Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Thomas Price, Jr. posted "no trespassing" signs on his property in 1998 in an attempt to quell what he believed were an excessive number of snow machiners using a trail that crossed his land, damaging it, traveling at high speeds, and causing a great deal of noise. In 2003, the Supreme Court held that a group of snow machiners had established a public prescriptive easement over the trail but twice remanded the case to the superior court to define the scope of the easement. The superior court held additional hearings, and in 2007 issued a memorandum that defined the easement. Appellant appealed the court's definition. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant did not meet his burden of proving that the volume of snow machine traffic exceeded the scope of the easement. However, the Court reversed the superior court's decision that found the easement includes non-snow machine users. The Court remanded the case again for further clarification on the permissible scope of the snow machine easement, including seasonal limits, width and speed limit. View "Price v. Eastham" on Justia Law

In 2006, Appellant Yvan Safar contracted with developer Per Bjorn-Roli to construct a 12-unit condominium project. Appellee Wells Fargo agreed to finance the project. By early 2007, the developer paid Appellant the entire amount of his contract, and Wells Fargo disbursed the entire loan, but the units were not complete. Appellant allegedly used his own funds to meet his payroll needs on the project. The project overran its budget, and Wells Fargo had to foreclose. Appellant contended that the bank promised to reimburse him for monies he spent in contemplating the completion of the project. After trial, the superior court found that Wells Fargo made no enforceable promise to Appellant to reimburse him. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the bank did not make any promise or commitment to Appellant sufficient to meet the "actual promise" element of promissory estoppel. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Appellant's case. View "Safar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Christina J. appealed the termination of her parental rights to her son Gideon. She developed substance abuse problems as a young teenager and because involved in an abusive relationship with Gideon's father shortly after leaving custody of the Office of Children's Services (OCS). Gideon was born when Christina was 19 and removed from her custody when he was four months old after OCS received reports of violence, substance abuse and neglect from both parents. Christina participated in substance abuse, domestic violence and mental health assessments, but nine months after OCS took custody of Gideon, it petitioned to terminate her parental rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Christina failed to remedy the conduct that placed Gideon at a substantial risk of harm. Accordingly, the Court held that the lower court did not err by finding termination of Christina's parental rights was in Gideon's best interest. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Christina J. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Terminated employee Karen Crowley appealed a superior court's dismissal of her contract claims against her former employer, the Alaska Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services (OCS). Ms. Crowley was hired in 2000 as a non-permanent social worker. She was granted permanent status after a six-month probation. Toward the end of her probationary period, Ms. Crowley's supervisor began receiving complaints about Ms. Crowley's job performance. An investigation was initiated. The report of the investigation found seven specific allegations against her. In 2002, the director of OCS terminated Ms. Crowley's employment. Subsequently Ms. Crowley filed suit in 2004, alleging breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful retaliation and discrimination based on age and race. In 2006, the superior court granted summary judgment to OCS on all counts. Ms. Crowley appealed to the Supreme Court in 2007, which then reversed and remanded the superior court's judgment with respect to the good faith and fair dealing and retaliation claims. The remaining issues were retried, and judgment reentered in favor of OCS. Upon re-review of Ms. Crowley's claims, the Supreme Court found that she showed neither an objective nor a subjective breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment dismissing her case. View "Crowley v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The City of Juneau has an ordinance that prohibits smoking in certain places. In 2008, the City Assembly amended the ordinance to prohibit smoking in "private clubs" that offer food or alcoholic beverages for sale. The Fraternal Order of Eagles, Juneau-Douglas Aerie 4200 and three of its members challenged the ban on smoking on both its face and as applied to their Aerie facility. The Eagles argued that the prohibition violates both their First Amendment rights under the federal and state constitutions. Upon careful consideration of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the ban on smoking in private clubs did not violate the Eagles' right to privacy under the federal or state constitutions, nor did it implicate the freedom of association under the federal First Amendment. The Court affirmed a lower court's order that granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Juneau. View "Fraternal Order of Eagles, Juneau-Douglas Aerie 4200 v. City & Borough of Juneau" on Justia Law

The Alaska Department of Transportation and Public Facilities (DOTPF) fired Appellee Paul Smith for misconduct. Smith, an equipment operator, shot and field-dressed a moose while on duty in 2005 and received a thirty-day suspension. In 2006, he took a fuel tank stand from his workstation, later claiming that he thought he received permission to do so. At about the same time, 100 gallons of fuel disappeared from the same station. DOTPF concluded that Appellee had stolen the fuel and terminated him. After unsuccessfully filing union grievances and complaints with the state Human Rights Commission and federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Appellee filed suit, alleging breach of contract, civil rights and tort law violations. The superior court granted summary judgment to the state on all counts. Appellee appealed the superior court's ruling on his civil rights and contract claims. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record and the arguments Appellee made on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decisions as to both of Appellee's claims. View "Smith v. Alaska" on Justia Law

At issue for the Supreme Court was whether under the Federal Constitution a criminal defendant's court-appointed counsel must, upon the defendant's demand after lawful sentencing pursuant to a plea agreement, file a petition for discretionary sentence review by the Court when state law precludes an appeal of right. Defendant David Stone was charged with manslaughter, assault, and driving under the influence. Soon after judgment was entered, an attorney from the public defender agency asked Defendant if he wished to appeal his sentence. The attorney reviewed his file, and spoke with Defendant's trial counsel. After review, the attorney concluded that Defendant could not appeal his sentence. Defendant pro se petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that the attorney's failure to object or appeal his sentence as excessive constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The superior court denied Defendant's application, holding that it was "unwilling to find that an attorney is ineffective on the sole basis that the attorney did not advance a meritless argument." On argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended that because Defendant did not question the legality of his sentence, it could not have been ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to appeal his sentence. Defendant countered by arguing that he was entitled to appellate review regardless of the terminology he used. The Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court. Upon its consideration of the legal authority and briefs submitted by both parties, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate courts, holding that Defendant was entitled to require his court-appointed counsel to file a petition for the Court's discretionary review of his sentence. View "Stone v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The State provided prisoner Dewell Pearce extensive medical care during his incarceration. Around the time of his release from custody, Mr. Pearce won a medical malpractice judgment against the State. The State paid part of the judgment, but relying on a reimbursement statute, withheld the medical care costs associated with conditions unrelated to the malpractice claim. The State then sought a declaratory judgment that it was entitled to reimbursement from Mr. Pearce for treatment of the unrelated conditions. The superior court ruled that the statute in question did not authorize the State to seek reimbursement from former prisoners no longer in custody. The State appealed. Upon review of the superior court record and the applicable statute, the Supreme Court found that the superior court misinterpreted the law. The Court reversed the superior court's ruling and vacated the judgment. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Alaska Dep't of Corrections v. Hendricks-Pearce" on Justia Law

In 1999, Appellant-Employee Kenneth Monzulla hurt his back at work. In 2001, he and his employer entered a partial compromise and release agreement to settle all issues stemming from the injury except for future medical care for his lumbar and thoracic spine. More recent disputes involved the extent of Appellant's medical care. A recurring issue between the parties pertained to venue for the proceedings. In 2008, Appellee Voorhees Concrete Cutting asked the Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission to review and stay a non-final order that denied its change of venue from Fairbanks. The Commission first issued a partial stay, which permitted the case to go forward in any venue other than Fairbanks. It later reviewed the merits of the Workers' Compensation Board's decision to deny the change of venue and reversed it. On appeal, Mr. Monzulla contended that the Commission did not have subject matter jurisdiction over "motions for extraordinary review." He claimed that legislature only granted the Commission jurisdiction to hear appeals of final Board orders. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that jurisdiction to hear appeals is "necessarily incident to the Commission's express power" to hear appeals from final Board decisions. The Court affirmed the Commission's decision. View "Monzulla v. Voorhees Concrete Cutting" on Justia Law

Appellant Leta Trask painted a religious message on her roof. Appellee Ketchikan Gateway Borough filed a complaint to enjoin Ms. Trask from displaying the message. The Borough argued that the message was in violation of a borough ordinance prohibiting roof signs. Ms. Trask counterclaimed for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the Borough's enforcement of the ordinance violated her free speech rights. The superior court held that the message was not a "sign" contemplated by the ordinance and that she did not have to remove it. The court dismissed Ms. Trask's 1983 claim for lack of standing. Ms. Trask appealed the dismissal of her 1983 claim to the Supreme Court. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that it was error to dismiss Ms. Trask's 1983 claim. The Court reversed the lower court's dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trask v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law