Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The respondent in involuntary commitment and medication proceedings, Jacob S., appealed a few issues related to findings that he was mentally ill and posed a risk of harm to others. The superior court ordered both 30-and 90-day commitments, the latter following a jury trial. The court also entered medication orders after finding the respondent unable to make mental health treatment decisions. The primary argument respondent made on appeal of the commitment order, was: (1) when a respondent requests a jury trial on a 90-day commitment petition, who decides the factual underpinning for and the ultimate question of least restrictive alternative to commitment (the jury or the court); and (2) can a respondent be found incompetent under AS 47.0.837(d)(1) if only part of the requirements of that statute is not met? The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the court decides the question of least restrictive alternative; and (2) yes, a respondent can be found incompetent if one part is not met. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court’s commitment and medication orders. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Jacob S." on Justia Law

Peter Metcalfe was employed briefly by the State in the early 1970s and contributed to the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). In 1981, Metcalfe took a refund of his PERS contributions. Under a statute in effect at the time, if Metcalfe later secured State employment and returned his refund to PERS with interest, he was entitled to reinstate at his prior PERS service tier and credit. But in 2005 the legislature repealed that statute, leaving a five-year grace period for regaining State employment and reinstating to a prior PERS status. The State then sent notice to former PERS members that “[d]efined benefit members who do not return to covered employment before July 1, 2010 will forfeit their defined benefit tier and all service associated with the refund.” In 2012 Metcalfe inquired about his PERS status. He was informed that even if he were to regain State employment, he could not reinstate to his prior PERS service tier and credit because under the new statute, his grace period for reinstatement ended in 2010. In June 2013 Metcalfe brought a putative class action lawsuit against the State, alleging that the 2005 legislation: (1) violated article XII, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution; (2) deprived a class of former employees of their vested interest in the contractual “benefit to be reinstated to state employment at the tier level they previously held”; and (3) effectively breached the class members’ employment contracts. Metcalfe sought damages, but he also asked for a seemingly mutually exclusive declaratory judgment that the State must comply with former AS 39.35.350. The class was never certified. The State moved to dismiss Metcalfe’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The superior court tentatively rejected the argument that Metcalfe failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, rejected the argument that Metcalfe’s claim was not ripe and that he lacked standing, but dismissed Metcalfe’s claim as time barred. Metcalfe appealed, and the State cross-appealed the superior court’s ruling that Metcalfe’s claim was ripe and argued that the superior court’s decision could be upheld on the ground that Metcalfe lacked standing to sue. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the contract damages claim on the alternative ground that no such claim existed; the Court reversed and remanded the declaratory and injunctive relief claim for further proceedings. View "Metcalfe v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A mother and her eight children were routinely severely abused by the father of the younger children while living in another state. The mother fled to Alaska with four of her daughters in 2013. After the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) obtained temporary custody of the children, the mother resisted OCS’s efforts to reunify the family and refused to participate in supervised visits with her daughters. She left Alaska in October 2014, maintaining only sporadic contact with her daughters, and she had not returned. The superior court terminated the mother’s and father’s parental rights with respect to two of the younger daughters, finding that: the children were in need of aid due to abandonment and other statutory factors; that the parents had not remedied the conduct that made the children in need of aid; that OCS had made reasonable efforts toward reunification; and that termination was in the daughters’ best interests. The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights but did not appeal the superior court’s finding that her children were initially in need of aid. Finding that the superior court's judgment was amply supported by the record, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Joy B. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

A worker whose Alaska workers’ compensation case was closed in 1977 filed a new claim in 2012 related to his injury from the 1970s. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board dismissed the new claim, and he appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission. The Commission granted the worker three extensions of time to file his brief and later issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. The Commission dismissed the appeal, relying on its interpretation of a Board regulation. Finding that the interpretation of that regulation was made in error, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Eder v. M-K Rivers" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and the owner of a car wash reached an agreement for the State to acquire the car wash site as part of a highway improvement project. After the State acquired the site, the owner elected not to relocate the car wash. The owner then brought an inverse condemnation suit against the State, claiming business damages resulting from the State’s acquisition. At the close of a jury trial the superior court denied the State’s motion for a directed verdict; awarded the owner $1.79 million in damages and the court awarded attorney’s fees and costs. The State appealed, arguing that the owner’s claimed damages were not compensable because it was feasible for the owner to relocate the car wash after the State acquired the original site. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the State that feasibility was the correct standard for analyzing the owner’s decision not to relocate when deciding whether he was entitled to business damages. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court’s denial of the State’s motion for directed verdict, vacated the attorney’s fee and costs awards, and remanded for reconsideration of prevailing party status, attorney’s fees, and costs. View "Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities v. Alaska Laser Wash, Inc." on Justia Law

A client personally financed the sale of his business corporation. His attorney drafted documents that secured the buyer’s debt with corporate stock and an interest in the buyer’s home. Over seven years later the government imposed tax liens on the corporation’s assets; according to the client, it was only then he learned for the first time that his attorney had not provided for a recorded security interest in the physical assets. The client sued the attorney for malpractice and violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). The superior court held that the statute of limitations barred the client’s claims and granted summary judgment to the attorney. But after review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that it was not until the tax liens were filed that the client suffered the actual damage necessary for his cause of action to be complete. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Westbrook" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the validity of an easement that Thomas Carnahan claimed extended over property owned by Keven and Marlene Windel. In addition, there were issues surrounding damage allegedly caused by improvements within that easement. Carnahan won at trial in "Windel I," but the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration of attorney fee issues. On remand, the superior court awarded Carnahan feed, finding that he was the prevailing party. The Windels appealed again, arguing the superior court erred in its analysis of Rule 68 when awarding Carnahan attorney fees. Finding no reversible error in the resolution of the fee dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Windel v. Carnahan" on Justia Law

A narrow strip of land in the Turnagain area of Anchorage, immediately west of Lynn Ary Park and bordering Knik Arm, is at the center of the parties' dispute in this matter. The land is in the shape of a parallelogram; its long sides run in a northeasterly direction up Knik Arm and its short sides run north-south. The property was initially subdivided in May 1952. As initially platted the northern subdivision boundary stopped just south of a 50-70 foot bluff. The bluff itself was just south of the mean high-tide line of Knik Arm; the land between the northern boundary of the lots and the mean high-tide line was not developable land. During the Good Friday Earthquake of 1964, the bluff face flattened out and slid northward into Knik Arm. This caused the existing land between the pre-earthquake bluff face and the pre-earthquake mean high-tide line to become developable and created new land between the pre-earthquake mean high-tide line and the post-earthquake mean high-tide line. Despite the plats of the subdivision apparently indicating that their lots’ northern boundary is at the top of the pre-earthquake bluff face, appellants and lot owners Matthew Fink and Diane Wilke alleged that their property actually extended north to the pre-earthquake mean high-tide line. The parties did not dispute that the Municipality of Anchorage owned the new land between the pre-earthquake mean high-tide line and the post-earthquake mean high-tide line. The Municipality argued that the lot owners did not have a substantial interest in the disputed property and that the statute of limitations barred the lot owners’ claim. The superior court concluded that the lot owners failed to show a substantial interest in the disputed parcel and that, even if the lot owners did have a substantial interest, the statute of limitations barred their claim. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Fink v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

The superior court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of a child to her grandparents, after a trial at which the court found by clear and convincing evidence that leaving the child in her mother’s custody would be clearly detrimental to the child’s welfare. Nine months later, the mother moved to modify custody, attesting by affidavit that she had improved her life in a number of ways and had accomplished goals the court had set for her. She also argued that the court’s grant of custody following trial had been only temporary, and she was thus entitled to a biological-parent preference and the court could modify custody without proof of a substantial change in circumstances. The court denied her motion without a hearing, holding both that its custody decree was intended to be final and that the mother failed to show the substantial change in circumstances necessary to entitle her to an evidentiary hearing. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s holdings, and therefore affirmed its denial of the mother’s modification motion without a hearing. View "Abby D. v. Sue Y." on Justia Law

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (the Department or the State) terminated the employment of seafood inspector Ernest Thomas following a contentious airport inspection that resulted in complaints by a seafood processor and an airline. Thomas contended his termination was actually in retaliation for an ethics complaint he had filed over a year earlier against the agency’s director. The superior court decided most of the inspector’s claims against him on summary judgment but allowed one claim, alleging a violation of his free speech rights, to go to trial. The jury found that the ethics complaint was not a substantial or motivating factor in the inspector’s termination, and the superior court entered final judgment for the agency. On appeal, Thomas argued the superior court erred in granting summary judgment, in denying his motion for a new trial based on allegations of jury misconduct, and in awarding attorney’s fees to the agency. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thomas v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law