Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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In 1995, Alaska Interstate Construction's assets were sold to a joint venture but it continued to be operated by its founder, John Ellsworth, through a company he owned called Pacific Diversified Investments, Inc. In 1998, Alaska Interstate conveyed a 20% ownership interest to Ellsworth and entered into an operating agreement that provided for Ellsworth's continued management of its operations through Pacific Diversified Investments. Alaska Interstate filed suit against Pacific and Ellsworth in 2005, principally alleging fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act, breach of the parties' operating agreement, and conversion. The jury returned a verdict of $7.3 million in favor of Alaska Interstate on its Unfair Trade Practices Act claims and $7.3 million on its claims for common law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. The parties filed many post-trial motions. Though the jury decided that Pacific Diversified Investments and Ellsworth engaged in conduct that was fraudulent, it decided that they did not materially breach the parties' operating agreement. Alaska Interstate filed a post-verdict motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing the jury's finding of fraud required the finding that the operating agreement was materially breached. That motion was denied. But the superior court did enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict nullifying the $7.3 million award for violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. Alaska Interstate Construction appealed; Pacific cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's denial of the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict which found that the Unfair Trade Practices Act did not apply to intra-corporate disputes. The Court reversed the superior court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Pacific's argument that Alaska Interstate's claims were exempt from the Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Court reversed the superior court's ruling on material breach and held that the jury's findings of fraud and wilful misconduct, under the circumstances of this case, required the finding that Pacific materially breached the operating agreement as a matter of law. The Court reversed the superior court's order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Pacific's fraud in the inducement claim, and we vacated the superior court's determination of prevailing party, award of attorney's fees, and award of prejudgment interest. View "Alaska Interstate Construction, LLC v. Pacific Diversified Investments, Inc." on Justia Law

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Margery Kniffen, as Trustee for the Margery T. Kniffen Family Trust and Darrell Kniffen II, purchased an undeveloped tract in Fairbanks North Star Borough, planning to develop a subdivision. They also purchased a lot in Gold Country Estates, an existing subdivision adjacent to the undeveloped tract. The Kniffens sought a variance allowing them to construct a road across their Gold Country Estates lot to provide access to the planned subdivision. After hearing public testimony, the local Platting Board unanimously voted to deny the variance based on safety concerns. But after a subsequent site visit, the Board reconsidered the variance request and approved it. Gold Country Estates homeowners appealed to the Planning Commission, which upheld the Platting Board’s decision. The homeowners filed suit in superior court, arguing that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act and that the proposed road violated Gold Country Estates’ covenants. The superior court ruled that Gold Country Estates’ covenants did not allow a Gold Country lot to be used as access for the new subdivision. Though the Kniffens’ access proposal was defeated, Gold Country continued to pursue its due process and Open Meetings Act claims against the Borough. The superior court ultimately ruled in favor of the Borough on those claims. The homeowners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court erred by not finding that the Platting Board denied them due process and violated the Open Meetings Act. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Borough on the homeowners' Open Meetings Act and due process claims, as well as the superior court's order declining to award attorney’s fees. View "Gold Country Estates Preservation Group, Inc. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

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Appellant Chana Boyko was a teacher who resigned in lieu of termination from the Anchorage School District after violating a "last chance agreement." She alleged the School District breached a resignation agreement in which it promised not to release negative information about her to prospective employers. Appellant sued, claiming that she was terminated as a result of disability discrimination and that the School District's comments made in violation of the resignation agreement breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and interfered with her prospective contractual relations. The superior court granted the School District summary judgment on all claims, concluding that the District had nondiscriminatory reasons for termination and that its comments were protected by statutory immunity. Appellant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claims of statutory immunity, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and interference with prospective contractual relations, because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding these claims. The Court affirmed summary judgment on the discrimination claim. View "Boyko v. Anchorage School District" on Justia Law

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Appellee Wayne Manning told Appellant Diane Roberson he would give her his share of their jointly purchased mobile home. Without her knowledge, he then transferred title of the mobile home to his name only and sold it to co-Appellee Dennis Wilson. Wilson attempted to terminate Roberson's tenancy in the mobile home. Roberson filed suit in the superior court to be declared the owner of the home. The court concluded that Manning did not give his share of the home to Roberson and that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser and therefore the owner. Roberson appealed, arguing that she is the owner because Manning's gift to her was valid and the sale to Wilson was invalid. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the superior court's conclusion that Manning did not give Roberson the home. The Court also vacated the superior court's determination that Wilson was a good-faith purchaser. The case was remanded for additional findings. View "Roberson v. Manning" on Justia Law

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Appellant Tom Oels was a sergeant with the Anchorage Police Department (APD) since 2002. In 2005, he stated his intent to retire and be rehired while retaining the rank of sergeant. Appellant was told that under AMC 03.30.068(A)(4) he could retire, but could only be rehired as an entry-level patrol officer, not as a sergeant. Appellant filed a complaint with the Employee Relations Board (the Board) alleging: (1) that MOA and the Anchorage Police Department Employees Association (APDEA) had violated AMC 03.30.068(A)(4) by requiring that sergeants be rehired as patrol officers, and (2) that APDEA had breached its duty of fair representation. The Board heard the matter and decided against Appellant on both counts. Appellant appealed the ruling to the superior court which, sitting as an intermediate appellate court, affirmed the Board’s decision. The superior court held that although the plain meaning of the ordinance was ambiguous, the underlying legislative history demonstrated that the provision was intended to allow for flexibility to rehire sergeants as patrol officers. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s analysis that the municipal code defined "rehire" as returning to the same position or class of positions, but the Court ultimately reached a different result. The Court found that the ordinance was not ambiguous; by its terms, it did not require sergeants to be rehired as entry-level patrol officers. The Court therefore reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Oels v. Anchorage Police Dept. Employees Association" on Justia Law

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Darren McLaren sued his wife Teresa for divorce. The superior court divided the couple's property, intending to award each spouse approximately half of the marital estate. Teresa, who appeared pro se, appealed multiple aspects of the property division. After a thorough review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court correctly resolved all of the issues appealed. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court. View "McLaren v. McLaren" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Eleanor Oakes owned a 7/8 undivided interest in a 20-acre parcel of land in Council, while Respondents David and Sine Holly owned a 1/8 undivided interest in the property. The parties went to court to partition the property, and each agreed to submit up to three partition proposals for the court’s selection after it heard evidence about the choices. The superior court selected one of Petitioner's proposals, and she hired a surveyor to implement the division of the property. The survey revealed a significant error in the map presented to the superior court of the selected proposal. The error resulted in the Hollys acquiring more river frontage than Petitioner had intended in her proposal which was selected by the superior court. Petitioner moved to amend the proposal, but the Hollys urged that the selected proposal be implemented as surveyed. The superior court concluded that under the doctrine of mutual mistake, Petitioner bore the risk of the drafting mistake in her proposals, and it enforced the proposal with the drafting error. But because the error in the property description did not occur in the formation of contract, the Supreme Court in its review concluded that the doctrine of mutual mistake was inapplicable. "Instead, the error occurred during the evidentiary hearing and formed a mistaken factual premise for the trial court's decision." The Court therefore remanded the case back to the superior court to determine whether it was appropriate to grant relief for mistake, and if so, to repartition the property in compliance with state law. View "Oates v. Holly" on Justia Law

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In 2001, Bill Kiernan owned American Towing & Recovery (Kiernan) and Willie Creech owned Vulcan Towing & Recovery (Creech). That year Kiernan and Creech decided to share a lot for their towing businesses. They agreed to split all costs associated with the lot evenly. The parties did not put their agreement in writing. While Creech asserted that under the oral agreement, Kiernan was merely a lessee with a conditional option to purchase a 50% interest, Kiernan testified in a sworn deposition that in exchange for paying half of the costs, he was to receive a 50% ownership in the lot. The relationship between the parties eventually broke down. In 2007 Kiernan became aware that Creech had taken out a second mortgage on the property without telling him, and Kiernan sued Creech. The issue on appeal involved whether their oral agreement provided that they would co-own the property, or that the Kiernan party would lease from the Creech. Creech moved for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of frauds barred any oral co-ownership agreement between the parties. The superior court granted the motion. Kiernan appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment because the substance of the oral agreement was a disputed fact material to resolving whether an exception to the statute of frauds applied. View "Kiernan v. Creech" on Justia Law

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Appellant Jacob Ennen was seriously injured while he was a passenger in Gordon Shanigan's car. Shanigan's insurer, Integon Indemnity Corporation (Integon), paid $50,000 to cover Shanigan's possible liability to Appellant. Under Alaska insurance statutes, Appellant would also likely have been entitled to underinsured motorist benefits under Shanigan's policy. However, Integon's policy was inconsistent with these statutes, and Integon told Ennen that he was not entitled to any additional money. Six years later, some time after Integon learned that its underinsured motorist provision violated Alaska insurance statutes, Integon paid Appellant underinsured motorist benefits plus interest and fees. Appellant sued Integon for bad faith. Integon filed a third-party complaint against Appellant's attorney, Craig Allen. Before trial, the superior court dismissed Integon’s claims against Allen on the ground that allowing Integon to implead Appellant's attorney would violate public policy. The superior court held that because Appellant did not own the insurance policy, Integon did not owe him a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the superior court concluded that Appellant had no cause of action for bad faith. But, in the event this ruling were to be reversed on appeal, the superior court made an alternate finding that while Integon had committed the tort of bad faith, Appellant had suffered no damages as a result. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed on both counts. "The superior court was justifiably cautious about extending the bad faith cause of action to a new class of plaintiffs, but we conclude that Ennen, as an insured, is eligible under our existing case law to bring a cause of action for bad faith." The Court concluded that Appellant established facts that would entitle him to damages. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the dismissal of Integon's third-party claim against Allen on the alternative ground that Allen was not a proximate cause of Appellant's harm. View "Ennen v. Integon Indemnity Corp." on Justia Law

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David S. appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter Hannah, who is an Indian child. Hannah was taken into the custody by the Office of Children's Services (OCS) while David was incarcerated. David remained in jail for the first 20 months of Hannah's life. David was released from prison and was on parole for five months, during which time he had regular visits with Hannah. David then became a fugitive for nine months, before being recaptured and reincarcerated. While David was a fugitive, OCS petitioned for termination of his parental rights, and two months after David was returned to prison, the superior court held a termination trial. The superior court found that Hannah was a child in need of aid due to David’s abandonment, incarceration, and substance abuse. The superior court also concluded that OCS had engaged in active efforts to help David's rehabilitation, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and that it was in Hannah's best interests for David's parental rights to be terminated. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling because OCS established all requirements necessary for termination. View "David S. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs" on Justia Law