Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A husband and wife obtained a marriage dissolution that included a provision to split the “profits . . . after the cost of fuel and can[ne]ry dues” from their jointly owned commercial fishing boat. The parties disputed the meaning of the term “profits.” Each party contended that the other owed a large sum of money pursuant to the agreement. The superior court approved a standing master’s recommendation that interpreted “profits” to mean “payment from the cannery, less deductions for fuel, dues and other advancements.” Because the superior court’s findings regarding the parties’ reasonable expectations at the time of the dissolution agreement were not clearly erroneous, and because the superior court’s interpretation of the provision accurately reflects those expectations, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mahan v. Mahan" on Justia Law

Ryan Air entered into a contractual agreement to sublease an airport lot in Kotzebue. The agreement gave Ryan Air an option to purchase the leasehold and apply its rent payments to the final purchase price. But when Ryan Air attempted to complete the purchase, Bruce Andrew Baker d/b/a Baker Leasing, LLC, the other party to the contract, disputed the outstanding balance and sent Ryan Air a notice of breach. Both parties brought their claims to the superior court. After a trial, the court concluded that Ryan Air did not materially breach the contract and ordered the parties to proceed with the transfer. Baker appealed the order, arguing that the court’s factual findings regarding his breach claims were erroneous, that the conveyance documents contained warranties beyond those he was contractually obligated to provide, and that Ryan Air’s attorney’s fees award was unreasonable. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s findings were not clearly erroneous, that the warranties contained in the conveyance documents did not exceed Baker’s contractual requirements, and that Ryan Air’s attorney’s fees were reasonable. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court’s judgment in most respects. However, the parties agreed that the superior court double-counted some of Ryan Air’s rent payments. The case was remanded to allow the superior court to address that issue. View "Baker v. Ryan Air, Inc." on Justia Law

Paul Stavenjord, a Buddhist inmate, asked to receive a Kosher diet and to be permitted to purchase a prayer shawl. Prison officials at the Alaska Department of Corrections denied his requests. Stavenjord filed a complaint alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and various constitutional provisions. The superior court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Stavenjord had failed to demonstrate: (1) that a Kosher diet and prayer shawl were necessary for the practice of his religion; (2) that he was sincere in his requests for religious accommodation; and (3) that the Department's lack of accommodations substantially burdened the practice of his religion. Under Alaska's summary judgment standard, the initial burden falls on the moving party: the Department. Furthermore, religious necessity was not an element of RLUIPA. Because summary judgment was granted by placing the initial burden on the non-moving party and by focusing on Stavenjord's failure to make an evidentiary showing not required under RLUIPA, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stavenjord v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

A family of business owners obtained a bank loan to invest in a fledgling hotel project. The family later sued the bank, alleging that one of its loan officers fraudulently induced them to invest in the project. This appeal centered on numerous aspects of the resulting superior court proceedings. In particular, the family claimed that the bank committed a fraud upon the court through inaccurate and inconsistent portrayals of the loan officer’s conduct. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that although some testimony offered by the bank may have been misleading, it was not sufficiently egregious as to constitute fraud upon the court. View "Alaska Fur Gallery, Inc. v. First National Bank Alaska" on Justia Law

Two parents disputed the legal custody and visitation rights for their daughter; the mother resided in Alaska and the father resided on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation in Montana. The superior court awarded sole legal custody to the mother because it concluded that the parties could not communicate effectively to co-parent their daughter. The court ordered unsupervised visitation between the father and the daughter in Alaska, but prohibited visitation on the reservation until the daughter turned eight. The father appealed. Although the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it decided legal custody, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court failed to fully justify its decision when creating its restrictive visitation schedule and allocating visitation expenses. Consequently the Supreme Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Red Elk v. McBride" on Justia Law

Ronald Brooks was a director and one-third shareholder of W.B.H. Corp., a closely held Alaska corporation formed in 1991. The other two shareholder-directors were Joann Horner and Helen Warner. At the times relevant to this lawsuit, the corporation’s sole asset was a group of contiguous mining claims north of Fairbanks called Bittner Lode. Despite the parties’ agreement to share costs equally, Horner and Warner for a number of years paid Brooks’s share of the annual payments necessary to maintain the mineral leases. This case arose from a dispute over the sale of a corporate asset during the winding up of the corporation. Two of the shareholders successfully bid to purchase the asset; the other shareholder claims they failed to overcome their conflict of interest and prove that the transaction was just and reasonable as to the corporation. Following trial, the superior court found in favor of the interested shareholders, in large part because the disinterested shareholder had voted to approve the transaction with full knowledge of the material facts. The disinterested shareholder (Brooks) appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the superior court did not clearly err in its findings of fact or err in its application of Alaska law and the corporation’s bylaws. View "Brooks v. Horner" on Justia Law

Offenesia Yako Bavilla died in 2010. In 1987, Offenesia executed a will that left most of her assets to her children Etta and Steven. In the mid-2000s Offenesia was elderly and "slipping mentally." In November 2005 a doctor wrote that Offenesia's "mental status has declined significantly," that she "has become nearly mute," and that she "appears to hallucinate." The doctor concluded that "[d]ue to her dementia, her condition is quite likely to continue to deteriorate." In February 2006, Offenesia executed a new will, prepared by Alaska Legal Services Corporation. This new will eliminated Etta from any inheritance but still included her brother, Steven. The 2006 will included a statement explicitly "revoking all prior wills and codicils." This appeal stemmed from Etta's attempt to informally probate the 1987 will. Because Offenesia signed a new will in 2006, the superior court did not accept Etta's informal probate of the 1987 will. Etta, acting pro se, attempted to contest the validity of the 2006 will by filing a motion to amend her probate of the 1987 will to include a challenge to the 2006 will. Her motion to amend was denied, as was her motion for recusal of the magistrate judge who recommended denial of that amendment. On appeal, Etta challenged the superior court's denial of her motion to amend her pleadings and the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. After review, the Supreme Court remanded for the superior court to allow Etta to amend her pleadings but affirmed the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. View "In Re Estate of Bavilla" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. She argued that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that the children were children in need of aid because of the mother’s mental illness, a statutory basis for termination not alleged in the petition; (2) finding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made the necessary efforts towards reunification; and (3) allowing two witnesses to testify as experts. In affirming the trial court’s order, the Alaska Supreme Court held: (1) the trial court’s finding that the children were children in need of aid was supported by alternative grounds that are not challenged on appeal; (2) its finding that OCS made the required efforts to reunify the family was supported by the evidence; and (3) its acceptance of the challenged expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion. View "Sylvia L. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant exercised his constitutional right not to testify at trial. The prosecutor, in her rebuttal closing argument, commented that two people knew what had happened on the night in question, and only one of them, the victim, had testified. The defendant did not object to the comment, and the jury convicted him of attempted murder. The court of appeals, reviewing the defendant’s unpreserved claim of error, determined that the prosecutor’s remark violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. But the court of appeals concluded that there was no plain error because “at least some reasonable judges could have concluded that the problem was not egregious enough to warrant a mistrial, and that the problem could be handled through curative instructions.” After its review of the case, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but on different grounds: because the error, even though obvious, non-tactical, and affecting a substantial right, was harmless beyond a reasonable dou View "Goldsbury v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Defendants in two criminal cases failed to object to errors at trial: in "Moreno v. Alaska," the admission of improper testimony regarding Jorge Moreno's exercise of his right to be free from compelled self-incrimination; in "Hicks v. Alaska," the lack of a jury unanimity instruction when the prosecutor directed the jury that it could find Mary Hicks guilty of either of two episodes of allegedly driving under the influence of alcohol. Moreno and Hicks both appealed, and in each case, the appellate court held that the defendants failed to show that the error was not the result of counsel's strategic decision not to object. Moreno and Hicks filed petitions for hearing before the Supreme Court, arguing that the burden of proof should be on the State to show that their counsels' failures to object were the result of tactical decisions. They also contended that the court of appeals erroneously speculated on the purported tactical benefits they received due to their attorneys' lack of objections. Lastly, they each requested an evidentiary hearing to develop the record on this issue. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether to apply an evidentiary presumption or to place a burden of proof on a party to establish that a defendant's lack of objection at trial was or was not the result of defense counsel's intelligent waiver or tactical decision not to object. The Court concluded, however, that Alaska case law compels neither result: defense counsel's tactical reason for failing to object, or counsel's intelligent waiver of an objection, should be plainly obvious from the record before foreclosing the reviewing court's consideration of the remaining plain error elements. The Court reversed the court of appeals' decisions on this issue. But it concluded that Moreno suffered no prejudice despite the error in his case, and affirmed the court of appeals' decision upholding Moreno's conviction on this alternate ground. Hicks's case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "Moreno v. Alaska" on Justia Law