Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A business was investigated by the Consumer Protection Unit (CPU) of the Alaska Attorney General’s Office after the CPU received an anonymous letter alleging that the business, a local car dealership, was charging documentation fees on top of advertised prices, potentially violating Alaska law. The letter included an email exchange confirming the practice. Following approval from the Department of Law, the CPU monitored the business’s website and conducted an undercover visit, during which employees confirmed the additional fees. In December, the CPU issued a subpoena requesting documents related to vehicle sales, including contracts and advertisements, to further its investigation.After the business missed the deadline to produce documents, it petitioned the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, to quash the subpoena. The business argued that the CPU lacked “cause to believe” a violation had occurred, as required by statute, and challenged the reliability of the anonymous complaint and the legitimacy of the undercover investigation. The CPU responded that the subpoena was an administrative subpoena, subject to a low threshold for issuance, and that the letter and email provided a sufficient basis for investigation.The Superior Court denied the petition to quash, finding that the subpoena was authorized under AS 45.50.495(b), was part of a good-faith investigation, and adequately specified the documents to be produced. The court held that the “cause to believe” standard did not apply to the subpoena power in subsection (b), but that even if it did, the evidence met the low bar required. The business appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska affirmed the superior court’s order, holding that the CPU had sufficient basis to issue the subpoena under AS 45.50.495(b), regardless of whether the “cause to believe” standard applied. The court found no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s decision. View "Business Doe, LLC v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A married couple separated after more than twenty years together and reached a settlement agreement to divide the marital portion of the husband’s Alaska Railroad Corporation pension plan equally, including a 50% survivor benefit for the wife. However, the pension plan’s terms did not allow for the precise division the parties intended. The plan only permitted three options for survivor benefits: no survivor, treating the wife as the surviving spouse (which would give her more than her marital share), or a conditional benefit that could end if the husband remarried and predeceased the wife. The husband proposed selecting the third option and, if he remarried, purchasing life insurance to protect the wife’s interest. The wife objected, expressing concern about relying on the husband to maintain life insurance and arguing for the option that would make her the sole survivor beneficiary.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, selected the third option, allowing the husband to name a future spouse as a joint survivor beneficiary, but did not require him to purchase life insurance. The court reasoned that this option most fairly allocated the risks and reflected the parties’ agreement to divide only the marital portion of the plan. The court did not address or incorporate the husband’s offer to purchase life insurance in its order.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether the superior court abused its discretion by not requiring life insurance or otherwise protecting the wife’s survivor benefit interest. The Supreme Court held that the superior court erred by failing to explain why it did not require the husband to purchase life insurance or otherwise ensure the wife’s interest was protected. The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to reconsider the life insurance offer and explain its decision. View "Sandvik v. Frazier" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over mining rights to a parcel of land near Nome, Alaska. After the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) deemed certain mining claims abandoned, two individuals, Foster and Baker, relocated and recorded new claims in 2017. However, another miner, Klutchnikov, also recorded claims on the same land, asserting an earlier staking date, which would give his claims priority. DNR notified the parties of the overlap and advised them to resolve the conflict through legal means. Klutchnikov later transferred his claims to Amerigold Holdings, LLC, which invested in developing the site. Baker and Silverbow Mining, LLC, whose claims were closed by DNR due to the unresolved conflict, filed suit seeking a declaration that Klutchnikov’s claims were invalid because he had not physically staked the land, but had instead “paper staked” the claims.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Second Judicial District, Nome, held a bench trial. The court admitted testimony from other miners about Klutchnikov’s alleged pattern of paper staking, over Amerigold’s objection. The court found that Klutchnikov had not physically staked the disputed claims and that Baker and Silverbow’s claims were valid. The court rejected Amerigold’s laches defense, concluding that Amerigold had not shown it was prejudiced by the delay in filing suit, and that any harm suffered by Amerigold’s manager, Hice, was not relevant because he was not a party.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska held that laches can apply to both quiet title and declaratory judgment actions when they are equitable in nature. The court further held that prejudice to a nonparty closely connected to the defendant, such as an investor with a contractual relationship, may be considered in the laches analysis. The court vacated the Superior Court’s rejection of the laches defense and remanded for further proceedings on that issue, but affirmed the admission of testimony regarding Klutchnikov’s prior acts as relevant to the absence of accident. View "Amerigold Holdings LLC v. Baker" on Justia Law

A couple divorced, and the superior court awarded them joint legal custody of their minor child, with primary physical custody to the mother. The court also divided the couple’s marital estate. The father, representing himself, appealed, arguing that the division of the marital estate was inequitable. He claimed errors in the court’s determinations, including not crediting him for post-separation payments, not allowing him to apply for the child’s Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), not allowing him to claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes, and its custody decision.The superior court held a one-day trial by videoconference, where both parties testified. The court issued a decree of divorce and findings of fact and conclusions of law, awarding joint legal custody to both parties and primary physical custody to the mother. The court divided the proceeds from the sale of the marital home, taking into account the father’s child support arrearage and an escrow shortage. The court also divided the couple’s vehicles and assigned debts based on testimony and the mother’s spreadsheet. The court ordered that the mother would be responsible for the child’s PFD and could claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes. The court ordered that the father’s 401(k) be divided equitably according to the mother’s spreadsheet.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. It vacated the superior court’s division of the marital estate, finding that the court’s treatment of the father’s 401(k) was unclear and lacked clarifying findings. It also found legal error in the court’s failure to address post-separation payments when dividing the marital estate. The court remanded for further proceedings on these issues. The Supreme Court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s decisions, including the custody award and the decisions regarding the child’s PFD and tax dependency. View "Wolffe v. Wolffe" on Justia Law

A nine-year-old boy lifted his grandmother, causing her to fall and suffer pain. The boy’s father, in response, pushed the boy to the ground to show him "how it felt to be Grandma." The boy’s mother sought a domestic violence protective order (DVPO) against the father on the boy’s behalf. The superior court granted the order, finding that the father had assaulted the boy and rejected the father's argument that the push was reasonable parental discipline.The superior court found that the father's actions amounted to an assault and were not reasonable corporal discipline. The court noted that the father should have calmed down and had a mature conversation with his son instead of pushing him to the ground. The court granted a long-term DVPO against the father. The father moved for reconsideration, arguing insufficient evidence of assault and permissible corporal discipline. The court denied reconsideration.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the superior court’s finding of assault, as the father’s actions caused the boy physical pain and were reckless. The court also affirmed the superior court’s rejection of the reasonable corporal discipline defense, finding that the father’s actions were not reasonable or appropriate and were motivated by retribution rather than a desire to promote the child’s welfare. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Peter R. v. B.M.R." on Justia Law

A mother and father, both residing in Nome, Alaska, disputed custody of their three children. The mother sought to modify the existing custody arrangement and move with the children to Palmer, where she and her new husband had purchased a home. The father opposed the move. Following a hearing, the superior court awarded primary physical custody and sole legal custody of the children to the father. The mother appealed.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Second Judicial District, found that the mother's relocation to Palmer constituted a substantial change in circumstances, necessitating a modification of the custody arrangement. The court awarded primary physical custody to the father, emphasizing the importance of maintaining the children's geographic stability in Nome. The court also awarded sole legal custody to the father, reasoning that joint legal custody only works when parents' decisions are consistent nearly all the time, which it found was not the case here.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the superior court erred by not conducting the required symmetrical analysis when one parent intends to relocate a significant distance. The court also failed to consider the children's relational stability in determining physical custody. The Supreme Court held that the superior court must conduct a symmetrical analysis, considering the consequences of the move with or without the children, and must also consider relational stability, not just geographic stability. Additionally, the Supreme Court found that the superior court's award of sole legal custody to the father was unsupported by the record and based on an incorrect legal standard. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the award of primary physical custody for the superior court to conduct the required analyses and reversed the award of sole legal custody, maintaining joint legal custody between the parents. View "Outwater v. Ahmasuk" on Justia Law

A challenge was brought against the Alaska Division of Elections for including Eric Hafner, a federal prisoner, as one of the four candidates on the 2024 general election ballot for the U.S. House of Representatives. Hafner, who finished sixth in the primary, was elevated to the general election ballot after two of the top-four candidates withdrew. The Alaska Democratic Party and Anita Thorne argued that Alaska law only allows the fifth-place candidate to replace a withdrawn candidate, not the sixth-place candidate.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, rejected the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate irreparable harm and sided with the Division's interpretation of the law, which required successive replacements for withdrawn candidates. The court also concluded that Hafner was not constitutionally disqualified and that he was an indispensable party to the litigation.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's decision. The court held that AS 15.25.100(c) requires the Division to replace successive withdrawn candidates on the general election ballot if additional primary candidates are available. The court found that the statute's language and the purpose of Ballot Measure 2, which aimed to increase voter choice, supported this interpretation. The court also noted that its precedent favors resolving ambiguities in election laws in favor of greater ballot access. Thus, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed. View "Alaska Democratic Party v. Beecher" on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed two Indian children from their home after finding their parents intoxicated and unable to care for them. The superior court adjudicated the children as being in need of aid, and the children’s tribe intervened. The children’s father moved to another state and, after initially failing to engage with OCS, eventually completed all case plan requirements. OCS then sought to place the children with their father through the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC), but the other state denied approval. Despite this, OCS sought permission from the superior court to release custody to the father while he was temporarily in Alaska.The superior court found that the ICPC was inapplicable to a release of custody to a parent under AS 47.14.100(p) and granted OCS’s request, dismissing the case. OCS released custody to the father before he left Alaska. The Native Village of Saint Michael appealed, arguing that the ICPC should apply and that the superior court failed to make adequate best interest findings.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and concluded that when OCS properly releases custody of a child to a parent under AS 47.14.100(p), the requirements of the ICPC do not apply, even if the parent plans to subsequently transport the child to another state. The court affirmed the superior court’s decision that the ICPC was inapplicable under the circumstances and that the other state’s approval was not required for placement with the father. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the case. View "Native Village of Saint Michael v. State" on Justia Law

A mother and father had their parental rights terminated in two consolidated child in need of aid (CINA) cases. They appealed the termination, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order and remanded for further proceedings. While the appeal was pending, the children's foster parents petitioned to adopt them, and the superior court granted the adoption petitions. On remand, the superior court did not require the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) to make further efforts to reunify the family and instead reevaluated the same information, terminating the parental rights again. The parents appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the termination order a second time.The parents then sought to vacate the adoption and reopen the CINA case. The adoptive parents opposed, arguing that the parents' attempt to vacate the adoption was barred by the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree. The superior court agreed with the adoptive parents, concluding that the parents' failure to appeal the adoption decree itself within one year barred their challenge. The court also concluded that the motion to reopen the CINA case was moot because the adoption remained valid, and the children were no longer in need of aid.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's judgment. The court held that the one-year limitation period for challenging an adoption decree under AS 25.23.140(b) applies strictly to appeals of the adoption decree itself, not to appeals of related termination orders in CINA cases. The court emphasized the legislative intent to provide finality and stability for adopted children, noting that allowing collateral attacks on adoption decrees beyond the one-year period would unreasonably disrupt the upbringing of adopted children. Consequently, the adoption remained valid, and the CINA case was moot. View "In re Adoption of C.R. and E.R. v. State" on Justia Law

A general contractor, Keluco General Contractors, Inc., secured a workers’ compensation and employers’ liability policy through Travelers Property Casualty Company of America. The policy was set to last one year, expiring on March 5, 2017. After the policy expired, a Keluco employee was injured at work. Keluco attempted to make a claim on its workers’ compensation policy and discovered it had expired. Travelers claimed to have sent a notice of nonrenewal to Keluco and its insurance agent, Gretchen Santerre, but Keluco claimed it never received the notice.Keluco sued Santerre and her employer, Country Mutual Insurance Company, for failing to inform it of the nonrenewal notice. Santerre filed a third-party complaint against Travelers. The Superior Court of Alaska granted partial summary judgment against Travelers, ruling that it failed to send the nonrenewal notice in the manner required by statute, specifically by not obtaining a certificate of mailing from the United States Postal Service (USPS). The court found that Travelers breached its contract with Keluco.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings on summary judgment, agreeing that Travelers violated AS 21.36.260 by not obtaining a certificate of mailing from USPS and thus breached its contract with Keluco. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Travelers’ contribution claim against Santerre, noting that Alaska law allows for the allocation of fault to a party who has settled out of a case.However, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court’s determination of when prejudgment interest began to accrue. The Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest should begin to accrue on September 20, 2017, the date the Keluco employee was injured and entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, rather than January 9, 2017. The case was remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest. View "Travelers Property Casualty Company of America v. Keluco General Contractors" on Justia Law