Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A 19-year-old man had a sexual relationship with a 13-year-old girl, and she became pregnant. The man pleaded guilty to attempted sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree. While the man was incarcerated the girl gave birth to their son. When the girl was 17, she was arrested and sent to a juvenile correctional facility. A dispute arose over custody of the child and the superior court ultimately entered a custody order based on the parents’ stipulation. The mother was to have primary physical custody and the father would have regular visitation. When the mother’s living situation became unstable, the father sought to modify the custody order. Those proceedings, which included an earlier appeal to the Alaska Supreme Court, resulted in two orders of relevance here: (1) an order relating to the mother's attempt to terminate the father’s parental rights because his paternity was rooted in a criminal sex act; and (2) the father’s motion to modify custody and ultimate award of sole custody with visitation for the mother and both sets of grandparents. The superior court rejected the mother’s interpretation of former AS 25.23.180(e), which described an “independent proceeding” for the termination of parental rights of sexual abusers, and dismissed her petition. Meanwhile, in granting the father custody, the trial court concluded he overcame the domestic violence presumption that would have barred his custody. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded: (1) in the termination case, the superior court erred in rejecting the mother's petition; and (2) in the custody case, the trial court erred by failing to properly integrate the father's sexual abuse of the mother into its best interests analysis for awarding custody. Both orders were reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Angelica C. v. Jonathan C." on Justia Law

In August 2007 Brent McCormick was injured while working aboard FV CHIPPEWA, owned by Chippewa,Inc. McCormick filed a lawsuit against Chippewa and Louis Olsen, the vessel's captain in August 2010. McCormick initiated settlement negotiations with the employer's insurance company for "policy limits." Under the insurance policy there was a per-occurrence coverage limit. During negotiations, counsel for McCormick and the insurance company discussed the terms of the settlement over a phone call; the parties provided inconsistent accounts of which issues were addressed on the call. McCormick's counsel’s affidavit asserted he raised the issue of the number of occurrences and the parties agreed to leave it unresolved. Shortly after this phone call, the parties reached a purported settlement agreement. McCormick filed suit to enforce the purported settlement agreement for policy limits based on three occurrences. The insurance company filed for summary judgment, asserting that the agreement was for policy limits of a single occurrence. The superior court granted summary judgment for the insurance company, concluding that its interpretation of the purported settlement agreement was correct. On appeal, McCormick argued the superior court abused its discretion on evidentiary and discovery issues and erred by granting the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion. But the Court did find an issue of fact barring summary judgment due to the contradictory accounts of the phone call. A reasonable person could have discerned a genuine factual dispute on a material issue because this phone call could have either: (1) provided extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the settlement agreement, or (2) indicated there was no meeting of the minds on an essential term, and thus no enforceable agreement was formed. Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "McCormick v. Chippewa, Inc." on Justia Law

A mother filed a motion for clarification, arguing that Alaska no longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over a child custody order under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) after she, her ex-husband, and their two children lived in South Carolina for over a year. The father objected, arguing he was still a resident of Alaska, and he intended to return to Alaska after his service in the Air Force. The superior court found that it did not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over its initial custody order because neither the parents nor the children presently resided in Alaska. The court also suggested that substantial evidence related to custody existed in South Carolina, and therefore it was likely the more appropriate forum. The Alaska Supreme Court determined the superior court indeed had continuing jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Furthermore, because the parties and court did not have a full opportunity to address all of the relevant UCCJEA forum non conveniens factors, the court's orders were reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Mouritsen v. Mouritsen" on Justia Law

This case involved an obligor father who never missed a child support payment to the obligee, mother for their minor child. The father retired and began collecting Social Security retirement benefits. As a result, the child became eligible to receive a derivative monthly children’s insurance benefit (CIB) from the Social Security Administration (SSA). The mother received four years of CIB payments in addition to regular monthly child support payments from the obligor; the law allowed the CIB payments to be credited against the child support obligation. However, neither parent notified the Alaska Department of Revenue, Child Support Services Division (CSSD) that they were receiving CIB payments for their daughter. After four years of overpayments, CSSD discovered the CIB payment from SSA and credited the father more than $47,000 in child support overpayment. The father filed suit, asking the superior court for a judgment against the mother for overpaid child support. He also requested reimbursement or credit for overpaid health insurance premiums. The superior court denied reimbursement for either overpayment, and the father appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed, finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment. View "Rosenbaum v. Shaw" on Justia Law

A father appealed after his parental rights to his daughter were terminated. The father attended the termination proceeding but left early, at which point the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) moved forward with an offer of proof. The father’s attorney objected to the offer of proof, but the court accepted the offer and terminated the father’s parental rights. Before the Alaska Supreme Court, the father challenged the termination proceeding’s procedure and outcome, arguing thatOCS’ use of an offer of proof violated his right to procedural due process and constituted structural error. He also argued the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights because there was not sufficient evidence. The Supreme Court agrees that a court could not accept such an offer as proof of the facts asserted, unless the opposing party offers no dispute. Therefore, the termination order was vacated, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Norman S. v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs, Ofc. of Children's Svcs." on Justia Law

Arthur A. appealed a 30-day involuntary commitment order entered after the superior court determined he was mentally ill, posed a risk of harm, and was gravely disabled. He contended on appeal that the court erred by refusing to allow him to represent himself at the commitment hearing. The Alaska Supreme Court held that a respondent in involuntary commitment proceedings has at least an implied statutory right to self-representation, although that right is not absolute. "If a respondent clearly and unequivocally invokes the self-representation right, the superior court must hold a preliminary hearing and consider factors outlined in McCracken v. Alaska, 518 P.2d 85 (Alaska 1974), to determine whether self-representation should be allowed." Because the respondent’s self-representation request in this case was denied without adherence to the McCracken framework, the Court concluded the 30-day commitment order had to be vacated. View "In the Matter of the Necessity for the Hospitalization of: Arthur A." on Justia Law

Before the Alaska Supreme Court in this case was a constitutional claim arising from the application of a juvenile jurisdiction waiver statute. A minor subject to the statutory provision did not testify at his waiver hearing and did not overcome the presumption enumerated in the statute; the superior court granted the State’s waiver petition. The minor appealed, contending the statutory rebuttable presumption and shifted burden of proof violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination and his constitutional due process rights. The Supreme Court explained that fundamental fairness required adopting an exclusionary rule when a minor bears the burden of rebutting the statutory presumption of being unamenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system: the minor’s testimonial evidence at the waiver hearing cannot be used as substantive evidence over the minor’s objection at any subsequent juvenile adjudication or adult criminal proceedings. View "C.D., a Minor v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

The Alaska Supreme Court has held previously that, under some circumstances, a parent whose parental rights have been involuntarily terminated under Alaska’s child in need of aid (CINA) statutes could seek post-termination review and reinstatement of parental rights. A superior court may vacate a termination order if the child has not yet been adopted and the parent demonstrates, “by clear and convincing evidence, that reinstatement of parental rights is in the best interest of the child and that the person is rehabilitated and capable of providing the care and guidance that will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the child.” Dara S. was the biological mother of Paxton, born February 2011, Paxton was born in Alaska but lived with Dara’s sister and brother-in-law, Scarlet and Monty, in Oregon since being placed with them by OCS in April 2014. Dara visited Paxton in July 2014 and decided to stay in Oregon. Dara’s parental rights to her son had were ultimately terminated as a result of her mental health issues. She timely sought review and reinstatement of her parental rights, and an Alaskan superior court granted review and ultimately granted her reinstatement request. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) and the child’s guardian ad litem (GAL) appealed the reinstatement decision, arguing both that post-termination reinstatement of parental rights after an involuntary termination was barred as a matter of law and that the mother had not proved by clear and convincing evidence that reinstatement was in the child’s best interests. The Alaska Supreme Court rejected the argument that reinstatement was barred as a matter of law, but remanded the case to the superior court for further elucidation of its best interests determination. The superior court held a post-remand evidentiary hearing and ultimately confirmed its best interests determination. OCS, joined by the GAL, appealed that determination, arguing that some of the court’s underlying factual findings, and therefore its ultimate best interests finding, were clearly erroneous, and that the reinstatement order therefore had to be vacated, leaving the parental rights termination in place. The Supreme Court determined the disputed underlying factual findings supporting the best interests determination either were not material or not clearly erroneous. Therefore, it concluded the superior court’s reinstatement decision should have been affirmed. View "Alaska, Department of Health & Social Services v. Dara S." on Justia Law

The court of appeals determined that Paino Manuel Alvarez-Perdomo was coerced to take the stand at his criminal trial, thus violating his privilege against self-incrimination in both the federal and Alaska constitutions. But the court of appeals held this error was not a structural error requiring reversal, and that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Alaska Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide an issue of first impression: whether the violation of a criminal defendant’s right not to take the stand was a structural error., The Court concluded it was indeed a structural error, because it implicated personal interests more fundamental than the ordinary risk of a wrongful conviction. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded for a new trial. View "Alvarez-Perdomo v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Raymond Dapo was born in 1990. OCS took custody of him ten years later and, in April 2000, placed him in Taun Lucas’s foster home. Lucas and her husband David legally adopted Dapo in May 2002. According to Dapo, Lucas began sexually abusing him shortly thereafter; Lucas, however, alleged that she was sexually abused by Dapo, and Dapo, then 11 years old, was arrested and charged with two counts of first-degree sexual assault. The charges were eventually dropped, and Dapo was returned to the custody of the State as a dependent child. When he was 24 years old (in 2015), Dapo filed a complaint against Lucas, alleging that she had sexually abused him while he was a minor. In September 2015, Lucas filed a third-party claim against OCS for apportionment of fault, contending that OCS “had a duty to protect” Dapo and “negligently failed to protect” him. The superior court granted OCS’s motion to dismiss the apportionment claim, holding that it was barred by the ten-year statute of repose, AS 09.10.055(a). Dapo appealed. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the statute of repose applied to the apportionment claim and was not unconstitutional as applied. However, the Court determined there were issues of fact regarding the applicability of two exceptions to the statute of repose: claims for gross negligence and claims for breaches of fiduciary duty. Therefore the superior court’s order was reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Dapo v. Alaska, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law