Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1992, Robert Farmer and his wife, Kathy, bought Wolverine Lodge in Glennallen from Peggy Jo Watson. The purchase price of $365,000 was secured by a deed of trust on the property. Farmer defaulted on the mortgage for the first time in 1996, but he cured before the foreclosure sale occurred. In 2012 Farmer defaulted again. Farmer was almost five months late on the payments, had not paid the real estate taxes or room taxes, and had no insurance on the property. Watson paid all of these expenses herself in order to keep the property up-to-date and insured. She testified that "Farmer promised many times that he would bring the loan current and obtain insurance,” but “[h]e never did." In March 2012 Watson commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Watson’s attorney recorded a notice of default and a notice of sale, and distributed them to Farmer by mail and personal service. Notice of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was published in the Alaska Journal of Commerce and posted at various locations in Anchorage. The nonjudicial foreclosure sale was postponed six times. It was initially set for July 25, but Watson postponed it until August 29. On August 28 Farmer filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and Watson again postponed the sale, this time at Farmer’s request, until September 26. Because of the ensuing automatic bankruptcy stay, the sale was postponed until October 31, then until November 28, then again until December 19, and finally until December 27, when the sale actually took place. Watson’s attorney was the only attendee at each of the scheduled sales. Each of these postponements was announced publicly on the sale date, and the trustee signed the notice of postponement every time. Farmer was not otherwise notified of any of the postponements, and, at the time of the actual sale, he alleged that neither "[he], [his] wife, nor [his] bankruptcy attorney knew . . . that a deed of trust foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 27, 2012." Farmer argued that equity required re-notice after each postponement and that the lack of re-notice violated his due process rights. The superior court granted summary judgment to Watson. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: equity does not require re-notice after postponement of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and notice of a postponement by public announcement satisfies due process. View "Farmer v. Alaska USA Title Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Neighbor and owner of property near the Palmer Municipal Airport brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Palmer, arguing that the airport operation diminished his property value. The superior court entered summary judgment for the City of Palmer because the property owner failed to submit any expert testimony regarding damages. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision because Alaska law permits property owners to testify about their opinion of the property's value before and after an alleged taking. View "Briggs v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

Cody Lee and Stacey Dean (collectively, "Lee") and Barbara Konrad disputed a boundary between their lots in an Anchorage subdivision. Lee insisted that the boundary line was established by a 1992 survey, which Lee later marked with fence posts. Konrad argued that a survey she commissioned after purchasing her lot in 2008 disclosed the true boundary and that encroachment of fill material caused by Lee along the fenceline between the lots was a trespass. The superior court concluded that Konrad’s survey correctly identified the boundary line and that the fill material encroachment was a trespass. The court issued an order requiring Lee to remove the fill material and erect a retaining barrier to prevent future trespass; it declared Konrad the prevailing party and awarded attorney’s fees. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review were: (1) whether the superior court correctly determined the boundary between the lots; (2) whether the court erred by concluding that dirt and gravel encroaching onto Konrad’s property was a trespass; and (3) whether the court’s attorney’s fees award was an abuse of discretion. The Court concluded: (1) that because Lee and Konrad’s predecessors agreed to the boundary established by the 1992 survey, and marked that boundary with fence posts in 1999, the boundary between the lots was established by acquiescence; (2) the superior court correctly found that the fill material encroaching onto Konrad’s property after she purchased her lot was a trespass, but erred by ordering Lee to remove fill material that encroached onto the property before Konrad purchased it because this fill material was not a trespass as to Konrad; and (3) it was an abuse of discretion to order Lee to pay for construction of a retaining wall to prevent future encroachment. The Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and remanded for redetermination of prevailing-party status and recalculation of attorney’s fees. View "Lee v. Konrad" on Justia Law

Clifton Tweedy leased property from the Matanuska-Susitna Borough since May 1988. The property included a house that was built in 1968 and located less than 18 feet from the lakeshore. When Tweedy assumed the lease, the existing structure was exempt from the Borough’s 75-foot shoreline setback ordinance because it was constructed before any setback requirement existed. Shortly after he took possession of the property, Tweedy added a stairwell on the exterior of the house. In 2010 Tweedy applied with the Borough to purchase the property. Because structures on the property were located less than 75 feet from the shoreline, the sale required an exemption from the Borough’s setback requirement. The Borough Planning Director determined that Tweedy’s addition was unlawful and that the application could not be processed until Tweedy removed it. The Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment Appeals affirmed the Planning Director’s decision. Tweedy appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals" on Justia Law

In 2009 Elisabeth Bachmeier defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust against her home, and a nonjudicial foreclosure was initiated. Bachmeier requested a reinstatement quote in order to halt the foreclosure. Alaska Trustee, the trustee under the deed of trust, replied with a quote which included foreclosure costs that were not attorney's fees or court costs, the only items the foreclosure statute expressly mentions as recoverable in a reinstatement amount. Bachmeier brought suit against Alaska Trustee, Routh Crabtree Olsen (the law firm aiding in the foreclosure), and Richard Ullstrom (an attorney employed by Routh Crabtree Olsen), alleging that the inclusion of the disputed foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and was a deceptive practice in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). Bachmeier also argued that her deed of trust did not provide that all foreclosure costs could be recovered in the reinstatement amount. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The superior court concluded that the inclusion of the foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and that the UTPA applied to nonjudicial foreclosures. Alaska Trustee appealed. The Supreme Court granted review to determine: (1) the scope of permissible charges to be included in the reinstatement amount given to homeowners facing nonjudicial foreclosure under AS 34.20.070(b); and (2) whether the UTPA applied to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. The Court held that because the beneficiary of a deed of trust has a right to be returned to its status quo ante when the borrower reinstates after a default, Alaska Trustee could include in Bachmeier's reinstatement amount all reasonable costs it incurred pursuing the foreclosure under the foreclosure statute, regardless of whether Bachmeier's deed of trust specifically provided for the inclusion of such costs. Furthermore, the Court held that the UTPA did not apply to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. View "Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier" on Justia Law

Clifton Tweedy began leasing property from the Matanuska-Susitna Borough on Big Lake in May 1988. When Tweedy assumed the lease, the existing structure was exempt from the Borough’s 75-foot shoreline setback ordinance because it was constructed before any setback requirement existed. Shortly after he took possession of the property, Tweedy constructed a stairwell addition on the exterior of the house. In 2010 Tweedy applied with the Borough to purchase the property. Because structures on the property were located less than 75 feet from the shoreline, the sale required an exemption or variance from the Borough’s setback requirement. The Borough Planning Director determined that Tweedy’s addition was unlawful and that the application could not be processed until Tweedy removed it. The Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment Appeals affirmed the Planning Director’s decision. Tweedy appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed. Because the 75-foot setback applied to Tweedy’s property when he constructed the addition, the addition was unlawful when it was built and he was not entitled to an exemption or variance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals" on Justia Law

Appellant Sheila Brandner appealed the Anchorage Municipal Board of Equalization's valuation of her home for the 2012 tax year. She argued the Municipal assessor's office used an improper appraisal method and that the Board overestimated the value of her property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board made a clerical error in the calculation of the value of Brandner's property. Therefore the case was remanded to the Board to adopt a final assessment consistent with the Board's intent. View "Brandner v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

A fire broke out at a mobile home owned by Leo Regner near North Pole. The North Star Volunteer Fire Department, the North Pole Fire Department, and the Fort Wainwright Fire Department responded to the fire but were unable to prevent damage to the mobile home. Regner sued the fire departments and several of their employees, alleging negligence. Regner voluntarily dismissed his claim against the Fort Wainwright Fire Department and its employee, and the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that they were immune from suit. The superior court granted complete summary judgment. Regner appealed only the superior court’s decision that he failed to make a sufficient showing of negligence to defeat summary judgment. Because the defendants did not move for summary judgment on the merits of Regner’s negligence claims and the merits of those claims were not otherwise addressed in the summary judgment proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Regner v. North Star Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute between property owners on a small island in Southeast Alaska. After moving to the island with his family, Todd Shumway engaged in activities that Betty Black, the largest landowner, claimed were in violation of the island's protective covenants. The superior court found in favor of Black and awarded injunctive and monetary relief to her and another landowner, Dale Lockwood. When Black attempted to collect on her judgment by executing on Shumway's island property, Shumway, who was incarcerated in Arizona on charges unrelated to this case, claimed a homestead exemption. The superior court denied the exemption. Shumway appealed the denial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shumway v. Betty Black Living Trust" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on the doctrine of adverse possession and whether the presumption that a private drive across another's property was a permissive use and did not give rise to an easement. The presumption does not apply where a drive was not originally established by the other's property owner for his or her own use. Appellee Edward Shaw owned two lots of land; Appellants James Dault and Shala Dobson owned a non-adjacent parcel in the same subdivision. Shaw used a trail as access to his parcel. The trial crossed several parcels, including that owned by Dault and Dobson. Dault built a shed on his property where the trail had been. Shaw's house was not then occupied. When Shaw’s brother, Michael, discovered that a driveway was being constructed, he asked Dault about the project. Dault assured Michael that the new driveway would provide safer access to Shaw's property, but Michael expressed concern over the lack of a Borough permit. During a subsequent conversation, Dault said that he did not believe that he needed a Borough permit. Michael had by then discovered the grantor easements on some of the lots, including his brother's, and based on them, told Dault to remove the obstruction from the trail. After consideration of the parties various land interests and the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the presumption of a private drive as permissive use and did not give rise to an easement applied in this case because the drive at issue was constructed by the original subdivision developers for their own use. The Court concluded the trial court erred in finding that Shaw had a prescriptive easement to use the portion of the trial crossing Dault's lot. View "Dault v. Shaw" on Justia Law