Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Paige Vonder Haar purchased a vehicle from a seller in Oregon in 2007. The parties labeled the vehicle variously as an “electric car” or a “customized golf cart,” depending on their perspective. Paige’s husband David testified that it was one of a number of vehicles built by Dale Noland for Disneyland “to move passengers and their luggage from hotels and places in the park.” The Vonder Haars were not given any documents of title or registration at the time of purchase, but the bill of sale described it as a “1972 Noland car.” Paige sought to title and register it as a “low-speed vehicle,” a special category of vehicles deemed roadworthy under Alaska law. A cursory inspection failed to satisfy the Department of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV), that the vehicle met standards, and the DMV refused to title and register it as a low-speed vehicle. Following an evidentiary hearing, a hearing officer upheld that decision, which was affirmed again on appeal to the superior court. Paige appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to affirm the decision of the hearing officer: substantial evidence supported the hearing officer’s finding that the vehicle had not been shown to be safe for roadway use and that the decision not to title or register it therefore had a reasonable basis. View "Vonder Haar v. Dept. of Administration" on Justia Law

An applicant for federal disability benefits applied for state benefits that were intended to provide basic assistance while the federal application was pending. The Division of Public Assistance denied these interim benefits, relying on a subset of the criteria that the Social Security Administration uses to determine eligibility for federal benefits. The superior court reversed this decision, holding that Alaska law required the Department to apply the same federal substantive criteria and procedural requirements to its determination of eligibility for state interim benefits. The Department petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for review. After review, the Court concluded that, while state law did not require the Department to track the federal analysis exactly when it assessed eligibility for state interim benefits, the Department’s application of the law erroneously excluded a category of applicants who would be found to be disabled for purposes of federal benefits and who therefore should have been entitled to interim assistance. The Court affirmed the superior court’s decision in part, reversed it in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services v. Gross" on Justia Law

Michael Wagner shot and killed his landlord, Steven Key, in 2006. The superior court ruled that the prosecution could use Wagner's police interview to impeach him if he took the stand at his murder trial. Wagner argued on appeal that the police violated his right to remain silent, and that the court's ruling prevented him from testifying. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that on the trial court record, it was impossible to tell whether the court's ruling affected Wagner's decision not to testify, whether the prosecution would have impeached him with his police statement, or whether this evidence would have affected the jury. The Court, therefore, concluded that Wagner had not preserved his "Miranda" claim for appellate review. Wagner's conviction was affirmed. View "Wagner v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A police officer’s employment was terminated for abuse of alcohol, sexually offensive remarks made to two female officers, and alleged dishonesty during the subsequent police investigation. An arbitrator concluded that terminating the officer’s employment was an excessive penalty and ordered the officer’s reinstatement. The superior court affirmed the arbitration decision and the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court based on the deference that must be given to an arbitration decision. However, the Alaska Police Standards Council revoked the officer’s police certificate after concluding that the officer was not of good moral character and was dishonest. The superior court reversed the decision to revoke, substituting its judgment for the Council’s. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court, holding that the Council’s decision, like that of the arbitrator, was entitled to deference. The Court therefore affirmed the Council’s decision to revoke the officer’s police certificate. View "Alaska Police Standards Council v. Parcell" on Justia Law

Arthur Kinnan lived in a residence as part of a substance abuse treatment program operated by Sitka Counseling. Funding for that program ended, and Sitka Counseling informed Kinnan that he would be required to vacate. Kinnan filed suit against Sitka Counseling and two of its staff members, unsuccessfully alleging several torts based on the defendants’ conduct when removing him from the premises, violations of Alaska’s Landlord Tenant Act, and deprivation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kinnan argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the superior court wrongfully denied a continuance to allow him to seek counsel, wrongfully excluded the testimony of a late-disclosed witness and two affidavits, and improperly facilitated questioning regarding Kinnan’s mental disability. The Supreme Court concluded that any error resulting from the exclusion of Kinnan’s witness was harmless and saw no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s denial of Kinnan’s continuance, its exclusion of the affidavits as hearsay, or its consideration of Kinnan’s mental disability. Furthermore, the Court also rejected Kinnan’s argument that the superior court’s adverse rulings created an appearance of judicial bias. View "Kinnan v. Sitka Counseling" on Justia Law

In this case, the superior court awarded the parents joint physical custody of their daughter, finding that although the father had committed domestic violence, it was “not of a degree or frequency” to trigger the presumption found in Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g) (a rebuttable presumption that a parent with a "history of perpetrating domestic violence" not be awarded sole or joint physical custody of a child). The Supreme Court, on review of this case, found that the trial court’s factual findings were ambiguous as to whether the father committed more than one act of domestic violence. The Court therefore remanded this case for further findings on this issue. View "Faye H. v. James B." on Justia Law

Castle Properties, Inc. held a right of first refusal on approximately 2.4 acres of unimproved land owned by the Wasilla Lake Church of the Nazarene (Church). The City of Wasilla offered the Church another parcel of approximately 17 acres in exchange for this property. Having learned of the City’s offer, Castle requested a copy of the purchase and sale agreement memorializing the exchange. The Church, apparently unaware of the right of first refusal, denied this request. Castle then informed the Church that it was exercising its right and submitted a cash offer, which the Church rejected. Castle filed suit, and the superior court found that Castle received adequate notice when it obtained the city ordinance approving the City’s offer and that the Church acted reasonably in rejecting Castle Properties’ competing cash offer. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not clearly err in finding that Castle received adequate notice, that Castle exercised its rights by making a competing offer, and that the Church’s response did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Castle Properties, Inc. v. Wasilla Lake Church of the Nazarene" on Justia Law

Appellant Tommie Patterson was injured in a hit-and-run accident and sued his car insurance company claiming it had breached his insurance contract by failing to reasonably compensate him for his injuries. He later moved to amend his complaint to include racketeering, embezzlement, mail fraud, and bad faith claims, but the superior court denied the motion. A jury returned a liability verdict that was smaller than the insurance company's offer of judgment. The superior court ruled that the insurance company was the prevailing party and awarded attorney's fees and costs. Patterson appealed the denial of his motion to amend, the awarding of attorney's fees and costs, and several of the court's other procedural and evidentiary rulings. Finding no abuse of discretion in the court's rulings, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Patterson v. GEICO General Insurance Company" on Justia Law

A married couple moved from Fairbanks to Mississippi to “start a new life” and work on their marriage. After living in Mississippi for a few months the husband filed for divorce, and a Mississippi court entered a temporary child custody order awarding the couple joint physical custody of their child. A few months later the mother fled to Alaska with the child and filed for divorce in Alaska Superior. The Alaska court dismissed the mother’s action, concluding that Mississippi had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). The mother appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed: Mississippi had jurisdiction when it issued its temporary child custody order because (1) Alaska did not have home state or recent home state jurisdiction when the father filed his suit in Mississippi, and (2) the child had a significant connection to Mississippi and substantial evidence was available there. View "Norris v. Norris" on Justia Law

The Alaska Board of Game has established two different systems of subsistence hunting for moose and caribou in Alaska’s Copper Basin region: (1) community hunts for groups following a hunting pattern similar to the one traditionally practiced by members of the Ahtna Tene Nene’ community; and (2) individual hunts. A private outdoors group, the Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund, argued that this regulatory framework violated the equal access and equal protection clauses of the Alaska Constitution by establishing a preference for a certain user group. The Fund also argued that the regulations were not authorized by the governing statutes, that they conflicted with other regulations, and that notice of important regulatory changes was not properly given to the public. The Supreme Court concluded that the Board’s factual findings supported a constitutionally valid distinction between patterns of subsistence use, and because the Board’s regulations do not otherwise violate the law, the Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to the State, upholding the statute and the Board regulations against the Fund’s legal challenge. View "Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. Alaska" on Justia Law