Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involved "Diana" and her daughters(all "Indian children"): Natalie was born in 2008; Selah was born in 2009; Ava was born in 2010; and Drew was born in 2011. The children's father previously relinquished his parental rights. Diana has shown a pattern of drinking alcohol while pregnant, abstaining once she learns she is pregnant, and then resuming drinking after the child is born. She admitted at trial that she drank during three of her previous pregnancies. OCS has been involved with this family since 2009 because of the parents' behavior when they drank. According to family, "there [were] no two better people on this earth who could take care of those kids" when they were sober. But when they were drinking, they were not good parents. Diana became confrontational and bossy, the children went hungry, and their home was unstable. Natalie became the caregiver of her siblings; when she was four years old she made her younger sisters' bottles, changed their diapers, and dressed them. This caused Natalie to be a "worry wart," and the stress caused her "tummy issues" and exacerbated her eczema. The other children also had issues: Selah has severe separation anxiety, Ava's speech was delayed, and Drew had "the shakes." The children were adjudicated children in need of aid in March 2013. Following a trial in the summer of 2014, the trial court terminated Diana's parental rights to the children after finding them subject to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011(6), (9), and (10). Diana appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that OCS proved beyond a reasonable doubt that placing her children in her custody would likely put the children at risk of serious harm. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Diana P. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvcs" on Justia Law

The superior court granted Caroline J. a long-term domestic violence protective order and awarded her interim sole physical and legal custody of her and Theodore J.'s three children. During the pendency of the divorce and custody trial, the superior court ordered reunification counseling for Theodore and the children, but Caroline continually failed to bring the children to the counseling sessions, and the court found she had engaged in parental alienation. After Theodore completed a domestic violence intervention program, the court awarded the parents shared physical and joint legal custody of the children. Caroline appealed. "Although we are mindful of the struggles faced by victims of domestic violence, in this case Caroline failed to make the necessary showing that domestic violence caused her to interfere with the children’s reunification counseling and to engage in parental alienation conduct. [. . .] Instead, in the superior court Caroline blamed the missed appointments on the children’s and her schedules and the children’s reluctance to go to counseling. She did not argue that she was afraid of Theodore or that her fear caused her to act the way she did. In fact, the court specifically found that she indicated a desire to have Theodore in the children’s lives." The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's custody order. View "Caroline J. v. Theodore J." on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Ray DeVilbiss owned property within a road service area, but did not make use of the roads built and maintained with the road service taxes levied on that property. He argued Alaska law required that his property therefore be excluded from the service area, and that the tax was invalid absent a special benefit to his property. The superior court rejected these claims, and granted the borough that oversaw the service area summary judgment. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court affirmed. Alaska law neither required boroughs and municipalities to exclude properties that do not make use of roads financed by road service taxes nor tied the validity of a tax to each taxpayer’s receipt of a special benefit. View "DeVilbiss v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough" on Justia Law

A husband and wife filed for divorce in 1986 and the court awarded the wife monthly child support. But the parties did not actually separate until 2007 (except for a period apart from 1997 to 2001). Their dissolution was a sham, structured to shield otherwise marital property from the husband's bankruptcy. After the parties actually separated in 2007, the wife contacted the Child Support Services Division to enforce past due child support dating back to 1986, which totaled nearly $118,000. The husband filed a motion for relief from the child support judgment. The superior court granted the motion after concluding that the parties' original dissolution had been obtained by a fraud on the court. The superior court used its discretion under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6) to set aside the 1986 dissolution and order a division of property and child support as of 2007, when the parties actually separated. The wife appealed. Because the parties' 1986 dissolution used the court system as a tool to defraud creditors and thus undermined the court's integrity, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's conclusion that the dissolution was a fraud on the court under Rule 60(b)(6). View "Fernandez v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

At the center of this an appeal was the superior court's de novo valuation of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) for tax assessment years 2007, 2008, and 2009. In February 2014 the Alaska Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the superior court's de novo valuation of TAPS for the 2006 assessment year.1 The parties introduced considerably more evidence during trial for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 years, but the operative facts remained substantially the same and the superior court applied similar standards and methods for valuation. Many of the issues raised on appeal were similar or identical to issues raised in the 2006 appeal and thus are partially or wholly resolved by the Court's prior opinion. Because the superior court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion with regard to any of its findings or its methodology, and because it committed no legal error in its conclusions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alaska Dept. of Revenue v. BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc." on Justia Law

Following their separation, two parents initially shared physical custody of their daughter. But after a domestic violence incident, the superior court awarded the mother sole legal and primary physical custody, while allowing the father telephone calls and supervised visitation. The father subsequently filed a motion to modify custody, seeking a return to equal physical custody. The superior court denied this request, concluding that the daughter's emotional needs and the father's unwillingness to foster a strong relationship between the mother and daughter supported the continuation of supervised visitation. Because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in considering the child's best interests, and because it articulated a plan through which the father could achieve unsupervised visitation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Matthew P. v. Gail S." on Justia Law

This case centered on a challenge to the Board of Game's 2010 amendments to regulations for subsistence caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13, known as the Nelchina basin. The Alaska Board of Game promulgated regulations managing caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13. The regulations allowed hunting under three types of permits: a community harvest subsistence permit, an individual subsistence permit, or a non-subsistence drawing permit. A hunter challenged the regulations on constitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that they wrongfully interfered with his subsistence hunting rights, and also sought a judicially imposed public reprimand of an assistant attorney general representing the Board. The superior court dismissed the claim against the attorney, granted summary judgment upholding the regulations, and awarded partial attorney's fees to the State and an intervenor defendant. The hunter appeals. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment orders, but vacated the attorney's fees awards and remand for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Jennifer and Adam were the parents of three minor children: a daughter, Andrea, and two younger boys. The children were Indian children as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The State's Office of Children's Services (OCS) took three minor children into emergency custody, then sought a court order granting OCS temporary custody, asserting there was probable cause to find the children in need of aid. A standing master determined that no probable cause existed and recommended that the three children be returned to their mother's custody. The State objected to the master's recommendation, and the superior court reviewed and rejected it, finding that there was probable cause. The mother filed this appeal, asking the Supreme Court to hold that masters have the authority to return children to their homes without judicial review. Before the State filed its brief, the superior court dismissed the underlying case, making this appeal moot. After its review, the Supreme Court applied the "public interest" exception to the mootness doctrine and affirmed the superior court's ruling. View "Jennifer L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over whether the owner of a wood chipper could be held jointly and severally liable, along with two property owners, for damages caused to their property by the chipper's leak of diesel fuel. The chipper's owner had leased it to another person, who abandoned it. The property owners claimed they were only severally liable, if at all, for a portion of the damages and that the chipper's owner was liable for the rest. A jury found that the chipper did not contaminate one of the two properties, but as for the other the jury found its owner jointly and severally liable, along with the chipper's owner. The superior court then equitably allocated damages among the liable property owner, the owner of the chipper, and the chipper's lessee. This allocation left the property owner liable for most of his own loss. property owners appealed the equitable allocation of damages, and an evidentiary ruling and the award of attorney's fees. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court properly construed the governing statutes and the evidence rules and that its award of attorney's fees was not an abuse of discretion. View "Oakly Enterprises, LLC v. NPI, LLC" on Justia Law

"Dakota K." appealed a 30-day involuntary psychiatric commitment. The issue this case presented for the Alaska Supreme Court's review was whether the State or the respondent had the burden to prove the existence of prior involuntary commitments. The Court held that this burden rested with the respondent, who must make some evidentiary showing that the commitment was his first in order to raise the presumption of collateral consequences. " Involuntary commitment proceedings are necessarily expeditious. There is a limited amount of time for the respondent's attorney to meet the client, obtain legal and medical records, and marshal a defense to the underlying allegations of mental illness and risk of harm to self or others. It is therefore unrealistic to expect that the attorney would also present evidence during the commitment proceedings to establish collateral consequences for the purposes of a potential appeal. But after the trial court proceedings have concluded it would be entirely appropriate for the respondent to seek an evidentiary hearing in the superior court on the issue of collateral consequences. This evidentiary hearing would be for the limited purpose of obtaining findings from the court that the commitment was the first involuntary one or, if it were not the first, that there are other collateral consequences flowing from the commitment that would be avoided if it were reversed on appeal." In this case, Dakota never alleged, much less made an evidentiary showing suggesting, that his involuntary commitment at API was his first and therefore gave rise to a presumption of collateral consequences. Nor did he allege that the exception should apply because of any actual collateral consequences. Dakota's appeal of the superior court's order was deemed moot and the appeal dismissed. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Dakota K." on Justia Law