Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Sherman "Red" Smith built and operated a sawmill on 14 acres of land under a special-use permit from the U.S. Forest Service. He alleged that Alaska acquired title to the land and conveyed it to a third party without acknowledging his claim or compensating him for his improvements. The last disputed conveyance of the land took place in 1983. The superior court dismissed Petitioner's claim, finding it to be time-barred under any applicable statute of limitations. The superior court also ruled in favor of the State on two alternative grounds: first, concluding that sovereign immunity bars fraud actions against the State and second, determining that res judicata bars the relitigation of a claim the superior court previously dismissed in 2007. Petitioner appealed, arguing that statutes of limitations cannot bar claims brought for the vindication of constitutional rights. Because statutes of limitations do apply to constitutional claims, and because Petitioner did not allege harm amounting to a continuing violation, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Petitioner's claim as time-barred. The Court also affirmed the superior court's alternative finding that the 2007 dismissal of Petitioner's previous claim bars his current action. View "Smith v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A couple lived together briefly in New Mexico and then separated, with the man moving permanently to Alaska. Shortly after he moved, the woman ("Stephanie W.") discovered that she was pregnant and gave birth to a son. The child had no contact with his father for the first three years of his life. At his paternal grandmother's initiative, the child then visited his father in Alaska several times over a three-year period, including a year-long visit during which he attended kindergarten in Alaska. After the boy returned to New Mexico, the boy's father filed for legal and primary physical custody. After a trial, the superior court awarded primary physical custody to the father and summertime visitation to the mother. Legal custody as to schooling decisions was awarded to the father. Legal custody as to all other decisions was awarded jointly to the mother and father. The mother appealed. Because Stephanie has not shown that the superior court's findings on a sexual abuse issue were clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's finding that the child had not been sexually abused by the father. But the Court remanded the custody issue for a new consideration of the best interests of the child in two respects: (1) Because Stephanie brought her allegations of sexual abuse against the father in good faith, the Court remanded for reconsideration of the "close and continuing relationship" factor in accordance with this opinion; and (2) because the court did not discuss the father's ongoing obligation to support the child, the Court remanded for consideration of the continuity and stability factor. View "Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V." on Justia Law

Citizens sought a ballot initiative to eliminate the special regulations that govern real property transactions in a local economic development area. After the municipal clerk twice denied their petition for a ballot initiative, the sponsors sued for an order placing the initiative on the ballot. Finding the petition to be both contrary to existing law and misleading, the superior court upheld the municipal clerk's denial. The sponsors appealed. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the petition is neither contrary to existing law nor misleading, it reversed. View "Sitkans for Responsible Government v. City & Borough of Sitka" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sven Rofkar grew a substantial quantity of marijuana in a house he rented. After state troopers searched the house, Petitioner was charged with four felonies, all brought under separate subsections of AS 11.71.040, designated as "misconduct involving a controlled substance in the fourth degree." A jury found Rofkar guilty on all charges. The superior court merged two possession charges into the manufacturing charge, but refused to merge the "maintaining" charge. Petitioner therefore stood convicted of two felonies. The double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense." The underlying question in this case was whether two convictions have been imposed on Petitioner for the "same offense" within the meaning of this clause or whether he committed two crimes. Petitioner raised this issue on appeal to the court of appeals. But the court of appeals declined to consider it. Instead, the court held that its opinion in "Davis v. State" was controlling authority. Petitioner did not argue that "Davis" should be overruled in his opening brief, although he did so in his reply brief, the court gave the double jeopardy issue no further consideration. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this case should be reviewed by the court of appeals on the merits for two reasons: first, the double jeopardy issue was raised and not waived; second, it was not clear that "Davis v. State" was decided in accordance with the applicable test for deciding double jeopardy claims set out in the Court's opinion in "Whitton v. State." View "Rofkar v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Rudy R. moved to modify the agreement through which he and Heather W. shared 50-50 custody of their daughter. He argued that recent legal troubles and instability in Heather's life amounted to changed circumstances that required modifying the custody agreement in the child's best interests. The superior court agreed. Heather appealed, arguing that the evidence did not show that any of her changed circumstances affected her child. The superior court also found that it was in the child's best interests for Rudy to have primary physical custody. Heather argued this was an abuse of discretion because the trial court considered impermissible character evidence, gave disproportionate weight to some factors while ignoring others, and refused to consider evidence of past domestic violence between the parties. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding changed circumstances and did not assign disproportionate weight to certain statutory best interest factors. But because the issue of domestic violence was never adjudicated, the Court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Rudy has a history of domestic violence, and, if so, whether he rebutted the statutory presumption against an award of custody. View "Heather W. v. Rudy R." on Justia Law

This case concerned the ownership of James "Jim" and Terrie Gottstein’s former marital home. Jim paid for the property, but Terrie’s name alone was on the deed. The Gottsteins lived in the home for 15 years before moving out; they later separated. Terrie entered into a deal to sell the property to another couple, the Krafts, for significantly less than its appraised value, and Jim objected. One month before closing, Jim recorded a notice of interest under AS 34.15.010, which forbid a spouse from selling "the family home or homestead" without the consent of the other spouse. Neither the Krafts nor Terrie knew about the notice of interest, and the sale went ahead as planned. Following the sale, Jim filed suit against the Krafts, requesting that the superior court recognize his ownership interest in the property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Krafts. The superior court concluded that it was not "the family home or homestead," rendering Jim’s notice of interest under AS 34.15.010 ineffectual. Jim appealed, arguing: (1) that the statute protected his interest in the property; (2) that the Krafts had constructive notice of his interest and therefore were not bona fide purchasers; and (3) that Jim has an equitable interest in the property and the superior court was mistaken in not granting his request for an equitable remedy. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the phrase "family home or homestead" in AS 34.15.010 refers to a family’s residence. Because the disputed property was vacant, and the couple had moved to another home at the time of sale, it did not fall under the spousal consent requirement of AS 34.15.010(b). Jim thus did not put the Krafts on notice of any legally valid claim to the property. View "Gottstein v. Kraft" on Justia Law

Bobbie Ann Hunter and Shaun Conwell had two sons before separating. Conwell filed a complaint for custody in 2006 but Hunter did not respond. The superior court granted Conwell sole legal and primary physical custody of the boys in a 2006 default judgment. Nearly two years later Hunter, acting pro se, sought modification of custody. The superior court denied Hunter’s motion without a hearing because it concluded that Hunter’s allegations were insufficient to constitute a substantial change in circumstances. Hunter appealed, and in a 2009 opinion the Supreme Court rejected as time-barred her arguments regarding the initial custody determination, but reversed the superior court’s denial of her motion for modification. The Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on Hunter’s allegations of: (1) potential verbal abuse of the boys; (2) a change in Conwell’s employment requiring significant time away from the boys; (3) signs that the boys were developing mental health problems; and (4) Conwell’s interference with court-ordered telephonic visitation. An evidentiary hearing on remand was held and the superior court found that Hunter had not demonstrated a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of custody. The court noted, however, that Conwell’s continued interference with telephonic visitation would alone amount to a substantial change if not remedied going forward. Hunter moved for reconsideration; her motion was deemed denied after 30 days. Hunter then appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s finding of no substantial change in circumstances. View "Hunter v. Conwell" on Justia Law

Petitioner Daniel Nelson applied for post-conviction relief, alleging 35 claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. At a deposition, trial counsel asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination regarding his representation of Petitioner. The superior court ultimately dismissed all but one post-conviction relief claim for failure to establish a prima facie case, and the court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner petitioned for the Supreme Court's review to determine whether the ordinary presumption of defense counsel's competence applied when counsel invokes the Fifth Amendment regarding the representation. The Court determined that it does, but noted that an adverse inference may be drawn in the petitioner's favor on specific disputed factual issues if warranted in an appropriate case. With this clarification, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision because this was not an appropriate case warranting such an inference. View "Nelson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

An adult woman diagnosed with a mental illness appealed her already completed 30-day involuntary commitment to Alaska Psychiatric Institute (API), arguing the evidence did not support the superior court’s findings that: (1) she was likely to cause harm to herself or others due to her mental illness; and (2) API was the least restrictive alternative placement for her. Because Alaska's existing case law provides that an evidentiary-based "weight of the evidence" challenge to a completed involuntary commitment is moot absent accompanying legal issues appropriate for decision under the mootness doctrine's public interest exception, the Supreme Court asked the parties to submit supplemental briefing on mootness. As a result, the Court addressed a question not directly raised in earlier cases: should the Court's application of the mootness doctrine in this context accommodate the importance of collateral consequences arising from an involuntary commitment? The Court answered that question "yes" and therefore reached the merits of this appeal. On the merits, the Court affirmed the superior court's involuntary commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Joan K." on Justia Law

In an October 2007 election, Kenai Peninsula Borough voters approved local initiatives establishing term limits for members of the Borough Assembly and the school board. But voters also reelected five incumbents who, by the terms of the initiatives, would be ineligible to serve an additional term. The Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers (ACT) filed a lawsuit against the Borough requesting a court declaration that the initiatives applied to candidates chosen in the October 2007 election and that the seats held by the five incumbents were vacant. The Borough argued that the initiatives were invalid. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to ACT and partial summary judgment to the Borough and, therefore, did not designate either as the prevailing party. ACT appealed the superior court's decision not to name a prevailing party and argued that ACT should have been named the prevailing party. After its review of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that ACT and the Borough both prevailed on distinct issues central to the case. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision not to name a prevailing party or award attorney's fees and costs to either party. View "Alliance of Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. Kenai Peninsula Borough" on Justia Law