Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A superior court ordered the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) to audit the child support and spousal support accounts of a divorced couple. The audits revealed that the agency had collected too much child support from the ex-wife and that the ex-husband owed her the overpayment as well as arrearages in spousal support. The ex-wife’s attorney filed an attorney’s lien on money in the ex-husband’s possession that the attorney claimed was owed to his client, then filed a separate action to enforce the lien. The ex-husband paid the money to CSSD, which turned it over to the ex-wife.The superior court granted summary judgment to the ex-husband on the attorney’s lien claim, concluding that the lien was invalid because the ex-husband was required to pay the money for the overpayment and the spousal support arrearages directly to CSSD. The attorney appealed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the attorney’s lien satisfied the requirements of the governing statute, AS 34.35.430(a)(3). Therefore the Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Law Offices of Steven D. Smith, P.C. v. Ceccarelli" on Justia Law

Defendant Aaron Young was accused of involvement in a shooting and convicted at trial, in part on the strength of three eyewitness identifications. He challenged the admissibility of two of the identifications on due process grounds, but the superior court ruled them admissible. Defendant also requested an eyewitness-specific jury instruction, which the superior court refused. Furthermore, defendant argued that he was entitled to a mistrial because of an alleged discovery violation by the State that he learned of mid-trial. The superior court denied his motion, finding that the State had not violated the disclosure rules and alternatively that the defendant had not suffered any prejudice. The defendant was convicted, and the court of appeals affirmed his conviction. On petition to the Alaska Supreme Court, defendant argued not only that his conviction should have been reversed based on the current law on the admissibility of eyewitness identifications, but also that Alaska’s due process clause required the adoption of a new test. He also argued that the superior court erred in failing to give his requested jury instruction and in failing to grant him a mistrial. The Supreme Court held that the superior court erred under the law as it currently existed when it held one of the eyewitness identifications sufficiently reliable to be admitted at trial, but that it did not err in admitting the other. The Court also held that the superior court erred in refusing to give an eyewitness-specific jury instruction but did not err in denying a mistrial. Because the errors were harmless, the Court affirmed defendant’s conviction. In light of the issues raised by this appeal, the Court concluded that the current test for the admissibility of eyewitness identification evidence does not adequately protect the right to due process under the Alaska Constitution. The Court therefore identified factors that courts should consider in future cases when deciding whether to admit eyewitness identification evidence. View "Young v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Jasmine was born in February 2009 to Clementine and Jermaine. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of the child after receiving reports that her mother’s conduct had placed her at risk of harm. OCS then investigated the child’s father, who lived out of state, and determined that the child would be safe in his care. At the temporary custody hearing, the superior court granted Jermaine's motion to dismiss the case and ordered the child released from OCS custody. Clementine appealed, arguing that the court should have granted her request for a continuance and held an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the court erred by dismissing the petition without first making findings on the allegations it contained. The Supreme Court concluded that the mother had no right to an evidentiary hearing on the father’s conduct and that the superior court did not err by dismissing the petition when OCS declined to pursue it. View "Clementine F. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

A husband and wife separated after the husband was charged with sexually abusing their minor daughter. The husband eventually pleaded guilty to first degree indecent exposure. In the civil divorce suit, the superior court took judicial notice of the conviction, concluded that the husband’s sexual offense was the cause of his current financial woes and was therefore a form of economic misconduct, and divided the marital property 70-30 in the wife’s favor. The court also concluded that the wife had not wasted or otherwise misused marital funds she had withdrawn between separation and trial and accordingly declined to recapture those funds in the property division. The husband appeals, claiming the superior court should not have considered his criminal offense and by doing so demonstrated bias against him. The husband also contended the superior court abused its discretion by favoring the wife in the property division and that his due process rights were violated. Finding that the superior court erred by treating the wife's attorney's fees as marital expenses, failing to address the husband's request for fees, and by adjusting the property division to account for expenses the husband was separately obligated to pay.The Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings, but affirmed in all other respects. View "Jerry B. v. Sally B." on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal reached a settlement in their divorce, providing that the qualified marital portion of the husband’s pension would be distributed to the wife and the nonqualified portion would be distributed to the husband, subject to a provision for equitable reallocation if the values of those portions changed significantly. The settlement also described four firearms and ammunition that the husband would deliver to the wife. After the decree issued, the wife’s portion of the pension declined in value and the husband’s portion increased, so the wife filed motions attempting to obtain information about the reasons for this change in value and attempting to enforce the settlement agreement’s equitable reallocation provision to compensate for the changes. She also argued that the husband had not delivered the guns. The superior court ruled for the husband in all respects, and it awarded enhanced attorney’s fees against the wife. The wife appealed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the significant change in the relative values of the parties’ pension accounts triggered the verification and reallocation provision of their settlement agreement. Accordingly, the superior court’s denial of the wife’s motion for an equitable reallocation was reversed and the case remanded for an equitable reallocation according to the parties’ agreement. Because the husband was no longer the prevailing party, the Court also vacated the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to the husband. The Court affirmed the superior court’s decision as to the issue over the guns. View "Herring v. Herring" on Justia Law

The superior court in this case divided the marital property, granted child custody and determined the child support obligation. On appeal of that order, the noncustodial, nonresident parent claimed the superior court lacked jurisdiction, the orders were substantively incorrect, and the court appeared to be biased against him. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the record contained no evidence of bias and that the court did not err in entering the marital property and child custody orders. But in calculating the father’s child support obligation, the court assumed that Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 imposed an income ceiling of $110,000 - $10,000 below the statutory level. Because the father’s income appeared to exceed $120,000, the Supreme Court deduced this assumption likely rendered the support order too low. Accordingly the Court remanded the support order for reconsideration. View "Sherrill v. Sherrill" on Justia Law

In November 2010, Stevie Lander was driving on an icy road. Her vehicle slid into a Bonnie Luther's car. Although Luther reported no injuries at the scene of the accident, that evening she went to the emergency room for head and neck pain, and within weeks she began to suffer from lower back pain that prevented her from returning to her job as a flight attendant. Luther attributed her pain to the accident and sued Lander for negligence two years later. Lander admitted negligence and made an offer of judgment, which Luther did not accept. The case proceeded to trial in 2014, and the jury awarded Luther a total of $3,259 for past medical expenses, past wage and benefit loss, and past non-economic losses. The superior court granted attorney’s fees to Lander under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68(b) and denied Luther’s motion for a new trial. Luther appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by denying her a new trial based on inadequate damages and by excluding evidence of the amount of payments for medical treatment made by Luther’s insurer. She also challenged the superior court’s decision to grant attorney’s fees based on billing records that were filed under seal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of payments made for Luther’s medical treatment by her insurer. But because that error was harmless, the Court affirmed the final judgment entered by the superior court. View "Luther v. Lander" on Justia Law

In February 2012, Alaska Airlines terminated Helen Lingley, a longtime employee, for violating company rules and polices after she allegedly took earbuds from a left-on-board box, made contradictory statements during the ensuing investigation, and made discourteous comments about her coworkers. The terms and conditions of Lingley’s employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by Lingley’s union,the International Association of Machinists and AerospaceWorkers, pursuant to the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA). This agreement broadly incorporated Alaska Airlines’ rules and policies and gave the company the right to change those rules and policies at any time. Lingley sued Alaska Airlines for wrongful termination without first attempting to arbitrate her claims under the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement subject to the RLA. The superior court denied the Lingley leave to amend her complaint, concluding that her claims and proposed claims were precluded by failure to exhaust contractual remedies and were preempted by the RLA. The Supreme Court found the collective bargaining agreement did not clearly and unmistakably waive the Lingley's right to litigate her claims, a prerequisite to finding her claims precluded. "And a number of her proposed claims may have an independent state law basis that does not depend on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement; such claims would not be preempted by the Railway Labor Act." Accordingly the Court reversed the superior court order denying leave to amend. View "Lingley v. Alaska Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Alaska Supreme Court's review arose from competing claims of right to the pore space in a large limestone formation about a mile underground. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC (CINGSA) had leases with the holders of the mineral rights, the State of Alaska and Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI), that allowed it to use the porous formation as a reservoir for storing injected natural gas. But the City of Kenai, which owned a significant part of the surface estate above the reservoir, claimed an ownership interest in the storage rights and sought compensation from CINGSA. CINGSA filed an interpleader action asking the court to decide who owns the storage rights and which party CINGSA should compensate for its use of the pore space. On summary judgment CINGSA argued that CIRI and the State owned the pore space and attendant storage rights because of the State’s reservation of certain subsurface interests as required by AS 38.05.125(a). The superior court granted CINGSA’s motion. The City appealed both the grant of summary judgment and the superior court’s award of attorney’s fees to CIRI. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the State and CIRI indeed owned the pore space and the gas storage rights, and that it was not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to award attorney’s fees to CIRI. View "City of Kenai v. Cook Inlet Natural Gas Storage Alaska, LLC" on Justia Law

Timothy G. alleged he was abused by his stepfather repeatedly between 1997 and 2006. In 2006, Timothy reported the abuse to his mother. She took Timothy and his four siblings to a shelter, sought a protective order against the stepfather, and instituted divorce proceedings. The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) then substantiated the report of harm, removed the children from their mother’s care, and placed them in foster care. In 2012, Timothy filed a complaint naming OCS and his stepfather as defendants. He sought compensatory damages from OCS, claiming that “[a]s a direct and proximate consequence of [OCS’s] breach of [its] dut[y] of care, [he] suffered physical injury, psychological and emotional injury and distress, psychological torment, torture and sexual abuse, pain and suffering, and resultant loss of earning capacity.” Timothy alleged that OCS had investigated at least ten reports of harm involving him and his siblings, but had taken no action. In response to OCS' motion to dismiss, Timothy G. asserted that the statute of limitations had been tolled on his claim because he was mentally incompetent following those years of abuse. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing on this issue and concluded that Timothy had failed to prove that he was incompetent. On appeal, Timothy argued that the superior court should have ruled in his favor if he produced more than a scintilla of evidence to support his assertion. But the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court applied the proper burden of proof and the proper test for competency, and that the court did not clearly err in finding that Timothy did not prove his incompetence. View "Timothy G. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law