Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When passing a 1997 ordinance, the Anchorage Municipal Assembly amended the boundaries of a proposed Downtown Improvement District to exclude some properties on K and L Streets. The building at 420 L Street, the property owned by appellant L Street Investments, was in the original proposal but was subsequently carved out by the Assembly. In 2000 the Assembly extended the life of the District for ten years. Beginning in 2009, the Anchorage Downtown Partnership canvassed businesses hoping to extend the term of the District and expand it to include businesses between I and L Street. After the majority of business owners in the proposed District approved the extension and expansion, the Assembly extended the term of the District and expanded it to include businesses between I and L Streets, including the building at 420 L Street. L Street Investments filed suit, arguing: (1) Section 9.02(a) of the Municipality of Anchorage's Charter did not authorize the Municipality to finance services within the District by an assessment; and (2) the District is a "service area," and AS 29.35.450(c) prohibits the expansion of a service area unless a majority of voters in the area to be added vote in favor of expanding the service area. The Anchorage Downtown Partnership intervened, and all parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the Municipality and the Anchorage Downtown Partnership. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "L Street Investments v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was the validity and interpretation of a roadway easement granted to meet a borough's subdivision plat-waiver requirements. The borough approved a nearby subdivision project contingent on upgrading the easement roadway. The owners of the servient estate first insisted that the developer maintain his roadway upgrade within the original easement. After the work was completed the owners sued the developer for trespass, alleging implicitly that the original easement grant was invalid because it was not properly executed and acknowledged, and asserting that there might be public prescriptive easement across their property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the developer on the validity of the easement, holding that any acknowledgment deficiencies were cured. The Supreme Court agreed with the landowners that the superior court misapplied the statute, but affirmed the grant of summary judgment on other grounds. View "Windel v. Mat-Su Title Insurance Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a three-way transfer of boat tie-up spaces in a recreational subdivision. The principal issue before the Supreme Court was whether the trial court erred in requiring the joinder of one of the people involved in the transfer as an indispensable party. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err because appropriate relief could not be afforded in the absence of the person in question. The Supreme Court also concluded that the case was properly dismissed because the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's order requiring joinder. View "Weilbacher v. Ring" on Justia Law

In 1961, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a right-of-way grant to the Alaska Department of Public Works conveying a "road building material site" along the Denali Highway with no expiration date and no rental fee. After the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) was enacted in 1971, the United States conveyed the surface and subsurface estates encompassing the State's material site to Ahtna, Inc., an Alaska Regional Native Corporation. The conveyance was "subject to" the "[r]ights-of-way for Federal Aid material sites." ANCSA allowed the federal government to waive administration of the rights-of-way, which BLM did in 1984. The BLM waiver stated that the State was the grantee of the right-of-way at issue, and instead of providing an expiration date the waiver described the term of duration of the right-of-way as "[p]erpetual." The waiver entitled Ahtna to "any and all interests previously held by the United States as grantor," but the waiver explicitly stated there were no rental or other revenues associated with the right-of-way. The State removed material from the site until 1988, but the State did not use material from the site for the next 20 years. The State began using the site again in 2008. Ahtna demanded compensation for the removal of gravel from the material site and directed the State to cease and desist further entry onto Ahtna lands. The State responded that its right to remove the gravel pre-existed Ahtna's title interest. The State filed suit against Ahtna, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The superior court granted summary judgment to the State, concluding that the State had a valid interest in the material site right-of-way under the Federal-Aid Highway Act, and that Ahtna could not cancel the right-of-way for nonuse or abandonment so long as the State operated and maintained the Denali Highway. Ahtna appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under the assumption that BLM's waiver transferred administrative authority to Ahtna, that authority did not include the right to cancel the State's interest in the material site for nonuse or abandonment without consent from the State. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to the State. View "Ahtna, Inc. v. Alaska Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sherman "Red" Smith built and operated a sawmill on 14 acres of land under a special-use permit from the U.S. Forest Service. He alleged that Alaska acquired title to the land and conveyed it to a third party without acknowledging his claim or compensating him for his improvements. The last disputed conveyance of the land took place in 1983. The superior court dismissed Petitioner's claim, finding it to be time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations. The superior court also ruled in favor of the State on two alternative grounds: first, concluding that sovereign immunity bars fraud actions against the State and second, determining that res judicata bars the relitigation of a claim the superior court previously dismissed in 2007. Petitioner appealed, arguing that statutes of limitations cannot bar claims brought for the vindication of constitutional rights. Because statutes of limitations do apply to constitutional claims, and because Petitioner did not allege harm amounting to a continuing violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Petitioner's claim as time-barred. The Court also affirmed the superior court's alternative finding that the 2007 dismissal of Petitioner's previous claim bars his current action. View "Smith v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Citizens sought a ballot initiative to eliminate the special regulations that govern real property transactions in a local economic development area. After the municipal clerk twice denied their petition for a ballot initiative, the sponsors sued for an order placing the initiative on the ballot. Finding the petition to be both contrary to existing law and misleading, the superior court upheld the municipal clerk's denial. The sponsors appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the petition is neither contrary to existing law nor misleading, it reversed. View "Sitkans for Responsible Government v. City & Borough of Sitka" on Justia Law

Margery Kniffen, as Trustee for the Margery T. Kniffen Family Trust and Darrell Kniffen II, purchased an undeveloped tract in Fairbanks North Star Borough, planning to develop a subdivision. They also purchased a lot in Gold Country Estates, an existing subdivision adjacent to the undeveloped tract. The Kniffens sought a variance allowing them to construct a road across their Gold Country Estates lot to provide access to the planned subdivision. After hearing public testimony, the local Platting Board unanimously voted to deny the variance based on safety concerns. But after a subsequent site visit, the Board reconsidered the variance request and approved it. Gold Country Estates homeowners appealed to the Planning Commission, which upheld the Platting Board’s decision. The homeowners filed suit in superior court, arguing that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act and that the proposed road violated Gold Country Estates’ covenants. The superior court ruled that Gold Country Estates’ covenants did not allow a Gold Country lot to be used as access for the new subdivision. Though the Kniffens’ access proposal was defeated, Gold Country continued to pursue its due process and Open Meetings Act claims against the Borough. The superior court ultimately ruled in favor of the Borough on those claims. The homeowners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court erred by not finding that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Borough on the homeowners' Open Meetings Act and due process claims, as well as the superior court's order declining to award attorney’s fees. View "Gold Country Estates Preservation Group, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

Thirty seven years ago, two business partners bought a 160-acre property bordering the Kenai River which they subdivided into 114 lots (Holiday Park Subdivision). The partners reserved an easement across Lot 30 for the benefit of all Holiday Park owners, but disagreements arose over the permissible uses and geographic boundaries of the easement. In 2004, the owner of Lot 30 sold it to Kenai River Airpark, LLC. One of the developers of Holiday Park sued Kenai River Airpark and the Airpark Owners Association to prevent their use of Lot 30. The superior court ruled that members of the Airpark Owners Association could use Lot 30 as long as they did not interfere with Holiday Park owners’ use of the easement. The superior court also ruled that the easement’s scope was limited to a defined path shown on the Holiday Park plat, but that permissible uses of the easement included boat launching, bank fishing, and river access. The Holiday Park developer appealed. Because Holiday Park’s plat unambiguously described the easement’s scope as “30' BOAT LAUNCH ESM’T,” the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s ruling permitting more expansive use. However, the Court affirmed the superior court’s order regarding the geographic bounds of the easement; the original developer did not establish an expanded easement by prescription, implication, inquiry notice, or estoppel. View "HP Limited Partnership v. Kenai River Airpark, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Price, Jr. posted "no trespassing" signs on his property in 1998 in an attempt to quell what he believed were an excessive number of snow machiners using a trail that crossed his land, damaging it, traveling at high speeds, and causing a great deal of noise. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that a group of snow machiners had established a public prescriptive easement over the trail but twice remanded the case to the superior court to define the scope of the easement. The superior court held additional hearings, and in 2007 issued a memorandum that defined the easement. Appellant appealed the court's definition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving that the volume of snow machine traffic exceeded the scope of the easement. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that found the easement includes non-snow machine users. The Court remanded the case again for further clarification on the permissible scope of the snow machine easement, including seasonal limits, width and speed limit. View "Price v. Eastham" on Justia Law

Appellant Frank Griswold appealed the Homer Advisory Planning Commission’s grant of a conditional-use permit to a mariculture association. The city clerk rejected his appeal for lack of standing because Appellant did not show that the permitted action would have an adverse effect on the use, enjoyment or value of his property. Appellant appealed that rejection to the superior court. The court affirmed the Planning Commission’s decision. Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. The Court found that the Homer City Code restricted standing in land use appeals and that the city clerk correctly rejected Appellant’s appeal. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law