Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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A woman, Lila B., was detained at a psychiatric hospital for a mental health evaluation due to a severe head-lice infestation. The hospital staff sought to shave her head without her consent, arguing it was necessary to treat the lice and prevent their spread to other patients and staff. Lila objected, citing her religious beliefs and the psychological impact of head-shaving.The Superior Court of Alaska authorized the involuntary head-shaving, finding that the hospital had a compelling interest in preventing the spread of lice and that shaving her head was the least restrictive means of achieving this. The court relied on testimony from hospital staff that other treatments, such as permethrin shampoo, would be ineffective due to the severity of the infestation and that isolation was not feasible.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and held that the State must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that head-shaving is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling government interest. The court found that the State failed to meet this heightened standard. The evidence did not clearly and convincingly establish that less restrictive alternatives, such as using permethrin shampoo in conjunction with a head covering or some form of isolation, were inadequate. The court concluded that the State did not sufficiently explore these alternatives.As a result, the Supreme Court of Alaska vacated the order authorizing the involuntary head-shaving, emphasizing the need for the State to meet a substantial evidentiary burden before infringing on a patient's fundamental rights. View "In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of Lila B." on Justia Law

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An Alaska hunter challenged a state regulation that allocates permits for hunting Kodiak brown bears, with at least 60% reserved for Alaska residents and no more than 40% for nonresidents, who must generally hunt with a professional guide. The hunter argued that this allocation grants nonresidents a special privilege in violation of the Alaska Constitution’s principle of equal access to fish and game and that it fails to manage resources for the maximum benefit of Alaskans.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, upheld the regulation, concluding that it did not grant an exclusive right to nonresidents and that the allocation system was within permissible bounds. The court found that the regulation did not exclude residents from hunting and that the allocation balanced various interests, including economic benefits and conservation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the regulation did not violate the equal access clauses of the Alaska Constitution. It reasoned that treating residents and nonresidents differently does not, in itself, violate the constitution, and that the regulation did not grant nonresidents an unconstitutional special privilege. The court also found that the state could consider economic benefits when managing wildlife resources and that the Board of Game had taken a hard look at the relevant factors, including conservation and economic benefits, when establishing the permit system. Thus, the regulation was consistent with the constitutional duty to manage resources for the maximum benefit of Alaskans. View "Cassell v. State of Alaska, Department of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

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A man was injured in an accident outside city limits and sued a city and an emergency-responder employee for negligently providing assistance and aggravating his injuries. The city and employee offered the man $7,500 to settle the lawsuit, which he did not accept. They also moved for summary judgment, arguing that they could not be sued because AS 09.65.070(d)(4) does not allow lawsuits based on the “gratuitous extension of municipal services” beyond city limits. The superior court granted summary judgment in their favor, ruling that their actions were gratuitous because they were under no legal obligation to take them. The court also granted attorney’s fees to the city and employee based on a court rule that requires a party to pay the other side’s legal fees if the party rejected an offer of judgment to settle the case that was more favorable than the judgment the party ultimately received.The man appealed, arguing that the city’s emergency response was not gratuitous because he was billed a mileage fee for the ambulance service. He also argued that the city and employee were not entitled to attorney’s fees because their pretrial offer of judgment was invalid.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that AS 09.65.070(d)(4) bars the lawsuit because the city and employee’s actions were gratuitous, meaning they were performed without legal obligation and without charging more than the standard fee. The court also held that the offer of judgment was valid and that the superior court did not err in awarding attorney’s fees to the city and employee. The court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment and the award of attorney’s fees. View "Rochon v. City of Nome" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Jouppi, the owner of an airplane, was convicted of transporting beer into the village of Beaver, Alaska, which prohibits the importation of alcoholic beverages. Following his conviction, Alaska law mandated the forfeiture of his airplane as it was used to commit the offense. Jouppi argued that the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the U.S. Constitution.The District Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, initially declined to order the forfeiture on statutory grounds. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, mandating the forfeiture. On remand, the trial court again declined to order the forfeiture, this time on constitutional grounds, finding it unconstitutionally excessive. The State appealed again, and the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling, remanding for further fact-finding, as it concluded the trial court failed to correctly apply the test for excessive fines from United States v. Bajakajian.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It held that the forfeiture of the airplane did not violate the Excessive Fines Clause because it was not grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense. The court found that the forfeiture was punitive and thus a "fine" under the Eighth Amendment. Applying the Bajakajian factors, the court concluded that the forfeiture was not excessive given the nature and extent of the crime, the legislative intent behind the statute, and the harm caused by the offense. The court also noted that Jouppi failed to preserve his arguments under the Alaska Constitution and the Sixth Amendment, and thus did not address them. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Jouppi v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

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A former landlord sued two commercial tenants and their law firm, alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. The claims arose from prior litigation where the tenants had successfully counterclaimed for damages against the landlord. The landlord claimed that the tenants' actions during the prior litigation caused him emotional distress and were malicious and abusive.In the prior proceedings, the landlord had filed a forcible entry and detainer (FED) action against the tenants, which resulted in the tenants counterclaiming for breach of contract and other damages. The superior court dismissed the landlord's FED claim and some of the tenants' counterclaims but awarded the tenants damages for breach of contract related to property maintenance. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed this decision.The superior court dismissed the landlord's new claims, taking judicial notice of the prior proceedings without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that the NIED claim was barred by litigation privilege, the malicious prosecution claim failed because the prior proceedings did not terminate entirely in the landlord's favor, and the abuse of process claim failed because the landlord did not allege an ulterior purpose separate from the litigation process.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision. It held that the superior court properly took judicial notice of the prior proceedings and did not need to convert the motion to dismiss. The court agreed that the NIED claim was barred by litigation privilege, the malicious prosecution claim failed due to the lack of favorable termination, and the abuse of process claim failed because the landlord did not allege an ulterior purpose independent from the litigation process. View "Griffith v. Hemphill" on Justia Law

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Kaiser-Francis Oil Company (KFOC), a Delaware corporation, and its subsidiary Aurora-KF, LLC, sold Aurora Gas, LLC, an Alaska company, to Rieck Oil, Inc., a Delaware corporation formed by Kay Rieck. The sale included an indemnity guarantee from Deutsche Oel & Gas, S.A. (DOGSA), another company owned by Rieck, to cover obligations under a pre-existing guarantee by George B. Kaiser to Cook Inlet Regional, Inc. (CIRI). When Aurora Gas went bankrupt, CIRI called on Kaiser and KFOC to fulfill the obligations, but DOGSA and Rieck Oil did not indemnify them.KFOC sued Rieck Oil, DOGSA, and Kay Rieck in the Alaska Superior Court, seeking to pierce Rieck Oil’s corporate veil to hold Rieck personally liable. The superior court applied Delaware law, reasoning that most jurisdictions apply the law of the state of incorporation for veil-piercing claims. Under Delaware law, the court found that KFOC failed to prove the necessary element of fraud or injustice to pierce the corporate veil and ruled in favor of Rieck.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case, focusing on whether Alaska or Delaware law should apply to the veil-piercing claim. The court held that Alaska law applies, as veil-piercing is not a matter of internal corporate affairs but involves the rights of third parties. The court reasoned that Alaska has a more significant interest in the matter, given the involvement of Alaska land and an Alaska Native Corporation. Consequently, the court vacated the superior court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings under Alaska law. View "Kaiser-Francis Oil Company v. Deutsche Oel & Gas, S.A." on Justia Law

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The case involves the State of Alaska's statutes that allow local school districts to operate correspondence study programs and provide public funds for educational expenses. Parents of public school students sued the State, arguing that these statutes violated the Alaska Constitution by allowing public funds to be used for private school tuition, which they claimed was unconstitutional.The Superior Court of Alaska ruled that the statutes were facially unconstitutional and invalidated them entirely. The court did not address the narrower question of whether the statutes were unconstitutional when applied to allow public funds to be used for private school tuition. The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Alaska.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and determined that the Superior Court's ruling went too far. The Supreme Court noted that the statutes allowed for a substantial number of constitutionally valid uses of allotment funds, such as purchasing books, supplies, and other educational materials. The court emphasized that even if using allotment funds for private school tuition were unconstitutional, it would not justify invalidating the entire statutes.The Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court instructed that the proper parties must be joined, and the Superior Court must first determine whether the statutes actually permit the use of allotment funds for private school tuition before addressing the constitutionality of such use. The Supreme Court did not decide whether using allotment funds for private school tuition is constitutional, leaving that question open for further consideration. View "State of Alaska, Dept. of Education & Early Development v. Alexander" on Justia Law

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A group of foster children challenged the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) for using their federal Social Security benefits to reimburse itself for foster care costs. The children claimed this practice violated their due process and equal protection rights under the Alaska Constitution and sought restitution. The Superior Court of Alaska found a due process violation and ordered OCS to notify foster children about its practice regarding Social Security benefits. However, the court rejected the equal protection and restitution claims, deeming them preempted by federal law.The Superior Court held that OCS violated due process by not informing foster children about their Social Security benefits and the potential financial advantages of having a private representative payee. The court ordered OCS to provide notices explaining the concept of a representative payee, the consequences of OCS being the payee, and the possibility of proposing an alternative payee. OCS argued that complying with the notice order would violate federal privacy laws, but the court modified its order to address these concerns.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s conclusions. The Supreme Court held that the due process claim and the court’s notice order were not preempted by federal law. The court determined that foster children have a property interest in knowing about their Social Security benefits and the ability to nominate a private payee. The court found that OCS’s systematic practice of using benefits to reimburse itself without notice created a high risk of depriving children of their rights.The Supreme Court also held that the equal protection claim was preempted because it would conflict with federal regulations governing the use of Social Security benefits. The court concluded that OCS’s practice of using benefits for foster care costs was permissible under federal law. Finally, the court rejected the proposed remedies of disgorgement and creating a trust, as they would constitute impermissible attachments on federal benefits and were preempted by federal law. View "State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services v. Z. C." on Justia Law

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A woman sued her former attorneys for malpractice, alleging they failed to advocate for her interests during mediation, resulting in an unfavorable settlement for her and her business. The superior court granted summary judgment to the attorneys, concluding that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations and denied her motion to amend her complaint.The superior court ruled that the statute of limitations for the malpractice claim had expired, as the woman filed her suit more than three years after her injury occurred. The court also rejected her argument for tolling the limitations period under the continuous representation rule, concluding that her communications with the attorneys did not show continued representation in her personal capacity. Additionally, the court rejected her equitable estoppel argument, reasoning that the alleged conflicts of interest did not raise concerns under the Rules of Professional Conduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the grant of summary judgment, holding that the continuous representation rule applies to legal malpractice claims, delaying the accrual of the claim until the attorney's representation in the matter ceases. The court found a genuine factual dispute about when the attorneys' representation ended, vacating the superior court's decision and remanding for further proceedings. The court also affirmed the superior court's ruling that the attorneys are not barred by the doctrine of fraudulent estoppel from pleading the statute of limitations defense, as the woman failed to present evidence that her delay in filing suit was in reasonable reliance on the nondisclosure. Finally, the court vacated and remanded the superior court's decision to deny leave to amend the complaint, as the claims were not futile and leave to amend should have been granted. View "Sheldon-Lee v. Birch Horton Bittner, Inc." on Justia Law

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A father opposed the petition of his child's foster parent for guardianship. The child, a member of his mother's tribe, had been in the foster parent's care for about two years. The Office of Children's Services (OCS) took custody of the child in 2019 due to domestic violence and drug abuse in the mother's home. The father, living in Arizona at the time, was contacted by OCS after the child was taken into custody. OCS attempted to place the child with the father, but an Arizona home study recommended against it. The child was placed with the foster parent, a relative and tribal member.The superior court granted the foster parent's guardianship petition after an evidentiary hearing, finding it in the child's best interests and that returning the child to the father would likely result in serious emotional damage. The father appealed, arguing that the guardianship was a de facto termination of parental rights and required additional findings and procedural steps.The Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court to address whether OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). On remand, the superior court made additional findings on the existing record and reaffirmed the guardianship order.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion. The court held that the superior court made the necessary findings under ICWA, including that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family and that guardianship was in the child's best interests. The court also clarified that guardianship proceedings do not require the termination of parental rights and can proceed independently of a Child in Need of Aid (CINA) proceeding. The order appointing the guardian was affirmed. View "In re Protective Proceedings of Macon J." on Justia Law