Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Philip J. v. Alaska
"Philip J." is the father of seven children who were adjudicated to be children in need of aid. On appeal, he claimed that his right to due process was violated because he was unaware that the State would seek adjudication findings at the conclusion of a hearing that started as a contested probable cause (temporary custody) hearing. He also argued that he was denied due process because he was not allowed to present a closing argument. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Philip was not denied due process because he had notice that the State was seeking adjudication findings, because he had an opportunity to be heard on adjudication, and because he was not denied the opportunity to deliver a closing argument. The Court affirmed the superior court's order adjudicating all of the children as in need of aid. View "Philip J. v. Alaska" on Justia Law
In the Matter of Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault
The Supreme Court granted the Office of Public Advocacy's petition for review on the limited question whether the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault qualified as a "public agency" within the meaning of "Flores v. Flores" (AS 44.21.410(a)(4)) such that the Office of Public Advocacy is required to provide representation to an indigent party in a child custody dispute in which the other party is represented by the Network. Because the Court maintained that from its holding in "Flores" that it would be fundamentally unfair in the specific context of child custody disputes to allow public funding to support one party but not that party’s indigent opponent, the Court found that the Network qualifies as a public agency for purposes of AS 44.21.410(a)(4).
View "In the Matter of Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Alaska Supreme Court, Government & Administrative Law
Burts v. Burts
Leon Burts filed for divorce in 2009. The superior court valued Leon’s post-retirement military health insurance benefit as a marital asset and allocated it to Leon. Leon appealed, arguing that the benefit was too speculative to be valued and that state courts are preempted from treating this type of federal benefit as a marital asset. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s characterization of this benefit as marital property, but concluded the court’s valuation was erroneous. The case was remanded for reconsideration of the value of the benefit. View "Burts v. Burts" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Alaska Supreme Court, Family Law
Dená Nená Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
Native nonprofit corporation Dena Nena Henash (d/b/a Tanana Chiefs Conference) applied to the Fairbanks North Star borough assessor for charitable-purpose tax exemptions on several of its properties. The assessor denied exemptions for five of the parcels, concluding that they did not meet the exemption’s requirements. The superior court affirmed the denial as to four of the properties and remanded the case for consideration of one property back to the assessor, who granted the exemption. The Nonprofit appealed the denial of exemptions for three of the remaining properties plus a portion of the fourth, and appealed the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to the Borough. Because the properties in question were used exclusively for charitable purposes, the Supreme Court reversed the assessor’s determination on the four appealed properties, vacated the attorney’s fees award, and remanded for an award of fees.
View "Dená Nená Henash v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law
ASRC Energy Services Power v. Golden Valley Electric
This case arose from an award by Golden Valley Electric Association (GVEA) of two competitively bid construction contracts on its Northern Intertie Project. In November 2001 GVEA awarded Global Power & Communications, LLC (Global) a $39.4 million contract (Contract NI-8) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River flats section. Later GVEA awarded Global an approximately $5.3 million contract (Contract NI-9) for construction of the Northern Intertie’s Tanana River crossing and Fairbanks sections. Subsequently, after Global had been awarded NI-9 and before it had completed work on NI-8, Global presented GVEA with requests for additional compensation (RFIs) totaling approximately $2.4 million in connection with NI-8. GVEA responded that it found "no legitimate basis" to justify Global’s RFIs and rejected Global’s request for additional payment. Global also notified GVEA that Global would submit more RFIs, arising out of both NI-8 and NI-9. In all, Global sought additional compensation totaling $5.7 million under the two contracts. GVEA responded to Global denying most of the RFIs but indicated that it would approve a few and consider partial payment for a few others. Global sued, and a trial court ultimately held in GVEA's favor, awarding it costs under both the contract and the applicable state law. Global appealed, arguing among other things, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling in favor of GVEA. Upon review of the lengthy record from the trial court, the applicable legal authority and legislative history, and the two contracts in question, the Supreme Court partly affirmed and partly vacated the trial court's decision. The case was remanded for: (1) a fee determination regarding GVEA’s "UTPA" claim against Global and (2) a new trial on causation and damages relating to GVEA’s breach of NI-9.
View "ASRC Energy Services Power v. Golden Valley Electric" on Justia Law
Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc.
A construction company solicited a bid from a subcontractor to perform concrete work. The construction company provided a plan and bid schedule. The subcontractor responded with a proposal, which the construction company accepted. The subcontractor carried out the subcontract as it understood the terms. After the work was completed, the subcontractor discovered it had inadvertently underbid on the project. In the ensuing lawsuit, the superior court granted partial summary judgment to the construction company with respect to all damages claimed in relation to the bidding error. The subcontractor appealed the partial summary judgment order, claiming breach of an implied warranty that the plans and specifications would be sufficient, and arguing that the superior court erred by applying the theory of unilateral mistake to the case. Because the construction company did not breach the implied warranty and the subcontractor committed a unilateral mistake for which it bore the risk, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Handle Construction Co., Inc. v. Norcon, Inc." on Justia Law
Nelson v. Nelson
An Alaskan military couple divorced in 2008. Their agreement for custody of their two children was incorporated into the divorce decree. The following year, the father, who anticipated relocating with the military, sought modification of the custody arrangement. In its order denying modification, the superior court tried to give effect to the parties' custody agreement but did not independently analyze the best interests of the children. Because a substantial change in circumstances occurred, and because a custody decision must be based on an independent best-interests analysis, the Supreme Court remanded this case for the superior court to undertake a full best-interests inquiry. The Court also remanded for the superior court to resolve a dispute concerning payment of a custody investigator.
View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Alaska Supreme Court, Family Law
O’Connell v. Will
In 2002 Plaintiff Kevin O'Connell was awarded damages against Defendants Anthony and Paulette Will for Defendants' failure to pay a promissory note. Under the attorney's fee provision in the note, Plaintiff was also awarded full attorney's fees and costs. After Plaintiff's attorney engaged in post-judgment collection efforts, Anthony Will paid the judgment. In 2009 Anthony Will filed a request for an order that the judgment in the case had been satisfied, and the superior court granted the motion. Plaintiff filed a motion seeking a further award of fees, arguing that he incurred additional fees in collecting the original judgment and that under the terms of the promissory note he is entitled to an additional award for those fees. The superior court denied his motion and Plaintiff appealed. He also argued that the superior court should not have considered Anthony Will's motion for entry of a satisfaction of judgment because Anthony failed to serve Paulette Will, Anthony's ex-wife, with the motion. Because the promissory note's terms did entitle Plaintiff to post-judgment fees, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's order denying Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. The superior court did not err in considering Anthony Will's motion, but because Plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment attorney’s fees, the Court vacated the superior court’s entry of an order that the judgment was satisfied. View "O'Connell v. Will" on Justia Law
Renaissance Alaska, LLC, v. Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation
Renaissance Resources Alaska, LLC (Renaissance) partnered with Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation (Rutter) to develop an oil field. Renaissance and Rutter acquired a lease to the entire working interest and the majority of the net revenue interest of the field. They then formed a limited liability company, Renaissance Umiat, LLC (Umiat), to which they contributed most of the lease rights. But when they formed Umiat, Renaissance and Rutter did not contribute all of their acquired lease rights to the new company: they retained a 3.75% overriding royalty interest (ORRI). Rutter was eventually unable to meet the capital contributions required by Umiat's operating agreement and forfeited its interest under the terms of the agreement. Rutter filed suit against Renaissance seeking a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to half of the retained 3.75% ORRI. Renaissance argued why it deserved the entire 3.75%: (1) Renaissance held legal title to the 3.75% ORRI; and (2) Rutter could only obtain title through an equitable remedy to which Rutter is not entitled. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that Renaissance's characterization was inaccurate and that Rutter was entitled to title to half of the 3.75% ORRI. Furthermore, Renaissance argued that the superior court should have found an implied term that Rutter would forfeit its share of the 3.75% ORRI if Rutter failed to contribute its share of expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that there was not such an implied term in the agreement. View "Renaissance Alaska, LLC, v. Rutter & Wilbanks Corporation" on Justia Law
Erkins v. Alaska Trust, LLC
In 2004 and 2005, while allegedly bedridden and taking prescription pain medication, Plaintiff Gregory Erkins took out two successive loans on his house. The proceeds of the second, larger loan were used in part to pay off the first. In early 2007, Plaintiff ceased making regular payments and this loan fell into default. His house was listed for foreclosure sale. Also, at some point between February 2005 and November 2007, the loan was assigned from Ameriquest Mortgage Company to Appellee Bank of New York Trust Company, N.A. Acting pro se, Plaintiff filed suit in the superior court against Alaska Trustee, LLC, Bank of New York (the current holder of the loan), and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JP Morgan) (a party apparently unconnected to the proceedings except in that Bank of New York was listed as its successor). Plaintiff disputed the terms of the second loan, and argued fraud as well as lack of contractual capacity at the time of its origination. Several months after Plaintiff filed his complaint, as a trial date was about to be set, counsel for the defendants presented Plaintiff with a forbearance agreement. This agreement contemplated postponing the foreclosure sale in exchange for $2,000 monthly payments. Plaintiff executed this agreement. Allegedly unbeknownst to Plaintiff, the agreement also contained a waiver of claims broad enough to cover his claims against the defendants. Nine months later, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that this waiver of claims functioned as a settlement and released all of Plaintiff's claims in this suit. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact barring judgment that they were not liable for any tort of Ameriquest, and that Plaintiff had released his claims in the forbearance agreement. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that portion of the superior court’s decision finding that defendants could not be held liable for the alleged torts of Ameriquest. But the Court reversed that portion of the superior court’s order concluding that Plaintiff released his claims against the defendants by entering into a forbearance agreement because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the inclusion of the waiver of claims provision in the forbearance agreement constituted constructive fraud. View "Erkins v. Alaska Trust, LLC" on Justia Law