Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A husband and wife divorced, and agreed that the wife would receive the marital home and a portion of the husband’s military retirement benefits. Additionally, the wife would remove the husband from the marital home mortgage. Two years later the wife sought a qualified retirement order to effectuate the property distribution. Following a dispute over the wife’s entitlement to the retirement and the wife’s failure to remove the husband’s name from the marital home mortgage, the superior court refused to issue a qualified order because the husband’s “retirement pay consist[ed] entirely of VA disability compensation and retirement [pay] for physical disability” and under federal law the disability compensation was not divisible marital property. The superior court also ordered the wife to remove the husband’s name from the mortgage within 60 days. When the wife did not comply the court forced the home’s sale. The superior court then awarded the husband prevailing party attorney’s fees. The wife appealed, challenging the superior court’s refusal to divide the military retirement and the court’s forced home sale. The Supreme Court affirmed those decisions, but reversed the refusal to reopen the marital property division. The superior court’s prevailing party determination and attorney’s fees award were vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Guerrero v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Clifford Tagaban argued that the City of Pelican's foreclosed upon several parcels of land against which he had a judicial lien without giving him proper notice. In 1998 Tagaban was awarded a judgment against the Kake Tribal Corporation, and the next year he recorded this judgment as a ten-year lien against parcels of property the Corporation owned. Tagaban requested and received lien extensions from the superior court in 2008 and 2009, though he did not record the second lien extension until 2012. The City foreclosed upon the parcels in August 2010. Although the City’s counsel notified Tagaban’s counsel of the foreclosure via email in 2010, eleven months before the redemption period ended, Tagaban filed suit to challenge the City’s lack of formal foreclosure and redemption notice to him as well as the constitutionality of Alaska’s foreclosure and redemption notice statutes. The superior court granted summary judgment to the City on all issues and awarded the City attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed. Because AS 29.45.330 only required foreclosure notice to property owners, and this statute met constitutional due process requirements, Tagaban as a lienholder and not a property owner, was not due foreclosure notice by the City. And because Tagaban did not record the second lien extension until after the redemption period ended, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s conclusion that the City was not required to issue redemption notice to him under AS 29.45.440 because he was not a lienholder of record when notice of the expiration of the redemption period was due. The Court also affirmed the superior court’s award of Rule 68 attorney’s fees but vacated its award under Rule 82. View "Tagaban v. City of Pelican" on Justia Law

A 21-year-old intoxicated Hooper Bay resident, Louis Bunyan, committed suicide while he was detained in a holding cell by the City of Hooper Bay. His mother filed a wrongful death action against the City, alleging that the City’s negligence led to her son’s death. She sought damages in her individual capacity and on behalf of her son’s estate and her son’s minor children. The case proceeded to a jury trial and the jury returned a million-dollar judgment against the City. The City appealed, raising a number of issues. The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rulings in many respects. But the Court vacated the jury’s damages award and remanded for further proceedings on the issue of allocation of fault between the City and the deceased under AS 09.17.080. View "City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan" on Justia Law

Appellant Helen Wilson was an elderly woman residing at the Palmer Pioneer home with her husband. Helen previously lived in her own house but was unable to manage her medications and nutrition independently. Her son and grandson lived with her but were unable or unwilling to help. After Adult Protective Services received several reports of harm, a temporary emergency guardian was appointed for Helen; the guardian placed her in an assisted living facility and then in the Pioneer Home. Despite her limited financial means, Helen continued to support her son and grandson, who remained in her house. The master observed that Helen needed help managing personal care because she “was previously unable to maintain the level of necessary care prior to the petition being filed” and her family had previously “interfered with [personal care assistants].” And the master found that Helen needed assistance applying for benefits and managing her assets due to her “limited math abilities,” “age-related cognitive decline,” “tendency to give away more money than she can afford,” and “extremely tight budget,” which made “[h]er ability to receive benefits . . . a major factor in maintaining her current level of independence.” Accordingly the master gave the guardian authority to provide for Helen’s personal care, apply for insurance and government benefits, and“control [Helen’s] estate and income . . . to pay for the cost of services that the guardian is authorized to obtain on behalf of [Helen].” He recognized that Helen should be free to give away her discretionary income, but that she needed “a partial guardian [to] ensure that she only gives money away after her own necessities, including adequate nutrition, medication, and housing costs, have been met.” Before the superior court ruled on the master’s recommendations, the public guardian filed a motion for sale of Helen’s residence to help defray costs required to meet her daily needs. Helen appeals the appointment of a partial public guardian and full conservator, particularly for their role in making decisions on her behalf, and for selling her house. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Wilson v. Alaska Dept. of Law" on Justia Law

t issue in this appeal are parents’ motions to modify their existing child custody arrangement. Without a hearing, the superior court denied the mother’s motion but granted the father’s motion for a temporary modification; later, with the parties’ agreement, the court made the temporary order permanent. The mother argues on appeal that she was entitled to evidentiary hearings. She also appeals the superior court’s denial of her request that income be imputed to the father for purposes of calculating his child support obligation. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reason to disturb the superior court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hope P. v. Flynn G." on Justia Law

This case involved "Diana" and her daughters(all "Indian children"): Natalie was born in 2008; Selah was born in 2009; Ava was born in 2010; and Drew was born in 2011. The children's father previously relinquished his parental rights. Diana has shown a pattern of drinking alcohol while pregnant, abstaining once she learns she is pregnant, and then resuming drinking after the child is born. She admitted at trial that she drank during three of her previous pregnancies. OCS has been involved with this family since 2009 because of the parents' behavior when they drank. According to family, "there [were] no two better people on this earth who could take care of those kids" when they were sober. But when they were drinking, they were not good parents. Diana became confrontational and bossy, the children went hungry, and their home was unstable. Natalie became the caregiver of her siblings; when she was four years old she made her younger sisters' bottles, changed their diapers, and dressed them. This caused Natalie to be a "worry wart," and the stress caused her "tummy issues" and exacerbated her eczema. The other children also had issues: Selah has severe separation anxiety, Ava's speech was delayed, and Drew had "the shakes." The children were adjudicated children in need of aid in March 2013. Following a trial in the summer of 2014, the trial court terminated Diana's parental rights to the children after finding them subject to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011(6), (9), and (10). Diana appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that OCS proved beyond a reasonable doubt that placing her children in her custody would likely put the children at risk of serious harm. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Diana P. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Srvcs" on Justia Law

The superior court granted Caroline J. a long-term domestic violence protective order and awarded her interim sole physical and legal custody of her and Theodore J.'s three children. During the pendency of the divorce and custody trial, the superior court ordered reunification counseling for Theodore and the children, but Caroline continually failed to bring the children to the counseling sessions, and the court found she had engaged in parental alienation. After Theodore completed a domestic violence intervention program, the court awarded the parents shared physical and joint legal custody of the children. Caroline appealed. "Although we are mindful of the struggles faced by victims of domestic violence, in this case Caroline failed to make the necessary showing that domestic violence caused her to interfere with the children’s reunification counseling and to engage in parental alienation conduct. [. . .] Instead, in the superior court Caroline blamed the missed appointments on the children’s and her schedules and the children’s reluctance to go to counseling. She did not argue that she was afraid of Theodore or that her fear caused her to act the way she did. In fact, the court specifically found that she indicated a desire to have Theodore in the children’s lives." The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's custody order. View "Caroline J. v. Theodore J." on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Ray DeVilbiss owned property within a road service area, but did not make use of the roads built and maintained with the road service taxes levied on that property. He argued Alaska law required that his property therefore be excluded from the service area, and that the tax was invalid absent a special benefit to his property. The superior court rejected these claims, and granted the borough that oversaw the service area summary judgment. Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court affirmed. Alaska law neither required boroughs and municipalities to exclude properties that do not make use of roads financed by road service taxes nor tied the validity of a tax to each taxpayer’s receipt of a special benefit. View "DeVilbiss v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough" on Justia Law

A husband and wife filed for divorce in 1986 and the court awarded the wife monthly child support. But the parties did not actually separate until 2007 (except for a period apart from 1997 to 2001). Their dissolution was a sham, structured to shield otherwise marital property from the husband's bankruptcy. After the parties actually separated in 2007, the wife contacted the Child Support Services Division to enforce past due child support dating back to 1986, which totaled nearly $118,000. The husband filed a motion for relief from the child support judgment. The superior court granted the motion after concluding that the parties' original dissolution had been obtained by a fraud on the court. The superior court used its discretion under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b)(6) to set aside the 1986 dissolution and order a division of property and child support as of 2007, when the parties actually separated. The wife appealed. Because the parties' 1986 dissolution used the court system as a tool to defraud creditors and thus undermined the court's integrity, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's conclusion that the dissolution was a fraud on the court under Rule 60(b)(6). View "Fernandez v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

At the center of this an appeal was the superior court's de novo valuation of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) for tax assessment years 2007, 2008, and 2009. In February 2014 the Alaska Supreme Court issued a decision affirming the superior court's de novo valuation of TAPS for the 2006 assessment year.1 The parties introduced considerably more evidence during trial for the 2007, 2008, and 2009 years, but the operative facts remained substantially the same and the superior court applied similar standards and methods for valuation. Many of the issues raised on appeal were similar or identical to issues raised in the 2006 appeal and thus are partially or wholly resolved by the Court's prior opinion. Because the superior court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion with regard to any of its findings or its methodology, and because it committed no legal error in its conclusions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alaska Dept. of Revenue v. BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc." on Justia Law