Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The passenger of a car was injured in a two-car accident. The passenger brought suit against the other car's driver; the passenger's requested recovery included her insurer's subrogation claim for medical expenses. The driver made an early offer of judgment, which the passenger rejected. The driver then paid the subrogation claim, thereby removing it from the passenger's expected recovery. The driver then made a second offer of judgment, which the passenger rejected, and the case proceeded to trial. After trial the jury awarded the passenger damages and both parties claimed prevailing party status; the driver sought attorney's fees under Alaska Civil Rule 68. The superior court ruled the first offer of judgment did not entitle the driver to Rule 68 fees, but the second offer did. Both parties appealed, arguing the superior court improperly considered the subrogation claim in its Rule 68 rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the subrogation payment had to be taken into account when evaluating the first offer of judgment, but not the second. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's rulings. View "Dearlove v. Campbell" on Justia Law

This appeal presented the question of whether the Alaska State Commission for Human Rights (the Commission) must interview one or more witnesses identified by a complainant before dismissing a complaint for lack of substantial evidence to support a discrimination claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory duty to impartially investigate implied that the Commission must make a reasonable effort to interview at least some of the witnesses identified by a complainant where it appears that they may have relevant information. The Court also concluded that this duty was not satisfied under the facts of this case because the Commission did not interview any of the witnesses identified by the complainant even though they potentially had relevant information. View "Toliver v. Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights" on Justia Law

A worker suffered an above-the-knee amputation of his right leg in a work-related accident in 2003. The accident happened when he used his foot to push a bale of mulch that he was feeding into a machine; his leg was caught in the machine and later had to be amputated. He received workers’ compensation benefits for the injury and later sued the manufacturer and the owner of the machine under various tort theories. After trial a jury found that the manufacturer was not negligent and the product was not defective. It also found that the company that owned the machine at the time of the accident was negligent, but that its negligence was not a legal cause of the accident. After finding that the worker and his employer were negligent and that their negligence was a cause of the accident, the jury apportioned fault for the injury between them. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erroneously admitted evidence of the worker's receipt of workers' compensation and social security benefits and his past drug use, the Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Jones v. Bowie Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

A limited partnership based in New York that invests in the claims of unsecured creditors sent a letter to an Alaska corporation offering to purchase one such claim for about one-third of its face value. The letter was addressed to the credit manager and was sent to the corporate offices. Upon receiving the envelope, the Alaska corporation forwarded it unopened to the manager of its accounts receivable department in Georgia. The manager executed the enclosed assignment agreement and returned it back to the limited partnership, which then sent a check in payment for the claim. The Alaska corporation eventually filed suit in superior court to have the agreement set aside. The superior court declined to do so. Because the Supreme Court concluded that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether the manager of the accounts receivable department had apparent authority to execute the agreement as a matter of law, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Airline Support, Inc. v. ASM Capital II, L.P." on Justia Law

Appellants Richard and Durena Tracy appeal the superior court’s dismissal of their state law negligence and federal constitutional claims against the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS). This case arose from Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceedings to protect their granddaughter, Annie. The Tracys also appealed the superior court’s denial of summary judgment in their favor and its award of attorney’s fees against them. The Tracys are the biological grandparents of "Annie" and now her adoptive parents. When Annie was five, a kindergarten teacher erroneously suspected Annie had been victim to sexual abuse by Richard. OCS investigated the allegation, all the while Richard was not permitted contact with Annie until the investigation was complete. When the allegations were deemed groundless by an OCS expert, Richard and Durena sued OCS for damages stemming from the fees and expenses they incurred defending themselves from the OCS investigation. Ultimately the Tracys lost that battle, and the district court granted OCS's request for attorney fees. Affirming the superior court's dismissal of the Tracys' claims, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorneys' fees against the Tracys. The Court found that because there was no bad faith nor asserted with improper motive, the superior court should not have given OCS an award of fees. View "Tracy v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Eight days after relinquishing her parental rights to twin children, their mother filed a motion requesting that the superior court order the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS) to release the children's annual Permanent Fund Dividends (dividends) to her. The superior court granted the motion. The guardian ad litem (GAL) and OCS opposed her motion. The superior court ordered OCS to provide proof of compliance with 15 AAC 23.223(i). OCS filed copies of the address change forms and an affidavit of the OCS employee who completed the forms stating OCS had complied with the Department's regulation. The superior court concluded OCS's filing did not comply with the regulation's "evidence of the change in legal custody" requirement and ordered OCS to release the dividends to the mother. The GAL sought reconsideration, which the superior court denied. The Supreme Court granted the GAL's petition for review. OCS and the GAL argued that the fact the Department paid the dividends to OCS suggests the Department itself thought the change of address forms were sufficient to comply with 15 AAC 23.223(i) and the superior court should have deferred to the Department's determination. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed: the superior court (and all of the parties in the superior court proceeding) knew of OCS's custody of the children because the superior court itself signed the custody order. "There was and could be no dispute that OCS actually was entitled to redirect and hold the children's dividends, regardless of the information provided to the Department." The Court reversed the superior court's decision. View "Tea, Guardian Ad Litem, on Behalf of A.T. and S.T." on Justia Law

Purchasers of a lot in a newly formed airpark subdivision prepared and properly executed an easement agreement granting them access to the subdivision's aviation facilities. The purchasers later claimed the easement agreement gave them a priority right to use the subdivision's common areas, distinct from use rights granted to other lot owners. The subdivision's homeowner's association disputed that claim. The superior court ruled that the easement agreement did not grant the purchasers the right to exclude other lot owners from common areas. The court also issued a variety of orders on related issues, declaring the subdivision a common interest community and quieting title to its common use areas as superior to the easement agreement. The court awarded attorney's fees against the purchasers. One of the purchasers appealed but subsequent events rendered all issues except the attorney's fees decision moot. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that the easement agreement did not grant priority rights to the purchasers, the Court affirmed the superior court's award of attorney's fees against the purchasers. View "Schweitzer v. Salamatof Air Park Subdivision Owners, Inc." on Justia Law

"Jade" is the biological daughter of Roy and Sheila. Jade is an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Between 1998 and 2007, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) received at least 12 reports of drug abuse and child neglect in the family. Before Jade's birth in September 2004, the couple's older children were transferred to OCS custody for two years. Roy and Sheila attempted to complete drug treatment programs but were unsuccessful. Sheila relapsed while pregnant with Jade; her discharge report from the treatment program indicated she tested positive for cocaine in August 2005 and stopped attending treatment sessions or contacting drug counselors in October 2005. Roy was discharged for positive drug tests and missing treatment. Since being taken into OCS custody in July 2008, Jade has lived in five separate placements. In its termination order, the superior court found that termination of parental rights was in Jade's best interests and that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Roy contested three of the superior court's findings: that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family; that termination was in Jade's best interests; and that good cause existed to deviate from the ICWA placement preferences. Sheila did not appeal the superior court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record supported the superior court's conclusions with regard to OCS's efforts to keep the family together, and that it was in Jade's best interests to terminate Roy's parental rights. View "Roy S. v. Alaksa" on Justia Law

Petitioner Izaz Khan was indicted on one count of perjury based on four allegedly false statements made in a financial affidavit. At trial, the court instructed the jury, without objection from Petitioner, that they did not need to be unanimous regarding which statements were false. The jury convicted Petitioner. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that even assuming the instruction was erroneous, the error would not rise to the level of plain error. The court of appeals reasoned that any error was not prejudicial because Petitioner had presented a single defense that applied to all four statements. Petitioner filed a petition for hearing, which the Supreme Court granted on the following questions: "(1) whether a unanimous jury verdict is a right under the Alaska Constitution, and (2) if so, the appropriate plain error analysis for reviewing the effect of a contrary jury instruction given without any objection by the defendant." The parties disagreed about the proper plain error analysis for constitutional errors. Last year, in a case decided after the Court granted this petition, it clarified its constitutional plain error analysis in "Adams v. Alaska." Petitioner argued that the Court should depart from "Adam"s to adopt the analysis of the Supreme Court of Hawai'i in "Nichols v. Hawai'i" in analyzing erroneous jury instructions. The State argued that the Court should have departed from "Adams" and adopt the federal plain error standard from the United States Supreme Court's decision in "United States v. Olano." The Alaska Supreme Court declined both parties' invitations to reconsider "Adams," and reaffirmed its decision in that case. Because the court of appeals did not apply the correct standard for constitutional plain error, the Court remanded this case for a determination whether, if the challenged jury instruction was erroneous, reversal was required under the proper plain error analysis. View "Khan v. Alaska" on Justia Law

M.K. is a 34-year-old mentally ill Alaska Native woman who lived in a rural village. In 1999, when M.K. was 22, her father A.K. sexually assaulted her. M.K. reported the crime to police, but soon changed her story and A.K. was not tried at that time. A.K. continued to live with the family for four years until advances in DNA evidence led to his case being reopened, and to A.K. being charged and convicted in 2003 of the sexual assault. M.K.'s mother remained married to A.K., who has since been released from prison and was on probation and prohibited from living with M.K. M.K.'s mother had no plans to divorce A.K., and testified that she is not sure whether A.K. will return to live with the family when his probation ends. The Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) petitioned for guardianship of M.K. in July 2008 based on M.K.'s mental illness and her inability to manage her own care. The court visitor completed a report, and a hearing was held over several days, following which the superior court appointed the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) as M.K.'s full guardian. M.K. objected to this decision. The superior court treated her written objection as an implicit motion for reconsideration and denied it. M.K. appealed, arguing that the superior court erred in its application of the guardianship statutes in her case, in its best interest finding that OPA should be appointed in place of M.K.'s mother, and in appointing OPA as a full (as opposed to partial) guardian. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "In Re Protective Proceedings of M.K." on Justia Law