleged conflicts of interest did not raise concerns under the Rules of Professional Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the continuous representation rule applies to legal malpractice claims, delaying the accrual of the claim until the attorney's representation in the matter ceases. The court found a genuine factual dispute about when the attorneys' representation ended, vacating the superior court's decision and remanding for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the superior court's ruling that the attorneys are not barred by the doctrine of fraudulent estoppel from pleading the statute of limitations defense, as the woman failed to present evidence that her delay in filing suit was in reasonable reliance on the nondisclosure. Finally, the court vacated and remanded the superior court's decision to deny leave to amend the complaint, as the claims were not futile and leave to amend should have been granted. View "Sheldon-Lee v. Birch Horton Bittner, Inc." on Justia Law

Two workers' compensation claimants, represented by attorney David Graham, settled their claims with Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium (SEARHC) except for attorney's fees. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board awarded Graham significantly less than he requested. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision, but the Alaska Supreme Court reversed it, instructing the Commission to consider enhanced fees. On remand, the Commission did not change the fee award, leading to another appeal.The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission initially affirmed the Board's reduced fee award. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed this decision, clarifying that the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act allows for enhanced fees and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, the Commission again awarded $450 per hour, citing past awards and the factors in Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), but did not enhance the fee despite acknowledging the complexity and novelty of the issues.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission abused its discretion by not adequately considering the factors that supported an enhanced fee. The Court emphasized the need for the Commission to apply the modified lodestar method, which involves calculating a baseline fee and then considering whether to adjust it based on various factors, including the complexity and novelty of the case and the contingent nature of the work. The Court vacated the Commission's fee award and remanded the case, directing the Commission to enhance the fees based on its findings. The Court also clarified that the Commission must consider all relevant factors and not rely solely on past awards. View "Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium" on Justia Law

The case involves a medical malpractice suit brought by the parents of a stillborn child against the midwives who attended the birth. The plaintiffs alleged that the midwives failed to obtain informed consent for delivery by midwife at a birth center instead of by a physician at a hospital. They claimed the midwives did not disclose the risks associated with midwife delivery for an expectant mother of advanced maternal age with a history of miscarriage. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the midwives, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that midwife delivery caused the stillbirth.The superior court found that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to establish proximate cause, a necessary element in informed consent claims. The court noted that the plaintiffs needed to show both that they would not have consented to the treatment if properly informed and that the treatment caused the injury. The midwives presented expert testimony indicating that their care did not cause the stillbirth, and the plaintiffs failed to rebut this with their own expert evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's summary judgment in favor of the midwives. The court held that the plaintiffs did not present admissible evidence to dispute the midwives' expert opinion that the stillbirth was caused by an infection unrelated to the midwives' care. The court also affirmed the superior court's award of enhanced attorney’s fees to the midwives, finding that the plaintiffs engaged in vexatious or bad faith conduct during the litigation. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' failure to provide necessary expert testimony on causation was fatal to their claims. View "Goodwin v. Mat-Su Midwifery, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of landowners (the Andersons) sued their neighbors (the Wilsons) over a property dispute involving access to remote parcels near a lake. The Andersons argued that a public easement existed over the Wilsons' property, providing access from a highway to their properties. They claimed this easement was established by patent, subdivision agreement, prescription, and under Revised Statute 2477 (RS 2477). The Wilsons contended that any access was permissive and private. The dispute arose after the Wilsons blocked access due to perceived excessive use by unauthorized individuals.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, held a 12-day bench trial. The court found in favor of the Wilsons, concluding that no public easement existed. It determined that the Andersons had only a private easement over the Wilsons' property. The court also awarded the Wilsons 75% of their attorney’s fees, finding them to be the prevailing party. The Andersons appealed both the easement determination and the attorney’s fee award.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It affirmed the Superior Court's decision that no public easement existed, agreeing that the Andersons had not provided clear and convincing evidence of public use before the land was withdrawn from the public domain. The court also upheld the finding that no easement by implication, necessity, or estoppel existed. However, the Supreme Court vacated the attorney’s fee award and remanded it for further consideration. It found that the billing records were insufficiently detailed and included fees unrelated to the litigation. The court also noted that the hourly rates charged by the Wilsons' attorney were significantly higher than those customarily charged in the locality, requiring further examination of their reasonableness. View "Anderson v. Wilson" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the control of a nonprofit corporation, which was dissolved by the State due to the executive director’s failure to pay taxes and fees and renew corporate registration. Despite the dissolution, the directors and members continued the corporation’s activities, unaware of the loss of corporate status. When the issue was discovered, some individuals filed paperwork to incorporate a new entity with the same name, offices, and bank account. A national affiliate proposed elections to resolve the leadership, but the new incorporators denied affiliation with the old corporation. Elections were held, and new directors were chosen, leading to litigation over who had authority to act on behalf of the new corporation.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, ruled that the new corporation was essentially the same entity as the old one, with the same members. The court concluded that the disputed election was valid and that the newly elected individuals had authority to act on behalf of the corporation. The court ousted the individuals who had filed the incorporation paperwork and awarded attorney’s fees to the prevailing parties but exempted individual litigants from liability for these fees.The Alaska Supreme Court largely affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings but vacated and remanded the dismissal of one third-party claim for a more detailed explanation. The court also vacated and remanded the Superior Court’s decision to excuse individual litigants from liability for attorney’s fees, finding the reason for this ruling invalid. The main holding was that the new corporation was the same entity as the old one, and the election of new directors was valid, giving them authority to act on behalf of the corporation. View "Aiken v. Alaska Addiction Professionals Association" on Justia Law

The case involves a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) issued in favor of a child's father (Jacob G.) against the child's mother (Savanah F.) following an incident of custodial interference that involved the mother taking the child from Alaska to Texas without the father's knowledge and in violation of a custody order. The father had sought attorney's fees, which were denied by the Superior Court without explanation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the Superior Court's decision, holding that a person who successfully petitions for a DVPO is entitled to seek attorney’s fees from the respondent, and these can only be denied in exceptional circumstances. The Court held that neither of the arguments made by the mother in opposition to the fees - that her act of custodial interference was justified by the father’s substance abuse, and that she could not afford to pay the fees - constituted exceptional circumstances. The Court noted that the mother's argument fails to recognize the harm caused by custodial interference, and that her financial circumstances did not justify denial of the fees, given she had paid her own legal fees and had the ability to earn income. View "Jacob G. v. Savanah F." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the decision of the Superior Court to grant summary judgement in favor of an attorney, John Wallace, in a case brought against him by the estate of a deceased entrepreneur. The estate, represented by Courtney Guerra, blamed Wallace for the financial mismanagement of the estate by its previous personal representative, Robert Nesbitt, who Wallace had represented. The estate alleged that Wallace was liable for damages due to his negligent performance of duties as Nesbitt's attorney. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that Wallace had no duty of care to the estate's beneficiaries, as they were not his clients. Furthermore, the estate's claims of malpractice against Wallace were waived due to insufficient briefing in their appeal. The court concluded that Wallace didn't know or have reason to know that Nesbitt was mismanaging the estate's funds, and therefore, he had no legal duty to prevent or rectify Nesbitt's actions. View "Guerra v. Nesbitt" on Justia Law