Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A woman was admitted to a hospital emergency room with pregnancy-related complications. The attending physician recommended that she be transported by medivac to a different facility. The woman and her husband informed the physician that they needed their insurer’s preauthorization for that course of action or they could be personally liable for the costs. The physician allegedly promised to call the insurer and, if it would not approve the medivac, have the hospital bear the costs itself. But the physician failed to contact the insurer until much later, and the insurer declined coverage. The couple sued the physician and the hospital, alleging that the physician breached her fiduciary duty by failing to obtain preauthorization as promised; that her promise created an enforceable contract, which was breached; and that if there was no contract the physician’s promise should be enforced through the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The superior court granted summary judgment to the physician and hospital. The couple appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior court did not err when it ruled in favor of the physician and hospital on the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract, but that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the claim for promissory estoppel. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Thomas v. Archer" on Justia Law

Providence Alaska Medical Center terminated Dr. Michael Brandner’s hospital privileges without notice and an opportunity to be heard after determining he had violated hospital policy by failing to report an Alaska State Medical Board order requiring him to undergo an evaluation of his fitness to practice medicine. Brandner unsuccessfully challenged this action through Providence’s internal post-termination hearing and appeal procedures. Brandner then sued in superior court, seeking reinstatement and damages for, in relevant part, alleged due process violations both in the procedures used and in the substantive standard applied in his termination. The superior court ruled that Brandner’s due process rights were not violated, that he was not entitled to reinstatement, and that under federal law Providence was entitled to immunity from his damages claims. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision concerning the substantive standard applied to terminate Brander; he therefore was not entitled to reinstatement or post-termination-hearing damages. But Brandner’s due process rights were violated by the procedures Providence employed because was not given required notice and a hearing prior to the termination of his hospital privileges; the Court therefore reversed the superior court’s decision on the pre-termination notice and hearing claim and its decision that Providence had damages immunity from this claim. View "Brandner v. Providence Health & Services - Washington" on Justia Law

A driver and his passengers sued another driver for injuries arising from an accident. After a trial, the jury returned an award of past pain and suffering damages for the driver, and past medical expenses and pain and suffering damages for one of the passengers. The driver and passengers appealed this award, arguing that it was impermissibly inconsistent and not supported by the weight of the evidence. Because the driver and passengers failed to challenge the jury verdicts before the trial court, all of their challenges were waived, and the Supreme Court affirmed the verdicts in full. View "Small v. Sayre" on Justia Law

The respondent in involuntary commitment and medication proceedings, Jacob S., appealed a few issues related to findings that he was mentally ill and posed a risk of harm to others. The superior court ordered both 30-and 90-day commitments, the latter following a jury trial. The court also entered medication orders after finding the respondent unable to make mental health treatment decisions. The primary argument respondent made on appeal of the commitment order, was: (1) when a respondent requests a jury trial on a 90-day commitment petition, who decides the factual underpinning for and the ultimate question of least restrictive alternative to commitment (the jury or the court); and (2) can a respondent be found incompetent under AS 47.0.837(d)(1) if only part of the requirements of that statute is not met? The Alaska Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the court decides the question of least restrictive alternative; and (2) yes, a respondent can be found incompetent if one part is not met. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court’s commitment and medication orders. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Jacob S." on Justia Law

Peter Metcalfe was employed briefly by the State in the early 1970s and contributed to the Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS). In 1981, Metcalfe took a refund of his PERS contributions. Under a statute in effect at the time, if Metcalfe later secured State employment and returned his refund to PERS with interest, he was entitled to reinstate at his prior PERS service tier and credit. But in 2005 the legislature repealed that statute, leaving a five-year grace period for regaining State employment and reinstating to a prior PERS status. The State then sent notice to former PERS members that “[d]efined benefit members who do not return to covered employment before July 1, 2010 will forfeit their defined benefit tier and all service associated with the refund.” In 2012 Metcalfe inquired about his PERS status. He was informed that even if he were to regain State employment, he could not reinstate to his prior PERS service tier and credit because under the new statute, his grace period for reinstatement ended in 2010. In June 2013 Metcalfe brought a putative class action lawsuit against the State, alleging that the 2005 legislation: (1) violated article XII, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution; (2) deprived a class of former employees of their vested interest in the contractual “benefit to be reinstated to state employment at the tier level they previously held”; and (3) effectively breached the class members’ employment contracts. Metcalfe sought damages, but he also asked for a seemingly mutually exclusive declaratory judgment that the State must comply with former AS 39.35.350. The class was never certified. The State moved to dismiss Metcalfe’s lawsuit for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The superior court tentatively rejected the argument that Metcalfe failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, rejected the argument that Metcalfe’s claim was not ripe and that he lacked standing, but dismissed Metcalfe’s claim as time barred. Metcalfe appealed, and the State cross-appealed the superior court’s ruling that Metcalfe’s claim was ripe and argued that the superior court’s decision could be upheld on the ground that Metcalfe lacked standing to sue. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the contract damages claim on the alternative ground that no such claim existed; the Court reversed and remanded the declaratory and injunctive relief claim for further proceedings. View "Metcalfe v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A mother and her eight children were routinely severely abused by the father of the younger children while living in another state. The mother fled to Alaska with four of her daughters in 2013. After the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) obtained temporary custody of the children, the mother resisted OCS’s efforts to reunify the family and refused to participate in supervised visits with her daughters. She left Alaska in October 2014, maintaining only sporadic contact with her daughters, and she had not returned. The superior court terminated the mother’s and father’s parental rights with respect to two of the younger daughters, finding that: the children were in need of aid due to abandonment and other statutory factors; that the parents had not remedied the conduct that made the children in need of aid; that OCS had made reasonable efforts toward reunification; and that termination was in the daughters’ best interests. The mother appealed the termination of her parental rights but did not appeal the superior court’s finding that her children were initially in need of aid. Finding that the superior court's judgment was amply supported by the record, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Joy B. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

A worker whose Alaska workers’ compensation case was closed in 1977 filed a new claim in 2012 related to his injury from the 1970s. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board dismissed the new claim, and he appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission. The Commission granted the worker three extensions of time to file his brief and later issued an order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. The Commission dismissed the appeal, relying on its interpretation of a Board regulation. Finding that the interpretation of that regulation was made in error, the Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision. View "Eder v. M-K Rivers" on Justia Law

The State of Alaska and the owner of a car wash reached an agreement for the State to acquire the car wash site as part of a highway improvement project. After the State acquired the site, the owner elected not to relocate the car wash. The owner then brought an inverse condemnation suit against the State, claiming business damages resulting from the State’s acquisition. At the close of a jury trial the superior court denied the State’s motion for a directed verdict; awarded the owner $1.79 million in damages and the court awarded attorney’s fees and costs. The State appealed, arguing that the owner’s claimed damages were not compensable because it was feasible for the owner to relocate the car wash after the State acquired the original site. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the State that feasibility was the correct standard for analyzing the owner’s decision not to relocate when deciding whether he was entitled to business damages. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court’s denial of the State’s motion for directed verdict, vacated the attorney’s fee and costs awards, and remanded for reconsideration of prevailing party status, attorney’s fees, and costs. View "Dept. of Trans. & Public Facilities v. Alaska Laser Wash, Inc." on Justia Law

A client personally financed the sale of his business corporation. His attorney drafted documents that secured the buyer’s debt with corporate stock and an interest in the buyer’s home. Over seven years later the government imposed tax liens on the corporation’s assets; according to the client, it was only then he learned for the first time that his attorney had not provided for a recorded security interest in the physical assets. The client sued the attorney for malpractice and violation of the Alaska Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). The superior court held that the statute of limitations barred the client’s claims and granted summary judgment to the attorney. But after review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that it was not until the tax liens were filed that the client suffered the actual damage necessary for his cause of action to be complete. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Westbrook" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the validity of an easement that Thomas Carnahan claimed extended over property owned by Keven and Marlene Windel. In addition, there were issues surrounding damage allegedly caused by improvements within that easement. Carnahan won at trial in "Windel I," but the Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration of attorney fee issues. On remand, the superior court awarded Carnahan feed, finding that he was the prevailing party. The Windels appealed again, arguing the superior court erred in its analysis of Rule 68 when awarding Carnahan attorney fees. Finding no reversible error in the resolution of the fee dispute, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Windel v. Carnahan" on Justia Law