Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The bank wanted to foreclose on appellant Gregory Erkins' property. Appellant alleged that he was incapacitated when he entered into the loan contract and attempted to use this defense against a bank that was a subsequent purchaser of the note. In the first appeal of this case, the Alaska Supreme Court held that summary judgment had been improperly granted to the bank, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the superior court granted summary judgment on different grounds, concluding the bank was a holder of the note in due course, and therefore immune from appellant's incapacity defense. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court this time, and affirmed. View "Erkins v. Alaska Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law

A grandparent petitioned for restriction-free visitation with his grandchildren after they moved out of state. The parents conceded that visitation with the grandparent was in the children’s best interests, but opposed court-ordered visitation, stating that they had never denied reasonable visitation and would continue to allow visitation with some restrictions. Without finding any of the parents’ visitation restrictions unreasonable or any history of denying reasonable visitation, the superior court entered an order requiring “reasonable” visitation. The parents appealed, arguing that the order violated their constitutional rights to the care, custody, and control of their children. Immediately after oral argument the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s visitation order. The Court explained the basis for that order. Because the superior court’s findings precluded the possibility that a constitutional visitation order could be entered based on the record in this case, the Court also dismissed the grandfather’s visitation petition in its entirety. View "Ross v. Bauman" on Justia Law

A grandparent petitioned for restriction-free visitation with his grandchildren after they moved out of state. The parents conceded that visitation with the grandparent was in the children’s best interests, but opposed court-ordered visitation, stating that they had never denied reasonable visitation and would continue to allow visitation with some restrictions. Without finding any of the parents’ visitation restrictions unreasonable or any history of denying reasonable visitation, the superior court entered an order requiring “reasonable” visitation. The parents appealed, arguing that the order violated their constitutional rights to the care, custody, and control of their children. Immediately after oral argument the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s visitation order. The Court explained the basis for that order. Because the superior court’s findings precluded the possibility that a constitutional visitation order could be entered based on the record in this case, the Court also dismissed the grandfather’s visitation petition in its entirety. View "Ross v. Bauman" on Justia Law

The State Department of Revenue sought to hold the sole shareholder, director, and employee of a closely held Washington corporation personally liable for the corporation’s unpaid tax debts. The superior court pierced the corporation’s corporate veil, ruled that the shareholder’s successor corporation was liable for the tax debt, voided two contract transfers as fraudulent conveyances, and ruled that the shareholder had breached fiduciary duties to the corporation and the State as the corporation’s creditor. The shareholder and corporation appealed the superior court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil, arguing that the superior court erred by not barring the State’s suit under the principle of res judicata, by applying Alaska rather than Washington veil-piercing law, and by making clear factual errors. The shareholder and corporation also appealed the superior court’s finding that two contracts were fraudulently conveyed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that res judicata did not bar the State from seeking to pierce the corporation's corporate veil to collect tax debt established in an earlier case. Furthermore, the Court held that the corporation's veil was properly pierced under both Alaska and Washington state law. Though the superior court's fraudulent conveyance determination contained errors of fact, the Supreme Court concluded that those errors were harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pister v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The State Department of Revenue sought to hold the sole shareholder, director, and employee of a closely held Washington corporation personally liable for the corporation’s unpaid tax debts. The superior court pierced the corporation’s corporate veil, ruled that the shareholder’s successor corporation was liable for the tax debt, voided two contract transfers as fraudulent conveyances, and ruled that the shareholder had breached fiduciary duties to the corporation and the State as the corporation’s creditor. The shareholder and corporation appealed the superior court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil, arguing that the superior court erred by not barring the State’s suit under the principle of res judicata, by applying Alaska rather than Washington veil-piercing law, and by making clear factual errors. The shareholder and corporation also appealed the superior court’s finding that two contracts were fraudulently conveyed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that res judicata did not bar the State from seeking to pierce the corporation's corporate veil to collect tax debt established in an earlier case. Furthermore, the Court held that the corporation's veil was properly pierced under both Alaska and Washington state law. Though the superior court's fraudulent conveyance determination contained errors of fact, the Supreme Court concluded that those errors were harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pister v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

An oyster farmer closed his farm after dozens of people became sick from eating his oysters. He sued the state Department of Environmental Conservation, alleging that the agency negligently informed him that the site of his farm was suitable for shellfish farming. The superior court granted summary judgment for the agency, concluding that the farmer’s misrepresentation claim was barred by state sovereign immunity. The farmer argued on appeal that the agency’s sovereign immunity defense was inapplicable because his complaint alleged a claim of negligence, not negligent misrepresentation. After review, the Supreme Court found the allegations in the farmer’s complaint supported only a negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the agency. View "Miller v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

An oyster farmer closed his farm after dozens of people became sick from eating his oysters. He sued the state Department of Environmental Conservation, alleging that the agency negligently informed him that the site of his farm was suitable for shellfish farming. The superior court granted summary judgment for the agency, concluding that the farmer’s misrepresentation claim was barred by state sovereign immunity. The farmer argued on appeal that the agency’s sovereign immunity defense was inapplicable because his complaint alleged a claim of negligence, not negligent misrepresentation. After review, the Supreme Court found the allegations in the farmer’s complaint supported only a negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the agency. View "Miller v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

Appellant William Foondle appeals the superior court’s dismissal of his claims for legal malpractice against the public defenders who represented him in a criminal case. A grand jury indicted William Foondle for felony driving under the influence (DUI) in 2007. The DUI charge was a felony because Foondle had been convicted of DUI twice in the preceding ten years: once earlier in 2007 and once in North Dakota in 1999. Assistant public defenders Angela O’Brien and Daniel Lord were assigned to defend Foondle. In dismissing Foondle’s malpractice claims, the superior court relied on the public policy principle that precluded criminally convicted plaintiffs from civil recovery based on the alleged negligence of their former defense counsel. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court’s legal analysis was correct, and affirmed the judgment on that basis. Furthermore, the Court rejected, as unsupported, Foondle’s argument that the dismissal violated his rights to due process and access to the courts. View "Foondle v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

In a personal injury trial resulting from a car accident, plaintiff sought to cross-examine defendant's medical expert about his substantial connection to the insurance industry in an effort to prove bias. In response to defense counsel's motion in limine, the district court ruled that plaintiff could not refer to the fact that defendant was insured or that her insurance company and others had hired the expert witness numerous times. The trial court did permit plaintiff to cross-examine the expert witness about his financial interest in continuing to work for "defendants" and "defense attorneys." On appeal from the district court judgment, the superior court concluded that the district court had abused its discretion by excluding evidence of the expert's connections to the insurance industry, reasoning that the expert witness and the company which hired him had extensive dealings with the defendant's insurance company and the insurance industry more broadly and that this information was relevant to the question of bias. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that the district court erred in ruling that relevant evidence of the expert witness's substantial connection to the insurance industry should have been excluded. But the district court's error was harmless because at trial, plaintiff was able to elicit testimony about the witness's connection to the insurance industry. The Court therefore vacated the superior court's remand order and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "Ray v. Draeger" on Justia Law

Lake and Peninsula Borough voters passed an initiative prohibiting large-scale mining activities that had a "significant adverse impact" on anadromous waters within the Borough. Pebble Limited Partnership and Alaska (first in separate suits, later consolidated) brought suit against the Borough claiming that the initiative was preempted by state law. Two of the initiative sponsors intervened to support the initiative. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Pebble and the State and enjoined the Borough from enforcing the initiative. The sponsors appealed, arguing that the dispute was unripe and that the superior court's preemption analysis was erroneous. But because at least the State has articulated a concrete harm stemming from the initiative's mere enactment, the Supreme Court found the case ripe for adjudication. And because the initiative purported to give the Borough veto power over mining projects on state lands within its borders, it seriously impeded the implementation of the Alaska Land Act, which granted the Department of Natural Resources "charge of all matters affecting exploration, development, and mining" of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in favor of Pebble and the State. View "Jacko v. Alaska" on Justia Law