Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, Plaintiff Helen Barton was injured while watching a high school football game in Barrow when a player ran out of bounds during a play and collided with her, breaking her leg. Plaintiff sued the North Slope Borough School District, alleging in part that the football field had not been designed or built with a proper "run-off" area along the sidelines and that spectators had improperly been allowed to stand in the run-off area during the game. Plaintiff retained expert landscape architect Juliet Vong who proposed to testify that she used a particular manual in designing sports fields "to help ensure the appropriate dimensions and design criteria are met for a given sport and level of play." The School District filed a motion in limine to exclude Vong's testimony because it did not provide an admissible expert opinion. The superior court agreed with the District and excluded Vong's report and testimony. At a jury trial in August 2010, the District was found not negligent. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the superior court should not have excluded Vong's testimony and that doing so was prejudicial to Plaintiff's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that although it was error to exclude Vong’s testimony, the error was harmless. View "Barton v. North Slope Borough School District" on Justia Law

Six tribal councils, joined by two other associations, filed an action against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in the superior court seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2005 Bristol Bay Area Plan (BBAP, the Plan) was unlawful. DNR’s motion to dismiss under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) was denied and the superior court held that: (1) the BBAP is a regulation that must be promulgated under the Alaska Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and (2) Alaska Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) does not bar the Tribes’ claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellate Rule 602(a)(2) did not bar the Tribe's claims and the that BBAP is not a regulation. View "Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources v. Nondalton Tribal Council" on Justia Law

John Weinberger and Patrice Weinmeister are the parents of a young son. After an incident of mutual domestic violence, John obtained an ex parte restraining order against Patrice. John and Patrice both sought custody of their son in the separate custody proceeding that followed. After a one-day bench trial, the superior court determined that Patrice had a "history of perpetrating domestic violence," but the court also ruled that Patrice rebutted the presumption against awarding custody to her. John appealed the custody decision. John contended that the superior court's determination that Patrice overcame the presumption was based on a misreading of AS 25.24.150(h). John argued that the superior court read this statute with "or" between the conditions for rebutting the presumption rather than "and." In other words, rather than reading the statute to require consideration of an intervention program, and a showing that Patrice does not engage in substance abuse, and a showing that the child’s best interests would be served by awarding custody to her, John argued that the superior court interpreted the statute to allow the presumption to be overcome if Patrice made any one of the three showings identified in the statute. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with John. Because Patrice failed to rebut the statutory presumption, the superior court erred by awarding custody to Patrice and the custody order was reversed. View "Weinberger v. Weinmeister" on Justia Law

Stephanie F. and George C. both sought physical and legal custody of their son and daughter. Following lengthy proceedings, the superior court found that it would be in the children's best interests for custody to be awarded to George. But the court also found that George committed two acts of violence against Stephanie in the months leading up to their separation. The acts were described by the court as "situational violence" not reflective of a chronic pattern, but still a history of violence under AS 25.24.150(g). As a result, a statutory presumption against awarding custody to George was triggered. The superior court concluded that George did not rebut the presumption because he did not complete a batterers' intervention program. Assuming (without deciding) that the perceived conflict between the statutory presumption and the children's best interests likely violated the children's and George's right to due process, the superior court avoided the presumed constitutional question by articulating an alternate standard for overcoming the statutory presumption. Stephanie appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the completion of a batterers' intervention program is not the only way to rebut the presumption in AS 25.24.150(g), and because the statute does not prevent the superior court from conducting a complete best interests analysis, the statute did not raise due process concerns. The superior court did not abuse its discretion or make clearly erroneous findings of fact when it ruled that it was in the children's best interests to be with George, but it did not consider whether the steps George took to address his history of domestic violence rebutted the presumption in AS 25.24.150(g). Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for consideration of that issue. View "Stephanie F. v. George C." on Justia Law

There was one issue for the Supreme Court's resolution in this, the fifth appeal in this case. After the last remand, the superior court entered a judgment awarding the class a principal refund of $12.4 million with prejudgment interest exceeding $62 million. The question presented on appeal was whether one of the Court's previous decisions in this case, "Carlson III," incorrectly decided that the rate of prejudgment interest for unconstitutional commercial fishing license and limited entry permit fee overpayments was the statutorily imposed punitive interest rate for underpaid and overpaid taxes under Title 43 of the Alaska Statutes. Because the statute establishing prejudgment interest for underpayment and overpayment of taxes did not apply to the refund of overpayment of the commercial fishing fees involved in this case, and because the Court's earlier incorrect holding on this issue resulted in a manifest injustice, the Court concluded that its earlier decision on this issue must be overruled. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case for a new prejudgment interest calculation. View "Alaska Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson" on Justia Law

Thirty seven years ago, two business partners bought a 160-acre property bordering the Kenai River which they subdivided into 114 lots (Holiday Park Subdivision). The partners reserved an easement across Lot 30 for the benefit of all Holiday Park owners, but disagreements arose over the permissible uses and geographic boundaries of the easement. In 2004, the owner of Lot 30 sold it to Kenai River Airpark, LLC. One of the developers of Holiday Park sued Kenai River Airpark and the Airpark Owners Association to prevent their use of Lot 30. The superior court ruled that members of the Airpark Owners Association could use Lot 30 as long as they did not interfere with Holiday Park owners’ use of the easement. The superior court also ruled that the easement’s scope was limited to a defined path shown on the Holiday Park plat, but that permissible uses of the easement included boat launching, bank fishing, and river access. The Holiday Park developer appealed. Because Holiday Park’s plat unambiguously described the easement’s scope as “30' BOAT LAUNCH ESM’T,” the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s ruling permitting more expansive use. However, the Court affirmed the superior court’s order regarding the geographic bounds of the easement; the original developer did not establish an expanded easement by prescription, implication, inquiry notice, or estoppel. View "HP Limited Partnership v. Kenai River Airpark, LLC" on Justia Law

The Bethel Superior Court entered an order terminating an incarcerated father's parental rights to three of his five children. The father appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by finding that the State made active efforts to prevent the breakup of his family and finding that it was in the children's best interests for his parental rights to be terminated. Because the superior court's active efforts and best interests findings were supported by the record and not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's ruling terminating the father's parental rights. View "Doe v. Alaksa Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the long-standing "emergency aid" exception to the general requirement that a search warrant be obtained prior to police entry into a residence. With this opinion, the Court established that the Alaska Constitution's standards for justifying the doctrine's application goes beyond those required by the federal Constitution, and adopted the standards the State court of appeals first implemented in "Gallmeyer v. State." The Court then considered whether the court of appeals correctly applied the doctrine when it reversed the trial court's ruling that the doctrine excused the warrantless police entry in Defendant Robert Gibson, III's case. Because the police had a reasonable belief of an emergency to justify a warrantless entry into the residence, the Supreme Court concluded the court of appeals did not, and reversed the appellate court's decision. View "Alaska v. Gibson" on Justia Law

A mother petitioned the superior court to adopt her biological son. She was never married to the child's father. While the court concluded that the father's consent was not needed, it denied the petition as not being in the child's best interests. Instead, the court granted physical and legal custody to the mother and visitation rights to the father. Because Alaska's adoption statute does not contemplate an adoption under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "In the Matter of the Adoption of Xavier K." on Justia Law

Appellant James Grace suffered permanent brain injuries when his helmet failed after he braked to avoid hitting a dog and was thrown over the handlebars of his motorcycle. Appellant and his wife, Kathleen, filed personal injury and loss of consortium claims against the helmet retailer and manufacturer. The Graces received disbursements from the receiver of one of the manufacturer's second-tier insurance providers that had filed for bankruptcy and gone into liquidation, and entered a settlement agreement with the third-tier insurance carrier. Appellant and his wife separated at some point after the accident, divorced for a month, and remarried. Except for a partial disbursement of funds that occurred while their final divorce hearing was pending, the Graces were unable to agree upon how the remaining settlement and insurance proceeds should be divided. The Graces' lawyer filed an action for interpleader asking the superior court to determine how to divide the remaining funds. After a one-day trial, the superior court concluded that: (1) based on the "analytic" approach in "Bandow v. Bandow," the portion of the recovery from the receiver for the manufacturer's second-tier insurance carrier that was allocated for past economic loss, past medical loss, and rehabilitation services was marital property and should have been divided equally; and (2) the recovery from the third-tier insurance carrier was the result of a jointly-assigned bad faith insurance claim and belonged to both parties. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's division of the proceeds from the second-tier insurance carrier, but reversed its division of the proceeds from the third-tier insurance carrier. View "Grace v. Peterson" on Justia Law