Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of Lake and Peninsula Borough voters filed suit against two local elected officials, alleging various violations of state and local conflict of interest laws and the common law conflict of interest doctrine. The officials moved for summary judgment on the ground that the voters failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The superior court granted the motion and stayed the proceedings so that the Alaska Public Offices Commission (APOC) could review several of the voters’ claims. In doing so the court relied in part on case law involving the separate doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which allowed a court to stay proceedings to give the relevant administrative agency an initial pass at the claims. The matter came before the Supreme Court, and it reverse the superior court’s order after review, finding that because the voters were not required to exhaust administrative remedies and because the order staying the proceedings could not be affirmed on independent grounds. View "Seybert v. Alsworth" on Justia Law

In 2014, a petition was filed on behalf of the Seacliff Condominium Association for an order requiring Heather R., the owner of a condominium in Seacliff, to undergo an involuntary 72-hour psychiatric evaluation. The petition alleged that Heather was a threat to “herself . . . and her neighbors” based on “[y]ears of confrontation, threats, aberrant and widely swinging behavior suggesting drug use,” including “taking pictures inside people’s houses, inability to have normal social interactions, [and] lying [in] wait to confront neighbors.” After conducting a statutorily required ex parte screening investigation, which did not include an interview with Heather, the superior court master determined that there was probable cause to believe that she was mentally ill and presented a likelihood of serious harm to others. Heather appealed the evaluation order, claiming that the ex parte investigation violated due process and that the master failed to properly conduct the statutorily required screening investigation. Although this appeal was technically moot, the Supreme Court reached the merits of these claims under the public interest exception. The Court vacated the evaluation order because the superior court master failed to conduct the interview as part of the screening investigation required by statute; the Court did not reach the due process question. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Heather R." on Justia Law

John Botson was arrested for driving under the influence. According to a breath test, his blood alcohol level was .141. The police officer informed Botson of his constitutional right to an independent chemical test, which Botson declined. But unbeknownst to Botson and the police officer administering the test, the breath test device had produced an error code related to one of its quality assurance mechanisms. Botson argues that his breath test result was inadmissible under the Anchorage Municipal Code, which required breath tests to be conducted in compliance with methods approved by the Alaska Department of Public Safety. He also argued that suppression was required under the Due Process Clause of the Alaska Constitution because his ignorance of the error code prevented him from knowingly and intelligently waiving his constitutional right to an independent chemical test. But although the administration of Botson’s breath test may not have strictly complied with approved methods, Botson did not contest the district court’s finding that the error code had no bearing on the accuracy of the test. Accordingly, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s and the court of appeals’ conclusions that the breath test result was admissible under Alaska's “substantial compliance” doctrine. The Supreme Court also agreed that Botson validly waived his right to an independent chemical test because he had a basic understanding of that right before declining the test. View "Botson v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) filed a petition to terminate a mother’s parental rights to two of her daughters. The superior court granted the petition. The mother appealed the superior court’s finding that OCS made active efforts to reunify the family, as required by state and federal law, as well as a few of the factual findings underlying this conclusion. Because the superior court did not clearly err in finding that OCS made active efforts by providing services geared toward reunification the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the termination decision. View "Denny M. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Article VII, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution required the state legislature to “establish and maintain a system of public schools” open to all children in the state. To fulfill this mandate, the legislature defined three types of school districts according to where the district is located: city school districts, borough school districts, and regional education attendance areas. “[E]ach organized borough is a borough school district”; a borough must “establish[], maintain[], and operate[] a system of public schools on an areawide basis.” Local school boards managed and controlled these school districts under authority delegated by AS 14.12.020. The statute required local borough and city governments to raise money “from local sources to maintain and operate” their local schools. The superior court held that this required local contribution was an unconstitutional dedication of a “state tax or license.” But the minutes of the constitutional convention and the historical context of those proceedings suggested that the delegates intended that local communities and the State would share responsibility for their local schools. Those proceedings also indicated that the delegates did not intend for state-local cooperative programs like the school funding formula to be included in the term “state tax or license.” These factors distinguished this case from previous cases where the Alaska Supreme Court found that state funding mechanisms violated the dedicated funds clause. The Court therefore held that the existing funding formula did not violate the constitution, and reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment holding that the funding formula was unconstitutional. View "Alaska v. Ketchikan Gateway Borough" on Justia Law

A non-custodial parent moved to modify a child support order after she quit her job in Anchorage, moved to a remote village, and adopted a subsistence lifestyle. Although the parent acknowledged that she was voluntarily unemployed, she argued that her decision was reasonable in light of her cultural, spiritual, and religious needs. The superior court disagreed and denied the motion. The parent appealed, arguing that the superior court gave inadequate weight to her cultural and religious needs and that the child support order violated her right to the free exercise of her religion. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the superior court adequately considered all relevant factors in deciding not to modify the child support order. "And there was no plain error in the court’s failure to anticipate the free exercise claim, which the parent raises for the first time on appeal." View "Sharpe v. Sharpe" on Justia Law

The Lieutenant Governor declined to certify a proposed ballot initiative that would ban commercial set net fishing in nonsubsistence areas, reasoning that the initiative was a constitutionally prohibited appropriation of public assets. The superior court approved the initiative, concluding that set netters were not a distinct commercial user group and that the legislature and Board of Fisheries would retain discretion to allocate the salmon stock to other commercial fisheries. After the Supreme Court's review of the matter, it concluded that set netters were a distinct commercial user group that deserved recognition in the context of the constitutional prohibition on appropriations. The Court therefore reverse the superior court’s judgment because this proposed ballot initiative would have completely appropriated salmon away from set netters and prohibited the legislature from allocating any salmon to that user group. View "Lieutenant Governor of the State of Alaska v. Alaska Fisheries Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

Kelsey George was convicted of four counts of first degree sexual abuse of a minor, three counts of second degree sexual abuse of a minor, and one count of attempted sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree. George appealed, challenging one of the first-degree sexual abuse counts (Count Ten) and the attempted sexual abuse count (Count One). The court of appeals affirmed his convictions on both counts, and George filed a petition for hearing regarding the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the conviction on Count Ten, which was granted. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to convict George on Count Ten. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ decision in part, and remanded this matter to the superior court for entry of a judgment of acquittal on Count Ten. View "George v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Dolores Hunter, the personal representative of the estate of Benjamin G. Francis, appealed a series of orders following a jury verdict in a wrongful death, products liability, and fraud action against Philip Morris USA Inc. resulting from Francis’s death from lung cancer. Following the verdict, Hunter moved for a new trial on the basis of evidentiary rulings at trial and on the basis that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The superior court initially granted Hunter’s motion for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence but then granted Philip Morris’s motion to reconsider, vacated its first order and denied Hunter’s motion for a new trial. Because the superior court’s orders applied a test that was inconsistent with the “weight of the evidence” new trial standard the Alaska Supreme Court previously established to guide trial courts, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of Hunter’s motion. View "Hunter v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law

Dea and James Dundas married in 1997 after a lengthy relationship. Dea raised their two sons, operated a B&B, kept the books for their businesses, and filed their taxes. Dea also was an expediter for James' fishing and construction businesses, purchasing and delivering supplies to job sites and to James' boat. According to Dea, James is one of the best heavy equipment operators in the area, and James acknowledged that Dea’s hard work was a substantial reason for their financial success. Through their industry and skill, James and Dea acquired roughly $1.7 million in marital assets. In January 2011 Dea filed for divorce, and James moved out of the marital home later that year. The divorce was not finalized for nearly three-and-a-half years. In the interim the couple continued to treat certain bank accounts as marital and others as separate, making it difficult for the superior court to later determine when the joint marital enterprise ended and how to value the bank accounts. The issues on appeal in this matter revealed issues under each step of the equitable distribution process (identification, valuation, and distribution) as well as issues of alimony, child visitation expenses, and child support credits. The Supreme Court remanded this case back to the trial court for resolution of issues regarding these steps. View "Dundas v. Dundas" on Justia Law