Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A woman died intestate survived by her husband and three adult children from a previous marriage. The husband had acquired a boat for a fishing charter business during his marriage to the decedent, but the boat and charter business were titled in his name alone. Relying on principles of equitable distribution for divorce cases, the estate's personal representative asked the court to include half the value of the boat and a skiff in the estate's property because marital funds had been used to purchase them. The court denied this request, and the estate's assets were distributed according to statute. The children appealed, contending their mother's estate held an undivided interest in the boats and business. Because the superior court correctly decided that the equitable distribution framework for divorce proceedings did not apply in probate proceedings, the Supreme Court affirmed its decision. View "Pestrikoff v. Hoff" on Justia Law

Richard Villars and Kathleen Villars were married in 1984, divorced in 2002. Richard served in the military for most of the marriage, first in the United States Air Force and later in the Alaska Air National Guard. Prior to filing their dissolution, the parties drafted a settlement agreement dividing their property such that each person was to receive half of the marital estate. The value of Richard’s military retirement benefits was not known at the time of dissolution because he had not yet qualified for benefits. However, Richard and Kathleen agreed to split the marital portion of Richard’s military retirement benefits 50/50 should Richard receive them. Richard began collecting his military retirement benefits in 2009 at the age of 48, twelve years earlier than he and Kathleen had expected at the time of dissolution. Kathleen asserted she was entitled to collect her marital portion of Richard’s military retirement benefits when Richard began collecting them. Richard disagreed, arguing that the parties intended Kathleen to collect only when Richard turned 60 years old. The superior court determined that the settlement agreement was unambiguous and the parties intended to divide equally the marital portion of Richard’s military retirement benefits when he began receiving them, not when he turned 60. The superior court ordered Richard to repay Kathleen 50% of the marital portion of the retirement benefits he had received to date. Richard appealed, arguing that the superior court’s finding on the parties’ intent was erroneous and that the retirement benefits were his separate property until he reached the age of 60. Richard further argued that the superior court impermissibly modified the settlement agreement. Because the findings of the superior court were not clearly erroneous and the superior court did not make an impermissible modification to the settlement agreement, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Villars v. Villars" on Justia Law

Andrew G. Horwath, Sr. died in 1991. His widow, Marjorie Horwath, later moved to Minnesota to live with their daughter, Mary Jaworski. A Minnesota court entered a conservatorship order for Marjorie, appointing Mary "Conservator of the Person" and Michael Horwath (Andrew and Marjorie's son and Mary's brother) "Conservator of the Estate." Marjorie died in 2001, and Michael died in 2007. Michael served for a time as personal representative of Andrew's estate and applied to do so for Marjorie's estate too, but was not formally appointed. Another Horwath daughter, Sue Streets, became the personal representative for the estates of Andrew, Marjorie, and Michael. In November 2008 Mary presented claims against all three estates, alleging that her then-deceased brother Michael had not always made a court-ordered monthly payment to her for their mother's care and that Michael had not reimbursed her for improvements she made to her house while caring for Marjorie. Mary also claimed Michael had improperly dissipated property and mismanaged both parents' estates. Sue issued a disallowance o f these claims in December 2008, asserting that the claims were unfounded and time-barred under both the non-claim statute and the applicable statutes of limitations. Mary petitioned for an extension of time to initiate proceedings on her disallowed claims. Sue opposed the motion, arguing that no extension could be allowed because all of Mary's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. The superior court denied Mary's extension petition on grounds that her claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. Mary unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration, The court did not respond to the motion for reconsideration, and Mary subsequently appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that although Mary's statement of issues on appeal asserted the superior court erred by denying her requested extension because she "exceeded the period under the statute of limitations," thereby causing a "forfeiture" of her claims, the legal arguments in Mary's opening brief did not address this issue. The issue before the superior court was neither the merits of Mary's claims nor the merits of personal representative Sue 's disallowance of Mary's claims for failure to comply with the non-claim statute. The issue before the court was Mary's requested extension of time to contest Sue's disallowance of Mary's claims. The court denied the extension because the applicable statutes of limitations already had run on all of Mary's claims. Having failed to argue the statute of limitations issues in the superior court or in her opening brief to the Supreme Court, Mary was deemed to have waived these issues. The superior court's decision was therefore affirmed. View "Jaworski v. Estates of Horwath" on Justia Law

An eastbound driver (Shawn Mickelsen) attempted to make an illegal left turn into a restaurant's exit driveway. The eastbound driver collided with an oncoming westbound driver, killing the westbound driver. The decedent's estate sued the restaurant for wrongful death, arguing that the restaurant was negligent in creating a dangerous condition on its land and failing to take steps to make the condition safe, for example, by warning eastbound drivers not to use the exit driveway in this manner. The superior court dismissed the complaint, holding that the restaurant had no duty to guard against risks created by the conduct of third parties. Because the complaint, read liberally, stated a cause of action, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the superior court and remanded for further proceedings: "[i]t may yet be proper for the superior court to dismiss Mickelsen's claim on summary judgment, or it may be that the case must go to trial. But Mickelsen's claim cannot be dismissed as a matter of law based on [the restaurant's] owing no duty of care to passing motorists allegedly endangered by the artificial conditions on [its] property." View "Estate of Shawn Martin Mickelsen v. North-Wend Foods, Inc." on Justia Law

Margery Kniffen, as Trustee for the Margery T. Kniffen Family Trust and Darrell Kniffen II, purchased an undeveloped tract in Fairbanks North Star Borough, planning to develop a subdivision. They also purchased a lot in Gold Country Estates, an existing subdivision adjacent to the undeveloped tract. The Kniffens sought a variance allowing them to construct a road across their Gold Country Estates lot to provide access to the planned subdivision. After hearing public testimony, the local Platting Board unanimously voted to deny the variance based on safety concerns. But after a subsequent site visit, the Board reconsidered the variance request and approved it. Gold Country Estates homeowners appealed to the Planning Commission, which upheld the Platting Board’s decision. The homeowners filed suit in superior court, arguing that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act and that the proposed road violated Gold Country Estates’ covenants. The superior court ruled that Gold Country Estates’ covenants did not allow a Gold Country lot to be used as access for the new subdivision. Though the Kniffens’ access proposal was defeated, Gold Country continued to pursue its due process and Open Meetings Act claims against the Borough. The superior court ultimately ruled in favor of the Borough on those claims. The homeowners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court erred by not finding that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Borough on the homeowners' Open Meetings Act and due process claims, as well as the superior court's order declining to award attorney’s fees. View "Gold Country Estates Preservation Group, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

After a minor collision between two vehicles in the drive-through line of a Taco Bell, Jack Morrell, the driver of one vehicle, stabbed and killed Eric Kalenka, the driver of the other vehicle. Morrell was uninsured and Kalenka’s policy provided coverage for liabilities arising out of the “ownership, maintenance, or use” of an uninsured motor vehicle. Kalenka’s automobile insurer filed an action in superior court, seeking a declaration that Kalenka’s policy did not provide coverage for Kalenka’s death. The superior court concluded that there was no general liability coverage under the policy. Appellant Uwe Kalenka, the personal representative of Eric Kalenka’s estate, appealed the denial of liability coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that Kalenka’s policy did not provide liability coverage. View "Kalenka v. Infinity Insurance Companies" on Justia Law

An elderly woman requiring long-term medical care gave $120,000 to her son in February 2007. The mother believed that the gift would not prevent her from receiving Medicaid coverage if she lived long enough to exhaust her remaining assets. She relied on a provision in Alaska's Medicaid eligibility manual that suggested prospective Medicaid beneficiaries could give away a portion of their assets while retaining sufficient assets to pay for their medical care during the period of ineligibility that Medicaid imposes as a penalty for such gifts. But by the time the mother applied for Medicaid in September 2008, the Alaska legislature had enacted legislation with the retroactive effect of preventing the kind of estate planning the mother had attempted through her gift. The State temporarily denied the mother's application. The son appealed pro se on behalf of his mother, who died in 2009. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Alaska legislature's retroactive change to the Medicaid eligibility rules was valid. The Court thus affirmed the State's temporary denial of the mother's application. View "Pfeifer v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Serv." on Justia Law

In 2002, the superior court appointed a professional conservator for a mother suffering from dementia. Her daughter, Appellant Evelyn Foster (who also served as special advocate), resisted the appointment. From 2002 onward, Appellant engaged in wide-ranging legal challenges to the conservator’s handling of her mother’s conservatorship. In response, the conservator incurred large legal fees, paid by the estate, in defending its actions. After the mother’s death, the superior court approved the conservator’s final accounting. The court recognized flaws in the conservator’s management of the mother’s property, including a breach of fiduciary duty. But based on a "prevailing party analysis," the court approved reimbursement from the mother’s property for the full attorney’s fees the conservator expended in defending itself. Because the Supreme Court concluded that certain of the superior court’s factual findings might be inconsistent, the Court remanded the case for the superior court to clarify its findings or make them consistent. And because it was error to evaluate attorney’s fees under the prevailing party standard, The Court remanded for reconsideration of attorney’s fees. In all other respects the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court. View "Foster v. Professional Guardian Services Corp." on Justia Law