Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A father of four was accused of sexually abusing his 12-year-old daughter, leading to the removal of his children from the home. The primary issue was whether the father's conduct, including washing his daughter's breasts during lengthy showers, could be considered normal caretaking or affection. The father argued that the superior court relied on facts not in evidence, violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his refusal to testify, and erred in concluding that his conduct amounted to sexual abuse.The Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kenai, found all four children in need of aid on grounds of sexual abuse and neglect. The court noted that the father had invoked his right to remain silent, and it drew a negative inference from his silence, concluding that sexual contact had occurred. The court also found that the children were at substantial risk of being sexually abused because the mother failed to stop the father's conduct and continued to support him. The court issued a temporary custody and adjudication order, and later granted the State's petition for release of the children from state custody.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's adjudication order. The court held that the superior court did not clearly err in making its factual findings and that it was permissible to draw an adverse inference from the father's refusal to testify. The court concluded that the father's conduct could not be reasonably construed as normal caretaking, interaction, or affection, and thus, the children were in need of aid due to sexual abuse. The court did not address other arguments raised by the father, as the adjudication of one child in need of aid was sufficient to sustain the order. View "Brad S. v. State" on Justia Law

A grandmother petitioned for guardianship of her adult granddaughter, who had developmental disabilities and other health issues. In 2012, the Superior Court of Alaska found the granddaughter incapacitated and appointed the grandmother as her guardian. However, the guardianship was terminated in 2014 after the grandmother failed to submit a required report. From 2014 to 2022, the grandmother and the granddaughter’s sister provided informal care. In 2022, Adult Protective Services (APS) and medical providers raised concerns about the granddaughter’s care, leading APS to file a new petition for guardianship.The Superior Court of Alaska initially appointed a temporary guardian and later granted APS’s petition for full guardianship without a new finding of incapacity, relying on the 2012 determination. The granddaughter requested a jury trial on the issue of her capacity, but the court denied this request, applying the doctrine of issue preclusion, which prevents relitigation of issues already decided.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the Superior Court erred in applying issue preclusion to the granddaughter’s capacity. The court noted that capacity can change over time and that there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the facts regarding the granddaughter’s capacity were the same in 2012 and 2022. The court emphasized that APS, as the petitioner, had the burden of proving the granddaughter’s current incapacity. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s order appointing a permanent guardian and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the granddaughter’s capacity. View "In re Protective Proceeding of S.J." on Justia Law

Harry Powell was indicted by a grand jury in 2018 on charges of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and second-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance, involving two minors, A.S. and A.O. During the grand jury proceedings, the State presented video recordings of interviews with the minors conducted at a child advocacy center. Powell moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the video recordings were inadmissible hearsay. The superior court agreed and dismissed the counts involving A.S., finding that the foundational requirements of Alaska Evidence Rule 801(d)(3) could not be met at the grand jury stage.The State appealed, and while the appeal was pending, Powell died. The court of appeals affirmed the superior court's decision, holding that the recorded statements could not be admitted as non-hearsay under Evidence Rule 801(d)(3) at grand jury proceedings because the foundational requirements could not be met at that stage. The court of appeals also referenced a Nevada Supreme Court decision, Rugamas v. Eighth Judicial District Court, which held that similar hearsay exceptions did not apply at grand jury proceedings in Nevada.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and reversed the court of appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that under Alaska Criminal Rule 6(s), evidence that would be admissible at trial may be presented to the grand jury, even if the foundational requirements cannot be met at the grand jury stage. The court emphasized that the rule allows for a forward-looking assessment and that the prosecutor's good faith, reasonable judgment about the evidence's admissibility at trial is sufficient for grand jury proceedings. The court concluded that the recorded statements of minor crime victims could be admitted before the grand jury if they would meet the requirements of Evidence Rule 801(d)(3) at trial. View "State v. The Estate of Harry Powell" on Justia Law

Two workers' compensation claimants, represented by attorney David Graham, settled their claims with Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium (SEARHC) except for attorney's fees. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board awarded Graham significantly less than he requested. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision, but the Alaska Supreme Court reversed it, instructing the Commission to consider enhanced fees. On remand, the Commission did not change the fee award, leading to another appeal.The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission initially affirmed the Board's reduced fee award. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed this decision, clarifying that the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act allows for enhanced fees and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, the Commission again awarded $450 per hour, citing past awards and the factors in Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a), but did not enhance the fee despite acknowledging the complexity and novelty of the issues.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the Commission's decision, finding that the Commission abused its discretion by not adequately considering the factors that supported an enhanced fee. The Court emphasized the need for the Commission to apply the modified lodestar method, which involves calculating a baseline fee and then considering whether to adjust it based on various factors, including the complexity and novelty of the case and the contingent nature of the work. The Court vacated the Commission's fee award and remanded the case, directing the Commission to enhance the fees based on its findings. The Court also clarified that the Commission must consider all relevant factors and not rely solely on past awards. View "Rusch v. Southeast Alaska Regional Health Consortium" on Justia Law

A pretrial detainee at Goose Creek Correctional Center was asked to provide a urine sample for random drug testing. Under the Department of Corrections (DOC) policy, inmates have two hours to provide a sample. The detainee attempted to comply but was unable to urinate within the required time. Consequently, he was charged with refusing to provide a urine sample, which is considered a high-moderate infraction, and was disciplined.The detainee pled not guilty at a disciplinary hearing, arguing that he tried to comply but could not urinate. The prison tribunal found him guilty using the preponderance of the evidence standard and imposed punitive segregation. The detainee appealed to the facility’s superintendent, who upheld the decision. He then appealed to the superior court, arguing that the preponderance of the evidence standard violated his due process rights and that he should have been offered a saliva test instead of a urine test.The superior court affirmed the administrative decision, concluding that the preponderance of the evidence standard is constitutional. The court also noted that the detainee did not raise the saliva test argument until his reply brief, thus it was not preserved for review.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the Alaska Constitution permits the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in prison disciplinary proceedings, balancing the inmate’s interest in avoiding harsher conditions against the prison’s interest in maintaining order. The court also declined to address the saliva test argument, as it was not properly preserved during the administrative proceedings or raised in a timely manner in the superior court. The decision of the superior court was affirmed. View "Valoaga v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

A motorist, a physician, was injured when a truck struck the rear of her car while she was stopped at a construction site. She sued the truck driver and his employer for lost earnings and other damages. The superior court found that her future earning capacity was affected but dismissed her claim for future lost earnings, stating she failed to prove the amount of damages to a reasonable certainty.The superior court awarded her $1,036,491 for future medical and life care expenses, $79,961 for past lost income, and $500,000 in noneconomic damages. However, it dismissed her claim for future lost earning capacity. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, stating that once the fact of damages for future lost earning capacity was established to a reasonable certainty, the court could reasonably estimate the amount from the evidence in the record. The case was remanded to the superior court to determine the damages for future lost earning capacity.On remand, the superior court used the evidence in the record to fashion a damages award. It found that the motorist's pre-accident earning capacity was $1,169,554 and estimated her post-accident earning capacity to be $1,018,087.40. The court calculated her annual expected loss of income to be $150,746.60 and determined that she would suffer this loss for 6.3 years, the average remaining work life for a woman her age. The total damages for loss of earning capacity were calculated to be $949,703.58, bringing the total award to $2,566,155.58.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the superior court's estimation of lost earning capacity and found no clear error. The court affirmed the damages award, concluding that the superior court's method of calculating the damages was reasonable and grounded in the evidence. The superior court's order on remand was affirmed. View "Downing v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2019, Brent Bartlett, an off-duty police officer with the Juneau Police Department (JPD), rear-ended Arlene Tripp’s vehicle while driving his personal car under the influence of alcohol, resulting in her injury. Bartlett, who had a history of alcohol abuse and PTSD, was found to have a blood alcohol content of 0.239. Bartlett’s partner, also a JPD officer, was aware of his issues but did not report them. The Tripps sued the City and Borough of Juneau (CBJ), JPD, and the police chief, alleging negligent training and supervision of Bartlett.The Superior Court of Alaska, First Judicial District, dismissed the case, ruling that JPD did not owe a duty of care to the public to protect them from harm caused by officers’ off-duty alcohol consumption. The court found no statutory duty under AS 18.65.130 or CBJ’s Drug-Free Workplace policy and JPD Conduct Rule 114. It also determined that existing precedent did not impose such a duty and that public policy considerations did not support recognizing a duty of care in these circumstances.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The court held that neither statutes nor precedent imposed a duty of care on JPD to train officers against excessive off-duty alcohol consumption. It also concluded that public policy did not favor imposing such a duty, as it was not foreseeable that training officers on alcohol consumption would reduce the likelihood of them driving under the influence while off duty. The court emphasized that the connection between JPD’s conduct and the Tripps’ injuries was too remote and that the moral blame lay with Bartlett’s criminal conduct. Therefore, the dismissal of the lawsuit was upheld. View "Tripp v. City and Borough of Juneau" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between the developers of an aviation-centric community and the homeowners' association regarding the transfer and use of special declarant rights associated with a unique lot. The developers sold the lot to new owners, but the deed did not clearly convey the special declarant rights, and the homeowners' association was not informed about the transfer of these rights. The new owners sought a declaratory judgment that they held the special declarant rights, allowing them to bypass the association's oversight for construction, rent aircraft facilities to non-lot owners, and permit those non-lot owners to use the airstrip. The association argued otherwise and also contended that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other community members.The Superior Court of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of the association, ruling that the new owners did not obtain the special declarant rights, that construction on the lot required the association's approval, that the lot owners must make tiedowns available to other members, and that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities. The court also awarded attorney's fees to the association.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and found that the statutory warranty deed was ambiguous regarding the transfer of the special declarant rights. The court reversed the summary judgment on this issue and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the new owners obtained the special declarant rights. The court affirmed the requirement for the lot owners to make tiedowns available to other members but reversed the determination that only lot owners could use the airstrip and aircraft facilities, finding the declaration ambiguous on this point. The court vacated the award of attorney's fees and remanded for a new prevailing party determination. View "Meyers v. Sky Ranch, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a medical malpractice suit brought by the parents of a stillborn child against the midwives who attended the birth. The plaintiffs alleged that the midwives failed to obtain informed consent for delivery by midwife at a birth center instead of by a physician at a hospital. They claimed the midwives did not disclose the risks associated with midwife delivery for an expectant mother of advanced maternal age with a history of miscarriage. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the midwives, ruling that the plaintiffs failed to present evidence that midwife delivery caused the stillbirth.The superior court found that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient evidence to establish proximate cause, a necessary element in informed consent claims. The court noted that the plaintiffs needed to show both that they would not have consented to the treatment if properly informed and that the treatment caused the injury. The midwives presented expert testimony indicating that their care did not cause the stillbirth, and the plaintiffs failed to rebut this with their own expert evidence.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the superior court's summary judgment in favor of the midwives. The court held that the plaintiffs did not present admissible evidence to dispute the midwives' expert opinion that the stillbirth was caused by an infection unrelated to the midwives' care. The court also affirmed the superior court's award of enhanced attorney’s fees to the midwives, finding that the plaintiffs engaged in vexatious or bad faith conduct during the litigation. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' failure to provide necessary expert testimony on causation was fatal to their claims. View "Goodwin v. Mat-Su Midwifery, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman and a man were married in July 2003 and separated in March 2022. Before their marriage, the woman had an employer-provided deferred compensation plan with a balance between $63,131.23 and $67,536.80. During the marriage, she continued contributing to the plan until 2006. She made significant withdrawals from the account for marital expenses, including $40,000 in 2009 and $75,000 in 2016. In 2018, the remaining funds were transferred to a USAA account and then to a Charles Schwab IRA account in 2020, which was valued at $102,100.55 at the time of trial. The parties disputed whether these funds were marital or nonmarital.The parties engaged in mediation in March 2022 and appeared before the superior court to memorialize their agreement. The court noted that the parties had agreed to allocate the assets and debts of the marriage with one exception related to the disputed account. The woman was to provide additional information to confirm that the marital portion of the account had already been spent. However, the parties had conflicting interpretations of this proviso, leading to further disputes.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court found that the superior court had erred in its legal conclusions. It ruled that the use of some funds for marital expenditures did not demonstrate an intent to donate the entire account to the marriage. Additionally, the court held that when a mixed account contains both premarital and marital funds, the default rule is "first in, last out," meaning premarital funds are not withdrawn until all marital funds have been exhausted. The court vacated the superior court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the respective separate and marital portions of the account. View "Rush v. Rush" on Justia Law