Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Doe A and John Doe B were convicted of criminal offenses that required them to register and comply with Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA). Following their convictions, the legislature amended ASORA, requiring certain offenders, including both Does, to comply with additional registration requirements. The Does sued, claiming that retroactive application of ASORA’s amendments to them violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Alaska Constitution. The superior court agreed, and the State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the amended ASORA could not be applied retroactively: in 2008, in a two-to-one decision, the Court held that ASORA’s amendments violated the Ex Post Facto Clause and did not apply to persons who committed their crimes before the amendments became effective. Two years later the Court promulgated Alaska Appellate Rule 106, which provided that any issue decided by a two-to-one vote would not have precedential effect. When the Court promulgated Appellate Rule 106 it was silent on the question whether that rule might have retroactive effect. By the Court's opinion in this case, that earlier two-to-one decision is now binding precedent that controlled the outcome of this case because Appellate Rule 106 does not have retroactive application. View "Alaska v. Doe" on Justia Law

Daniel and Luisa Burke owned a home in Anchorage. Nesavou Maka, Fungani Maka, and Alberta Maka were their next-door neighbors. A common driveway approximately 20 feet wide straddled the neighbors' properties. The Burkes wanted to build a fence down the middle of this driveway. However, a preexisting covenant to provide access granted the two lots’ owners reciprocal access to the common driveway. The Burkes filed suit to quiet title, seeking a declaratory judgment that the covenant was invalid and gave the Makas no legal right to use the Burkes’ portion of the driveway. The Makas asserted several affirmative defenses, including laches. Following a bench trial, the superior court found the Burkes used the driveway as shared; the Burkes were aware the Makas believed the driveway to be shared; and the Burkes caused the Makas prejudice by failing to object to the Makas’ visible use between 2004 and 2009. Based on those findings, the superior court ruled that laches barred the Burkes from challenging the covenant’s validity and dismissed the Burkes’ claims with prejudice. The Burkes appealed, arguing that the superior court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Because the superior court’s findings were not clearly erroneous and those facts supported the application of laches, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Burke v. Maka" on Justia Law

The center of this appeal before the Supreme Court involved a three-way transfer of boat tie-up spaces in a recreational subdivision. Specifically, the issue was whether the court erred in requiring the joinder of one of the people involved in the transfer as an indispensable party. The Court concluded that the court did not err because appropriate relief could not be afforded in the absence of the person in question. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the case was properly dismissed because the plaintiff refused to comply with the court's order requiring joinder. View "Weilbacher v. Ring" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary Hill, the owner of an assisted living home, sought damages from Appellees Linda Giani (an independent care coordinator), the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) and Staci Collier (a state licensing specialist) for alleged economic harm caused by a Report of Harm filed by Giani, which resulted in the removal of one of Hill's residents and a subsequent investigation conducted by Collier. The superior court granted summary judgment: to DHSS and Collier on Hill's state law tort claims on the basis of immunity; to Collier on Hill's 42 U.S.C. 1983 due process claim because Hill failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Collier's actions deprived her of a constitutional right; and to Giani on the basis of immunity and common law privilege. Hill appealed. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's grants of summary judgment to DHSS and Collier based on statutory immunity and to Collier on Hill's 1983 claim. Because the Court found that Hill raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Giani acted in good faith when she filed her Report of Harm, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Giani and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hill v. Giani" on Justia Law

While receiving workers' compensation benefits for an injury, an employee periodically endorsed benefit checks that included a certification that she had "not worked in any employment or self-employment gainful or otherwise." Her employer obtained surveillance videos of her activities at an herb store owned by her boyfriend and filed a petition with the Workers' Compensation Board alleging that she had fraudulently misrepresented her employment status for the purpose of obtaining benefits. The Board denied the petition, finding credible the employee's testimony that she did not consider her activities to be work that needed to be reported. On appeal, the Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission concluded that the Board erred in determining that the employee had not "knowingly" misrepresented her work status, but it affirmed the Board's denial of the petition on the alternative ground that the employer had not shown the requisite causal link between the allegedly fraudulent check endorsements and the payment of benefits. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Commission erred in its interpretation of the "knowingly" element of the test for fraud. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the Commission's decision because, based on the Board's binding credibility determination, the employee's statements were not knowingly false and therefore not fraudulent. View "ARCTEC Services v. Cummings" on Justia Law

A medical service provider filed but failed to serve a complaint against a former patient and her insurer. The superior court dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of service. Nearly a year later, the medical service provider filed a second complaint against the same parties. The superior court granted summary judgment dismissing that complaint, ruling that the medical service provider's claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that Alaska's savings statute (AS 09.10.240) did not apply because of failure to provide timely notice of the initial complaint. The medical service provider appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that AS 09.10.240 does not require timely notice of the initial complaint. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's order granting summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "American Marine Corporation v. Sholin" on Justia Law

Jason Coday shot and killed Simone Kim with a rifle obtained from Ray Coxe’s gun store. Kim’s Estate brought a wrongful death action against Coxe, alleging that Coxe negligently or illegally provided Coday the rifle. Coxe defended in part by asserting immunity under the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA). The Estate argued against applying the PLCAA and alternatively that it was unconstitutional. The superior court ruled that the PLCAA was constitutional and, interpreting and applying the PLCAA’s immunity provisions to the facts of this case, granted summary judgment dismissing the Estate’s claims against Coxe. The Estate appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s ruling that the PLCAA was constitutional and its interpretation of the PLCAA, but because it was unclear whether certain evidence before the superior court actually was or should have been considered when granting summary judgment dismissing the Estate’s claims, the Court vacated the summary judgment ruling and remanded the case for further consideration. View "Estate of Simone Young Kim v. Coxe" on Justia Law

Appellant Fredrick Williams appealed the superior court's decision affirming the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's ruling that a house was not exempt from Ketchikan Gateway Borough taxation. In 2002 Williams received a grant to rebuild his house from the Bureau of Indian Affairs Housing Improvement Program. Because Williams has owned the home for ten years, the repayment amount annually decreased by ten percent of the original amount, resulting in no repayment for a transfer occurring 20 years or more after Williams received the grant. Williams executed a deed of trust securing the federal government's right to repayment under the grant. Williams claimed that under the grant and the deed of trust, "[t]he federal government own[ed] . . . the $115,000 it took to build the home," and that Williams was therefore exempt from paying property taxes on it. On appeal, the superior court rejected this argument, upholding the Ketchikan Gateway Borough's view that the deed of trust securing the grant did not divest Williams of the ownership interest in his real property. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court's conclusion and affirmed and adopted its decision. View "Williams v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

Appellant Simone Greenway sued Appellee Larry Heathcott alleging among other things, identity theft and breach of domestic partnership and fiduciary duties. After a bench trial at which both parties were pro se, the superior court denied Appellant's claims. She argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying her a continuance so a particular lawyer could represent her when he became available, so she could compose her case, and so she could obtain testimony from a witness whose subpoena was quashed. She also argued that the court failed to help her sufficiently and failed to explain she could call the witnesses telephonically after it rejected her witness affidavits. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion as to these issues. She also asserted that the trial judge was biased, or appeared to be biased, against her. The audio recording of the trial refuted those assertions and demonstrated that the trial judge was impartial, patient, and courteous in dealing with Greenway and in trying to obtain understandable evidence from her. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Greenway v. Heathcott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court issued an order remanding a proposed redistricting plan to the redistricting board with instructions to formulate a new plan in compliance with state case law. Upon remand, the board was instructed to follow a certain process so that the Court could appropriately judge whether its violations of the Alaska Constitution were absolutely necessary for compliance with federal law. The board then submitted a modified plan to the superior court that changed four of forty house districts from the original plan. The amended plan was rejected by the superior court because the board failed to follow the process mandated by the Supreme Court. The board petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the superior court's conclusion on the amended plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the board again failed to follow the process the Court ordered on remand, and affirmed the decision of the superior court and required the board to draft a new plan for the 2014 elections. View "In Re 2011 Redistricting Cases" on Justia Law