Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gas producers that lease land from Alaska must pay royalties calculated on the value of the gas produced from the leased area. The royalty may be calculated in one of two methods: the “higher of” pricing or contract pricing. “Higher of” pricing is the default method of calculating royalties and is calculated using market data and the prices of other producers. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) usually does not calculate the royalty payments under “higher of” pricing until years after production. Under contract pricing, the lessee’s price at which it sells gas is used to determine the royalty payment. Appellant Marathon Oil requested contract pricing from 2008 onward and sought retroactive application of contract pricing for 2003-2008. The DNR approved contract pricing from 2008 onward but denied the retroactive application. The superior court affirmed the DNR’s decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Marathon argued that the statute that governs contract pricing permitted retroactive application of contract pricing. Upon review of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that though the statute was ambiguous, it would defer to the DNR’s interpretation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the DNR’s order. View "Marathon Oil Co. v. Dep't. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Chilkoot Lumber Company, a commercial landlord (Chilkoot) and its tenant, Rainbow Glacier Seafood (Rainbow) resolved their lease dispute by settlement and entered the terms of the settlement on the record at trial. Rainbow did not follow through with its duties under the settlement agreement. After the time for performance by Rainbow had expired, Chilkoot moved the court to enforce the agreement. The superior court denied the motion to enforce. On reconsideration, the parties tentatively agreed to reinstate the settlement agreement with new deadlines for performance. When they could not agree on new deadlines, the superior court entered an order that enforced the settlement agreement as modified by Rainbow’s proposed deadlines. Chilkoot subsequently violated the order, and the superior court ordered it to pay $1,000 per day it violated the agreement. Chilkoot appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court erred by imposing its own deadlines and sanctioning Chilkoot $1,000 per day. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order. The Court held it was an error for the lower court to conclude that the parties had not reached a settlement agreement and to deny Chilkoot’s motion to enforce the agreement. Furthermore, the Court found that the court’s sanctions against Chilkoot were "coercive and remedial, rather than punitive." The Court reversed the superior court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Chilkoot Lumber Co. v. Rainbow Glacier Seafoods, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Frank Griswold appealed the Homer Advisory Planning Commission’s grant of a conditional-use permit to a mariculture association. The city clerk rejected his appeal for lack of standing because Appellant did not show that the permitted action would have an adverse effect on the use, enjoyment or value of his property. Appellant appealed that rejection to the superior court. The court affirmed the Planning Commission’s decision. Upon review of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision. The Court found that the Homer City Code restricted standing in land use appeals and that the city clerk correctly rejected Appellant’s appeal. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

Appellant Loren Larson, Jr. sued Alaska, alleging that the Alaska Court of Appeals violated its "duties to establish rules of law and declare what legal rights a citizen has." The court dismissed Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief from an earlier conviction for two murders and one burglary. The superior court ruled that Appellant’s suit was barred by both judicial immunity and res judicata. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s case. The Court found that Appellant identified the source of the appellate court’s duties from the preamble of the Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct but did not make any specific allegations in relation to the law or to his case. With nothing more, the Court concluded that Appellant failed to state a claim for relief and dismissed his case. View "Larson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the 2008 valuation of a parcel of real property owned by Appellant Martha Dunnagan. Larry Varilek, the personal representative of Ms. Dunnagan’s estate, argued that the Board of Equalization overvalued the property and appealed the Board’s decision. The superior court held that Mr. Varilek failed to prove that the property was overvalued. Mr. Varilek appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the Board’s assessment. The Court found that Mr. Varilek failed to meet his burden by showing that the Board’s valuation was improper. View "Varilek v. Burke" on Justia Law

Appellant Habib Azimi was involved in a car accident and subsequently brought a pro se personal injury suit against the other driver, Appellee David Johns. Mr. Azimi twice asked for continuances for medical reasons, but the court denied both. Eventually final judgment was entered in favor of Mr. Johns, dismissing Mr. Azimi's case. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Azimi argued that his case should not have been dismissed. He argued that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his requests for continuances, and that the court did not provide "adequate guidance" under Alaska's lenient standards for pro se litigants. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the trial record, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that Mr. Azimi had not completed presentation of his case-in-chief. The Court found that the case could not be dismissed before the trial court weighed all of the evidence. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 1956, Appellants Harold and Ellen Cowan were deeded half of a tract of land that contained a "perpetual right of way running with the land" over a thirty-foot strip along its southeastern side. Between 1960 and 1973, Appellee Sharon Yeisley was deeded the other half that ran adjacent to the Cowan's land. The Yeisley deed made no mention of the right-of-way. Ms. Yeisley applied to subdivide her tract in 1980. The plat was approved and recorded. The new plat showed the right of way. In 2006, the Cowans filed suit against the Borough of Ketchikan, Sharon Yeisley and other parties seeking to quiet the title to the right of way. The Cowans argued that their 1956 deed conveyed it, or in the alternative, they acquired the strip by adverse possession. All parties filed motions for summary judgment. The superior court ruled that the 1956 deed did not convey the strip to the Cowans and that they had not adversely possessed it. The court applied the then-current adverse possession statute instead of the statute in effect when the Yeisley land was subdivided. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Cowans argued that the superior court erred in using the 2003 adverse possession statute. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The Court found that the lower court should not have used the 2003 statute. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant Phyllis Williams appealed an order of the superior court that denied four motions to reconsider child support, visitation arrangements, the appointment of a court custody investigator, and a share of her ex-husband Appellee DeJeaux Williams' military retirement pay. Both parties appeared pro se. Upon careful consideration of all of Ms. Williams' arguments, the Supreme Court found that Ms. Williams' motions were either untimely or otherwise lacked merit. The Court dismissed Ms. Williams' appeal and affirmed the lower court's orders on all matters raised on appeal.

Bryan and Leota Bagby divorced in 2008. Mr. Bagby was awarded custody of the coupleâs only child during the school year. Mrs. Bagby was awarded visitation in the summer months and on alternate holidays. Mr. Bagby moved to Arizona after the custody trial. Mrs. Bagby filed a motion to modify the custody order, but the court denied the motion without holding a hearing. The court reasoned that Mr. Bagbyâs move was not a substantial change in circumstances since the original order contemplated long-distance travel for visitation when both parents lived in different cities in Alaska. Mrs. Bagby appealed. The Supreme Court had consistently held that an out-of-state move is a substantial change in circumstances. In this case, the Court reversed the lower courtâs order and remanded the case for a hearing on Mrs. Bagbyâs motion to modify custody.

Appellee Advanced Physical Therapy, Inc. (APT) terminated the employment of Appellant Patricia Hoendermis. She had previously served as the clinicâs practice administrator. APTâs reason for terminating her was that Appellant had difficulty communicating with her co-workers and supervisors. Accordingly, Appellant disagreed with APTâs decision, and sued APT for wrongful termination and for failing to provide her overtime compensation. Appellant maintained that she was not an administrative or executive employee, and was therefore entitled to overtime pay. Furthermore, she alleged APT violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in her employment contract. The Superior Court granted APT summary judgment, and Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court reversed the grant of summary judgment to APT because it found genuine issues of material fact raised by Appellant on both her overtime compensation and wrongful termination claims. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.