Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The superior court issued a 30-day involuntary commitment order after finding that Mark V. was gravely disabled and “entirely unable to fend for himself independently in the community.” Mark argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove he could not live independently. Although Mark’s appeal was technically moot, his claim raised an important question that satisfied the public interest exception: Where does family and community support fit within the involuntary commitment process and which party bears the burden of proving or disproving that a respondent has that support? The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s inability to function with outside support, when relevant, was part of the petitioner’s burden of proving that there was no less restrictive alternative to commitment. But the Court found in this case that the State’s evidence satisfied this burden, and the Court therefore affirmed the 30-day commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V." on Justia Law

This appeal involved two petitions for long-term domestic violence protective orders. Olivia Lee-Magana prevailed both on a petition she brought against her ex-boyfriend Jacob Carpenter and on a petition he brought against her. She moved for attorney’s fees in both cases, but the trial court denied her motions at first and again on reconsideration. Lee-Magana appealed, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding her full attorney’s fees on both petitions : on hers because she was the prevailing petitioner in a domestic violence case for whom fees are allowed by statute, and on her ex-boyfriend’s because she was the prevailing party and his petition was vexatious. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s denial of attorney’s fees for Lee-Magana's successful defense against her ex-boyfriend’s petition. As for the court’s denial of attorney’s fees to Lee-Magana as the prevailing petitioner, the Court concluded there was no adequate reason for denying fees and therefore reversed and remanded for an award of fees in an appropriate amount. View "Lee-Magana v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission was created, an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decision could be appealed to the superior court, and a party dissatisfied with the superior court’s final resolution of the case then could appeal to the Supreme Court. Construing the appellate rules, the Supreme Court decided in "Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau," "a decision of a superior court, acting as an intermediate appellate court, which reverses . . . the decision of an administrative agency and remands for further proceedings, is a non-final order of the superior court." Joseph Huit worked for Ashwater Burns, Inc. in 2010. Early in November he was working on a remodel project, and as part of the job he removed a water-damaged vanity from a bathroom. As he was carrying the vanity he scratched his abdomen on a protruding drywall screw; he showed the scratch to some people at the job site, including his brother Steven, but did not file a report of injury. According to Huit at some point later in November the scratch appeared to heal. In early December, Huit felt ill at work, so he went to the emergency room. He would later be diagnosed with “spontaneous endocarditis” with metastatic lesions growing on his spleen, kidneys, brain and heart. By January 2011 Huit had severe aortic regurgitation, and in February he underwent aortic valve replacement surgery. Huit first thought about the possibility that the infection was work related while he was hospitalized; he explained that after the doctors told him he had an infection, he remembered the scratch and notified his employer. Ashwater Burns filed a report of injury on December 21 and later controverted benefits, relying on a cardiologist’s opinion formed after reviewing Huit’s medical records. This appeal presented the Supreme Court's first opportunity to consider whether "Thibodeau," should apply to Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission decisions. After review, the Court concluded that it should. This appeal also presented a first opportunity to consider, at least in part, the legislature’s 2005 amendments to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act’s presumption analysis. The Court reversed the Commission’s application of that analysis in this case and modified its earlier precedent. View "Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc." on Justia Law

A superior court ordered the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) to audit the child support and spousal support accounts of a divorced couple. The audits revealed that the agency had collected too much child support from the ex-wife and that the ex-husband owed her the overpayment as well as arrearages in spousal support. The ex-wife’s attorney filed an attorney’s lien on money in the ex-husband’s possession that the attorney claimed was owed to his client, then filed a separate action to enforce the lien. The ex-husband paid the money to CSSD, which turned it over to the ex-wife.The superior court granted summary judgment to the ex-husband on the attorney’s lien claim, concluding that the lien was invalid because the ex-husband was required to pay the money for the overpayment and the spousal support arrearages directly to CSSD. The attorney appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the attorney’s lien satisfied the requirements of the governing statute, AS 34.35.430(a)(3). Therefore the Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Law Offices of Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Ceccarelli" on Justia Law

Defendant Aaron Young was accused of involvement in a shooting and convicted at trial, in part on the strength of three eyewitness identifications. He challenged the admissibility of two of the identifications on due process grounds, but the superior court ruled them admissible. Defendant also requested an eyewitness-specific jury instruction, which the superior court refused. Furthermore, defendant argued that he was entitled to a mistrial because of an alleged discovery violation by the State that he learned of mid-trial. The superior court denied his motion, finding that the State had not violated the disclosure rules and alternatively that the defendant had not suffered any prejudice. The defendant was convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. On petition to the Alaska Supreme Court, defendant argued not only that his conviction should have been reversed based on the current law on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications, but also that Alaska’s due process clause required the adoption of a new test. He also argued that the superior court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction and in failing to grant him a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that the superior court erred under the law as it currently existed when it held one of the eyewitness identifications sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial, but that it did not err in admitting the other. The Court also held that the superior court erred in refusing to give an eyewitness-specific jury instruction but did not err in denying a mistrial. Because the errors were harmless, the Court affirmed defendant’s conviction. In light of the issues raised by this appeal, the Court concluded that the current test for the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence does not adequately protect the right to due process under the Alaska Constitution. The Court therefore identified factors that courts should consider in future cases when deciding whether to admit eyewitness identification evidence. View "Young v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Jasmine was born in February 2009 to Clementine and Jermaine. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of the child after receiving reports that her mother’s conduct had placed her at risk of harm. OCS then investigated the child’s father, who lived out of state, and determined that the child would be safe in his care. At the temporary custody hearing, the superior court granted Jermaine's motion to dismiss the case and ordered the child released from OCS custody. Clementine appealed, arguing that the court should have granted her request for a continuance and held an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the court erred by dismissing the petition without first making findings on the allegations it contained. The Supreme Court concluded that the mother had no right to an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the superior court did not err by dismissing the petition when OCS declined to pursue it. View "Clementine F. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

A husband and wife separated after the husband was charged with sexually abusing their minor daughter. The husband eventually pleaded guilty to first degree indecent exposure. In the civil divorce suit, the superior court took judicial notice of the conviction, concluded that the husband’s sexual offense was the cause of his current financial woes and was therefore a form of economic misconduct, and divided the marital property 70-30 in the wife’s favor. The court also concluded that the wife had not wasted or otherwise misused marital funds she had withdrawn between separation and trial and accordingly declined to recapture those funds in the property division. The husband appeals, claiming the superior court should not have considered his criminal offense and by doing so demonstrated bias against him. The husband also contended the superior court abused its discretion by favoring the wife in the property division and that his due process rights were violated. Finding that the superior court erred by treating the wife's attorney's fees as marital expenses, failing to address the husband's request for fees, and by adjusting the property division to account for expenses the husband was separately obligated to pay.The Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Jerry B. v. Sally B." on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal reached a settlement in their divorce, providing that the qualified marital portion of the husband’s pension would be distributed to the wife and the nonqualified portion would be distributed to the husband, subject to a provision for equitable reallocation if the values of those portions changed significantly. The settlement also described four firearms and ammunition that the husband would deliver to the wife. After the decree issued, the wife’s portion of the pension declined in value and the husband’s portion increased, so the wife filed motions attempting to obtain information about the reasons for this change in value and attempting to enforce the settlement agreement’s equitable reallocation provision to compensate for the changes. She also argued that the husband had not delivered the guns. The superior court ruled for the husband in all respects, and it awarded enhanced attorney’s fees against the wife. The wife appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the significant change in the relative values of the parties’ pension accounts triggered the verification and reallocation provision of their settlement agreement. Accordingly, the superior court’s denial of the wife’s motion for an equitable reallocation was reversed and the case remanded for an equitable reallocation according to the parties’ agreement. Because the husband was no longer the prevailing party, the Court also vacated the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to the husband. The Court affirmed the superior court’s decision as to the issue over the guns. View "Herring v. Herring" on Justia Law

The superior court in this case divided the marital property, granted child custody and determined the child support obligation. On appeal of that order, the noncustodial, nonresident parent claimed the superior court lacked jurisdiction, the orders were substantively incorrect, and the court appeared to be biased against him. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record contained no evidence of bias and that the court did not err in entering the marital property and child custody orders. But in calculating the father’s child support obligation, the court assumed that Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 imposed an income ceiling of $110,000 - $10,000 below the statutory level. Because the father’s income appeared to exceed $120,000, the Supreme Court deduced this assumption likely rendered the support order too low. Accordingly the Court remanded the support order for reconsideration. View "Sherrill v. Sherrill" on Justia Law

In November 2010, Stevie Lander was driving on an icy road. Her vehicle slid into a Bonnie Luther's car. Although Luther reported no injuries at the scene of the accident, that evening she went to the emergency room for head and neck pain, and within weeks she began to suffer from lower back pain that prevented her from returning to her job as a flight attendant. Luther attributed her pain to the accident and sued Lander for negligence two years later. Lander admitted negligence and made an offer of judgment, which Luther did not accept. The case proceeded to trial in 2014, and the jury awarded Luther a total of $3,259 for past medical expenses, past wage and benefit loss, and past non-economic losses. The superior court granted attorney’s fees to Lander under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68(b) and denied Luther’s motion for a new trial. Luther appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by denying her a new trial based on inadequate damages and by excluding evidence of the amount of payments for medical treatment made by Luther’s insurer. She also challenged the superior court’s decision to grant attorney’s fees based on billing records that were filed under seal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of payments made for Luther’s medical treatment by her insurer. But because that error was harmless, the Court affirmed the final judgment entered by the superior court. View "Luther v. Lander" on Justia Law