Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ronald Brooks was a director and one-third shareholder of W.B.H. Corp., a closely held Alaska corporation formed in 1991. The other two shareholder-directors were Joann Horner and Helen Warner. At the times relevant to this lawsuit, the corporation’s sole asset was a group of contiguous mining claims north of Fairbanks called Bittner Lode. Despite the parties’ agreement to share costs equally, Horner and Warner for a number of years paid Brooks’s share of the annual payments necessary to maintain the mineral leases. This case arose from a dispute over the sale of a corporate asset during the winding up of the corporation. Two of the shareholders successfully bid to purchase the asset; the other shareholder claims they failed to overcome their conflict of interest and prove that the transaction was just and reasonable as to the corporation. Following trial, the superior court found in favor of the interested shareholders, in large part because the disinterested shareholder had voted to approve the transaction with full knowledge of the material facts. The disinterested shareholder (Brooks) appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the superior court did not clearly err in its findings of fact or err in its application of Alaska law and the corporation’s bylaws. View "Brooks v. Horner" on Justia Law

Offenesia Yako Bavilla died in 2010. In 1987, Offenesia executed a will that left most of her assets to her children Etta and Steven. In the mid-2000s Offenesia was elderly and "slipping mentally." In November 2005 a doctor wrote that Offenesia's "mental status has declined significantly," that she "has become nearly mute," and that she "appears to hallucinate." The doctor concluded that "[d]ue to her dementia, her condition is quite likely to continue to deteriorate." In February 2006, Offenesia executed a new will, prepared by Alaska Legal Services Corporation. This new will eliminated Etta from any inheritance but still included her brother, Steven. The 2006 will included a statement explicitly "revoking all prior wills and codicils." This appeal stemmed from Etta's attempt to informally probate the 1987 will. Because Offenesia signed a new will in 2006, the superior court did not accept Etta's informal probate of the 1987 will. Etta, acting pro se, attempted to contest the validity of the 2006 will by filing a motion to amend her probate of the 1987 will to include a challenge to the 2006 will. Her motion to amend was denied, as was her motion for recusal of the magistrate judge who recommended denial of that amendment. On appeal, Etta challenged the superior court's denial of her motion to amend her pleadings and the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. After review, the Supreme Court remanded for the superior court to allow Etta to amend her pleadings but affirmed the magistrate judge's decision not to recuse himself. View "In Re Estate of Bavilla" on Justia Law

A mother appealed the termination of her parental rights to three of her children. She argued that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that the children were children in need of aid because of the mother’s mental illness, a statutory basis for termination not alleged in the petition; (2) finding that the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made the necessary efforts towards reunification; and (3) allowing two witnesses to testify as experts. In affirming the trial court’s order, the Alaska Supreme Court held: (1) the trial court’s finding that the children were children in need of aid was supported by alternative grounds that are not challenged on appeal; (2) its finding that OCS made the required efforts to reunify the family was supported by the evidence; and (3) its acceptance of the challenged expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion. View "Sylvia L. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

A criminal defendant exercised his constitutional right not to testify at trial. The prosecutor, in her rebuttal closing argument, commented that two people knew what had happened on the night in question, and only one of them, the victim, had testified. The defendant did not object to the comment, and the jury convicted him of attempted murder. The court of appeals, reviewing the defendant’s unpreserved claim of error, determined that the prosecutor’s remark violated the defendant’s right against self-incrimination. But the court of appeals concluded that there was no plain error because “at least some reasonable judges could have concluded that the problem was not egregious enough to warrant a mistrial, and that the problem could be handled through curative instructions.” After its review of the case, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but on different grounds: because the error, even though obvious, non-tactical, and affecting a substantial right, was harmless beyond a reasonable dou View "Goldsbury v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Defendants in two criminal cases failed to object to errors at trial: in "Moreno v. Alaska," the admission of improper testimony regarding Jorge Moreno's exercise of his right to be free from compelled self-incrimination; in "Hicks v. Alaska," the lack of a jury unanimity instruction when the prosecutor directed the jury that it could find Mary Hicks guilty of either of two episodes of allegedly driving under the influence of alcohol. Moreno and Hicks both appealed, and in each case, the appellate court held that the defendants failed to show that the error was not the result of counsel's strategic decision not to object. Moreno and Hicks filed petitions for hearing before the Supreme Court, arguing that the burden of proof should be on the State to show that their counsels' failures to object were the result of tactical decisions. They also contended that the court of appeals erroneously speculated on the purported tactical benefits they received due to their attorneys' lack of objections. Lastly, they each requested an evidentiary hearing to develop the record on this issue. The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether to apply an evidentiary presumption or to place a burden of proof on a party to establish that a defendant's lack of objection at trial was or was not the result of defense counsel's intelligent waiver or tactical decision not to object. The Court concluded, however, that Alaska case law compels neither result: defense counsel's tactical reason for failing to object, or counsel's intelligent waiver of an objection, should be plainly obvious from the record before foreclosing the reviewing court's consideration of the remaining plain error elements. The Court reversed the court of appeals' decisions on this issue. But it concluded that Moreno suffered no prejudice despite the error in his case, and affirmed the court of appeals' decision upholding Moreno's conviction on this alternate ground. Hicks's case was remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings. View "Moreno v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellants Richard Hughes, the Alaska Miners Association, and the Council of Alaska Producers challenged Lieutenant Governor Mead Treadwell's certification of a ballot initiative that would require final legislative approval for any large-scale metallic sulfide mining operation located within the Bristol Bay watershed. Appellants argued that the initiative violated the constitutional prohibitions on appropriation and enacting local or special legislation by initiative. Following oral argument, the Alaska Supreme Court issued an order affirming the superior court's summary judgment order in favor of the State and the initiative sponsors, and allowing preparation of ballots to proceed. View "Hughes v. Treadwell" on Justia Law

An adult passenger in a car was injured in a single-car accident. The passenger and his family brought suit against the vehicle’s unlicensed minor driver, the minor’s mother, the owner of the car, the insurance policy holder, the insurer, and the insurance adjuster who handled the claims arising from the accident. The passenger’s father attempted to raise a contractual interference claim, but the superior court concluded that the complaint did not state such a claim on his behalf. The superior court dismissed the father’s only other claim (intentional infliction of emotional distress), removed the father’s name from the case caption, and ordered the father to cease filing pleadings on behalf of other parties. After the superior court judge dismissed him from the action, the passenger’s father attempted to file a first amended complaint, which expressly stated his contractual interference claim on the theory that he was a third-party beneficiary of the contracts between his son and his son’s doctors. But the superior court denied the father leave to amend the complaint because the father had already been dismissed from the case. Following a settlement among all of the other plaintiffs and defendants (which the father did not join) the superior court granted final judgment to the insurer. The insurer moved for attorney’s fees against the father under Alaska Civil Rule 82, but the father never responded to that motion. The superior court granted the award without soliciting a response from the father, and the father appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order dismissing the father’s claims and denying leave to amend the complaint because the proposed first amended complaint was futile. But because the superior court had barred the father from filing any further pleadings in the case and had removed his name from the caption, the superior court had a responsibility to inform the self-represented father that he was permitted to file an opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees. Therefore, the Court vacated the fee award and remanded the case to the superior court to afford the father an opportunity to respond to the insurer’s motion for reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Bush v. Elkins" on Justia Law

Robert Gillam and two of his business ventures filed suit, alleging that the Alaska Public Offices Commission should not have been allowed to investigate and decide whether Gillam and his businesses had committed certain campaign finance violations. Gillam alleged that both the Executive Director and the Chair of the Commission were biased and that further consideration by the Commission would violate his right to due process protected by the Alaska and federal constitutions and his Alaska constitutional right to a fair investigation. The superior court concluded that Gillam’s claims were not ripe and that Gillam has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Upon review, the Alaska Supreme Court agreed that there was an administrative recusal procedure for Gillam’s state law claims and that Gillam needed to exhaust that remedy before bringing his state law claims to court. The Court also agreed that Gillam’s federal due process claim was not ripe because the recusal procedure might resolve that claim. View "RBG Bush Planes, LLC v. Kirk" on Justia Law

Shirley M. was the mother of Abigail, born in April 2010. For many years violence, prostitution, reported substance abuse, and other crimes consumed Shirley’s life. Abigail was Shirley’s fifth child: Haily was born in 2002, Daisy was born in 2003, Penny was born in 2005, and Andrew was born in 2008. In March 2004 OCS received a high priority report that the father of Shirley’s older children was abusing Haily. OCS removed the children but later returned them with in-home services and custody supervision. OCS made a referral for in-home services, including parenting training for both parents. Although the family participated in the services, OCS continued to have concerns. In June 2005 OCS considered removing the children from the home again after receiving another report that the father was abusing Haily. Shortly after Penny was born OCS petitioned to place the three children under supervision. Not long after that, Penny died due to asphyxiation. It was suspected that Shirley rolled over onto Penny when the family was sleeping in a tent in the yard at Rae’s residence. According to the social worker who saw Haily and Daisy the day they were removed from Shirley’s care, the children had low muscle tone and few speech skills. The social worker also reported that the children were generally unruly, screaming and trying to break things, and hitting and pinching each other. Shirley ultimately lost her parental rights as to her remaining children, and she appealed termination of those right, in this case, as to Abigail, on the grounds that the trial court erred in finding that: (1) Shirley failed to remedy the conduct that put Abigail at risk of harm; (2) the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to provide services to reunify the family; (3) termination was in Abigail’s best interests; and (4) OCS did not abuse its discretion in placing Abigail with her foster parents and not her great-grandmother, Rae. Finding no reason to disturb the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shirley M. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Svcs." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were the efforts of the Alaska Board of Game to control, by regulation, the movement of bison that stray outside the boundaries of two game ranches on Kodiak Island. The Board had statutory authority to determine when a domestic animal becomes "feral," and thus legally characterized as "game." Pursuant to this grant of authority, however, the Board's regulatory definition of a "feral" domestic animal must be reasonable and consistent with its authorizing statute. The Board amended the first regulation at issue to read: "Under this section, and in accordance with the definition of 'game' [provided in statute,] (which includes feral domestic animals) . . . musk oxen, bison, or reindeer that [are] lawfully owned . . . that [are] not confined or [are] not under positive control [are] feral unless the animal is a free-ranging animal on a state or federal grazing lease." The Board amended a second regulation to authorize the Alaska Department of Fish and Game to announce a public hunt of bison in Unit 8 (which included Kodiak) by emergency order. These amendments effectively confiscated lawfully owned domestic animals, unreasonably transforming them from "domestic" to "game" solely by reference to a property boundary line. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State and held the contested regulations invalid. The Court also vacated the court's award of attorney's fees to the State. View "Ellingston v. Lloyd" on Justia Law