Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At the time of separation, Kelly and Rachael Brennan controlled substantial assets, including a successful fishing business, Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) that Kelly obtained prior to his marriage to Rachael, and a large home in Halibut Cove. The court ordered Kelly to pay $5,000 per month as interim spousal support. After trial, the superior court determined that the IFQs had become marital property through transmutation, and it divided most of the marital estate 50/50. The property division included the proceeds from two post-separation sales of IFQs; the court also awarded Rachael half the gross proceeds from the post-trial sale of the couple’s fishing vessel. Kelly appealed, arguing the IFQs were his separate property not subject to division; he also challenged several other aspects of the court’s property division, arguing that the court abused its discretion in failing to account for various tax liabilities, payments, alleged damage to marital property, and other factors that he contends unfairly favored Rachael. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court applied the wrong legal standard to its transmutation analysis regarding the IFQs, and therefore reversed the determination that the IFQs were marital property, and reversed the award to Rachael of proceeds from post-separation IFQ sales. The Court remanded for the superior court to reconsider these issues as well as the overall equitable property distribution, and to explain its reasoning for awarding Rachael gross rather than net proceeds from the sale of the fishing vessel. The Court affirmed in all other respects. View "Brennan v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Gregory and Patricia Gordon were divorced by decree; the decree divided the marital estate. One of the largest components of the marital estate was a retirement medical benefit earned by Patricia during the marriage through her employment with the State of Alaska. The superior court found that the benefit was entirely marital, but the court concluded that including the full value of the benefit in the marital estate (which the court determined should be divided 50/50) would result in a “windfall” to Gregory. The court therefore applied “the coverture fraction as if [Patricia] had remained working for the State” - even though Patricia had in fact quit her job with the State during the marriage. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with Gregory’s argument that the court erred in applying this adjusted coverture fraction. "The superior court should have characterized the retirement medical benefit as marital or separate in accordance with the actual coverture fraction, valued the benefit at its full value, and divided the marital estate - including the retirement medical benefit - between the parties according to the statutory equitable factors." The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s equitable distribution of the marital estate and remanded for further consideration. View "Gordon v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Rowena Weathers (mother) appealed the superior court’s custody modification order awarding Dennis Weathers (father) physical custody of their daughter 59% of the year. Previously, pursuant to the parties’ divorce settlement agreement, the mother had been awarded primary physical custody in large part because the father’s employment required him to work overseas most of the year. After the father was retired by his employer due to a downturn in the oil market, he unilaterally took custody and refused to allow the mother to have custody of their daughter except for very limited visitation. The mother moved to modify custody to a 50/50 basis. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court’s custody award was an abuse of discretion because it gave disproportionate weight to grandparent involvement as a factor favoring the father while failing to weigh against the father the statutory best interests factor regarding the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent. Accordingly, the Court reversed the custody award and remanded to the superior court. View "Weathers v. Weathers" on Justia Law

John Doe I and John Doe II were two separate individuals required by the Department of Public Safety (DPS) to register as sex offenders in Alaska based on their out-of-state convictions. DPS argued Doe I’s Washington convictions and Doe II’s California conviction were “similar” to the Alaska offense of attempted sexual abuse of a minor under AS 11.31.100 and AS 11.41.436(a)(2), making both Doe I and Doe II subject to Alaska’s sex offender registration requirement. One superior court judge determined that Doe I was not required to register; another superior court judge determined that Doe II was required to register. The cases were consolidated on appeal, and the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that neither the Washington nor the California laws under which Doe I and Doe II were convicted were similar to the relevant Alaska law and therefore held that neither Doe I nor Doe II was required to register under Alaska law. View "Alaska, Dept. of Public Safety v. Doe I" on Justia Law

The superior court awarded custody of a child to her maternal grandmother. When the father later moved for a modification of custody, the court denied the motion on the ground that there had been no substantial change in circumstances. On appeal the father argued he should not have been required to show a substantial change in circumstances because the award of custody to the grandmother had been only temporary and he remained entitled to the parental preference. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the superior court’s oral remarks and written order granting custody to the grandmother, when read together, indicated an intent that there would also be a transitional period during which the parties would see how the child adapted to spending more time with her father, leaving open the possibility that the transition would result in permanent custody with the father. Therefore, the Court concluded that in the absence of a grant of permanent custody to the grandmother, the father remained entitled to the parental preference, and the grandmother continued to have the burden of proving that the preference should be overcome. View "Daves v. McKinley" on Justia Law

Sarah and Sean Whalen married in May 2004 and had three children. They separated in 2012, divorced in 2015. Sarah had petitioned for multiple domestic violence protective orders against Sean, some of which had been granted. In November 2015 Sarah filed a petition for a long-term domestic violence protective order against Sean. The superior court ruled that she could not rely on Sean’s past history of domestic violence alone to obtain a new protective order but had to show that Sean had committed a new incident of domestic violence since the previous protective order. The court also found that Sarah had not proved any new incident and denied her petition. Sarah appealed, arguing that she should be allowed to rely on past incidents of domestic violence that had supported past protective orders to obtain a new protective order. In the alternative she argued there had been a new incident of domestic violence. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s denial of the petition for a domestic violence protective order. View "Whalen v. Whalen" on Justia Law

The Lieutenant Governor of Alaska declined to certify a proposed ballot initiative that would establish a permitting requirement for activities that could harm anadromous fish habitat, reasoning that the initiative effected an appropriation of state assets in violation of article XI, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution. The initiative sponsors filed suit, and the superior court approved the initiative, concluding that the proposal would not impermissibly restrict legislative discretion. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded the initiative would encroach on the discretion over allocation decisions delegated to the Alaska Department of Fish and Game by the legislature, and that the initiative as written effected an unconstitutional appropriation. But the Court concluded the offending sections could be severed from the remainder of the initiative. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the superior court and remanded for that court to direct the Lieutenant Governor to sever the offending provisions but place the remainder of the initiative on the ballot. View "Mallott v. Stand for Salmon" on Justia Law

Nuria Mengisteab filed a motion to modify custody to relocate with the parties’ young son, Saul, to another state, and then moved two days later. After several months the superior court ordered that the child return to Alaska and conditionally awarded primary custody to the father if Mengisteab chose to remain out-of-state. Appealing pro se, Mengisteab argued the superior court erred in several respects. The Alaska Supreme Court determined none of her arguments had merit, except for her contention that the court failed to consider the effect separation from his mother would have on continuity and stability in the child’s life. Because the court was required to consider the child’s best interests based on the assumption that Mengisteab would remain out-of-state, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Mengisteab v. Oates" on Justia Law

Daniel Shearer alleged Brooks Range Petroleum Corporation (BRPC) promised him a ten-year term of employment, then terminated his employment two and a half years later. Shearer sued in the Alaska Second Judicial District, where he alleged the parties had negotiated and formed their contract. BRPC filed a motion to dismiss the case or to change venue to the Third Judicial District, where the contract was executed and where Shearer had performed most of his job duties. The superior court denied the motion, thus retaining venue in the Second Judicial District. The Alaska Supreme Court accepted review of this case to settle where venue for this case was proper. The Court concluded neither Shearer’s tort claims, nor his contract-based claims arose in the Second Judicial District, and the chosen venue was therefore not proper. The Court reversed the superior court’s order denying a change of venue. View "Brooks Range Petroleum Corporation v. Shearer" on Justia Law

Vince B. appealed a long-term domestic violence protective order entered against him for stalking his ex-wife. The couple separated two and a half years prior to their divorce; the proceedings were prolonged and unfriendly. The parties struggled to communicate in the course of their shared custody, often hurling profanities at one another. Sarah’s new boyfriend was a particular source of conflict. In February 2016 Vince dropped the children off at Sarah’s boyfriend’s house while she was not present. Vince struck Sarah’s boyfriend in the face, prompting a call to the police. Several other hostile exchanges in 2016 led Sarah to file two domestic violence protective order petitions. The first was denied; the second was granted, in part based on testimony from the first petition, and was the subject of this appeal. Vince B. argued the superior court: (1) abused its discretion and violated his due process rights in its treatment of his ten-year-old son’s proposed testimony; (2) violated the doctrine of ripeness by warning that future conduct could justify a stalking finding; (3) violated the doctrine of res judicata by reconsidering a claim that it previously had adjudicated in an earlier domestic violence petition; and (4) failed to make requisite findings of fact meeting the elements of stalking. He asks us to vacate the order. Seeing no error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s protective order. View "Vince B. v. Sarah B." on Justia Law