Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Article VII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution required the state legislature to “establish and maintain a system of public schools” open to all children in the state. To fulfill this mandate, the legislature defined three types of school districts according to where the district is located: city school districts, borough school districts, and regional education attendance areas. “[E]ach organized borough is a borough school district”; a borough must “establish[], maintain[], and operate[] a system of public schools on an areawide basis.” Local school boards managed and controlled these school districts under authority delegated by AS 14.12.020. The statute required local borough and city governments to raise money “from local sources to maintain and operate” their local schools. The superior court held that this required local contribution was an unconstitutional dedication of a “state tax or license.” But the minutes of the constitutional convention and the historical context of those proceedings suggested that the delegates intended that local communities and the State would share responsibility for their local schools. Those proceedings also indicated that the delegates did not intend for state-local cooperative programs like the school funding formula to be included in the term “state tax or license.” These factors distinguished this case from previous cases where the Alaska Supreme Court found that state funding mechanisms violated the dedicated funds clause. The Court therefore held that the existing funding formula did not violate the constitution, and reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment holding that the funding formula was unconstitutional. View "Alaska v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

A non-custodial parent moved to modify a child support order after she quit her job in Anchorage, moved to a remote village, and adopted a subsistence lifestyle. Although the parent acknowledged that she was voluntarily unemployed, she argued that her decision was reasonable in light of her cultural, spiritual, and religious needs. The superior court disagreed and denied the motion. The parent appealed, arguing that the superior court gave inadequate weight to her cultural and religious needs and that the child support order violated her right to the free exercise of her religion. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the superior court adequately considered all relevant factors in deciding not to modify the child support order. "And there was no plain error in the court’s failure to anticipate the free exercise claim, which the parent raises for the first time on appeal." View "Sharpe v. Sharpe" on Justia Law

The Lieutenant Governor declined to certify a proposed ballot initiative that would ban commercial set net fishing in nonsubsistence areas, reasoning that the initiative was a constitutionally prohibited appropriation of public assets. The superior court approved the initiative, concluding that set netters were not a distinct commercial user group and that the legislature and Board of Fisheries would retain discretion to allocate the salmon stock to other commercial fisheries. After the Supreme Court's review of the matter, it concluded that set netters were a distinct commercial user group that deserved recognition in the context of the constitutional prohibition on appropriations. The Court therefore reverse the superior court’s judgment because this proposed ballot initiative would have completely appropriated salmon away from set netters and prohibited the legislature from allocating any salmon to that user group. View "Lieutenant Governor of the State of Alaska v. Alaska Fisheries Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

Kelsey George was convicted of four counts of first degree sexual abuse of a minor, three counts of second degree sexual abuse of a minor, and one count of attempted sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree. George appealed, challenging one of the first-degree sexual abuse counts (Count Ten) and the attempted sexual abuse count (Count One). The court of appeals affirmed his convictions on both counts, and George filed a petition for hearing regarding the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction on Count Ten, which was granted. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to convict George on Count Ten. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision in part, and remanded this matter to the superior court for entry of a judgment of acquittal on Count Ten. View "George v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Dolores Hunter, the personal representative of the estate of Benjamin G. Francis, appealed a series of orders following a jury verdict in a wrongful death, products liability, and fraud action against Philip Morris USA Inc. resulting from Francis’s death from lung cancer. Following the verdict, Hunter moved for a new trial on the basis of evidentiary rulings at trial and on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The superior court initially granted Hunter’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence but then granted Philip Morris’s motion to reconsider, vacated its first order and denied Hunter’s motion for a new trial. Because the superior court’s orders applied a test that was inconsistent with the “weight of the evidence” new trial standard the Alaska Supreme Court previously established to guide trial courts, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of Hunter’s motion. View "Hunter v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

Dea and James Dundas married in 1997 after a lengthy relationship. Dea raised their two sons, operated a B&B, kept the books for their businesses, and filed their taxes. Dea also was an expediter for James' fishing and construction businesses, purchasing and delivering supplies to job sites and to James' boat. According to Dea, James is one of the best heavy equipment operators in the area, and James acknowledged that Dea’s hard work was a substantial reason for their financial success. Through their industry and skill, James and Dea acquired roughly $1.7 million in marital assets. In January 2011 Dea filed for divorce, and James moved out of the marital home later that year. The divorce was not finalized for nearly three-and-a-half years. In the interim the couple continued to treat certain bank accounts as marital and others as separate, making it difficult for the superior court to later determine when the joint marital enterprise ended and how to value the bank accounts. The issues on appeal in this matter revealed issues under each step of the equitable distribution process (identification, valuation, and distribution) as well as issues of alimony, child visitation expenses, and child support credits. The Supreme Court remanded this case back to the trial court for resolution of issues regarding these steps. View "Dundas v. Dundas" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a custody dispute between Susan M. and Paul H. involving: (1) Susan’s motion to sanction Paul for wrongfully denying her visitation; and (2) her motion to enjoin Paul from relocating to California with the children after the 2013-14 school year, a move the superior court previously approved. The superior court denied both motions, and Susan appealed. Though the Supreme Court affirmed, the Court warned that a parent’s unilateral suspension of the other parent’s visitation based on perceived violations of a custody agreement were improper in all but exceptional circumstances. "Even where such circumstances exist, the concerned parent should immediately inform the court of the problem." View "Susan M. v. Paul H." on Justia Law

Property owners granted a utility easement to the City of Wasilla in exchange for the City’s promise to build an access road across their property, subject to obtaining permits and funding. The access road was not built, and the property owners sued the City, claiming that it fraudulently induced them to sign the easement agreement, breached the agreement, and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After trial the superior court made findings of fact and conclusions of law about the parties’ negotiations, their reasonable expectations, the key provisions in the easement agreement, and the City’s efforts to satisfy the agreement’s conditions, and it ruled against the property owners on all their claims. The property owners appealed and the City cross-appealed, contending that the property owners’ claims should have been dismissed on statute of limitations grounds. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error with the superior court's findings of fact or final judgment. View "Laybourn v. City of Wasilla" on Justia Law

In April 2011 the City of Petersburg petitioned the State of Alaska's Local Boundary Commission to dissolve the City and incorporate a new borough. In August the Boundary Commission accepted the petition and published notice. In October the City and Borough of Juneau notified the Boundary Commission "of its intent to file an annexation petition that will pertain to some of the same boundaries as are at issue in the petition recently filed by the City of Petersburg." Juneau intended to annex almost half of the area sought for the Petersburg Borough. Juneau requested that the Boundary Commission postpone the Petersburg proceedings to allow for concurrent consideration of the two petitions. Boundary Commission staff recommended denying Juneau’s consolidation request, explaining that the Boundary Commission would have Juneau’s annexation petition, Juneau’s responsive brief in the Petersburg proceedings, and Juneau’s comments, and that during the final hearing the Boundary Commission could amend the Petersburg petition. The Boundary Commission ultimately denied Juneau’s request for consolidation or postponement, with one commissioner noting that "Juneau . . . will have opportunities to comment and [provide] testimony at the hearing." The primary issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Boundary Commission violated the Alaska Constitution when it approved the incorporation of the new borough over the objection of the existing borough. After review, the Court concluded that the Boundary Commission’s decision complied with constitutional requirements and therefore affirmed the superior court’s decision upholding the Boundary Commission’s incorporation decision. View "City & Borough of Juneau v. Alaska Local Boundary Comm'n" on Justia Law

Dr. Michael Brandner suffered a heart attack in September 2009 and was admitted to Providence Alaska Medical Center for emergency bypass surgery. Dr. Kenton Stephens was the cardiac surgeon who performed the operation; Dr. Robert J. Pease administered anesthesia. Dr. Brandner was also a medical doctor, licensed to practice plastic and reconstructive surgery. Bradner sued the anesthesiologist and medical providers involved in the surgery. The superior court dismissed Bradner’s claims on summary judgment, concluding that Bradner had offered no admissible evidence that the defendants breached the standard of care or caused the patient any injury. On appeal Bradner relied on his expert witness’s testimony that certain surgical procedures were suboptimal and that patients generally tended to have better outcomes when other procedures are followed. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that this testimony was insufficient to raise any issue of material fact regarding whether the defendants had violated the standard of care in a way that caused injury to the patient. View "Brandner v. Pease" on Justia Law