Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Baxter Senior Living, LLC, an assisted living facility in Anchorage, Alaska, obtained an insurance policy from Zurich American Insurance Company covering various types of losses, including those caused by microorganisms. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Baxter implemented several operational restrictions and incurred additional costs. Despite these measures, the facility experienced COVID-19 cases among staff and residents. Baxter filed a claim with Zurich for loss of business income due to the pandemic, which Zurich denied.Baxter then filed a complaint in February 2022, alleging breach of contract and other claims, arguing that the presence of COVID-19 and related governmental orders caused a loss of use of its property, constituting "direct physical loss of or damage to" the property under the insurance policy. Zurich moved to dismiss the case, arguing that neither the presence of the virus nor the governmental orders constituted "direct physical loss of or damage to" property. The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska certified two questions to the Alaska Supreme Court regarding the interpretation of this phrase in the context of the pandemic.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the certified questions and concluded that neither the presence of the COVID-19 virus at an insured property nor the operational restrictions imposed by pandemic-related governmental orders constitute "direct physical loss of or damage to" the property under a commercial insurance policy. The court emphasized that "direct physical loss" requires some physical alteration or deprivation of possession of the property, and "direct physical damage" requires a tangible alteration of the property. The court noted that the presence of the virus does not physically alter the property but merely attaches to it, and the operational restrictions do not cause a physical alteration or deprivation of possession. Therefore, the court answered both certified questions in the negative. View "Baxter Senior Living, LLC v. Zurich American Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A man domiciled in Washington passed away, leaving a will that specified it should be administered according to Alaska law. He had married his surviving spouse after executing the will. The will devised property to the surviving spouse, his brother, and the National Kidney Foundation (NKF). The surviving spouse claimed statutory allowances and an elective share under Alaska law, arguing she was entitled to the entire estate as an after-married spouse.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, initially ruled that Washington law governed the surviving spouse's rights because the decedent was domiciled in Washington at the time of his death. The court held that Washington law, not Alaska law, determined the surviving spouse's entitlement as an after-married spouse. The court also awarded the surviving spouse a statutory spousal allowance under Washington law but denied her claim to inherit as an after-married spouse. The court granted attorney's fees to NKF and denied the surviving spouse's motion for fees.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that Alaska law should govern the interpretation and effect of the will, including the rights of an after-married spouse, because the testator had explicitly chosen Alaska law to administer his will. The court found that Alaska's after-married spouse statute pertains to the interpretation and effect of a will when the testator subsequently marries, and thus, Alaska law should apply. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision to apply Washington law and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court also vacated the Superior Court's attorney's fee award. View "In the Matter of the Estate of: Bentley" on Justia Law

A couple owning a lot in Homer, Alaska, added a second dwelling made from a shipping container and obtained a permit from the city. A neighboring property owner challenged the permit, arguing that the container dwelling required a conditional use permit and was a nuisance under the city’s zoning code. The city’s zoning board determined that the container dwelling was an accessory building to the existing mobile home and did not require a conditional use permit. The board also found that the container dwelling was not a nuisance because it had been modified and no longer functioned as a shipping container.The neighboring property owner appealed to the Homer Board of Adjustment, which upheld the zoning board’s decision. The Board of Adjustment concluded that the container dwelling was an accessory building and did not require a conditional use permit. It also agreed that the container dwelling was not a nuisance. The neighboring property owner then appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board of Adjustment’s decision and awarded attorney’s fees to the city.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the Board of Adjustment’s interpretation of the zoning code was reasonable and that the container dwelling qualified as an accessory building. The court also found that the Board’s conclusion that the container dwelling was not a nuisance had a reasonable basis. However, the court vacated the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further proceedings, noting that fees cannot be awarded for defending against nonfrivolous constitutional claims, and some of the challenger’s constitutional claims were not frivolous. View "Griswold v. City of Homer" on Justia Law

A man sued his neighbors, claiming that an access road on their property caused flooding on his property. After settling with the neighbors and dismissing his claims with prejudice, he sued them again over continued flooding, alleging nuisance, trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and breach of contract.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, granted summary judgment for the neighbors on the tort claims, citing res judicata, but allowed the breach of contract claim to proceed. After a bench trial, the court found the neighbors had breached the settlement agreement and awarded specific performance, consequential damages, and attorney’s fees, but denied punitive damages. The neighbors appealed the breach of contract ruling, and the man cross-appealed the dismissal of his tort claims and the denial of punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the Superior Court’s ruling on the breach of contract claim, finding it was filed outside the three-year statute of limitations. The court held that the man was on inquiry notice of the breach when the driveway reconstruction was completed, as he observed defects at that time. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision that the tort claims were barred by res judicata, as they stemmed from the same transaction as the prior lawsuit. The court also upheld the denial of punitive damages, finding no evidence of egregious conduct by the neighbors.In summary, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed the breach of contract ruling and associated awards, affirmed the dismissal of the tort claims under res judicata, and upheld the denial of punitive damages. View "Williams v. Strong" on Justia Law

Gregory Numann and Diane Gallant were married in 2002 and separated in October 2016. They verbally agreed to maintain separate residences, with Numann paying child support and both contributing to their child's college fund. Numann served in the military from 1989 to 2015, accruing a pension worth about $730,000 at separation. Gallant, who worked throughout the marriage, had two retirement accounts worth about $30,000. Gallant filed for divorce in 2021, seeking a portion of Numann’s military retirement benefit.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, held a two-day trial and issued a divorce decree in July 2022. The court awarded Gallant 50% of the marital portion of Numann’s military retirement benefit from the date of separation. It also credited Numann for child support payments made after their child reached the age of majority. The court found that Gallant was entitled to a portion of the retirement benefit starting from the date of separation and ordered Numann to pay Gallant $94,248.70, representing her share of the retirement payments received since separation. The court balanced this against other obligations to avoid prolonged financial entanglement.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that the division of the military retirement benefit from the date of separation did not violate federal law under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act (USFSPA). The court clarified that the USFSPA allows state courts to treat military retirement pay as marital property subject to division under state law. The court also found no evidence of judicial bias against Numann. However, the court remanded the case to correct an inconsistency in the final written order regarding the division of the military retirement benefit. View "Numann v. Gallant" on Justia Law

Evan D., an Indian child, was born with significant health complications. Shortly after his birth, the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed an emergency petition to adjudicate him a child in need of aid due to his parents' history of neglect, substance abuse, and domestic violence. Evan was placed with foster parents Rosalind and Max M., who lived near a medical facility capable of addressing his health needs. The Native Village of Togiak, Evan’s tribe, was informed of the proceedings and later petitioned to transfer jurisdiction over Evan’s case to the tribal court.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, adjudicated Evan a child in need of aid and granted temporary custody to OCS. OCS petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Evan’s parents, and the Tribe petitioned to transfer jurisdiction. Rosalind and Max moved to intervene, arguing that the Tribe might place Evan with his grandmother, who they believed could not meet his health needs. The Superior Court denied their motion, stating that federal law prohibits considering potential placement changes when deciding whether to transfer jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case. The court held that the foster parents' arguments against transferring jurisdiction were contrary to federal law, which prohibits considering whether transfer could affect the child's placement. The court affirmed the Superior Court's decision, stating that the foster parents did not present valid grounds to deny the transfer of jurisdiction and therefore did not share any issue of law or fact in common with the underlying proceedings that would justify their intervention. The court also addressed the procedure for staying transfer orders pending appeal, emphasizing the need to balance competing interests. View "Rosalind M. v. State" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between two lakefront property owners, the McCavits and the Lachers, over a dock extension built by the McCavits. The Lachers claimed that the extension interfered with their riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The superior court agreed and ordered the removal of the dock extension. The McCavits appealed, leading to the articulation of a new rule of reasonableness to determine whether the dock unreasonably interfered with the neighbors' rights. The case was remanded for the superior court to apply this new rule, and the court again ruled in favor of the Lachers.Initially, the superior court found that the dock extension unreasonably interfered with the Lachers' riparian rights and constituted a private nuisance. The court ordered the removal of the dock extension and awarded attorney’s fees to the Lachers. The McCavits appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case for the superior court to apply a newly articulated rule of reasonableness. On remand, the superior court reaffirmed its earlier findings and again ruled in favor of the Lachers, ordering the removal of the dock extension and awarding attorney’s fees.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying the new rule of reasonableness or in finding that the dock constituted a private nuisance. However, the Supreme Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and remanded for further consideration, noting that fees related to the litigation against the Alaska Department of Natural Resources (DNR) should not be charged to the McCavits. The main holding is that the superior court's application of the reasonableness rule and its finding of a private nuisance were upheld, but the attorney’s fees award was vacated and remanded for recalculation. View "McCavit v. Lacher" on Justia Law

A 13-year-old boy, Oscar M., sought to intervene in his parents' custody dispute after the superior court granted primary interim custody to his father, Shawn M., with weekend visitation for his mother, Marilyn P. Oscar, through an attorney, moved to intervene, arguing that his preferences were not adequately represented by his parents or the Guardian Ad Litem (GAL). The superior court denied his motion, leading to this appeal.The superior court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, initially handled the custody dispute. After a series of domestic violence allegations and protective orders, the court granted Shawn primary custody and Marilyn weekend visitation. Oscar, through his attorney, filed a motion to intervene, claiming his interests were not adequately represented. The GAL also moved for the court to appoint counsel for Oscar, expressing concerns about potential manipulation by Marilyn. The court denied both motions, reasoning that Oscar's preferences were already adequately represented and that his intervention would complicate the proceedings.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Oscar's interests were adequately represented by his parents and the GAL. It noted that Alaska's statutory framework provides mechanisms for considering a child's preferences without making the child a party to the litigation. The court also found that allowing Oscar to intervene would likely cause undue delay and complicate the proceedings, which would not be in Oscar's best interests. The court concluded that the superior court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Oscar's motion to intervene. View "Oscar M. v. Marilyn P." on Justia Law

The case involves the termination of parental rights of an incarcerated father, Anton K., to his two daughters, Allie and Melissa, who are Indian children under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) removed the children from their parents' home due to allegations of abuse and neglect. Anton was later incarcerated on charges of physical and sexual assault against the children's mother, Keri K., and remained in custody throughout the proceedings.The Superior Court of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Palmer, initially found probable cause to believe the children were in need of aid and that OCS had made active efforts to avoid removing them. OCS developed case plans for both parents and facilitated some initial visitation. However, after Anton's incarceration, OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide rehabilitative services were limited, partly due to COVID-19 restrictions and miscommunications with the Department of Corrections (DOC). OCS continued to work with Keri and the children's Tribe, eventually placing the children with maternal relatives after efforts to place them with paternal relatives failed.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's order terminating Anton's parental rights. The court held that OCS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup of the family, considering the entirety of its efforts, including those directed at Keri and the children's extended family. The court acknowledged the significant gaps in OCS's efforts to facilitate visitation and provide services to Anton while incarcerated but concluded that the overall efforts, including those to reunify the children with Keri and place them with relatives, were sufficient under ICWA. View "Anton K. v. State" on Justia Law

Austin and Regena Joy owned property in Anchorage and leased it to Randy Hahn for his firewood business, Best Split Firewood, LLC (BSF). The lease included a purchase option for BSF to buy the property at a specified price and terms. Hahn signed the agreement, adding "Best Split Firewood" as the occupant, but Regena did not sign. Hahn later sought to exercise the purchase option, but the Joys refused, doubting the option's enforceability and Hahn's financial capability.Hahn filed a complaint in the Alaska Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment to enforce the purchase option. The Joys denied the enforceability of the option and moved for summary judgment, arguing BSF could not enforce the option. Hahn opposed and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting the agreement was valid and enforceable. The Superior Court granted Hahn's motion, finding the agreement contained essential terms for a purchase option and that there was a meeting of the minds. The court also provided gap fillers for missing details and ordered specific performance, directing the Joys to sell the property to BSF.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decisions. The Supreme Court held that the agreement contained all essential terms for an enforceable purchase option and that BSF could exercise the option as Hahn's assignee, given Hahn's personal guarantee of BSF's obligations. The court also found that Hahn did not waive the purchase option by rejecting the Joys' offer, which contained errors and differed from the original agreement. Finally, the court rejected the Joys' unclean hands defense, finding no evidence of wrongdoing by Hahn related to the case. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment and order of specific performance. View "Joy v. Hahn" on Justia Law