Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A mother appealed the superior court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing for her motion to modify child custody. In October 2009 Kalindi filed a motion seeking to modify "interim" custody and visitation, to establish "final child custody orders," and to determine the rule of law regarding the effect of Shaun’s prior domestic violence on the custody decision. Kalindi sought sole legal and primary physical custody of their children and requested an evidentiary hearing. The superior court denied her motion without a hearing, stating that an August 2008 hearing had resulted in a "final order" and concluding that Kalindi was "barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel from attempting to re-litigate legal and factual matters that existed prior to the August 22, 2008 hearing," including "factual issues that were known or should have been known to" her at the hearing. Kalindi appealed the May 2010 order; her primary argument was that the superior court erred by denying her a custody modification hearing to present evidence of Shaun’s history of domestic violence. Because the Kalindi was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this case, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings. View "McAlpine v. Pacarro" on Justia Law

A worker was involved in a fight in a logging camp bunkhouse. He did not file a report of injury related to the fight for over a year. When he finally filed a report of injury, he alleged that he had injured his hip, lower back, and ear in the fight. His employer denied the worker benefits because he did not give timely notice of the injury. The worker then alleged that he had verbally informed his supervisor of the injuries. After a hearing, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board determined that the worker’s claim was barred because he did not give his employer timely notice of the injury. The Board performed an alternative analysis assuming the worker had given timely notice and decided that the claim was not compensable. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. Because the Commission correctly determined that substantial evidence in the record supports the Board’s decision on the compensability of the claim, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. View "McGahuey v. Whitestone Logging, Inc." on Justia Law

After a minor collision between two vehicles in the drive-through line of a Taco Bell, Jack Morrell, the driver of one vehicle, stabbed and killed Eric Kalenka, the driver of the other vehicle. Morrell was uninsured and Kalenka’s policy provided coverage for liabilities arising out of the “ownership, maintenance, or use” of an uninsured motor vehicle. Kalenka’s automobile insurer filed an action in superior court, seeking a declaration that Kalenka’s policy did not provide coverage for Kalenka’s death. The superior court concluded that there was no general liability coverage under the policy. Appellant Uwe Kalenka, the personal representative of Eric Kalenka’s estate, appealed the denial of liability coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s determination that Kalenka’s policy did not provide liability coverage. View "Kalenka v. Infinity Insurance Companies" on Justia Law

Ronald and Sharon Stevens separated in August 2006, ending a 40-year marriage. In June 2007 they appeared before the superior court for their divorce trial. Before the trial ended, the parties entered into what they thought was a settlement on the property division issues. But the parties could not agree on the exact terms of the settlement, and in August 2008 they returned to the superior court for a second day of trial on the property division issues. The superior court valued the property, equitably divided the estate, and ordered each side to pay his or her own attorney’s fees. Pertinent to this appeal, the trial court valued the parties’ two residences as of the date of the first day of trial. Sharon appealed and Ronald cross-appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court erred in valuing the real property as of the date of the first day of trial when the second and final trial day occurred over a year later. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Stevens v. Stevens" on Justia Law

A property owner appealed a judgment that allowed foreclosure on a borough property tax lien, arguing that the borough’s foreclosure was legally flawed and that the borough’s attorney should have been sanctioned for maintaining the foreclosure against his property. Because the superior court did not err in concluding there were no legal flaws in the foreclosure, and because therefore there was no basis to sanction the borough’s attorney, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all respects. View "Lot 04B & Block 83 Townsite v. Fairbanks North Star Borough" on Justia Law

Appellant Alaskan Crude Corporation operates an oil and gas unit known as the "Arctic Fortitude Unit." Alaskan Crude’s unit agreement with the Department of Natural Resources set work obligation deadlines that Alaskan Crude was required to meet to continue operating the Unit. In July 2008 the Commissioner found that Alaskan Crude had failed to meet its work obligations, gave notice that Alaskan Crude was in default under its unit agreement, and specified that the Unit would be terminated if Alaskan Crude did not cure the default by a new set of deadlines. Alaskan Crude appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the superior court, arguing that a pending judicial decision in a separate appeal qualified as a force majeure under the unit agreement, preventing Alaskan Crude from meeting its work obligations. It also argued that the Commissioner’s proposed default cure was an improper unilateral amendment of Alaskan Crude’s unit agreement. The superior court affirmed the Commissioner’s findings and decision and Alaskan Crude appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the pending judicial decision in Alaskan Crude’s separate appeal did not trigger the force majeure clause of the unit agreement; and (2) the Commissioner’s proposed default cure was not a unilateral amendment of Alaskan Crude’s unit agreement. Thus the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court upholding the decision of the Commissioner. View "Alaska Crude Corp. v. Alaska Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Six weeks after the Regulatory Commission of Alaska approved the 2007 Access Charge Rates long distance telephone companies pay to local telephone companies, an association of local telephone companies realized that five of the rates the Regulatory Commission approved were based upon an erroneous spreadsheet the association included in its rate filings. The association requested that the Regulatory Commission correct the rates. The Regulatory Commission corrected the rates prospectively, but concluded retrospective application was barred by the Supreme Court's case law on retroactive ratemaking. The superior court agreed that retrospective application of the adjusted rates was impermissible, and the association appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in "Matanuska Electric Association, Inc. v. Chugach Electric Association, Inc." (prohibiting retroactive ratemaking in "second look" cases), but held that the Regulatory Commission has the authority to implement corrections of some procedural mistakes starting when notice of a mistake is given. The Court remanded to the Regulatory Commission to determine the type of error that occurred in this case and whether the error should be corrected retrospectively. View "Alaska Exchange Carriers Assn., Inc. v. Regulatory Comm'n of Alaska" on Justia Law

Two men bought an island. After a dispute, they agreed that one would keep the island, while the other would receive a one-time payment and an option to buy the island at a fixed price, adjusted for inflation, if the owner ever chose to sell it. Years passed, the value of the island rose, far outpacing inflation. But the owner never elected to sell. Instead, he eventually conveyed the island to his sister, as a gift. The option holder sued. The superior court held on summary judgment that the option remained viable, but that the gift was not improper. The option holder appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the option agreement, but because material facts were in dispute concerning contractual claims and allegations that the option holder's conveyance was fraudulent, the Court reversed and remanded the superior court's grant of summary judgment on those claims. View "Shaffer v. Bellows" on Justia Law

An elderly woman requiring long-term medical care gave $120,000 to her son in February 2007. The mother believed that the gift would not prevent her from receiving Medicaid coverage if she lived long enough to exhaust her remaining assets. She relied on a provision in Alaska's Medicaid eligibility manual that suggested prospective Medicaid beneficiaries could give away a portion of their assets while retaining sufficient assets to pay for their medical care during the period of ineligibility that Medicaid imposes as a penalty for such gifts. But by the time the mother applied for Medicaid in September 2008, the Alaska legislature had enacted legislation with the retroactive effect of preventing the kind of estate planning the mother had attempted through her gift. The State temporarily denied the mother's application. The son appealed pro se on behalf of his mother, who died in 2009. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Alaska legislature's retroactive change to the Medicaid eligibility rules was valid. The Court thus affirmed the State's temporary denial of the mother's application. View "Pfeifer v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Serv." on Justia Law

Petitioner Frank Olson was arrested in Anchorage for driving while intoxicated. At the police station he refused to submit to a breath test. An officer advised him of the consequences for refusing to take the test using an implied consent form, but the form contained information that was out of date; it stated that refusal was a felony if the arrestee had been convicted of DWI or refusal twice within the previous five years. In fact, refusal was a felony if the arrestee had been twice convicted within the previous ten years. Petitioner had several prior DWI convictions, one of which was approximately three weeks outside the five-year window, but well within the ten-year window. Petitioner persisted in his refusal and was convicted of the class C felony, refusal to submit to chemical test. He appealed, claiming the erroneous warning violated his due process rights. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted his petition for hearing. Because the Court held that Petitioner bore the burden of proving prejudice from the erroneous information, the Court remanded his case to give him an opportunity to make that showing. View "Olson v. Alaska" on Justia Law