Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2009 Elisabeth Bachmeier defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust against her home, and a nonjudicial foreclosure was initiated. Bachmeier requested a reinstatement quote in order to halt the foreclosure. Alaska Trustee, the trustee under the deed of trust, replied with a quote which included foreclosure costs that were not attorney's fees or court costs, the only items the foreclosure statute expressly mentions as recoverable in a reinstatement amount. Bachmeier brought suit against Alaska Trustee, Routh Crabtree Olsen (the law firm aiding in the foreclosure), and Richard Ullstrom (an attorney employed by Routh Crabtree Olsen), alleging that the inclusion of the disputed foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and was a deceptive practice in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). Bachmeier also argued that her deed of trust did not provide that all foreclosure costs could be recovered in the reinstatement amount. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The superior court concluded that the inclusion of the foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and that the UTPA applied to nonjudicial foreclosures. Alaska Trustee appealed. The Supreme Court granted review to determine: (1) the scope of permissible charges to be included in the reinstatement amount given to homeowners facing nonjudicial foreclosure under AS 34.20.070(b); and (2) whether the UTPA applied to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. The Court held that because the beneficiary of a deed of trust has a right to be returned to its status quo ante when the borrower reinstates after a default, Alaska Trustee could include in Bachmeier's reinstatement amount all reasonable costs it incurred pursuing the foreclosure under the foreclosure statute, regardless of whether Bachmeier's deed of trust specifically provided for the inclusion of such costs. Furthermore, the Court held that the UTPA did not apply to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. View "Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier" on Justia Law

Clifton Tweedy began leasing property from the Matanuska-Susitna Borough on Big Lake in May 1988. When Tweedy assumed the lease, the existing structure was exempt from the Borough’s 75-foot shoreline setback ordinance because it was constructed before any setback requirement existed. Shortly after he took possession of the property, Tweedy constructed a stairwell addition on the exterior of the house. In 2010 Tweedy applied with the Borough to purchase the property. Because structures on the property were located less than 75 feet from the shoreline, the sale required an exemption or variance from the Borough’s setback requirement. The Borough Planning Director determined that Tweedy’s addition was unlawful and that the application could not be processed until Tweedy removed it. The Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment Appeals affirmed the Planning Director’s decision. Tweedy appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed. Because the 75-foot setback applied to Tweedy’s property when he constructed the addition, the addition was unlawful when it was built and he was not entitled to an exemption or variance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals" on Justia Law

Appellant Sheila Brandner appealed the Anchorage Municipal Board of Equalization's valuation of her home for the 2012 tax year. She argued the Municipal assessor's office used an improper appraisal method and that the Board overestimated the value of her property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board made a clerical error in the calculation of the value of Brandner's property. Therefore the case was remanded to the Board to adopt a final assessment consistent with the Board's intent. View "Brandner v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

A fire broke out at a mobile home owned by Leo Regner near North Pole. The North Star Volunteer Fire Department, the North Pole Fire Department, and the Fort Wainwright Fire Department responded to the fire but were unable to prevent damage to the mobile home. Regner sued the fire departments and several of their employees, alleging negligence. Regner voluntarily dismissed his claim against the Fort Wainwright Fire Department and its employee, and the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that they were immune from suit. The superior court granted complete summary judgment. Regner appealed only the superior court’s decision that he failed to make a sufficient showing of negligence to defeat summary judgment. Because the defendants did not move for summary judgment on the merits of Regner’s negligence claims and the merits of those claims were not otherwise addressed in the summary judgment proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Regner v. North Star Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between property owners on a small island in Southeast Alaska. After moving to the island with his family, Todd Shumway engaged in activities that Betty Black, the largest landowner, claimed were in violation of the island's protective covenants. The superior court found in favor of Black and awarded injunctive and monetary relief to her and another landowner, Dale Lockwood. When Black attempted to collect on her judgment by executing on Shumway's island property, Shumway, who was incarcerated in Arizona on charges unrelated to this case, claimed a homestead exemption. The superior court denied the exemption. Shumway appealed the denial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shumway v. Betty Black Living Trust" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on the doctrine of adverse possession and whether the presumption that a private drive across another's property was a permissive use and did not give rise to an easement. The presumption does not apply where a drive was not originally established by the other's property owner for his or her own use. Appellee Edward Shaw owned two lots of land; Appellants James Dault and Shala Dobson owned a non-adjacent parcel in the same subdivision. Shaw used a trail as access to his parcel. The trial crossed several parcels, including that owned by Dault and Dobson. Dault built a shed on his property where the trail had been. Shaw's house was not then occupied. When Shaw’s brother, Michael, discovered that a driveway was being constructed, he asked Dault about the project. Dault assured Michael that the new driveway would provide safer access to Shaw's property, but Michael expressed concern over the lack of a Borough permit. During a subsequent conversation, Dault said that he did not believe that he needed a Borough permit. Michael had by then discovered the grantor easements on some of the lots, including his brother's, and based on them, told Dault to remove the obstruction from the trail. After consideration of the parties various land interests and the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the presumption of a private drive as permissive use and did not give rise to an easement applied in this case because the drive at issue was constructed by the original subdivision developers for their own use. The Court concluded the trial court erred in finding that Shaw had a prescriptive easement to use the portion of the trial crossing Dault's lot. View "Dault v. Shaw" on Justia Law

The Nancy Lake State Recreation Area's ("the Park") governing regulations prohibit the use of motorized vehicles off of the Park's paved roads. However, the Park issues special use permits to owners of private property abutting the remote boundary of the Park that grant them the right to use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) along the Butterfly Lake Trail to access their private property. The ATVs have damaged the Butterfly Lake Trail and the surrounding wetlands. SOP, Inc. sued to enjoin the Park from issuing these ATV permits. SOP moved for summary judgment, and the Park filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied SOP?s motion and granted the Park's motion, concluding "there [was] nothing in the statutes or regulations that justifies court intervention and invalidation of the permits." SOP appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the permits created easements because the Park could not revoke the permits at will. The Court therefore found the permits were illegal and accordingly reversed. View "SOP, Inc. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Paul Harder brought a lawsuit seeking restoration damages against Joel and Darlene Wiersum after the Wiersums cleared trees from Harder's property without his permission. The Wiersums filed a third-party complaint against Harder's sister, Lisa Wietfeld. They sought to apportion fault to Wietfeld, claiming that she had negligently misrepresented that she owned the property where the trees were cut when she gave them permission to remove trees from her property. The superior court granted Wietfeld's summary judgment motion; the remaining parties proceeded to trial and a jury awarded Harder compensatory restoration damages and statutory treble damages. The Wiersums appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by dismissing their claim against Wietfeld and by denying their motions for directed verdicts and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Wietfeld owed no duty to Harder, it affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment as to Wietfeld. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the denial of the Wiersums' motions for a directed verdict because Harder presented sufficient evidence for the issue of restoration costs to be submitted to the jury. However, the Court concluded that the superior court erred by denying the Wiersums' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the jury's award of restoration damages was objectively unreasonable. Therefore the damages award was vacated and a new trial ordered. View "Wiersum v. Harder" on Justia Law

When passing a 1997 ordinance, the Anchorage Municipal Assembly amended the boundaries of a proposed Downtown Improvement District to exclude some properties on K and L Streets. The building at 420 L Street, the property owned by appellant L Street Investments, was in the original proposal but was subsequently carved out by the Assembly. In 2000 the Assembly extended the life of the District for ten years. Beginning in 2009, the Anchorage Downtown Partnership canvassed businesses hoping to extend the term of the District and expand it to include businesses between I and L Street. After the majority of business owners in the proposed District approved the extension and expansion, the Assembly extended the term of the District and expanded it to include businesses between I and L Streets, including the building at 420 L Street. L Street Investments filed suit, arguing: (1) Section 9.02(a) of the Municipality of Anchorage's Charter did not authorize the Municipality to finance services within the District by an assessment; and (2) the District is a "service area," and AS 29.35.450(c) prohibits the expansion of a service area unless a majority of voters in the area to be added vote in favor of expanding the service area. The Anchorage Downtown Partnership intervened, and all parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Municipality and the Anchorage Downtown Partnership. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "L Street Investments v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was the validity and interpretation of a roadway easement granted to meet a borough's subdivision plat-waiver requirements. The borough approved a nearby subdivision project contingent on upgrading the easement roadway. The owners of the servient estate first insisted that the developer maintain his roadway upgrade within the original easement. After the work was completed the owners sued the developer for trespass, alleging implicitly that the original easement grant was invalid because it was not properly executed and acknowledged, and asserting that there might be public prescriptive easement across their property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the developer on the validity of the easement, holding that any acknowledgment deficiencies were cured. The Supreme Court agreed with the landowners that the superior court misapplied the statute, but affirmed the grant of summary judgment on other grounds. View "Windel v. Mat-Su Title Insurance Agency, Inc." on Justia Law