Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Judith R. challenged the superior court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, "Dexter." The court terminated her rights based on her longstanding, unremedied mental illness. In its ruling on the record, the court sua sponte, directed the parties to consult with Dexter's therapist about the advisability of allowing continued contact between Judith and Dexter following termination of Judith's parental rights, but the court's written order made no mention of post-termination contact. On appeal, Judith challenged the superior court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in Dexter's best interests and the court's failure to issue a "detailed order regarding post-termination visitation." Because the court's best interests finding was supported by substantial evidence and because the court was not required to address post-termination contact in its termination order, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Judith R. v. Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

In 1999, the Alaska Board of Fisheries (the Board) made a use finding in the Chitina subdistrict for the first time, changing it from a "personal use" to a "subsistence" fishery. The Board reversed this decision in 2003, returning Chitina to a personal use fishery. The Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund (AFWCF) and the Chitina Dipnetters Association, Inc., after asking the Board to reconsider its 2003 finding in both 2005 and 2008, brought this suit to challenge the Board's negative customary and traditional use finding for Chitina. They claimed that the regulation used by the Board to make such a finding was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The superior court held that the regulation was valid and constitutional, but remanded for the Board to fully articulate the standard being used in its application of the regulation. It also instructed the Board not to consider "the per capita consumption of wild food in the home community of various users" upon remand. On remand, the Board codified a definition of "subsistence way of life," allowed the parties to submit evidence, and upheld its previous classification. Because 5 AAC 99.010(b) was consistent with its authorizing statutes, was reasonable and not arbitrary, did not violate the Alaska Constitution's equal access provisions, and was constitutionally applied when the Board made its customary and traditional use finding for the Chitina fishery in 2003, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the superior court's rulings. Because there was no indication that the Board actually relied on the per capita consumption of wild foods in the users' home communities when applying 5 AAC 99.010(b) and because that information could have been relevant to the subsistence inquiry, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the superior court's ruling. View "Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Five disabled Alaskans sued their former representative payee. At the conclusion of trial, the superior court awarded both compensatory and punitive damages to the plaintiffs; it also entered injunctive relief against the representative payee as to both parties and non-parties. But it declined to enter other injunctive relief as to non-parties. Three of the plaintiffs appealed. They argued that the superior court failed to understand that non-party injunctive relief was available under Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. Because the superior court actually entered non-party injunctive relief, the Supreme Court after its review of the case disagreed with the plaintiffs' characterization of the superior court proceedings and affirmed the superior court in all respects. View "Osbakken v. Whittington" on Justia Law

A worker at a fish processing plant was injured while on the job. His employer asserted that it did not maintain workers' compensation and that it was immune from suit, so the worker filed a negligence action in state court seeking reimbursement for medical expenses, compensation for lost wages, and attorney's fees. The superior court granted the employer's motion to dismiss on immunity grounds. Because the employer, an international organization, enjoys absolute immunity from suit and it did not waived this immunity, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Price v. Unisea, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2008, Michael Cooper was involved in a car accident that injured Samuel Thompson. Thompson sued Cooper and Cooper's employer for damages. The jury returned a verdict for Thompson for compensatory damages but not punitive. The parties appealed the trial court's rulings on certain evidentiary issues, jury instructions and denied motions. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed most of the trial court's rulings but reversed: (1) exclusion of Thompson's treating physicians' opinion testimony on causation; and (2) denial of a jury instruction on additional harm. View "Thompson v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Victoria ("Vicky") Cox and John Floreske were married in July 1981. They separated in September 2007 and divorced in June 2009. During their marriage, Vicky and John amassed a highly illiquid marital estate including three businesses and two subdivisions. After a bench trial each party was awarded a mutual right of first refusal on all properties awarded to the other party. This right was personal to the parties and would not survive them. Vicky appealed the superior court’s denial of her motion for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60(b)(4) and (5) arguing that: (1) the mutual right of first refusal is void under Civil Rule 60(b)(4); and (2) the superior court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to vacate the mutual right of first refusal under Civil Rule 60(b)(5). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was an abuse of discretion to deny the motion to vacate the mutual right of first refusal under Civil Rule 60(b)(5). View "Cox v. Floreske" on Justia Law

Alyeska Pipeline Service Company (Alyeska), the agent for the owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS), leases the TAPS right-of-way from the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (Department). Alyeska appealed the Department's 2002 appraisal of the TAPS lease price to Michael Menge, the Commissioner of the Department, and then to the superior court. Both affirmed the Department's appraisal. Alyeska appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing: (1) the Department misinterpreted AS 38.35.140(a); (2) the Department was required to adopt its interpretation of AS 38.35.140(a) as a regulation under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (3) the appraisal improperly included submerged lands within the right-of-way when the Department failed to establish that the State holds title to those lands. Finding no misinterpretation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The Department of Natural Resources restricted the non-winter use of large vehicles on the Rex Trail. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether these restrictions were within the Department's authority. Because the Department has broad authority to manage public lands in general and specific authority to manage rights-of-way such as the Rex Trail, and the restrictions did not violate any statutory limitations on this authority, the Supreme Court concluded that they were authorized. View "Caywood v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Helen S. K. and Samuel M. K. were married in 1990. Helen filed for divorce in December 2010, requesting sole legal and primary physical custody of the parties' three minor children and equitable division of the marital assets. Samuel counterclaimed, requesting joint legal and shared physical custody of the children. The superior court awarded joint legal custody of all three children, shared physical custody of the parties' two younger children, but awarded Samuel primary physical custody of the parties' oldest child. The court imputed income to Helen and required that she pay Samuel child support. The court divided the parties' marital assets equally and made other decisions concerning the valuation and distribution of certain marital assets. Helen appealed this decision on several grounds, including the use of in camera interviews, the primary physical custody award to Samuel, the imputation of income, the equal property division, and the valuation and distribution of many of the assets. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with respect to the court's valuation of one asset, but affirmed all of its other decisions. View "Helen S. K. v. Samuel M. K." on Justia Law

Siegfried Pedersen was convicted of assault and weapons misconduct. He brought a civil suit against the victims of those crimes, Daniel Blythe and Bobbie Luxford, alleging defamation and trespass. The superior court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on grounds of collateral estoppel. Pedersen appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred when, in deciding the motion to dismiss, it considered matters outside the pleadings without advising Pedersen of its intent to do so and giving him a reasonable opportunity to respond. The Court held that this error was harmless with regard to Pedersen's defamation claims. The Court also held that it was plain error for the superior court to dismiss Pedersen's trespass claims, claims to which collateral estoppel did not apply. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment on the defamation claims and reversed and remanded on the trespass claims. View "Pedersen v. Blythe" on Justia Law