Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Thomas Price, Jr. posted "no trespassing" signs on his property in 1998 in an attempt to quell what he believed were an excessive number of snow machiners using a trail that crossed his land, damaging it, traveling at high speeds, and causing a great deal of noise. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that a group of snow machiners had established a public prescriptive easement over the trail but twice remanded the case to the superior court to define the scope of the easement. The superior court held additional hearings, and in 2007 issued a memorandum that defined the easement. Appellant appealed the court's definition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving that the volume of snow machine traffic exceeded the scope of the easement. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that found the easement includes non-snow machine users. The Court remanded the case again for further clarification on the permissible scope of the snow machine easement, including seasonal limits, width and speed limit. View "Price v. Eastham" on Justia Law

Gas producers that lease land from Alaska must pay royalties calculated on the value of the gas produced from the leased area. The royalty may be calculated in one of two methods: the “higher of” pricing or contract pricing. “Higher of” pricing is the default method of calculating royalties and is calculated using market data and the prices of other producers. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) usually does not calculate the royalty payments under “higher of” pricing until years after production. Under contract pricing, the lessee’s price at which it sells gas is used to determine the royalty payment. Appellant Marathon Oil requested contract pricing from 2008 onward and sought retroactive application of contract pricing for 2003-2008. The DNR approved contract pricing from 2008 onward but denied the retroactive application. The superior court affirmed the DNR’s decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Marathon argued that the statute that governs contract pricing permitted retroactive application of contract pricing. Upon review of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that though the statute was ambiguous, it would defer to the DNR’s interpretation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the DNR’s order. View "Marathon Oil Co. v. Dep't. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Appellant Frank Griswold appealed the Homer Advisory Planning Commission’s grant of a conditional-use permit to a mariculture association. The city clerk rejected his appeal for lack of standing because Appellant did not show that the permitted action would have an adverse effect on the use, enjoyment or value of his property. Appellant appealed that rejection to the superior court. The court affirmed the Planning Commission’s decision. Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. The Court found that the Homer City Code restricted standing in land use appeals and that the city clerk correctly rejected Appellant’s appeal. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the 2008 valuation of a parcel of real property owned by Appellant Martha Dunnagan. Larry Varilek, the personal representative of Ms. Dunnagan’s estate, argued that the Board of Equalization overvalued the property and appealed the Board’s decision. The superior court held that Mr. Varilek failed to prove that the property was overvalued. Mr. Varilek appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s assessment. The Court found that Mr. Varilek failed to meet his burden by showing that the Board’s valuation was improper. View "Varilek v. Burke" on Justia Law

In 1956, Appellants Harold and Ellen Cowan were deeded half of a tract of land that contained a "perpetual right of way running with the land" over a thirty-foot strip along its southeastern side. Between 1960 and 1973, Appellee Sharon Yeisley was deeded the other half that ran adjacent to the Cowan's land. The Yeisley deed made no mention of the right-of-way. Ms. Yeisley applied to subdivide her tract in 1980. The plat was approved and recorded. The new plat showed the right of way. In 2006, the Cowans filed suit against the Borough of Ketchikan, Sharon Yeisley and other parties seeking to quiet the title to the right of way. The Cowans argued that their 1956 deed conveyed it, or in the alternative, they acquired the strip by adverse possession. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. The superior court ruled that the 1956 deed did not convey the strip to the Cowans and that they had not adversely possessed it. The court applied the then-current adverse possession statute instead of the statute in effect when the Yeisley land was subdivided. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Cowans argued that the superior court erred in using the 2003 adverse possession statute. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the lower court should not have used the 2003 statute. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.