Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Ebert v. Bruce L.
Sometime in early 2007, "Connie" approached Holly and William Ebert, a married couple she knew from church, about adopting her child. Connie wanted the Eberts to adopt her child because she thought they would be loving parents and because they shared her religious values. The Eberts agreed to the adoption. "Bruce" and Connie began a relationship in August 2006. At some point, Connie told Bruce that she was pregnant and was considering giving up the child for adoption. Bruce objected to the adoption. After a final attempt to repair their relationship, Bruce and Connie separated permanently in January 2007 and that was when Connie contacted the Eberts about her child. Before the child was born, the Eberts met with Bruce "to discuss a consent to adopt." In late December 2007, Bruce filed a complaint for custody of the child, "Timothy." In July 2008 the Eberts filed an adoption petition and intervened in Bruce's custody case. The superior court ordered paternity testing, and Bruce obtained a positive result. The court appointed counsel for Bruce and consolidated the adoption and custody cases. The superior court ordered an interim custody arrangement after a hearing in December 2008. The court granted physical custody to the Eberts and semiweekly visitation to Bruce. The court also ordered Bruce to pay $50 per month in child support, retroactive to 2007; over the next four months, Bruce paid a total of $200 in support. It was undisputed that Bruce paid no child support before being ordered to do so at a December 2008 hearing. He later testified that he did not realize he had a child support obligation and that the Eberts never applied to the Child Support Services Division for child support. Bruce claimed he was under the impression that the Eberts were wealthy and did not need his financial assistance. In May 2009 the superior court held a trial on the adoption petition and the custody dispute. In post-trial briefing, Bruce argued that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) compelled the court to grant Bruce custody of Timothy and prevented the Eberts from adopting Timothy without Bruce's consent. The Eberts argued that Bruce could not invoke ICWA to prevent the adoption because he was not a "parent" for purposes of the statute until he established paternity in late 2008. They also argued that ICWA section 1912(d)'s "active efforts" provision did not apply in a private adoption, particularly when the parent seeking to invoke ICWA had no meaningful connection to any tribe. And they maintained that, even if ICWA applied, the supervised visitation provided to Bruce was adequate to fulfill the active efforts requirement. Finally, they argued that Bruce's consent to the adoption was not required under state law because Bruce could not show that his failure to communicate with or support Timothy during the child's first year of life was justifiable. Connie, who continued to support the adoption, made arguments similar to the Eberts'. The Eberts and Connie appealed the superior court's denial of the adoption, claiming that Bruce's consent to the adoption was unnecessary. The Supreme Court found that under AS 25.23.050(a)(2)(B), the consent of a noncustodial parent was not required for adoption if that parent unjustifiably fails to support the child. But the superior court did not clearly err by concluding that Bruce had justifiable cause for his failure to support the child. View "Ebert v. Bruce L." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law, Native American Law
Chung v. Park
A landowner sued her neighbor for trespass, alleging that the neighbor cleared trees from the landowner’s property without permission. An expert witness hired by the landowner estimated that 562 trees were cleared from about a third of an acre of the property. He calculated that it would cost over $400,000 to restore the property to its former condition. But the neighbor's expert witness testified that the market value of the landowner's property was likely not affected by the removal of trees. After a bench trial in August 2013, the superior court found the neighbor liable for the trees removed from the property before September 27, 2008. The court determined there was insufficient evidence to find the neighbor liable for tree removal occurring after that date or for the burial of timber debris on the property. Although the court acknowledged that the landowner had not proved that the tree cutting reduced the value of her property and found that she had no reason personal for replacing the trees, it nevertheless concluded that “it would be reasonable both aesthetically and legally to award damages that would permit replacement of trees on that first portion of the lot that can be clearly shown to have been scraped clean as of September 27th, 2008.” The court therefore awarded the landowner the cost of replacing 50 trees, $23,500. Because the court found that the neighbor's trespass was not unintentional or involuntary, it awarded treble damages under AS 09.45.730. The neighbor appealed. "Ordinarily, a landowner damaged by a trespass may recover either the loss in property value or reasonable restoration costs. But restoration costs are inappropriate if they are disproportionate to the loss in property value, unless there is a reason personal to the landowner for restoring the land." In this case the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its estimation and vacated the award. View "Chung v. Park" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Real Estate & Property Law
In Re Adoption of S.F.
"Robert" appealed a superior court decision that his consent was not required for his biological daughter’s adoption. The superior court accepted the superior court standing master’s recommendation that Robert’s consent was not required under AS 25.23.050 because he had abandoned his daughter for a period of over six months, failed to provide for her care and support for over one year, and failed to meaningfully communicate with her for over one year. Because the abandonment finding was well-supported by the record, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In Re Adoption of S.F." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Alaska Div. of Workers’ Comp. v. Titan Enterprises, LLC
The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board fined an uninsured employers Titan Enterprises, LLC, Titan Topsoil, Inc. and CCO Enterprises (collectively, "Titan," all owned by Todd Christanson) a substantial amount because they had operated for a significant period of time without carrying statutorily required workers’ compensation insurance. On appeal, the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed part of the Board’s decision, but it reversed the Board on the amount of the fine and remanded the case to the Board for further proceedings. The employer then asked the Commission for an award of attorney’s fees as a successful party on appeal. The State, Division of Workers’ Compensation, which had initiated the Board proceedings, opposed the award on the basis that it, too, had been successful on a significant issue. The Commission awarded the employer full fees of approximately $50,000. The Division petitioned for review of the fee award, and the Supreme Court granted review. Because the Commission failed to consider the Division’s partial success in the appeal, it reversed the Commission’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alaska Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Titan Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law
Green v. Parks
Jason Green and Courtney Parks had a dispute over custody of their infant daughter. The superior court awarded joint legal custody but gave Courtney primary physical custody and the “final say” if the parties could not agree on issues of their child’s welfare. Jason appealed the court’s award of custody, a condition that he not consume any alcohol before or during visitation, and the order that he pay all visitation-related travel expenses. The Supreme Court affirmed the custody award and the allocation of visitation expenses, but remanded for reconsideration of whether the evidence supported the no-alcohol condition on Jason’s visitation. View "Green v. Parks" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Family Law
Garibay v. Alaska, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles
Joe Garibay was at the Sam's Club in Fairbanks when he collided with a woman’s shopping cart, waking her baby. She demanded an apology, but Garibay swore at her instead. Assuming he was drunk because of the beer in his cart and his threatening manner, the woman called the police, then followed Garibay out to the parking lot to get his license plate number. When a police officer arrived a few minutes later, the woman told him that Garibay was “maybe . . . a drunk,” that he had threatened her in front of her children, and that she wanted him charged with assault. Informed that an assault charge was unlikely, the woman asked that the police at least “find that guy to make sure he’s not drunk.” The officer assured her that they would try to find Garibay and “make sure he’s not, you know, drunk driving, something like that.” Police subsequently stopped him, then arrested him for driving under the influence of alcohol. The Department of Motor Vehicles revoked Garibay’s driver’s license for 90 days, and the superior court affirmed the revocation. Garibay appealed, arguing that the police stop constituted an unconstitutional search and seizure requiring that evidence of his drinking be excluded from the license revocation proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that the exclusionary rule applied in license revocation proceedings only in exceptional circumstances not present here. View "Garibay v. Alaska, Dept. of Administration, Division of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law
Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. v. Alder
Dillip Mullings owned a NAPA auto-parts store in Seward called Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. Mullings hired Dennis Alder to be the store manager, a position Alder held from 2006 to 2010, when he was terminated. Alder did not keep a time card, but it was undisputed that he typically worked from 6:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Monday through Friday. The extent of Alder’s overtime was not at issue on appeal; Mullings conceded that Alder worked over 40 hours a week. It was also undisputed that Alder was paid a salary and did not receive overtime pay. Once terminated, Alder sought unemployment compensation from the State. The Department of Wage and Hour determined that Alder was entitled to overtime pay, and attempted to negotiate a settlement on his behalf with Resurrection Bay. Alder later sued seeking overtime pay. The employer claimed the Alder was exempt from the overtime laws, but the superior court found he was not and awarded overtime pay and liquidated damages. The employer appealed. Because the employer failed to show that the manager satisfied all four requirements of the overtime laws’ exemption for executive employees, the Supreme Court affirmed the finding that the manager was owed overtime pay under Alaska and federal law. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the superior court’s award of liquidated damages, because the employer failed to carry his burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in good faith. View "Resurrection Bay Auto Parts, Inc. v. Alder" on Justia Law
Brewer v. Alaska
Major forest fires swept through areas south of Fairbanks in the summer of 2009 and approached properties owned by appellants (the landowners). Firefighters working under the direction of the State Department of Forestry intentionally set fire to the landowners’ vegetation. The burnouts deprived the advancing wildfires of fuel and saved the structures. But the landowners sued the State, bringing a takings claim under the eminent domain provision of the Alaska Constitution, article I, section 18, and tort claims for negligence and intentional misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the tort claims because of governmental immunity; it reversed its dismissal of the constitutional claim, remanding it to the superior court for further consideration of whether the specific exercise of the State’s police powers at issue here was justified by the doctrine of necessity. View "Brewer v. Alaska" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Real Estate & Property Law
Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council v. Wheeler
J.W. was the son of Jeanette Myre, a member of the Asa’carsarmiut Tribe, and John Wheeler, a non-member. In 2007 Myre petitioned the Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Court to assume jurisdiction over the custody of J.W. After a hearing in which both parents participated. The tribal court awarded Myre primary physical custody and granted Wheeler limited visitation rights. In 2011 Wheeler kept J.W. at the end of a visitation period, then initiated custody proceedings in Alaska superior court. Myre moved to enforce the 2007 tribal court custody order; the superior court found it to be a lawful custody order and returned J.W. to Myre’s custody. In 2012 Myre was arrested for child endangerment, and the State of Alaska assumed protective custody of J.W. Wheeler moved for modification of the custody order in the superior court. The Asa’carsarmiut Tribal Council intervened in the superior court proceeding to argue that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to modify the tribal court custody order. The superior court concluded it had modification jurisdiction and determined there had been substantially changed circumstances such that modification was in J.W.’s best interests. The superior court awarded Wheeler primary physical custody. Neither Wheeler nor Myre appealed the superior court’s decision, but the tribal council appealed, arguing that the superior court lacked modification jurisdiction. The narrow question before the Alaska Supreme Court was whether the tribal council has standing to appeal the superior court’s modification decision in light of the parents’ election not to appeal that decision. Concluding that under this circumstance, the tribal council did not have standing, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. View "Asa'carsarmiut Tribal Council v. Wheeler" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Family Law
Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge
A pilot who worked at a remote fishing lodge filed a claim under the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) for unpaid overtime wages. The Superior Court concluded that the pilot was a "professional employee" who was exempt from the overtime requirement. But the legislature amended AWHA in 2005 to adopt the federal definition of this exemption. The federal definition restricted the exemption to employees in "professions where specialized academic training is a standard prerequisite." Applying this definition, the Supreme Court concluded that the pilot was not exempt under AWHA and reversed. View "Moody v. Royal Wolf Lodge" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law