Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A narrow strip of land in the Turnagain area of Anchorage, immediately west of Lynn Ary Park and bordering Knik Arm, is at the center of the parties' dispute in this matter. The land is in the shape of a parallelogram; its long sides run in a northeasterly direction up Knik Arm and its short sides run north-south. The property was initially subdivided in May 1952. As initially platted the northern subdivision boundary stopped just south of a 50-70 foot bluff. The bluff itself was just south of the mean high-tide line of Knik Arm; the land between the northern boundary of the lots and the mean high-tide line was not developable land. During the Good Friday Earthquake of 1964, the bluff face flattened out and slid northward into Knik Arm. This caused the existing land between the pre-earthquake bluff face and the pre-earthquake mean high-tide line to become developable and created new land between the pre-earthquake mean high-tide line and the post-earthquake mean high-tide line. Despite the plats of the subdivision apparently indicating that their lots’ northern boundary is at the top of the pre-earthquake bluff face, appellants and lot owners Matthew Fink and Diane Wilke alleged that their property actually extended north to the pre-earthquake mean high-tide line. The parties did not dispute that the Municipality of Anchorage owned the new land between the pre-earthquake mean high-tide line and the post-earthquake mean high-tide line. The Municipality argued that the lot owners did not have a substantial interest in the disputed property and that the statute of limitations barred the lot owners’ claim. The superior court concluded that the lot owners failed to show a substantial interest in the disputed parcel and that, even if the lot owners did have a substantial interest, the statute of limitations barred their claim. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Fink v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

The superior court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of a child to her grandparents, after a trial at which the court found by clear and convincing evidence that leaving the child in her mother’s custody would be clearly detrimental to the child’s welfare. Nine months later, the mother moved to modify custody, attesting by affidavit that she had improved her life in a number of ways and had accomplished goals the court had set for her. She also argued that the court’s grant of custody following trial had been only temporary, and she was thus entitled to a biological-parent preference and the court could modify custody without proof of a substantial change in circumstances. The court denied her motion without a hearing, holding both that its custody decree was intended to be final and that the mother failed to show the substantial change in circumstances necessary to entitle her to an evidentiary hearing. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed with the superior court’s holdings, and therefore affirmed its denial of the mother’s modification motion without a hearing. View "Abby D. v. Sue Y." on Justia Law

The Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation (the Department or the State) terminated the employment of seafood inspector Ernest Thomas following a contentious airport inspection that resulted in complaints by a seafood processor and an airline. Thomas contended his termination was actually in retaliation for an ethics complaint he had filed over a year earlier against the agency’s director. The superior court decided most of the inspector’s claims against him on summary judgment but allowed one claim, alleging a violation of his free speech rights, to go to trial. The jury found that the ethics complaint was not a substantial or motivating factor in the inspector’s termination, and the superior court entered final judgment for the agency. On appeal, Thomas argued the superior court erred in granting summary judgment, in denying his motion for a new trial based on allegations of jury misconduct, and in awarding attorney’s fees to the agency. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Thomas v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

In a prison discipline proceeding, prisoner William Johnson was found guilty of possessing contraband. He appealed his punishment to a discipline committee, which affirmed the decision. Represented by counsel, Johnson appealed to the superior court, alleging that the Department of Corrections had deprived him of due process. The court granted the State’s unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the prisoner’s statement of points on appeal was deficient. When Johnson moved for reconsideration but made no attempt to remedy the deficiency, the superior court denied his motion and awarded the State attorney’s fees. Johnson appealed the dismissal and the award of attorney’s fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Mid-afternoon on an icy early March day, plaintiff Michele Marshall was stopped at a stoplight preparing to turn left from the outside turn lane. Defendant Matthew Peter testified that he came to a complete stop about one-half car length behind her. After about 30 seconds, the light turned green, Marshall began to move forward, and Peter released his foot from the brake. But Marshall stopped sooner than Peter expected; Peter returned his foot to the brake, attempted to stop, and slid into Marshall’s vehicle. He testified that his car “just tapped the back of her car” at a speed that “couldn’t [have] be[en] more than three miles an hour.” He had yet to place his foot on the accelerator. Marshall contended that no reasonable juror could have found Peter not negligent and that the superior court therefore should have granted her motion for a directed verdict on liability. After review of this matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the jury reasonably found the driver behind not negligent, and therefore affirmed the denial of the motion. View "Marshall v. Peter" on Justia Law

Williams Alaska Petroleum owned the North Pole refinery until 2004. Williams knew that the then-unregulated chemical sulfolane was present in refinery property groundwater, but it did not know that the sulfolane had migrated off the refinery property via underground water flow. Flint Hills Resources Alaska bought the North Pole refinery from Williams in 2004 pursuant to a contract that contained detailed terms regarding environmental liabilities, indemnification, and damages caps. Almost immediately the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation informed Flint Hills that sulfolane was to be a regulated chemical and that Flint Hills needed to find the source of the sulfolane in the groundwater. The Department contacted Flint Hills again in 2006. Flint Hills’s environmental contractor repeatedly warned Flint Hills that sulfolane could be leaving the refinery property and that more work was necessary to ascertain the extent of the problem. In 2008, Flint Hills drilled perimeter wells and discovered the sulfolane was migrating beyond its property and had contaminated drinking water in North Pole. A North Pole resident sued Flint Hills and Williams, and Flint Hills cross-claimed against Williams for indemnification. After extensive motion practice the superior court dismissed all of Flint Hills’s claims against Williams as time-barred. Flint Hills appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court correctly applied the contract’s damages cap provision, but concluded that the court erred in finding Flint Hills’s contractual indemnification claims and part of its statutory claims were time-barred. The Court also affirmed the court’s dismissal of Flint Hills’s equitable claims. View "Flint Hills Resources Alaska, LLC v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

The superior court modified a child custody decree, granting sole legal custody and primary physical custody to the child’s father and setting a visitation schedule. The mother picked the child up for summer visitation but did not share her travel plans with the father and did not answer the phone or otherwise respond when the father called for telephonic visitation with the child. After five days with no word from the mother or the child, the father filed a motion to show cause. The court ordered the mother to place the child on the phone at the scheduled telephonic visitation times, to keep the father informed of the child’s address and travel dates, and to give the child a telephone provided by the father to facilitate their telephonic visitation. The mother appealed, arguing that the custody decree did not give the father any telephonic visitation rights and that the court impermissibly modified the decree. She also argued that she did not receive adequate notice of the father’s motion. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court’s orders were within its inherent power to interpret and enforce the custody decree and that the mother received adequate notice of the father’s motion. View "del Rosario v. Clare" on Justia Law

Several men were in a car that rear-ended the plaintiff Linda Sellers' vehicle. She sued the car’s owner, believing he had been driving. The car’s owner moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis of an affidavit from a second man, who claimed he was driving at the time of the accident. Plaintiff amended her complaint to name both men. The second man then moved to dismiss the claim against him, arguing that under Alaska Civil Rule 15(c) plaintiff’s amended complaint did not relate back to the date of her initial filing and the claim was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the claim. Plaintiff proceeded to trial against the car’s owner, who defended on grounds that he had not been driving. The jury found against plaintiff, who then appealed to the superior court, arguing that the district court erred when it dismissed her claim against the second man. The superior court affirmed the district court’s decision. After granting review of the matter, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded plaintiff’s amended complaint met the requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c), and therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sellers v. Kurdilla" on Justia Law

A mother and father shared joint legal and physical custody of their daughter. The mother moved for sole legal and primary physical custody, alleging that a sustained lack of cooperation between the parents and other changes in their lives justified the modification of custody she requested. She moved in the alternative for a modification of the custody schedule. The superior court found there was no substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of custody and awarded partial attorney’s fees to the father. The father appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed these decisions. The case was remanded nevertheless for the superior court to consider whether the mother’s proposed modification of the new custody schedule would have been in the daughter’s best interests. View "Collier v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellant James Bingman, Sr. sought to redeem his foreclosed property by offering the City of Dillingham a promissory note for the amount due, without interest, that would mature 20 years later. The taxpayer asserted that his offer would be deemed accepted unless the City satisfied certain requirements to “terminate its power of acceptance.” The City explicitly rejected the offer by letter and, at the close of the statutory redemption period, filed for a tax deed in superior court. The taxpayer intervened, arguing that he had redeemed the property, but the superior court ruled there was no contract between him and the city. The taxpayer appealed; but finding no error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bingman v. City of Dillingham" on Justia Law