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The superior court terminated a mother’s and father’s parental rights, finding their two children were in need of aid based on abandonment, incarceration, risk of domestic violence, and substance abuse. The court also determined that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) had satisfied its duty to make reasonable efforts to reunify the parents and children. The mother and father separately appealed the court’s reasonable-efforts determinations; the mother also appealed the court’s findings that the children were in need of aid based on abandonment and domestic violence. Consolidating the cases, the Alaska Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed the superior court’s decision to terminate the mother’s and father’s parental rights. View "Violet C. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

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A mother wanted to relocate with her daughter from Alaska to New York. She sought primary custody, alleging that the father’s drinking and busy schedule made him an improper guardian for their two-year-old. The superior court concluded that it was in the child’s best interests to remain in Alaska in her father’s custody. The mother appealed, arguing the superior court erred in its analysis. The Alaska Supreme Court determined the superior court did not properly consider the effect of separating the child from her mother, vacated the custody order and remanded for further analysis. However, the Court affirmed the superior court's decision not to order protective measures to ensure the father's sobriety while caring for the child. View "Saffir v. Wheeler" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law

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Electrical utilities entered into agreements for the purchase and transmission of energy from a hydroelectric project to utilities in distant service areas. Legislation exempted the agreements from the review or approval of the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA); any disputes were to be resolved instead by a contractually established committee. A substation leased by Homer Electric Association (HEA) to Chugach Electric Association (Chugach) and used by Chugach for the transmission of the distant utilities’ electricity was along the transmission pathway. When the lease expired, HEA filed tariff applications with the RCA, seeking approval of rates for its own transmission of the other utilities’ energy. The other utilities objected to the RCA’s jurisdiction, citing their agreements and the legislation exempting the agreements from regulatory review. The RCA determined that it had the authority to consider the tariff applications. The affected utilities appealed to the superior court, which held that the RCA did not have that authority. HEA and the RCA petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for review, challenging both the superior court’s appellate jurisdiction and the merits of its decision regarding the RCA’s authority. The Supreme Court rejected the challenges to the superior court’s jurisdiction, and concluded that the intent of the original agreements and of the governing statute was to exclude disputes like this one from the RCA’s jurisdiction. The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the superior court reversing the RCA’s order. View "Regulatory Commission of Alaska v. Matanuska Electric Association, Inc." on Justia Law

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Two sisters were beneficiaries of their late parents trusts: one was trustee of the trusts and president of the family corporation; the other sister was a shareholder of the family corporation. The latter sister disputed proposed trust distributions and various aspects of the family corporation; she and her children sued the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty in both trustee and corporate capacities. The litigation resulted in two appeals, which the Alaska Supreme Court consolidated for oral argument and decision. After review, the Court largely affirmed the superior court s decisions because they were discretionary and, under the applicable standard of review, the Court could not say they were unreasonable given the court s factual findings; but the matters were remanded for reconsideration of certain trust property valuations, which may have required minor distribution adjustments. View "Bjorn-Roli v. Mulligan" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates

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Bill and Clara are the parents of Noah and Olwen, ages 12 and 5 at the time of the termination trial. Noah and Olwen were Indian children within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) based on their affiliation with the Aleut Community of St. Paul Island (theTribe). Bill and Clara had a lengthy history of alcohol abuse and domestic violence. Noah and Olwen suffered primarily through neglect and mental injury from exposure to their parents’ conduct. While Bill’s and Clara’s violence was typically directed at each other or other family members, there were reports of alleged physical abuse of Noah. The superior court terminated the parents' rights to their children. The parents appealed, arguing the superior court erred in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that OCS made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. Because the Alaska Supreme Court determined there was insufficient evidence to support an active efforts finding under a clear and convincing evidence standard, it reversed the superior court’s active efforts finding, vacated the termination order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bill S. v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

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A 2014 statute and 2013 regulation re-defined which abortions qualified as “medically necessary” for the purposes of Medicaid funding. The statute defined medically necessary abortions as those that “must be performed to avoid a threat of serious risk to the life or physical health of a woman from continuation of the woman’s pregnancy” as a result of a number of listed medical conditions; the regulation was similarly restrictive. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest challenged both the statute and regulation as unconstitutional, and the superior court held that both measures violated the equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution. The court reasoned that these measures imposed a “high-risk, high- hazard” standard on abortion funding unique among Medicaid services, and held that our 2001 decision striking down an earlier abortion funding restriction on equal protection grounds compelled the same result. The State appealed, arguing that the statute and regulation should be interpreted more leniently and therefore do not violate the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection clause. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision: the statute’s and the regulation’s facially different treatment of pregnant women based upon their exercise of reproductive choice required the Court to apply strict scrutiny, and the proposed justifications for the funding restrictions "did not withstand such exacting examination." View "Alaska v. Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest" on Justia Law

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An employer asked medical specialists to evaluate a worker with injuries to different body systems arising out of one work-related accident. The doctors gave two separate opinions, almost a year apart, about final medical stability and relevant permanent impairment ratings in their separate specialities. The employer paid no compensation based on the impairment ratings until almost three months after the second impairment rating. The worker asked the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board to order a penalty for late payment of impairment-related compensation benefits, but the Board agreed with the employer that no impairment-related compensation was payable until the employer obtained a combined impairment rating. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission reversed the Board’s decision, concluding that initial impairment-related compensation was payable upon notice of the first impairment rating and further impairment-related compensation was payable upon notice of the second impairment rating. The employer appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Unisea, Inc. v. Morales" on Justia Law

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In April 2014 Link Fannon acquired the property at issue in this appeal, along with a well and water system, from an owner subsequent to June Scheele’s 1998 transaction. The deed to Fannon made no mention of a Greenbelt Covenant. Fannon intended to increase the well’s production to service at least another ten acres of neighboring commercial property and to “sell bulk water” to the Department of Transportation for a Parks Highway upgrade. Fannon then began clear-cutting trees on Lot 1, Block 1. June’s estate brought suit against Fannon for violating the Greenbelt Covenant’s terms; the estate sought damages, a preliminary injunction against further clear-cutting, and an affirmative injunction to restore trees. The primary issue in this appeal was whether the superior court correctly interpreted two property restrictions, one found in a subdivision declaration and the other in a deed’s greenbelt covenant, to ultimately determine that the deed’s greenbelt covenant was enforceable. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court correctly applied interpretation rules by looking at the instrument language without regard to extrinsic evidence and correctly ruled that the subdivision declaration did not preclude the deed’s greenbelt covenant. It therefore affirmed the superior court’s decision. View "Fannon v. Polo" on Justia Law

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In 2002, Charles Herron, who was under the influence of alcohol and not old enough to legally possess or consume it, was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Bethel, Alaska A 15-year-old passenger in Herron’s vehicle, Angelina Trailov, was injured. Herron was insured by Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate filed a complaint for declaratory relief in the U.S. District Court in anticipation of Herron confessing judgment in the accident-related personal injury suit. Allstate requested a declaration that “its good faith attempt to settle Trailov and Mary Kenick's (Trailov's mother) claims satisfied its obligation to its insured, and a further declaration that Allstate [wa]s not obligated to pay any portion of the confessed judgment that exceed[ed] the limit of the bodily injury coverage afforded Herron under the [p]olicy.” Due to Herron’s April confession of judgment and assignment of claims, Allstate amended its federal complaint for declaratory relief. The only material addition was the statement that Herron had confessed judgment and assigned his rights against Allstate. The issue this case presented for the Alaska Supreme Court's review centered on the preclusive effect of that declaratory judgment in favor of the insurance company against its insured in federal court in a subsequent state court proceeding. The superior court concluded that the declaratory judgment had no preclusive effect on a negligent adjustment action brought in state court by the insured’s assignees against the insurance company and its claims adjuster. The state action proceeded to an 11-day jury trial ending with a multi-million dollar verdict against the insurance company and its claims adjuster. The declaratory judgment determined that the insurance company and the adjuster acted reasonably when they offered policy limits to settle the underlying claim against the insured. Because the insurance company’s and adjustor’s reasonableness in adjusting the insurance claim was a necessary element of a negligent adjustment tort, the Supreme Court held that the assignees of the insured were precluded from relitigating this issue. The superior court therefore erred in denying the insurance company’s and claims adjuster’s motions for summary judgment. View "Allstate Insurance Company v. Kenick" on Justia Law

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Dana Thompson was convicted of 13 counts of first degree sexual abuse of a minor and 4 counts of second degree sexual abuse of a minor stemming from a 4-year sexual relationship with the daughter of a family friend. The first degree sexual abuse of a minor convictions were based on the alternative theories that Thompson either: (1) occupied a “position of authority” over the victim; or (2) resided in the same household as the victim and had authority over her. Thompson argued to the court of appeals that the leading case interpreting the phrase “position of authority,” was wrongly decided. He alternatively argued that the jury was improperly instructed about the meaning of the phrase “position of authority.” The court of appeals rejected both arguments. Thompson also argued to the court of appeals that the superior court erred by failing to merge many of his convictions. The court of appeals rejected his argument that the rules for merger in sexual abuse of a minor cases should be different than the rules for merger in sexual assault cases. The court reaffirmed that for both types of cases the unit of prosecution is the distinct act of sexual penetration of different bodily orifices. But the court of appeals found that the superior court had misapplied the rules for merger and held that Thompson’s convictions for digital penetration, penis-to-genital penetration, and penetration with an object during the same time period merged because the same orifice was involved and the evidence was ambiguous as to whether each act “accompanied” the other acts. The State petitioned for review of the court of appeals’ merger ruling, proffering a rule allowing separate convictions for penetration with different objects or body parts, regardless of the time period. Thompson cross-petitioned, arguing the court of appeals’ rulings on “position of authority” and concluding that the jury was properly instructed, were erroneous. He also argued the unit of prosecution for merger purposes should be the “sexual episode” and that many of his convictions should have therefore merged. The Alaska Supreme Court found no error in the appellate court's judgment and affirmed. View "Alaska v. Thompson" on Justia Law