Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Branwen Collier and William Harris are the parents of a daughter, Zada. The parties agreed to shared physical custody of their daughter, and the superior court decided that joint legal custody was in the child’s best interest. The mother later filed a motion for modification of joint legal and shared physical custody, asserting that her work schedule had changed since the parties agreed on a physical custody schedule, that the father had violated court orders, and that he was not communicating effectively. The mother sought sole legal and primary physical custody. The superior court denied the motion without a hearing and awarded attorney’s fees to the father. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the mother was not entitled to a hearing on her motion to modify custody under the circumstances of this case, but vacated the award of attorney’s fees. View "Collier v. Harris" on Justia Law

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After a disciplinary hearing, a hearing officer found Alaska prison inmate Joseph James guilty of the “low-moderate” infraction of “threatening another person with future bodily harm” at Red Rocks Correctional Center in Arizona. The determination was based entirely on an incident report written by a prison staff member who had not witnessed the incident. Instead, the report’s author provided a hearsay account of a conversation between James and another staff member. After exhausting his administrative remedies, James filed an appeal to the superior court. James argued that basing the finding of guilt solely on the hearsay written account constituted a violation of his due process rights. James also maintained that the failure to audio-record the disciplinary hearing violated due process. The superior court affirmed the disciplinary determination. Because the Supreme Court concluded that James’s due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses was violated during the disciplinary proceedings and that he was prejudiced by the failure to audio-record the disciplinary hearing, the Court vacated the disciplinary determination and remanded the case for a new hearing. View "James v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

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This case involved a contract dispute between 3-D & Co. and Tew’s Excavating, Inc. The dispute was over the terms of a construction contract for two roads in the Scenic View Subdivision of the Matanuska-Susitna Borough. 3-D & Co. raised twelve issues on appeal, which in sum, contended that the superior court applied the wrong legal standards and arrived at the wrong factual conclusions regarding the terms of the contract. The Supreme Court took each of 3-D's issues in turn and affirmed the superior court's decisions in all respects. View "3-D & Co. v. Tew's Excavating, Inc." on Justia Law

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Robert J. Henrichs, Derenty Tabios, and Robert E. Burk were shareholders and former directors of Chugach Alaska Corporation who ran for election to the Chugach board in 2005. These former directors sued Chugach because their names were excluded from the board’s corporate proxy materials and because Chugach did not provide them with shareholder information for their own proxy campaigns within the time frame they demanded. The superior court granted Chugach summary judgment on all claims and the former directors appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed because Chugach was not required to deliver the information the former directors demanded and because Chugach’s conduct did not otherwise violate their rights as board candidates. View "Henrichs v. Chugach Alaska Corporation" on Justia Law

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Raising over 50 separate points in this second appeal, Allen Heustess challenged the superior court’s rulings on child support, property distribution, and attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court conducted an exhaustive review of the superior court record, and affirmed almost all of the superior court’s rulings, except: (1) because the record did not support the superior court’s finding regarding Mr. Heustess' income for 1995 and because the superior court did not deduct federal income tax liability from his gross income in its child support calculations for the years 1991 to 1996, the Court reversed the court’s calculation of the child support arrearage; (2) because the superior court may have considered Mr. Heustess' "vexatious" litigation conduct when it divided the marital estate and also considered it when it enhanced the award of fees against him, the Court remanded the superior court’s property division for additional findings; (3) the Court vacated the portion of the general fee award that is based on the parties’ relative economic circumstances so it could be reconsidered after the court recalculated Mr. Heustess' child support arrearage and the overall property division. But the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order enhancing the award of fees in Mrs. Bonnie Kelley-Heustess' favor, and affirmed the remaining rulings of the superior court in all respects. View "Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case were coverage limits associated with underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance and whether coverage provided under disputed insurance policies complies with the requirements of Alaska insurance statutes. The Respondent families hold UIM policies. They alleged they suffered emotional distress and loss of consortium as a result of a collision that killed one family’s child and severely injured the other family’s child. The insurer accepted that the policyholders incurred damages. However, it contended that the families exhausted the coverage limits available to them under the UIM policies because the family members seeking damages were not “in” the fatal collision. The superior court concluded that the families had not exhausted their UIM coverage under Alaska insurance statutes and reformed the insurance policies to allow the emotional distress claims to proceed to arbitration. The superior court dismissed the families’ loss of consortium claims as outside the coverage of the policies. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the families exhausted the coverage limits available under their policies and that these policies were consistent with statutory requirements, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision to reform the policies. Because coverage limits are exhausted, the Court declined to consider whether loss of consortium was covered under the policies. View "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Houle" on Justia Law

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The superior court awarded sole legal custody of two children to their mother, Taunya, upon her motion to modify custody. Their father, William, appealed, arguing that the superior court improperly weighed the best interests of the children. Because the Supreme Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the superior court’s conclusions and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "William P. v. Taunya P." on Justia Law

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In 2002, the superior court appointed a professional conservator for a mother suffering from dementia. Her daughter, Appellant Evelyn Foster (who also served as special advocate), resisted the appointment. From 2002 onward, Appellant engaged in wide-ranging legal challenges to the conservator’s handling of her mother’s conservatorship. In response, the conservator incurred large legal fees, paid by the estate, in defending its actions. After the mother’s death, the superior court approved the conservator’s final accounting. The court recognized flaws in the conservator’s management of the mother’s property, including a breach of fiduciary duty. But based on a "prevailing party analysis," the court approved reimbursement from the mother’s property for the full attorney’s fees the conservator expended in defending itself. Because the Supreme Court concluded that certain of the superior court’s factual findings might be inconsistent, the Court remanded the case for the superior court to clarify its findings or make them consistent. And because it was error to evaluate attorney’s fees under the prevailing party standard, The Court remanded for reconsideration of attorney’s fees. In all other respects the Court affirmed the decision of the superior court. View "Foster v. Professional Guardian Services Corp." on Justia Law

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The superior court interpreted a statutory preference for the purchase of state land in a manner that disqualified Appellant Melvin Gillis, from which he appealed. Appellant is a professional sport hunting and fishing guide. He obtained a 25-year lease of five acres of state land in April 1989. Appellant built a lodge on the land, and the operation of the lodge and his guiding business were his principal sources of income. In 2005, the state Department of Natural Resources (DNR) conveyed lands, including the land Appellant leased, to Aleutians East Borough. DNR also transferred its interest in Appellant's lease to the Borough. Appellant offered to purchase the land in November 2005. The Borough Assembly rejected Appellant's offer but proposed a new lease agreement. Appellant did not execute the proposed lease, and in 2007 he claimed he was eligible to purchase the land under state law. The Borough then filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the superior court to determine whether Appellant qualified for a preference right to purchase the land. The issue on appeal was whether the applicable statute required an applicant to enter land while it was under federal ownership as a condition of the preference right. The superior court concluded that the plain meaning of the statute required an applicant to enter land when it was under federal ownership before the federal government conveyed the land to the state. The court entered summary judgment in favor of the Borough and DNR. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's interpretation of the applicable statute and its summary judgment decision. View "Gillis v. Aleutians East Borough" on Justia Law

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Appellant Zebuleon Whitney collided with a bicyclist in his pick-up truck, seriously injuring the bicyclist. The bicyclist sought a settlement agreement in excess of the maximum coverage of the driver’s insurance policy. Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) responded with an offer to tender policy limits, which the bicyclist refused. After a series of court proceedings in both state and federal court, Appellant sued his insurance company, complaining in part that his insurance company had breached its duty to settle. State Farm moved for partial summary judgment on a portion of the duty to settle claims. The superior court granted the motion. The parties then entered a stipulation by which Appellant dismissed all remaining claims, preserving his right to appeal, and final judgment was entered in the insurance company’s favor. Because State Farm’s rejection of the bicyclist’s settlement demand and its responsive tender of a policy limits offer was not a breach of the duty to settle, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to that extent. But because the superior court’s order exceeded the scope of the insurance company’s motion for partial summary judgment, The Court reversed the superior court’s order to the extent it exceeded the narrow issue upon which summary judgment was appropriate. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings concerning the surviving duty to settle claims. View "Whitney v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law