Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mark Horne and Belinda Touhakis were romantically involved for several years in the mid 2000s, though they never married and produced no biological children together. During their relationship, Touhakis adopted a daughter. When Horne and Touhakis ended their relationship, Horne requested custody and visitation rights as a psychological parent. He also offered to provide child support. Under the terms of the settlement, the parties agreed that Horne had established a psychological parent relationship with Touhakis's daughter and would have six-day-long visitation rights every 21 days. Horne was then a self-employed entrepreneur, and several of his projects and investments began losing money shortly after the settlement. In late 2012 he asked the superior court to modify his child support obligation. During an evidentiary hearing, the Horne conceded that it would be fair to base his child support obligation on imputed income, and he estimated that he could earn a gross annual income of about $40,000 if he sought and obtained full-time employment. The superior court concluded that Horne underestimated his earning potential, and the court imputed income to Horne at twice his income estimate. Because the court's findings were insufficient to allow the Supreme Court to review its imputed income determination, it vacated the trial court's decision setting Horne's new monthly child support obligation, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Horne v. Touhakis" on Justia Law

Andrea C. appealed a superior court’s decision to award Marcus K. primary physical and sole legal custody of their two children. Andrea argued the superior court made inadequate findings regarding Marcus’s history of domestic violence, and she also challenged the superior court’s application of the best interest factors. "This significant shift in custody" appeared to the Supreme Court as having been the result of two factors: (1) Marcus rebutted the domestic violence presumption, making it possible for the superior court to award him physical and legal custody; and (2) the superior court had increasing concerns regarding Andrea’s parenting. Finding no abuse of discretion or other reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Andrea C., v. Marcus K." on Justia Law

A mother ("Theresa L.") appealed the termination of her parental rights to her two youngest children. The children, teenagers at the time of the termination hearing, testified that they did not want her rights to be terminated. The trial court decided that the children were in need of aid because of mental injury and that termination was in the children’s best interests. The mother argued on appeal that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) did not meet its burden of proving mental injury and that the trial court clearly erred in deciding that termination was in the children’s best interests because of their ages, their stated wishes, and their lack of a permanent placement. The Supreme Court issued an order reversing the trial court’s decision because OCS presented insufficient evidence that the children suffered a mental injury. This opinion explained the Court's reasoning. View "Theresa L., v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Soc. Svcs." on Justia Law

M&M Constructors, owned by James McGlinchy, submitted a permit application to the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to mine a mineral deposit for use as construction rock. DNR denied M&M’s permit application because it concluded that the mineral deposit was common variety stone. Under the Common Varieties Act, “common varieties” of stone are not subject to “location,” meaning they could not be permitted through the mining law’s location process. M&M appealed to the superior court, arguing that DNR wrongly denied its permit application and also denied it procedural due process. After the superior court affirmed, M&M appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed because M&M sought to mine for common variety stone that was "well within the ambit" of the Common Varieties Act, and it received "ample" due process in the DNR proceeding. View "McGlinchy v. Alaska Dept. of Nat. Resources" on Justia Law

Six Alaska prisoners jointly filed a pro se putative class-action complaint against various Department of Corrections officials. Their complaint listed 18 causes of action, many of which addressed changes in Department policy regarding inmate purchase and possession of gaming systems and restrictions on mature-rated video games. One of the prisoners moved for class certification and for appointment of counsel. The superior court denied the class action motion on the grounds that pro se plaintiffs could not represent a class, and denied the appointment of counsel. The Department then moved for dismissal of the prisoners’ complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The superior court granted this motion on the ground that all of the claims were class action claims that could not be pursued. Two of the plaintiffs, Jack Earl, Jr. and James Barber, each filed an appeal (which were consolidated for the purposes of this opinion). They argued that the superior court erred in denying the motion for class certification, denying the motion for appointment of counsel, and dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon review of their arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in denying class certification and appointment of counsel, but reversed the dismissal of the action and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barber v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

The bank wanted to foreclose on appellant Gregory Erkins' property. Appellant alleged that he was incapacitated when he entered into the loan contract and attempted to use this defense against a bank that was a subsequent purchaser of the note. In the first appeal of this case, the Alaska Supreme Court held that summary judgment had been improperly granted to the bank, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the superior court granted summary judgment on different grounds, concluding the bank was a holder of the note in due course, and therefore immune from appellant's incapacity defense. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court this time, and affirmed. View "Erkins v. Alaska Trustee, LLC" on Justia Law

A grandparent petitioned for restriction-free visitation with his grandchildren after they moved out of state. The parents conceded that visitation with the grandparent was in the children’s best interests, but opposed court-ordered visitation, stating that they had never denied reasonable visitation and would continue to allow visitation with some restrictions. Without finding any of the parents’ visitation restrictions unreasonable or any history of denying reasonable visitation, the superior court entered an order requiring “reasonable” visitation. The parents appealed, arguing that the order violated their constitutional rights to the care, custody, and control of their children. Immediately after oral argument the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s visitation order. The Court explained the basis for that order. Because the superior court’s findings precluded the possibility that a constitutional visitation order could be entered based on the record in this case, the Court also dismissed the grandfather’s visitation petition in its entirety. View "Ross v. Bauman" on Justia Law

A grandparent petitioned for restriction-free visitation with his grandchildren after they moved out of state. The parents conceded that visitation with the grandparent was in the children’s best interests, but opposed court-ordered visitation, stating that they had never denied reasonable visitation and would continue to allow visitation with some restrictions. Without finding any of the parents’ visitation restrictions unreasonable or any history of denying reasonable visitation, the superior court entered an order requiring “reasonable” visitation. The parents appealed, arguing that the order violated their constitutional rights to the care, custody, and control of their children. Immediately after oral argument the Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s visitation order. The Court explained the basis for that order. Because the superior court’s findings precluded the possibility that a constitutional visitation order could be entered based on the record in this case, the Court also dismissed the grandfather’s visitation petition in its entirety. View "Ross v. Bauman" on Justia Law

The State Department of Revenue sought to hold the sole shareholder, director, and employee of a closely held Washington corporation personally liable for the corporation’s unpaid tax debts. The superior court pierced the corporation’s corporate veil, ruled that the shareholder’s successor corporation was liable for the tax debt, voided two contract transfers as fraudulent conveyances, and ruled that the shareholder had breached fiduciary duties to the corporation and the State as the corporation’s creditor. The shareholder and corporation appealed the superior court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil, arguing that the superior court erred by not barring the State’s suit under the principle of res judicata, by applying Alaska rather than Washington veil-piercing law, and by making clear factual errors. The shareholder and corporation also appealed the superior court’s finding that two contracts were fraudulently conveyed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that res judicata did not bar the State from seeking to pierce the corporation's corporate veil to collect tax debt established in an earlier case. Furthermore, the Court held that the corporation's veil was properly pierced under both Alaska and Washington state law. Though the superior court's fraudulent conveyance determination contained errors of fact, the Supreme Court concluded that those errors were harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pister v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The State Department of Revenue sought to hold the sole shareholder, director, and employee of a closely held Washington corporation personally liable for the corporation’s unpaid tax debts. The superior court pierced the corporation’s corporate veil, ruled that the shareholder’s successor corporation was liable for the tax debt, voided two contract transfers as fraudulent conveyances, and ruled that the shareholder had breached fiduciary duties to the corporation and the State as the corporation’s creditor. The shareholder and corporation appealed the superior court’s decision to pierce the corporate veil, arguing that the superior court erred by not barring the State’s suit under the principle of res judicata, by applying Alaska rather than Washington veil-piercing law, and by making clear factual errors. The shareholder and corporation also appealed the superior court’s finding that two contracts were fraudulently conveyed. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that res judicata did not bar the State from seeking to pierce the corporation's corporate veil to collect tax debt established in an earlier case. Furthermore, the Court held that the corporation's veil was properly pierced under both Alaska and Washington state law. Though the superior court's fraudulent conveyance determination contained errors of fact, the Supreme Court concluded that those errors were harmless. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Pister v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law