Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Sarah D. and John D. separated shortly after their daughter turned three. Each claimed that the other was abusive, and obtained a short-term domestic violence protective order after they separated. The parties later stipulated to a mutual no-contact order but violated it by continuing a sporadic romantic relationship. Sarah requested interim attorney’s fees. After the superior court denied her request, Sarah consented to her lawyer’s withdrawal. Sarah and John then agreed to a property settlement. Before litigating custody Sarah again requested interim attorney’s fees and twice filed continuance motions requesting time to obtain counsel. Her motions were denied, and she appeared pro se throughout a four-day custody trial. John’s parents helped pay for his lawyer, and he was represented at all times. Over Sarah’s objections, John’s father was allowed to intervene as a party for visitation purposes. The trial court awarded shared physical and sole legal custody to John and gave John’s father unspecified visitation during John’s custodial time. Sarah appealed the court’s denials of her requests for an interim fee award, trial continuances, and to compel a witness's attendance at trial. She also appealed the court’s orders granting the grandfather intervention and visitation and the court’s domestic violence finding and custody decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the order granting the grandfather visitation and otherwise affirmed all but the custody decision, remanding for more detailed findings and conclusions on domestic violence issues. View "Sarah D. v. John D." on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Hutton was arrested on several weapons charges. After the first two counts were tried to a jury, he waived his right to a jury trial and the third count was tried to the court. He was convicted and appealed, arguing that he had not effectively waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that substantial evidence supported his waiver. The Alaska Supreme Court granted his petition for hearing to decide the appropriate standard of review for the waiver of the right to a jury trial. At oral argument, the State conceded petitioner was not advised of an essential element of the third count and that he was misadvised of the elements of his offense. Because petitioner was given incomplete and misleading information about the charge for which he was being asked to waive his right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court concluded that his waiver was constitutionally defective. The court of appeals’ decision was reversed, and the case was remanded to the superior court for a new trial. View "Hutton v. Alaska" on Justia Law

When Brandy and Jeremy Moore divorced in 2014, the superior court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of their ten-year-old daughter to Brandy, and awarded Jeremy unrestricted visitation, including visitation to foreign countries. Jeremy proposed taking the child to Micronesia during his visitation period because he became involved with a Micronesian woman he met while he was stationed there with the Army. Brandy asked the superior court to limit Jeremy’s international visitation to countries that have ratified the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The superior court denied Brandy’s motion, and she appealed, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by allowing unrestricted international visitation. She worried that if Jeremy absconded with the child to a non-signatory country, the child will then be beyond the jurisdiction of the Alaska court to enforce the custody order. But because the superior court made an express finding that Jeremy’s conduct raised no concerns about the safety and return of the child, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moore v. Moore" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on unsuccessful constitutional claimants’ invocation of a statutory protection against adverse awards of attorney’s fees and the responsive assertion that they had sufficient economic incentive to bring their claim regardless of its constitutional nature. In a related decision, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision on the merits of the constitutional claim and remanded for entry of declaratory judgment in the claimants’ favor. The constitutional claimants therefore became the prevailing parties, and the Court assumed that on remand they would seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs under AS 09.60.010. Because such an award was conditioned on the absence of sufficient economic incentive to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature, the Court also assumed that on remand the superior court would enter the same discovery orders regarding the petitioners’ financial information and third-party funding of the litigation. After review, the Supreme Court saw "no purpose in dismissing the original applications for relief and petition for review as moot in light of the change in prevailing party status, only to have them re-filed as a result of further attorney’s fees proceedings in the superior court." Thee therefore addressed the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” The Court first concluded that earlier public interest litigation case law provided that the guiding parameters for the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” Further, the Court concluded that in this case the claimants did not have “sufficient economic incentive” to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature. The Court vacated the superior court’s discovery order and remanded this for further proceedings. View "Alaska Conservation Foundation v. Pebble Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were land and water use permits allowing intensive mineral exploration on State land. Specifically, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had to give public notice before issuing the permits. Because the Alaska Constitution required public notice when interests in land were transferred, the answer to this question depended on whether the permits conveyed an interest in land. After a trial, the superior court held that notice was not required because the permits were nominally and functionally revocable and therefore did not transfer an interest in land. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the land use permits were not functionally revocable, conveyed an interest in land and consequently should have been preceded by public notice. As such, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Aulukestai v. Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Husband appealed a superior court decision dividing the marital property. He raises two issues with regard to his wife’s retirement health insurance benefits: (1) that the superior court erred in determining the marital portion of those benefits; and (2) that the superior court erred in the rate it selected for valuing those benefits. In addition, Husband challenged the superior court’s award to the wife of a larger share of the marital property, which the court justified on grounds that the wife would have primary care of the couple’s child, and Husband was receiving two income-producing businesses created during the marriage. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error with regard to the health insurance benefits. However, the Court found it was an abuse of discretion to rely on the stated two justifications for an unequal division of the marital property, and remanded for the superior court’s further consideration of the equitable division. Lastly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s valuation of the husband’s 2010 income tax liability, because its finding was supported by the estimates given at trial and it was not required to revise the finding based on the husband’s later submission of his actual return. View "Engstrom v. Engstrom" on Justia Law

The State Commission for Human Rights brought an action on behalf of an employee who alleged that her employer’s racist and insensitive remarks created a hostile work environment. The Commission ultimately found that the employee did not suffer a hostile work environment, but it denied the employer’s request for attorney’s fees. The employer appealed on the issue the fees, arguing that it was entitled to fees as the prevailing party and because it raised affirmative defenses under the Alaska and United States Constitutions. After review of the specific facts entered on the Commission's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Commission’s denial of fees. View "Ace Delivery & Moving, Inc. v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law

The Alaska Board of Game promulgated regulations managing caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13. A hunter challenged the regulations on constitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that they wrongfully interfered with his subsistence hunting rights, and also sought a judicially imposed public reprimand of an assistant attorney general representing the Board. The superior court dismissed the claim against the attorney, granted summary judgment upholding the regulations, and awarded partial attorney’s fees to the State and an intervenor defendant. The hunter appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment orders, but vacated the attorney’s fees awards and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Dr. Michael Brandner’s hospital privileges at Providence Alaska Medical Center were revoked after he violated hospital policy by failing to disclose an order from the Alaska State Medical Board that he undergo an evaluation of his fitness to practice medicine. Brandner appealed to the hospital’s Fair Hearing Panel and Appellate Review Committee, but the termination was upheld. Brandner filed suit against the hospital and several doctors involved in the termination proceedings, alleging breach of contract and denial of due process. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual doctors because they were immune from suit. Finding that the executive committee and hearing panel reasonably interpreted the policy, the Supreme Court found Brandner did not raise any material evidence tending to show that the executive committee and hearing panel were motivated by malice. As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's order dismissing Brandner's claims against the individual doctors. View "Brandner v. Bateman" on Justia Law

A man working at a concrete-pouring job was assaulted by another worker at the job site. The injured man filed a lawsuit against the assailant and both the concrete-pouring company and its owner. Although the company’s commercial general liability insurer initially provided a defense attorney in the negligence action, the insurer later brought a declaratory judgment action alleging that the incident fell within the policy’s employee-exclusion clause. The superior court granted summary judgment to the insurance company. The Supreme Court affirmed. "[B]ecause courts look to workers’ compensation law to give meaning to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment' in workers’ compensation/employers’ liability policies, and because commercial general liability policies are designed to avoid the existence of an overlap or a gap between workers’ compensation/employers’ liability and commercial general liability policies, sister jurisdictions interpret the same phrase in employee-exclusion clauses in commercial general liability policies in light of the identical language in workers’ compensation statutes. We have found no case law holding that the contractual phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment' in commercial general liability exclusions should be interpreted differently from the identical phrase in workers’ compensation statutes. For purposes of this appeal, we will use workers’ compensation case law to interpret the meaning of the commercial general liability policy’s exclusion of coverage for bodily injury "arising out of and in the course of employment.'" The employer did not purchase workers' compensation coverage. And in reading the general liability policy in question, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in determining that the incident here fell within the employee-exclusion claim. View "Devine v. Great Divide Insurance Company" on Justia Law