Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A cardiologist performed pacemaker surgery on Gregory Hagen and then ordered an x-ray to check the placement of the pacemaker leads and for complications. A second cardiologist reviewed the x-ray and discharged Hagen from the hospital. A radiologist also reviewed the x-ray, noted a potential “nodule” in Hagen's lung, and recommended follow-up x-rays. But these recommendations were never relayed to Hagen, who died from lung cancer approximately two years later. Hagen's wife Shirley filed a medical negligence suit against the two cardiologists, alleging that their failure to relay the radiologist’s recommendations resulted in a lost chance of survival for Gregory. The superior court granted summary judgment to the cardiologists on the grounds that expert testimony from a board-certified cardiologist was required to establish the standard of care and that the Estate had failed to identify such an expert. On appeal of that order, the Estate argued there was a genuine issue of material fact whether the cardiologist who ordered the x-ray later received the radiologist’s report. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Estate did not show how this issue was material to the superior court’s decision regarding the necessity of expert testimony to establish the standard of care. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Hagen v. Strobel" on Justia Law

Donald Olson and Aimee Moore met in 1995. Between 1995 and 2004 they had business and personal relationships. The business relationship began with Donald training Aimee to fly helicopters in exchange for Aimee’s work for Donald and his businesses. Eventually Aimee managed Donald’s businesses, and they agreed that she would receive a share of business profits. Aimee and Donald disputed the nature of their personal relationship: Aimee characterizes the relationship as a cohabative domestic partnership; Donald asserts the relationship was not a domestic partnership. Aimee terminated the personal relationship in July 2004. In December 2004 Aimee and Donald signed an agreement “related to the deferred compensation owed Aimee . . . for work performed during the period January 1996 through 2004.” In November 2005, after negotiating for more than a year, Aimee and Donald signed a final settlement agreement to end their business relationship. Aimee initiated arbitration against Donald, but not his businesses, in January 2012. Aimee alleged that Donald breached the agreement they had regarding her deferred compensation and certain aspects of managing the business. The matter was submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator ultimately agreed with Donald and his businesses, concluding that the parties’ personal relationship was not a domestic partnership and finding that Donald and the businesses had not materially breached the settlement agreement. The arbitrator ruled in Donald’s and the businesses’ favor and awarded them reasonable prevailing party costs and attorney’s fees. Aimee appealed the arbitrator's decision to the superior court, which affirmed the arbitrator's decision. She appealed to the Supreme Court, who in applying the deferential standards of review, affirmed the superior court's decision confirming the arbitration award. View "Moore v. Olson" on Justia Law

In December 2008 Michael Cooper caused a car accident that injured Samuel Thompson. During the second trial on compensatory damages the superior court excluded any evidence that Thompson had been assaulted by his then-girlfriend after the accident and limited the testimony of a defense expert witness. The superior court also gave an instruction on liability for additional harm to which Cooper objected. The jury returned a $1.4 million verdict in favor of Thompson, which exceeded his offer of judgment and thus entitled him to an award of attorney’s fees under Alaska Civil Rule 68. Cooper and his employer appealed the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, jury instruction, and fee award. After review, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the complete exclusion of the evidence that Thompson had been assaulted because it was relevant to his claim of continuing injury suffered as a result of the car accident. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Cooper v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Sarah D. and John D. separated shortly after their daughter turned three. Each claimed that the other was abusive, and obtained a short-term domestic violence protective order after they separated. The parties later stipulated to a mutual no-contact order but violated it by continuing a sporadic romantic relationship. Sarah requested interim attorney’s fees. After the superior court denied her request, Sarah consented to her lawyer’s withdrawal. Sarah and John then agreed to a property settlement. Before litigating custody Sarah again requested interim attorney’s fees and twice filed continuance motions requesting time to obtain counsel. Her motions were denied, and she appeared pro se throughout a four-day custody trial. John’s parents helped pay for his lawyer, and he was represented at all times. Over Sarah’s objections, John’s father was allowed to intervene as a party for visitation purposes. The trial court awarded shared physical and sole legal custody to John and gave John’s father unspecified visitation during John’s custodial time. Sarah appealed the court’s denials of her requests for an interim fee award, trial continuances, and to compel a witness's attendance at trial. She also appealed the court’s orders granting the grandfather intervention and visitation and the court’s domestic violence finding and custody decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court vacated the order granting the grandfather visitation and otherwise affirmed all but the custody decision, remanding for more detailed findings and conclusions on domestic violence issues. View "Sarah D. v. John D." on Justia Law

Petitioner Tracy Hutton was arrested on several weapons charges. After the first two counts were tried to a jury, he waived his right to a jury trial and the third count was tried to the court. He was convicted and appealed, arguing that he had not effectively waived his constitutional right to a jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction, holding that substantial evidence supported his waiver. The Alaska Supreme Court granted his petition for hearing to decide the appropriate standard of review for the waiver of the right to a jury trial. At oral argument, the State conceded petitioner was not advised of an essential element of the third count and that he was misadvised of the elements of his offense. Because petitioner was given incomplete and misleading information about the charge for which he was being asked to waive his right to a jury trial, the Supreme Court concluded that his waiver was constitutionally defective. The court of appeals’ decision was reversed, and the case was remanded to the superior court for a new trial. View "Hutton v. Alaska" on Justia Law

When Brandy and Jeremy Moore divorced in 2014, the superior court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of their ten-year-old daughter to Brandy, and awarded Jeremy unrestricted visitation, including visitation to foreign countries. Jeremy proposed taking the child to Micronesia during his visitation period because he became involved with a Micronesian woman he met while he was stationed there with the Army. Brandy asked the superior court to limit Jeremy’s international visitation to countries that have ratified the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The superior court denied Brandy’s motion, and she appealed, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by allowing unrestricted international visitation. She worried that if Jeremy absconded with the child to a non-signatory country, the child will then be beyond the jurisdiction of the Alaska court to enforce the custody order. But because the superior court made an express finding that Jeremy’s conduct raised no concerns about the safety and return of the child, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moore v. Moore" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on unsuccessful constitutional claimants’ invocation of a statutory protection against adverse awards of attorney’s fees and the responsive assertion that they had sufficient economic incentive to bring their claim regardless of its constitutional nature. In a related decision, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision on the merits of the constitutional claim and remanded for entry of declaratory judgment in the claimants’ favor. The constitutional claimants therefore became the prevailing parties, and the Court assumed that on remand they would seek an award of attorney’s fees and costs under AS 09.60.010. Because such an award was conditioned on the absence of sufficient economic incentive to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature, the Court also assumed that on remand the superior court would enter the same discovery orders regarding the petitioners’ financial information and third-party funding of the litigation. After review, the Supreme Court saw "no purpose in dismissing the original applications for relief and petition for review as moot in light of the change in prevailing party status, only to have them re-filed as a result of further attorney’s fees proceedings in the superior court." Thee therefore addressed the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” The Court first concluded that earlier public interest litigation case law provided that the guiding parameters for the meaning of “sufficient economic incentive.” Further, the Court concluded that in this case the claimants did not have “sufficient economic incentive” to bring the claim regardless of its constitutional nature. The Court vacated the superior court’s discovery order and remanded this for further proceedings. View "Alaska Conservation Foundation v. Pebble Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were land and water use permits allowing intensive mineral exploration on State land. Specifically, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had to give public notice before issuing the permits. Because the Alaska Constitution required public notice when interests in land were transferred, the answer to this question depended on whether the permits conveyed an interest in land. After a trial, the superior court held that notice was not required because the permits were nominally and functionally revocable and therefore did not transfer an interest in land. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the land use permits were not functionally revocable, conveyed an interest in land and consequently should have been preceded by public notice. As such, the Court reversed the superior court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Aulukestai v. Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Husband appealed a superior court decision dividing the marital property. He raises two issues with regard to his wife’s retirement health insurance benefits: (1) that the superior court erred in determining the marital portion of those benefits; and (2) that the superior court erred in the rate it selected for valuing those benefits. In addition, Husband challenged the superior court’s award to the wife of a larger share of the marital property, which the court justified on grounds that the wife would have primary care of the couple’s child, and Husband was receiving two income-producing businesses created during the marriage. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error with regard to the health insurance benefits. However, the Court found it was an abuse of discretion to rely on the stated two justifications for an unequal division of the marital property, and remanded for the superior court’s further consideration of the equitable division. Lastly, the Court affirmed the superior court’s valuation of the husband’s 2010 income tax liability, because its finding was supported by the estimates given at trial and it was not required to revise the finding based on the husband’s later submission of his actual return. View "Engstrom v. Engstrom" on Justia Law

The State Commission for Human Rights brought an action on behalf of an employee who alleged that her employer’s racist and insensitive remarks created a hostile work environment. The Commission ultimately found that the employee did not suffer a hostile work environment, but it denied the employer’s request for attorney’s fees. The employer appealed on the issue the fees, arguing that it was entitled to fees as the prevailing party and because it raised affirmative defenses under the Alaska and United States Constitutions. After review of the specific facts entered on the Commission's record, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the Commission’s denial of fees. View "Ace Delivery & Moving, Inc. v. Alaska State Commission for Human Rights" on Justia Law