Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Aurora Landau was a dancer at the Showboat Show Club in Anchorage. She filed a complaint against Showboat Show Club Anchorage, LLC, seeking to recover unpaid wages, overtime compensation, and impermissible deductions from her earnings. Her suit also named the LLC’s two members and managers, Terry Stahlman and James Goard. Stahlman, also the LLC’s registered agent, was personally served a summons and complaint for all three defendants at his Anchorage residence, which was listed in the LLC’s state licensing reports as the entity’s principal office and both Stahlman’s and Goard’s member address. One of the owners died while the suit was pending, and Landau substituted the owner’s estate in the proceedings. Judgment was eventually entered in favor of the former employee. A year later the deceased owner’s widow moved for relief from the judgment as the sole beneficiary of his estate, arguing that neither her husband nor the estate had been properly served with notice of the suit. The former employee responded that service had been proper and that, in any case, the widow did not have authority to file a motion on behalf of the estate. The court denied the motion on the ground that the widow had not shown good cause for relief from the judgment. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed on the alternate ground that the widow did not have authority to act on the estate’s behalf. View "Hester v. Landau" on Justia Law

The Alaska Supreme Court granted this petition for review to consider how the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) affected Alaska personal injury case law allowing a defendant ex parte contact with a plaintiff’s doctors as a method of informal discovery. The issue the Court requested the parties specifically brief was whether the federal law preempted Alaska case law, or, if not, whether federal law otherwise required us to overrule or modify our case law. After review, the Court concluded the federal law did not preempt existing Alaska case law. But the Court also concluded it should overrule the case law because its foundations "have been eroded by a cultural shift in views on medical privacy and new federal procedural requirements undermining the use of ex parte contact as an informal discovery measure." The Court therefore held that - absent voluntary agreement - a defendant may not make ex parte contact with a plaintiff’s treating physicians without a court order, which generally should not be issued absent extraordinary circumstances. "We believe that formal discovery methods are more likely to comply with the federal law and promote justice and that such court orders rarely, if ever, will be necessary." View "Jones v. Drury" on Justia Law

This appeal was one in a series of successive appeals brought by Kenneth Manning challenging the moose and caribou subsistence hunt regulations that governed a portion of southcentral Alaska. Manning filed this lawsuit in 2013 challenging the eligibility criteria for subsistence hunt permits, the point system for allocating Tier II subsistence permits, and the criteria for establishing nonsubsistence hunting areas. While these claims were pending, the Alaska Supreme Court issued a 2015 decision resolving similar claims brought by Manning in an earlier suit. Manning then moved to amend his complaint in this case and to add an individual official as a defendant. The superior court denied both motions, concluding that amendment would be futile because all of Manning’s claims would fail under Supreme Court precedent. The superior court also denied the State’s motion for attorney’s fees, concluding that Manning was exempt from an adverse attorney’s fees award under the constitutional litigant exception. Manning appealed the denial of his motion to amend; he also raised various allegations of deprivation of due process. The State cross-appeals the denial of its motion for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to amend because Manning failed to adequately brief (thus forfeiting) his arguments on some of the counts, and the remaining counts would have been futile. And the Court affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees to the State because none of Manning’s claims were frivolous. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

This case arose out of disputed collective bargaining negotiations between City of Fairbanks and Public Safety Employees Association, AFSCME Local 803 (PSEA). PSEA was the labor representative for the City’s police and dispatch employees. The issue this appeal presented for the Alaska Supreme Court's review centered on whether the city council’s reconsideration and ultimate rejection of a labor agreement constituted an unfair labor practice under Alaska’s Public Employer Relations Act (the Act). An Alaska Labor Relations Agency (ALRA) panel concluded a violation occurred, and on appeal the superior court affirmed that ruling. The Supreme Court determined the record did not support a finding of bad faith on the city’s part, and because the failure to ratify the agreement alone could not be a violation of the Act, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision affirming the ALRA panel’s ruling. View "Public Safety Employees Association v. City of Fairbanks" on Justia Law

A former agent appointed under a power of attorney, successfully defended an accounting of his actions, expenditures, and fees against objections and counterclaims by his former principal. At issue in this appeal was whether the former agent was entitled to reimbursement from his former principal for reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in maintaining that defense. The superior court denied the agent’s request for attorney’s fees because the dispute occurred in the context of a guardianship proceeding and because the request did not meet the requirements of AS 13.26.291, which governed cost-shifting in guardianship proceedings. The agent appealed, arguing: (1) AS 13.26.291 did not apply; (2) that he was entitled to attorney’s fees based on his authority as an agent to hire an attorney under AS 13.26.665(m); and (3) he was entitled to attorney’s fees based on common law principles, equity, and considerations of public policy. The Alaska Supreme Court concluded neither statute applied, but that the agent could be entitled to reimbursement of his attorney’s fees under the common law of agency and as a matter of equity. The Court therefore reversed the superior court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cottini v. Berggren" on Justia Law

In issuing a divorce decree between Terrace Solomon and Wendy Barnes (formerly Solomon), the issue of custody was reserved to be decided at a later trial. Before the custody trial could be held, Terrace was arrested and held in a United States Army prison outside Alaska. The superior court repeatedly continued the custody trial to allow Terrace’s counsel to get in contact with Terrace and arrange for his telephonic appearance at trial. But after about a year had passed, the court refused to further continue the matter. A short custody trial was held; Terrace was absent but represented by counsel. The court awarded sole legal custody and sole physical custody to Wendy. The court determined, among other things, that Terrace had a history of perpetrating domestic violence, triggering a presumption against awarding him custody. On appeal Terrace claimed the superior court abused its discretion when it refused to further continue the custody trial. Terrace also claimed the court erred in concluding he had a history of domestic violence: he contended the record was inadequate to support that conclusion and the court did not make the requisite findings to support it. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed the superior court’s domestic violence findings were insufficient and thus vacated the court’s determination concerning the domestic violence presumption. The Court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Solomon v. Solomon" on Justia Law

In issuing a divorce decree between Terrace Solomon and Wendy Barnes (formerly Solomon), the issue of custody was reserved to be decided at a later trial. Before the custody trial could be held, Terrace was arrested and held in a United States Army prison outside Alaska. The superior court repeatedly continued the custody trial to allow Terrace’s counsel to get in contact with Terrace and arrange for his telephonic appearance at trial. But after about a year had passed, the court refused to further continue the matter. A short custody trial was held; Terrace was absent but represented by counsel. The court awarded sole legal custody and sole physical custody to Wendy. The court determined, among other things, that Terrace had a history of perpetrating domestic violence, triggering a presumption against awarding him custody. On appeal Terrace claimed the superior court abused its discretion when it refused to further continue the custody trial. Terrace also claimed the court erred in concluding he had a history of domestic violence: he contended the record was inadequate to support that conclusion and the court did not make the requisite findings to support it. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed the superior court’s domestic violence findings were insufficient and thus vacated the court’s determination concerning the domestic violence presumption. The Court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Solomon v. Solomon" on Justia Law

The superior court divided J. Jill Maxwell and William Sosnowski's marital property during divorce proceedings. The superior court found that William was entitled to credit for post-separation mortgage payments that he made on the marital residence, but it did not determine the precise amount of those credits because the sale of the residence was pending. After the residence ultimately sold nearly two years later, the superior court issued a disbursement order that granted William credit for mortgage payments dating back to October 2011, when he moved out of the marital residence, rather than May 31, 2013, which the court had found to be the separation date. Jill appealed the effective date of the credit for these post-separation payments in the disbursement order. She also challenged consideration of the funds she provided to her adult son during the marriage in the property division order. The Alaska Supreme Court vacated the disbursement order because William was entitled to credit only for payments he made after the separation date. But the Court concluded Jill’s argument regarding the funds she gave her son was untimely because the property division order became final in December 2014. View "Maxwell v. Sosnowski" on Justia Law

Yong Kang lived in North Pole and rented a house from her son Benjamin. She once owned the house, but she sold it to Benjamin about nine months before the events underlying this dispute, because, as she explained, she was getting old and did not know how much longer she would be around. Kang lived in the house with her business partner, Chong Sik Kim. The two operated a massage business in the house called Lee’s Massage, and both had business licenses under that name. Kang asked a neighbor for help with major home repairs in exchange for a used pickup truck. The neighbor injured his wrist while working on the house. A few days later the two had a dispute and terminated their arrangement; Kang paid her neighbor $500 for his work. The neighbor later sought medical treatment for his wrist; he also filed a report of injury and a workers’ compensation claim with the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board. Kang denied liability on several grounds, but the Board decided, after a hearing, that Kang was her neighbor’s employer for purposes of the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act. Kang appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, which affirmed the Board’s decisions. The Alaska Supreme Court held, however, that the evidence did not support a finding that the woman was her neighbor’s employer, and therefore reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Kang v. Mullins" on Justia Law

A husband and wife divorced after 40 years of marriage. The wife appealed the superior court’s decision to equally divide their marital property, which consisted primarily of retirement benefits and debt. The superior court declined to consider how the couple’s Social Security benefits affected a fair distribution, believing that Alaska Supreme Court case law precluded it from doing so. But the Supreme Court held that although federal law prohibited any allocation of the parties’ Social Security benefits, the court could consider them as evidence of the parties’ financial condition in crafting an equitable division of the marital property. The wife raised a number of other challenges to the property division, but the Supreme Court concluded they lacked merit. The Court vacated the order dividing the marital property and remanded for further consideration in light of the parties’ Social Security benefits. View "Dunmore v. Dunmore" on Justia Law