Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant purchased a home and fell behind on her mortgage payments. Despite the bank having agreed to postpone a foreclosure sale, it proceeded with the sale. After she threatened suit, the bank re-purchased the home and entered into settlement negotiations with appellant; the bank promised to re-convey the property to appellant so that she could proceed with a sale to a third party. The bank subsequently refused to perform and appellant sued both the bank and the bank's counsel for breach of the settlement agreement and fraudulent inducement. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the woman on her breach of contract claim, finding that a binding settlement contract had been formed between appellant and the bank. Appellant then filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee sold the property and the bankruptcy estate abandoned the present state court claim, placing the remaining balance from the sale of the property into the superior court registry. The superior court held a bench trial on the remaining fraud claim and on the parties' respective damages. At the conclusion of appellant's case, the court granted a directed verdict to the bank and the bank's counsel on the fraud claim. The superior court awarded the bank the unpaid loan balance as well as the fair rental value of the property for appellant's post-foreclosure occupancy of the property, and awarded the woman lost sale damages. The superior court also awarded the parties prejudgment interest, and later awarded the bank and its counsel attorney's fees. Appellant appealed the superior court's final judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bank abandoned its claim for rental damages at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's award of rental damages and any accompanying award of prejudgment interest. Because any right to recover fees for work performed on behalf of the dismissed defendants was waived, because it was error to award attorney's fees to the bank's counsel in responding to the bankruptcy petition, and because the superior court did not properly calculate attorney's fees under Alaska Civil Rule 68, the case was remanded to recalculate attorney's fees. The superior court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Taylor v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage" on Justia Law

This case involved a three-way transfer of boat tie-up spaces in a recreational subdivision. The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in requiring the joinder of one of the people involved in the transfer as an indispensable party. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err because appropriate relief could not be afforded in the absence of the person in question. The Supreme Court also concluded that the case was properly dismissed because the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's order requiring joinder. View "Weilbacher v. Ring" on Justia Law

Two couples owned adjoining lots in Anchorage, located directly north and south of each other. Title to the southern lot originated from a federal land patent, which reserved a right-of-way across the northern boundary of the lot. A road ran through the right-of-way. The owners of this lot proposed to build a fence with a locked gate along the northern boundary of their lot. The fence would have impeded access to a cleared area on the northern neighbors' lot that the neighbors used for parking and storage. The northern neighbors obtained a permanent injunction preventing this limitation on access to the southern part of their lot. The southern neighbors appealed, arguing that the superior court denied them due process or, alternatively, erred in finding that their lot was subject to a public right-of-way. Because the superior court made no findings whether the federal land patent's right-of-way offer of a common law dedication was accepted, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the superior court to determine whether there has been acceptance of the offer of dedication. View "McCarrey v. Kaylor" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Oil and Gas Division (DNR), petitioned the Supreme Court for review of a superior court decision that under AS 38.05.035, the lack of continuing best interest findings (BIF) at each phase of an oil and gas project violated article VIII of the Alaska Constitution and that the DNR must issue a written best interest finding at each step of a phased project to satisfy the constitution. Because best interest findings after the lease sale phase are not required under the Alaska Constitution or AS 38.05.035, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's ruling. Furthermore, the Court held that the State was constitutionally required to consider the cumulative impacts of an oil and gas project at its later phases. View "Sullivan v. Resisting Environmental Destruction on Indigenous Lands" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a deed that was absolute on its face should have been reformed into a security agreement. Appellant Kelly Griffin owned property near Wasilla. Beginning in 2005, Appellee Michael Weber paid Griffin rent for use of a cabin on the property. One of Griffin's business creditors sued her for unpaid debts; Griffin also owed Weber for a series of small loans he made to her over the years. Griffin planned to refinance her property in order to pay off her debts, but when it became apparent she could not personally qualify for refinancing, she asked Weber to cosign the refinancing note. The refinancing bank conditioned its loan on the property being titled to both Griffin and Weber. Weber granted Griffin a power of attorney concerning the property thinking it might be useful expediting the refinancing. However, the bank opted not to refinance the property. The parties turned to a credit union who agreed to make the loan. Griffin subsequently signed a quitclaim deed of her property, granting it to both herself and Weber. Griffin used the proceeds of the loan to pay an existing loan on the property, her business debt and the debt she owed to Weber. In July 2010 Griffin sought to again refinance the property, this time with her fiancee, Ed Grube. The credit union approved, conditioned on Weber relinquishing his interest in the property. When Weber refused, Griffin signed a quitclaim deed conveying Weber’s interest to herself. The deed and an attachment to it indicated that Griffin was signing Weber’s name under the power of attorney granted in January 2009. The credit union refused to proceed with the new refinancing based on this deed. Weber filed a complaint against Griffin, claiming that Griffin’s act of signing the quitclaim deed under the January 2009 power of attorney was fraudulent, a breach of Griffin’s fiduciary duty and her duty of good faith and fair dealing, and a conversion. He sought compensatory and punitive damages, a declaration that the deed signed by Griffin was void, and partition of the property as a one-half owner. The superior court found that Griffin breached her fiduciary duty to Weber by using the power of attorney to sign the quitclaim deed of July 2010 for Weber and ruled that the deed was invalid. The court also found that there was not clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended the 2009 deed to be a security device rather than a conveyance under which they would equally share a one-half interest in the property. Griffin appealed, primarily arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to reform the deed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that reformation should have been granted because both parties to the transaction testified at trial that the deed was executed for security purposes. View "Griffin v. Weber" on Justia Law

Daniel and Luisa Burke owned a home in Anchorage. Nesavou Maka, Fungani Maka, and Alberta Maka were their next-door neighbors. A common driveway approximately 20 feet wide straddled the neighbors' properties. The Burkes wanted to build a fence down the middle of this driveway. However, a preexisting covenant to provide access granted the two lots’ owners reciprocal access to the common driveway. The Burkes filed suit to quiet title, seeking a declaratory judgment that the covenant was invalid and gave the Makas no legal right to use the Burkes’ portion of the driveway. The Makas asserted several affirmative defenses, including laches. Following a bench trial, the superior court found the Burkes used the driveway as shared; the Burkes were aware the Makas believed the driveway to be shared; and the Burkes caused the Makas prejudice by failing to object to the Makas’ visible use between 2004 and 2009. Based on those findings, the superior court ruled that laches barred the Burkes from challenging the covenant’s validity and dismissed the Burkes’ claims with prejudice. The Burkes appealed, arguing that the superior court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Because the superior court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and those facts supported the application of laches, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Burke v. Maka" on Justia Law

The center of this appeal before the Supreme Court involved a three-way transfer of boat tie-up spaces in a recreational subdivision. Specifically, the issue was whether the court erred in requiring the joinder of one of the people involved in the transfer as an indispensable party. The Court concluded that the court did not err because appropriate relief could not be afforded in the absence of the person in question. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the case was properly dismissed because the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's order requiring joinder. View "Weilbacher v. Ring" on Justia Law

Leisnoi, Inc. retained the law firm of Merdes & Merdes to represent it in litigation against Omar Stratman over its certification of and title to certain lands Leisnoi claimed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Leisnoi and Merdes entered a contingency fee agreement under which, if Leisnoi was successful, Merdes would receive an interest in the lands Leisnoi obtained or retained. The case was resolved in 1992 in favor of Leisnoi, although Stratman appealed and the related litigation continued for another decade. In October 2008, the Stratman litigation finally concluded in Leisnoi's favor. The following year, Merdes moved the superior court to issue a writ of execution. Leisnoi opposed the motion, arguing among other things that the judgment was void under 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s restrictions on contingency fee contracts involving Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands. In January 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Leisnoi's motion and granting Merdes's motion to execute. Six months later, Leisnoi paid Merdes the remaining balance. Leisnoi then appealed the superior court's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned questions of waiver and whether the superior court's judgment was void or voidable. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded: (1) Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment; (2) an Arbitration Panel's fee award and the superior court's 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act; (3) the superior court's 2010 order granting Merdes's motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act's prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts; (4) notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b) (the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)); and (5) Leisnoi was not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes was ordered to return Leisnoi's payment of the balance on the judgment, but Leisnoi was not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution. View "Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C." on Justia Law

In 1961, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a right-of-way grant to the Alaska Department of Public Works conveying a "road building material site" along the Denali Highway with no expiration date and no rental fee. After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was enacted in 1971, the United States conveyed the surface and subsurface estates encompassing the State's material site to Ahtna, Inc., an Alaska Regional Native Corporation. The conveyance was "subject to" the "[r]ights-of-way for Federal Aid material sites." ANCSA allowed the federal government to waive administration of the rights-of-way, which BLM did in 1984. The BLM waiver stated that the State was the grantee of the right-of-way at issue, and instead of providing an expiration date the waiver described the term of duration of the right-of-way as "[p]erpetual." The waiver entitled Ahtna to "any and all interests previously held by the United States as grantor," but the waiver explicitly stated there were no rental or other revenues associated with the right-of-way. The State removed material from the site until 1988, but the State did not use material from the site for the next 20 years. The State began using the site again in 2008. Ahtna demanded compensation for the removal of gravel from the material site and directed the State to cease and desist further entry onto Ahtna lands. The State responded that its right to remove the gravel pre-existed Ahtna's title interest. The State filed suit against Ahtna, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that the State had a valid interest in the material site right-of-way under the Federal-Aid Highway Act, and that Ahtna could not cancel the right-of-way for nonuse or abandonment so long as the State operated and maintained the Denali Highway. Ahtna appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the assumption that BLM's waiver transferred administrative authority to Ahtna, that authority did not include the right to cancel the State's interest in the material site for nonuse or abandonment without consent from the State. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Ahtna, Inc. v. Alaska Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities" on Justia Law

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), the agent for the owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), leases the TAPS right-of-way from the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (Department). Alyeska appealed the Department's 2002 appraisal of the TAPS lease price to Michael Menge, the Commissioner of the Department, and then to the superior court. Both affirmed the Department's appraisal. Alyeska appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) the Department misinterpreted AS 38.35.140(a); (2) the Department was required to adopt its interpretation of AS 38.35.140(a) as a regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (3) the appraisal improperly included submerged lands within the right-of-way when the Department failed to establish that the State holds title to those lands. Finding no misinterpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Alaska" on Justia Law