Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Alaska Board of Game promulgated regulations managing caribou hunting in Game Management Unit 13. A hunter challenged the regulations on constitutional and statutory grounds, arguing that they wrongfully interfered with his subsistence hunting rights, and also sought a judicially imposed public reprimand of an assistant attorney general representing the Board. The superior court dismissed the claim against the attorney, granted summary judgment upholding the regulations, and awarded partial attorney’s fees to the State and an intervenor defendant. The hunter appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and summary judgment orders, but vacated the attorney’s fees awards and remanded for further proceedings. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

Dr. Michael Brandner’s hospital privileges at Providence Alaska Medical Center were revoked after he violated hospital policy by failing to disclose an order from the Alaska State Medical Board that he undergo an evaluation of his fitness to practice medicine. Brandner appealed to the hospital’s Fair Hearing Panel and Appellate Review Committee, but the termination was upheld. Brandner filed suit against the hospital and several doctors involved in the termination proceedings, alleging breach of contract and denial of due process. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the individual doctors because they were immune from suit. Finding that the executive committee and hearing panel reasonably interpreted the policy, the Supreme Court found Brandner did not raise any material evidence tending to show that the executive committee and hearing panel were motivated by malice. As such, the Court affirmed the superior court's order dismissing Brandner's claims against the individual doctors. View "Brandner v. Bateman" on Justia Law

A man working at a concrete-pouring job was assaulted by another worker at the job site. The injured man filed a lawsuit against the assailant and both the concrete-pouring company and its owner. Although the company’s commercial general liability insurer initially provided a defense attorney in the negligence action, the insurer later brought a declaratory judgment action alleging that the incident fell within the policy’s employee-exclusion clause. The superior court granted summary judgment to the insurance company. The Supreme Court affirmed. "[B]ecause courts look to workers’ compensation law to give meaning to the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment' in workers’ compensation/employers’ liability policies, and because commercial general liability policies are designed to avoid the existence of an overlap or a gap between workers’ compensation/employers’ liability and commercial general liability policies, sister jurisdictions interpret the same phrase in employee-exclusion clauses in commercial general liability policies in light of the identical language in workers’ compensation statutes. We have found no case law holding that the contractual phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment' in commercial general liability exclusions should be interpreted differently from the identical phrase in workers’ compensation statutes. For purposes of this appeal, we will use workers’ compensation case law to interpret the meaning of the commercial general liability policy’s exclusion of coverage for bodily injury "arising out of and in the course of employment.'" The employer did not purchase workers' compensation coverage. And in reading the general liability policy in question, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not err in determining that the incident here fell within the employee-exclusion claim. View "Devine v. Great Divide Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In 2005 Gordon Timmerman, sole owner of MacDonald Miller Alaska, Inc., agreed to release a claim MacDonald Miller had against Ranes & Shine, LLC, and to pay an additional $18,000 in exchange for equipment Ranes & Shine claimed to own free of any encumbrances. Five years later First National Bank Alaska contacted Timmerman, asserting a security interest in the equipment and requesting its return. First National eventually filed this suit against Timmerman in 2010 to obtain possession of the equipment. Timmerman filed a third-party complaint against Ranes & Shine and its former managing member, Thomas Ranes, asserting breach of warranty of title, misrepresentation, unfair trade practices, and common law contract claims. Ranes & Shine alleged among its other contentions that the applicable statutes of limitation barred Timmerman’s suit because First National’s publicly filed Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) financing statement should have placed Timmerman on inquiry notice of First National’s security interest in the equipment at the time of the agreement in 2005. The superior court disagreed and held Ranes & Shine liable for breach of contract and misrepresentation, while also dismissing the claims asserted against Ranes individually. Ranes & Shine appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s statute of limitations and attorney’s fees and costs rulings, as well as various procedural rulings. But the Court reversed the superior court’s decision to dismiss the misrepresentation claim that Timmerman’s company, MacDonald Miller, had asserted against Ranes in his individual capacity, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue. View "Ranes & Shine, LLC v. MacDonald Miller Alaska, Inc." on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took custody of two young girls because of their parents’ substance abuse and neglect. OCS took custody of the parents’ son shortly after his birth for the same reasons. The trial court terminated the parents’ rights to all three children, who were Indian children as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The parents appealed, arguing that the trial court violated due process when it entered an adjudication and disposition order on the basis of OCS’s offer of proof before the parents had received proper notice or been appointed counsel. They also argued that the trial court erred at the termination trial when it found that: (1) the children were in need of aid; (2) the parents failed to timely remedy the conduct or conditions that placed the children at risk of harm; (3) OCS’s expert witnesses qualified as experts for purposes of ICWA; (4) the parents’ continued custody of the children would likely result in serious emotional or physical harm to the children; and (5) termination of parental rights was in the children’s best interests. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the lack of proper notice at the adjudication and disposition stage did not affect the outcome of this proceeding (and therefore did not deprive the parents of due process) and that the trial court’s decision at the termination stage was supported by the evidence. View "Payton S. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Paige Vonder Haar purchased a vehicle from a seller in Oregon in 2007. The parties labeled the vehicle variously as an “electric car” or a “customized golf cart,” depending on their perspective. Paige’s husband David testified that it was one of a number of vehicles built by Dale Noland for Disneyland “to move passengers and their luggage from hotels and places in the park.” The Vonder Haars were not given any documents of title or registration at the time of purchase, but the bill of sale described it as a “1972 Noland car.” Paige sought to title and register it as a “low-speed vehicle,” a special category of vehicles deemed roadworthy under Alaska law. A cursory inspection failed to satisfy the Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), that the vehicle met standards, and the DMV refused to title and register it as a low-speed vehicle. Following an evidentiary hearing, a hearing officer upheld that decision, which was affirmed again on appeal to the superior court. Paige appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to affirm the decision of the hearing officer: substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s finding that the vehicle had not been shown to be safe for roadway use and that the decision not to title or register it therefore had a reasonable basis. View "Vonder Haar v. Dept. of Administration" on Justia Law

An applicant for federal disability benefits applied for state benefits that were intended to provide basic assistance while the federal application was pending. The Division of Public Assistance denied these interim benefits, relying on a subset of the criteria that the Social Security Administration uses to determine eligibility for federal benefits. The superior court reversed this decision, holding that Alaska law required the Department to apply the same federal substantive criteria and procedural requirements to its determination of eligibility for state interim benefits. The Department petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for review. After review, the Court concluded that, while state law did not require the Department to track the federal analysis exactly when it assessed eligibility for state interim benefits, the Department’s application of the law erroneously excluded a category of applicants who would be found to be disabled for purposes of federal benefits and who therefore should have been entitled to interim assistance. The Court affirmed the superior court’s decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services v. Gross" on Justia Law

Michael Wagner shot and killed his landlord, Steven Key, in 2006. The superior court ruled that the prosecution could use Wagner's police interview to impeach him if he took the stand at his murder trial. Wagner argued on appeal that the police violated his right to remain silent, and that the court's ruling prevented him from testifying. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that on the trial court record, it was impossible to tell whether the court's ruling affected Wagner's decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury. The Court, therefore, concluded that Wagner had not preserved his "Miranda" claim for appellate review. Wagner's conviction was affirmed. View "Wagner v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A police officer’s employment was terminated for abuse of alcohol, sexually offensive remarks made to two female officers, and alleged dishonesty during the subsequent police investigation. An arbitrator concluded that terminating the officer’s employment was an excessive penalty and ordered the officer’s reinstatement. The superior court affirmed the arbitration decision and the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court based on the deference that must be given to an arbitration decision. However, the Alaska Police Standards Council revoked the officer’s police certificate after concluding that the officer was not of good moral character and was dishonest. The superior court reversed the decision to revoke, substituting its judgment for the Council’s. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court, holding that the Council’s decision, like that of the arbitrator, was entitled to deference. The Court therefore affirmed the Council’s decision to revoke the officer’s police certificate. View "Alaska Police Standards Council v. Parcell" on Justia Law

Arthur Kinnan lived in a residence as part of a substance abuse treatment program operated by Sitka Counseling. Funding for that program ended, and Sitka Counseling informed Kinnan that he would be required to vacate. Kinnan filed suit against Sitka Counseling and two of its staff members, unsuccessfully alleging several torts based on the defendants’ conduct when removing him from the premises, violations of Alaska’s Landlord Tenant Act, and deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kinnan argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court wrongfully denied a continuance to allow him to seek counsel, wrongfully excluded the testimony of a late-disclosed witness and two affidavits, and improperly facilitated questioning regarding Kinnan’s mental disability. The Supreme Court concluded that any error resulting from the exclusion of Kinnan’s witness was harmless and saw no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s denial of Kinnan’s continuance, its exclusion of the affidavits as hearsay, or its consideration of Kinnan’s mental disability. Furthermore, the Court also rejected Kinnan’s argument that the superior court’s adverse rulings created an appearance of judicial bias. View "Kinnan v. Sitka Counseling" on Justia Law