Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Zebuleon Whitney collided with a bicyclist in his pick-up truck, seriously injuring the bicyclist. The bicyclist sought a settlement agreement in excess of the maximum coverage of the driver’s insurance policy. Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) responded with an offer to tender policy limits, which the bicyclist refused. After a series of court proceedings in both state and federal court, Appellant sued his insurance company, complaining in part that his insurance company had breached its duty to settle. State Farm moved for partial summary judgment on a portion of the duty to settle claims. The superior court granted the motion. The parties then entered a stipulation by which Appellant dismissed all remaining claims, preserving his right to appeal, and final judgment was entered in the insurance company’s favor. Because State Farm’s rejection of the bicyclist’s settlement demand and its responsive tender of a policy limits offer was not a breach of the duty to settle, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to that extent. But because the superior court’s order exceeded the scope of the insurance company’s motion for partial summary judgment, The Court reversed the superior court’s order to the extent it exceeded the narrow issue upon which summary judgment was appropriate. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings concerning the surviving duty to settle claims. View "Whitney v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A child lived with both of his parents for the first two years of his life. His parents then separated, and they shared custody of the child for about a year, first under an informal agreement and later under the terms of the divorce decree. Less than a month after the decree was entered, Appellant Michael Rego (father) notified Appellee Joanna Rego (mother) that he intended to relocate to his former home state. Following a hearing, the superior court ruled that the move constituted a change of circumstances that justified a custody modification. Applying a "best interests" analysis, the superior court awarded custody to the mother if the father moved. The father appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that because the superior court applied the correct legal standard concerning the planned move and it did not abuse its discretion in weighing the best interest factors, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision regarding custody. View "Rego v. Rego" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Stevens was charged with and convicted of violating local borough noise and adult entertainment ordinances. The borough later protested the continued operation of his bar under its Alcoholic Beverage Control Board (ABC Board) liquor license. The ABC Board sustained the protest and denied Appellant's continued operation. Appellant requested an adjudicatory hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) to review the ABC Board's decision. The ALJ recommended the ABC Board uphold its initial decision and enforce the denial of continued operation under the license. Appellant appealed to the superior court which affirmed the ABC Board's decision. Appellant appealed again to the Supreme Court, who found the evidence in the ABC Board's and ALJ's record sufficient to overcome a challenge that the borough behaved in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner in protesting Appellant's operation under his liquor license. The Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Stevens v. Alaska Alcoholic Beverage Ctrl. Bd." on Justia Law

An Alaska state trooper was terminated in part due to dishonesty. The Public Safety Employees Association (PSEA) filed a grievance on behalf of the discharged trooper and then invoked arbitration. An arbitrator reinstated the trooper, ruling that the State did not have cause to terminate him. The superior court upheld the arbitrator's ruling. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the arbitrator committed gross error and that the reinstatement of the trooper was unenforceable. Upon review of the arbitrator's decision and subsequent superior court ruling, the Supreme Court held that the arbitrator's award in this case was not enforceable as a violation of public policy: "the State should be free to heighten its enforcement of ethical standards. . . We are [. . . ] troubled by the arbitrator's suggestion that the State's past lenience toward minor dishonesty requires it to be permanently lenient." Because the arbitrator's award was neither unenforceable nor grossly erroneous, the Court affirmed the superior court and the arbitration decision. View "Alaska v. Public Safety Employees Association" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant Byron Kalmakoff of raping and murdering his cousin when he was fifteen years old. Troopers sent to investigate the murder conducted four interviews with Defendant. Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress statements he made in those interviews based on "Miranda" violations. The trial court suppressed a portion of the first interview and all of the second, but admitted the third and fourth interviews. The court of appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions, concluding that any error in admitting portions of the first interview was harmless and that the third and fourth interviews were "sufficiently insulated" from any Miranda violations that occurred during the first two interviews. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for additional fact findings and concluded that the Miranda violations from the first two interviews violated Defendant's right to remain silent. As such, the third and fourth interviews were tainted by violations in the first two interviews. The Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Kalmakoff v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Shabd-Sangeet Khalsa bought a home kit from Mandala Custom Homes in 2003. The house was assembled and Appellant moved in. Shortly thereafter, the house developed various problems. Appellant climbed a ladder to inspect a leak in the ceiling and fell, injuring herself. Appellant sued Mandala and other parties in 2006, alleging that the house was defective and that the defects in the home caused a host of other damages, including those related to her fall. The superior court set a discovery schedule. When discovery did not proceed smoothly, the court ordered Appellant to sign medical releases, present herself for deposition, and submit to medical testing, cautioning her that if she did not comply with discovery orders, the court would impose sanctions against her. When Appellant refused to sign the medical release forms, the court found her in contempt and dismissed her fall-related claims. Proceeding with Appellant's other claims, the court turned to Appellant's deposition which had been delayed multiple times. The superior court concluded that Appellant's conduct when she eventually did appear constituted a willful refusal to comply with its orders. The court then dismissed Appellant's entire case with prejudice. Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion. Finding no abuse, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal. View "Khalsa v. Chose" on Justia Law

In 2005 the Department of Revenue denied Permanent Fund Dividends (PDFs) to Appellants In and Peggy Harrod and their children. The Harrods appealed to the superior court where they argued that the Department lacked the authority to adopt residency requirements for the dividend program, that the denial of their applications violated the U.S. and State constitutions, and that their 2002 and 2003 dividend applications were wrongfully denied. The superior court affirmed the denial of the dividends. From 1997 to 2000, the Harrods resided outside of Alaska and did not apply for PDFs. In 2001 they unsuccessfully applied. Because they had been absent from Alaska for more than five years, a presumption arose that they did not intend to return and remain in state. The DOR applied the presumption and the Harrods did not rebut it. The presumption was applied in the Harrods' 2002 and 2003 applications, and the DOR found that despite returning in state on infrequent or short trips, the Harrods had not remained in-state for five years. Having reviewed the parties' arguments and the record on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. View "Harrod v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Landowner Appellant Charles Miller contracted with Handle Construction Company, a manufacturer of pre-fabricated steel hangars, to erect a steel hangar on his land. After completing its work, the Company sued Appellant for unanticipated costs it incurred as a result of manufacturing defects in the hangar. Appellant made an offer of judgment which the Company accepted. When the Company received a separate payment from the hangar's manufacturer, Appellant refused to pay the full amount, arguing that an offset was warranted. The superior court rejected Appellant's argument and ordered him to pay the full amount of the offer. The case was submitted to the Supreme Court for review, but the Court determined that the basis for the superior court's decision was unclear. The Court reversed the decision and remanded the case for additional factual findings. View "Miller v. Handle Construction Company" on Justia Law

In 2007, after receiving 39 protective services reports involving allegations of abuse and neglect over the course of fifteen years, the Office of Children's Services (OCS) removed five children from parents "Ralph" and "Nell" based on evidence of physical abuse, mental inure, and chronic neglect. OCS put the children in foster care and provided the parents with case plans. Ralph and Nell had a sixth child. The superior court terminated parental rights to the newborn's older brother, but a separate trial was held with respect to her. Based on evidence of the parents' unremedied conduct and conditions that made the newborn a "child in need of aid," the superior court concluded that it was in the newborn's best interest to terminate Ralph and Nell's parental rights to her. Ralph appealed the termination order and the denial of his motion for continued visitation. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the superior court did not clearly err in finding Ralph had not timely remedied the conduct and conditions that placed the newborn at substantial risk of harm. The Court concluded that the superior court properly concluded that Ralph failed to show that ordering continued visitation after termination of parental rights was in the child's best interests. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's order. View "Ralph H. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Human Svcs." on Justia Law

In 2003, Officer Lee Virg-In used a taser twice on J.N., an 11-year-old girl. She had been driving an ATV in the streets of Kotzebue with another younger passenger. J.N. ran several stop signs and was otherwise driving dangerously. The Officer used his overhead lights and siren to signal J.N. to stop, but she refused, first trying to escape on the ATV and later on foot. According to J.N., she was never aggressive or threatening when the Officer eventually caught up with her. Sandra Russell, J.N.'s mother, filed a complaint against Officer Virg-In, alleging that his use of the taser constituted excessive force. Ms. Russell also sued the City of Kotzebue. The Officer defended the reasonableness of his actions and argued he was immune from suit. The superior court dismissed J.N.'s claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it was error to grant the Officer qualified immunity "because if a police officer used a taser multiple times on an 11-year-old girl who was suspected of traffic violations, was compliant and was not posing a threat to the officer or others, that conduct would be so egregious that any reasonable officer would have known the conduct was an excessive use of force." The Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Russell v. Virg-In" on Justia Law