Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the long-standing "emergency aid" exception to the general requirement that a search warrant be obtained prior to police entry into a residence. With this opinion, the Court established that the Alaska Constitution's standards for justifying the doctrine's application goes beyond those required by the federal Constitution, and adopted the standards the State court of appeals first implemented in "Gallmeyer v. State." The Court then considered whether the court of appeals correctly applied the doctrine when it reversed the trial court's ruling that the doctrine excused the warrantless police entry in Defendant Robert Gibson, III's case. Because the police had a reasonable belief of an emergency to justify a warrantless entry into the residence, the Supreme Court concluded the court of appeals did not, and reversed the appellate court's decision. View "Alaska v. Gibson" on Justia Law

A mother petitioned the superior court to adopt her biological son. She was never married to the child's father. While the court concluded that the father's consent was not needed, it denied the petition as not being in the child's best interests. Instead, the court granted physical and legal custody to the mother and visitation rights to the father. Because Alaska's adoption statute does not contemplate an adoption under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of Xavier K." on Justia Law

Appellant James Grace suffered permanent brain injuries when his helmet failed after he braked to avoid hitting a dog and was thrown over the handlebars of his motorcycle. Appellant and his wife, Kathleen, filed personal injury and loss of consortium claims against the helmet retailer and manufacturer. The Graces received disbursements from the receiver of one of the manufacturer's second-tier insurance providers that had filed for bankruptcy and gone into liquidation, and entered a settlement agreement with the third-tier insurance carrier. Appellant and his wife separated at some point after the accident, divorced for a month, and remarried. Except for a partial disbursement of funds that occurred while their final divorce hearing was pending, the Graces were unable to agree upon how the remaining settlement and insurance proceeds should be divided. The Graces' lawyer filed an action for interpleader asking the superior court to determine how to divide the remaining funds. After a one-day trial, the superior court concluded that: (1) based on the "analytic" approach in "Bandow v. Bandow," the portion of the recovery from the receiver for the manufacturer's second-tier insurance carrier that was allocated for past economic loss, past medical loss, and rehabilitation services was marital property and should have been divided equally; and (2) the recovery from the third-tier insurance carrier was the result of a jointly-assigned bad faith insurance claim and belonged to both parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's division of the proceeds from the second-tier insurance carrier, but reversed its division of the proceeds from the third-tier insurance carrier. View "Grace v. Peterson" on Justia Law

"Martha" and "William" are the parents of six children. They appealed the superior court’s order adjudicating their two youngest children as children in need of aid and placing the children in the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS). Martha and William argued that the superior court abused its discretion in making various evidentiary rulings and contended that it was clearly erroneous for the superior court to find that the children were in need of aid and that continued custody by the parents would be contrary to the children’s best interests. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to adjudicate the children as in need of aid and to keep them in the custody of OCS for a period not to exceed 18 months. View "Martha S. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Shirley Shea underwent a medical procedure in 1984 that resulted in intermittent soreness in her legs, back, and pelvic region. She began working for the State of Alaska in 1993, which required her to sit at a desk for prolonged periods of time. Shea’s pain began to worsen and in 2001, it forced her to leave her job. Appellant filed for both nonoccupational and occupational disability benefits, claiming that the periods of prolonged sitting at work aggravated her condition. An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Appellant's medical records indicated that prolonged sitting at work was one of the factors contributing to her chronic pain. The ALJ concluded that because Appellant's prolonged sitting at work was "simply one among many contributing factors" to her chronic pain, it was not "of particular causal significance" to her condition. Appellant appealed to the superior court, which upheld the ALJ's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court determined that Appellant must prove only that her employment was a substantial factor (not the substantial factor) in causing her disability. The Court remanded the case back to the ALJ for a reevaluation of the evidence. View "Shea v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Ryan Nelson agreed to perform an errand for his employer, a subcontractor, on the Appellant's day off. While on in the errand, the Appellant was injured at the job site. His employer filed a "notice of controversion" on the basis that Appellant was intoxicated at the time of the injury and his injuries were proximately caused by his intoxication. Appellant sued the general contractor and the Municipality of Anchorage (the owner of the job site) for negligence. The defendants asked the superior court to dismiss the action under the exclusive remedy provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act. The superior court granted summary judgment to the general contractor and the Municipality. Appellant appeals, arguing that lack of a workers' compensation remedy permits him to bring a common law negligence action or, alternatively, that the exclusivity provision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act denied him due process. He also argued as a matter of statutory construction, that the Municipality could not be a project owner. Because the worker has not shown that the employer’s controversion of benefits left him to his common law remedies, the Supreme Court determined Appellant's statutory construction and constitutional claims were not ripe. The Court also held that the Municipality could be a project owner. View "Nelson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

"David S." appealed the termination of his parental rights to his daughter Hannah, an Indian child. Hannah was taken into the custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) while David was incarcerated. David remained in jail for the first 20 months of Hannah's life. David was released from prison and was on parole for five months, during which time he had regular visits with Hannah. David then became a fugitive for nine months, before being recaptured and reincarcerated. While David was a fugitive, OCS petitioned for termination of his parental rights, and two months after David was returned to prison, the superior court held a termination trial. The superior court found that Hannah was a child in need of aid due to David’s abandonment, incarceration, and substance abuse. The superior court also concluded that OCS had engaged in active efforts to help David’s rehabilitation, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and that it was in Hannah’s best interests for David's parental rights to be terminated. David appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s ruling because OCS established all requirements necessary for termination. View "David S. v. Alaska Ofc. of Children's Svcs." on Justia Law

Parents "Madeline P." and "Rex P." challenged a school district's actions regarding their child's educational program under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). A hearing officer found an IDEA violation but awarded less compensatory education services for the child than the parents requested. On appeal, the superior court affirmed the IDEA violation finding and the compensatory education award. The parents appealed, arguing that more compensatory education services should have been awarded; the school district cross-appealed, arguing that no compensatory education services should have been awarded. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's findings regarding the school district's violation of the IDEA's procedural and substantive requirements and the compensatory education award. View "Madeline P. v. Anchorage School District" on Justia Law

Michael McCrary sued Ivanof Bay Village (Ivanof Bay) and its president, Edgar Shangin, under two contracts, alleging breaches of the implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The superior court dismissed the suit based on sovereign immunity. McCrary appealed the sovereign immunity ruling, arguing that even though the United States Department of Interior lists Ivanof Bay as a federally recognized Indian tribe, Ivanof Bay has not been formally designated as a federally recognized tribe. The Supreme Court previously concluded Alaska Native tribes recognized by Congress or the Executive Branch are sovereign under federal law, and McCrary did not demonstrate that conclusion should be overturned. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's dismissal of McCrary's suit. View "McCrary v. Ivanof Bay Village" on Justia Law

In late April 2006 Samuel Sengul leased a commercial storefront in downtown Juneau to Robert Manus, who was acting on behalf of CMS Franklin, Inc. The building was under construction when Sengul and CMS entered into the lease agreement, but the lease provided that Sengul would deliver the property to CMS in a specified improved condition by the time the lease commenced on June 1. The lease also included a rent abatement provision, which was at issue in this case. The building was not in improved condition until approximately June 8. Manus did not pay any rent, nor did he mention the rent abatement provision when he took possession of the building. Sengul finally demanded rent in late July, but Manus refused to pay, claiming abatement. In September, Manus had still not paid any rent, and Sengul put a lock on CMS's store door and placed signs demanding rent in the store windows. Manus had the lock cut off, but began to move the inventory out of the store, vacating it and returning the keys to Sengul two days after the lockout. Sengul then sued CMS and Manus for unpaid rent. The superior court determined that CMS had waived its right to rent abatement and owed Sengul unpaid rental amounts for the time that Manus had occupied the building. But the court also concluded that Sengul's lockout amounted to constructive eviction and awarded CMS damages as a refund for work performed on the premises that CMS was unable to benefit from after the constructive eviction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that Sengul's actions constituted constructive eviction, but the Court disagreed that CMS waived its entitlement to have the rent abated. The case was remanded for the superior court to recalculate the damages owed to CMS. View "Sengul v. CMS Franklin, Inc." on Justia Law