Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The superior court modified a child custody decree, granting sole legal custody and primary physical custody to the child’s father and setting a visitation schedule. The mother picked the child up for summer visitation but did not share her travel plans with the father and did not answer the phone or otherwise respond when the father called for telephonic visitation with the child. After five days with no word from the mother or the child, the father filed a motion to show cause. The court ordered the mother to place the child on the phone at the scheduled telephonic visitation times, to keep the father informed of the child’s address and travel dates, and to give the child a telephone provided by the father to facilitate their telephonic visitation. The mother appealed, arguing that the custody decree did not give the father any telephonic visitation rights and that the court impermissibly modified the decree. She also argued that she did not receive adequate notice of the father’s motion. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court’s orders were within its inherent power to interpret and enforce the custody decree and that the mother received adequate notice of the father’s motion. View "del Rosario v. Clare" on Justia Law

Several men were in a car that rear-ended the plaintiff Linda Sellers' vehicle. She sued the car’s owner, believing he had been driving. The car’s owner moved to dismiss the lawsuit on the basis of an affidavit from a second man, who claimed he was driving at the time of the accident. Plaintiff amended her complaint to name both men. The second man then moved to dismiss the claim against him, arguing that under Alaska Civil Rule 15(c) plaintiff’s amended complaint did not relate back to the date of her initial filing and the claim was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the claim. Plaintiff proceeded to trial against the car’s owner, who defended on grounds that he had not been driving. The jury found against plaintiff, who then appealed to the superior court, arguing that the district court erred when it dismissed her claim against the second man. The superior court affirmed the district court’s decision. After granting review of the matter, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded plaintiff’s amended complaint met the requirements for relation back under Rule 15(c), and therefore reversed the superior court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sellers v. Kurdilla" on Justia Law

A mother and father shared joint legal and physical custody of their daughter. The mother moved for sole legal and primary physical custody, alleging that a sustained lack of cooperation between the parents and other changes in their lives justified the modification of custody she requested. She moved in the alternative for a modification of the custody schedule. The superior court found there was no substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of custody and awarded partial attorney’s fees to the father. The father appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed these decisions. The case was remanded nevertheless for the superior court to consider whether the mother’s proposed modification of the new custody schedule would have been in the daughter’s best interests. View "Collier v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellant James Bingman, Sr. sought to redeem his foreclosed property by offering the City of Dillingham a promissory note for the amount due, without interest, that would mature 20 years later. The taxpayer asserted that his offer would be deemed accepted unless the City satisfied certain requirements to “terminate its power of acceptance.” The City explicitly rejected the offer by letter and, at the close of the statutory redemption period, filed for a tax deed in superior court. The taxpayer intervened, arguing that he had redeemed the property, but the superior court ruled there was no contract between him and the city. The taxpayer appealed; but finding no error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bingman v. City of Dillingham" on Justia Law

Floyd Cornelison injured his back at work in 1996 while shoveling dirt. He had back surgery later that year, but it did little to improve his condition. The Board found he was permanently and totally disabled (PTD) in 2001 under the "odd-lot doctrine." TIG Insurance, the workers’ compensation insurer for Floyd’s employer, did not contest that he was PTD; it reclassified his workers’ compensation benefits as PTD in 2000. Floyd also received Social Security disability payments, and the employer received an offset for those payments. The employer and TIG challenged Cornelison's continuing eligibility for workers’ compensation, relying on surreptitious video surveillance and a doctor’s report issued after the doctor viewed an edited surveillance video. Cornelison and his wife sued TIG and a number of others involved in the attempt to terminate benefits; they alleged several causes of action, contending that the video had been purposely edited to provide a false picture of the employee’s physical abilities and that the defendants had participated to varying degrees in a scheme to defraud the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board. The trial court granted summary judgment or dismissal as to all of the defendants on all counts. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court concluded the Cornelisons provided enough evidence to show that a material factual dispute existed about the accuracy of the edited videos and the manner in which the videos were created. They also presented more than generalized claims of emotional distress. Because the superior court failed to address the issues in dispute in the IIED claim against certain persons involved with the making of the videos, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on this claim and remand to the superior court. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Cornelison v. TIG Insurance" on Justia Law

The Anchorage Police Department seized some of appellant Willie Jackson's personal property when he was arrested. He would be charged with several state-law felonies, which were later dropped after he was indicted on federal charges. In December 2012, nearly eight years after the Anchorage police’s initial seizure of his property, Jackson filed a conversion suit against the Municipality of Anchorage, alleging the Municipality unlawfully failed to return his seized property despite a September 2006 order from the U.S. District Court ordering its return. The Municipality moved to dismiss the case based on the statute of limitations. The superior court dismissed Jackson’s case under Alaska Civil Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and Jackson appealed. Because Jackson’s complaint alleged facts which, if proved, were sufficient to entitle him to some form of relief, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the order dismissing Jackson’s complaint and remanded for further proceedings. View "Jackson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

In a 2007 ruling, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized that the State had "compelling interests" in aiding parents to help their minor children make informed and mature pregnancy-related decisions, and at that time, the Court indicated that a parental notification law might be implemented without unduly interfering with minors’ fundamental privacy rights. The 2010 voter-enacted Parental Notification Law revived an exception in the existing medical emancipation statute, creating considerable tension between a minor’s fundamental privacy right to reproductive choice and how the State could advance its compelling interests. By this 2016 opinion, the Alaska Court concluded that the Notification Law violated the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection guarantee and could not be enforced. "But the decision we reach today is narrow in light of the limited State interests offered to justify the Notification Law. The State expressly disclaims any interest in how a minor exercises her fundamental privacy right of reproductive choice, and it does not suggest that it has an interest in limiting abortions generally or with respect to minors specifically. And as a court we are not concerned with whether abortion is right, wrong, moral, or immoral, or with whether abortions should be available to minors without restriction. We are concerned only with whether, given its stated underlying justifications, the current Notification Law complies with the Alaska Constitution’s equal protection guarantee — and it does not." View "Planned Parenthood of the Great Northwest v. Alaska" on Justia Law

The superior court issued a 30-day involuntary commitment order after finding that Mark V. was gravely disabled and “entirely unable to fend for himself independently in the community.” Mark argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove he could not live independently. Although Mark’s appeal was technically moot, his claim raised an important question that satisfied the public interest exception: Where does family and community support fit within the involuntary commitment process and which party bears the burden of proving or disproving that a respondent has that support? The Supreme Court held that the respondent’s inability to function with outside support, when relevant, was part of the petitioner’s burden of proving that there was no less restrictive alternative to commitment. But the Court found in this case that the State’s evidence satisfied this burden, and the Court therefore affirmed the 30-day commitment order. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V." on Justia Law

This appeal involved two petitions for long-term domestic violence protective orders. Olivia Lee-Magana prevailed both on a petition she brought against her ex-boyfriend Jacob Carpenter and on a petition he brought against her. She moved for attorney’s fees in both cases, but the trial court denied her motions at first and again on reconsideration. Lee-Magana appealed, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding her full attorney’s fees on both petitions : on hers because she was the prevailing petitioner in a domestic violence case for whom fees are allowed by statute, and on her ex-boyfriend’s because she was the prevailing party and his petition was vexatious. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s denial of attorney’s fees for Lee-Magana's successful defense against her ex-boyfriend’s petition. As for the court’s denial of attorney’s fees to Lee-Magana as the prevailing petitioner, the Court concluded there was no adequate reason for denying fees and therefore reversed and remanded for an award of fees in an appropriate amount. View "Lee-Magana v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission was created, an Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decision could be appealed to the superior court, and a party dissatisfied with the superior court’s final resolution of the case then could appeal to the Supreme Court. Construing the appellate rules, the Supreme Court decided in "Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau," "a decision of a superior court, acting as an intermediate appellate court, which reverses . . . the decision of an administrative agency and remands for further proceedings, is a non-final order of the superior court." Joseph Huit worked for Ashwater Burns, Inc. in 2010. Early in November he was working on a remodel project, and as part of the job he removed a water-damaged vanity from a bathroom. As he was carrying the vanity he scratched his abdomen on a protruding drywall screw; he showed the scratch to some people at the job site, including his brother Steven, but did not file a report of injury. According to Huit at some point later in November the scratch appeared to heal. In early December, Huit felt ill at work, so he went to the emergency room. He would later be diagnosed with “spontaneous endocarditis” with metastatic lesions growing on his spleen, kidneys, brain and heart. By January 2011 Huit had severe aortic regurgitation, and in February he underwent aortic valve replacement surgery. Huit first thought about the possibility that the infection was work related while he was hospitalized; he explained that after the doctors told him he had an infection, he remembered the scratch and notified his employer. Ashwater Burns filed a report of injury on December 21 and later controverted benefits, relying on a cardiologist’s opinion formed after reviewing Huit’s medical records. This appeal presented the Supreme Court's first opportunity to consider whether "Thibodeau," should apply to Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission decisions. After review, the Court concluded that it should. This appeal also presented a first opportunity to consider, at least in part, the legislature’s 2005 amendments to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act’s presumption analysis. The Court reversed the Commission’s application of that analysis in this case and modified its earlier precedent. View "Huit v. Ashwater Burns, Inc." on Justia Law