Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Chloe W. appealed the termination of parental rights to her three-year-old son Timothy under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). She claimed the trial court erred by: (1) relying too heavily on a stipulation filed after the close of evidence, which Chloe argued was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) finding that Chloe had not remedied the conduct that placed Timothy at risk; (3) finding that OCS made active efforts to reunify the family; and (4) finding that terminating Chloe’s parental rights was in Timothy’s best interests. Because the trial court’s findings are amply supported by the record and its legal rulings are correct, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating Chloe’s parental rights to Timothy. View "Chloe W. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Richard and Olga Villars were married in Ukraine in 2004. Richard (a U.S. citizen), signed a Form I-864 affidavit of support in which he agreed to maintain Olga and her daughter, Linda, at 125% of the applicable federal poverty rate. Olga and Linda came to Alaska, and Richard and Olga later divorced. For several years Richard and Olga litigated Richard’s I-864 support obligation. After a previous appeal by Olga regarding Richard’s obligation for the first eleven months of 2010, the Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court to resolve Richard’s obligation for that period, which was no longer at issue. The parties have continued to dispute Richard’s I-864 obligations for 2009, December 2010, and all of 2011, 2012, and 2013. Following a series of hearings and orders in the superior court relating to these years, Richard filed this appeal, alleging a variety of errors by the superior court regarding its calculations of his obligations and potential offsets against those obligations. Because the superior court properly rejected Richard’s attempt to relitigate issues resolved in earlier proceedings, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s orders rejecting those claims. The case was remanded for further factual findings. View "Villars v. Villars" on Justia Law

In 1992, Robert Farmer and his wife, Kathy, bought Wolverine Lodge in Glennallen from Peggy Jo Watson. The purchase price of $365,000 was secured by a deed of trust on the property. Farmer defaulted on the mortgage for the first time in 1996, but he cured before the foreclosure sale occurred. In 2012 Farmer defaulted again. Farmer was almost five months late on the payments, had not paid the real estate taxes or room taxes, and had no insurance on the property. Watson paid all of these expenses herself in order to keep the property up-to-date and insured. She testified that "Farmer promised many times that he would bring the loan current and obtain insurance,” but “[h]e never did." In March 2012 Watson commenced nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Watson’s attorney recorded a notice of default and a notice of sale, and distributed them to Farmer by mail and personal service. Notice of the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was published in the Alaska Journal of Commerce and posted at various locations in Anchorage. The nonjudicial foreclosure sale was postponed six times. It was initially set for July 25, but Watson postponed it until August 29. On August 28 Farmer filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and Watson again postponed the sale, this time at Farmer’s request, until September 26. Because of the ensuing automatic bankruptcy stay, the sale was postponed until October 31, then until November 28, then again until December 19, and finally until December 27, when the sale actually took place. Watson’s attorney was the only attendee at each of the scheduled sales. Each of these postponements was announced publicly on the sale date, and the trustee signed the notice of postponement every time. Farmer was not otherwise notified of any of the postponements, and, at the time of the actual sale, he alleged that neither "[he], [his] wife, nor [his] bankruptcy attorney knew . . . that a deed of trust foreclosure sale was scheduled for December 27, 2012." Farmer argued that equity required re-notice after each postponement and that the lack of re-notice violated his due process rights. The superior court granted summary judgment to Watson. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: equity does not require re-notice after postponement of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale and notice of a postponement by public announcement satisfies due process. View "Farmer v. Alaska USA Title Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Fred Becker V, a loss prevention manager employed by Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., was terminated in 2012. He sued his former employer, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful termination. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Fred Meyer, concluding: (1) that Fred Meyer’s loss prevention policy manual did not create a contract between Becker and Fred Meyer and Becker’s employment was terminable at will; and (2) Becker had presented no evidence that he was treated differently from similarly situated employees with respect to the good faith and fair dealing claim. But because the record presented genuine issues of material fact regarding both claims, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment ruling. View "Becker v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

A mother appealed a modified decree involving the custody of her three children. The superior court decided that the parents’ inability to communicate justified a modification of the existing joint-custody arrangement, and that the best interests of the children favored an award of sole legal custody to their father. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in making these decisions. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the allocation of the costs of the court-appointed guardian ad litem. The case was remanded for the superior court’s clarification of one issue: whether it meant to include, in its final modified decree, a change to the father’s weekend visitation schedule made by the attorney who drafted the decree. View "Riggs v. Coonradt" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether an employee was entitled to temporary total disability benefits after he left employment under disputed circumstances. The employee injured his back at work but returned after being cleared for lighter duty. His employment soon ended (for reasons the parties dispute), and he moved with his family to Nevada, where he later had back surgery. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board found his injury compensable and ordered the employer to pay medical costs and disability benefits from the surgery onward; however, the Board denied temporary total disability benefits from the end of his employment to the surgery, finding the employee had voluntarily left his job for reasons that were not injury-related. The employee appealed to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission, which affirmed the decision on disability but remanded to the Board for clarification of its attorney’s fees award. The employee appealed the Commission’s decision regarding temporary total disability benefits and its denial of his request for attorney’s fees for the appeal. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision that the employee was not entitled to temporary total disability benefits, reversed its denial of attorney’s fees for the appeal, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Humphrey v. Lowe's Home Improvement Warehouse, Inc." on Justia Law

The superior court ordered that divorced parents each claim one of their two children for the federal income tax dependency exemption. Both children resided primarily with the mother, and the court ordered her to sign and file a federal form waiving her exemption for one child. The mother appealed, arguing the superior court lacked authority to order her to sign the waiver form. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the majority view that a custodial parent may be ordered to sign the waiver form, and affirmed the court’s order. View "Dodge v. Sturdevant" on Justia Law

In 2008, four years after appellants Ramona Christensen and Jack Scott purchased a new car, it collided with two moose on the Parks Highway. After the collision Christensen called the police to report the accident and called Scott to come pick her up at the scene. When Scott arrived Christensen said she felt nauseated, and Scott noticed a red mark on her forehead. Christensen could not remember many details of the collision, including whether she hit her head on something inside the car. During the days following the accident, Christensen reported feeling light-headed and dizzy. Christensen’s speech became disfluent and broken, and her gait became unsteady, causing her to fall repeatedly. About one week after the accident, Christensen sought medical attention to address her worsening symptoms. A neurologist examined Christensen and ordered an MRI spectroscopy. The spectroscopy showed evidence of bilateral frontal lobe brain damage. Since 2008 numerous other physicians and psychiatrists have examined and treated Christensen for her continuing speech, short-term memory, and mobility problems. The couple sued the car dealership for product liability, alleging that the car’s seat belt failed to restrain the driver in the accident. The superior court granted summary judgment to the dealership, concluding that "no reasonable jury could find that the Plaintiffs have proven that the seat belt . . . was defective." The couple appealed, arguing that the superior court applied an incorrect summary judgment standard and that genuine issues of material fact made summary judgment inappropriate. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the couple raised genuine issues of material fact regarding a seat belt defect and causation of the driver’s injury, it reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Service, Inc." on Justia Law

Jamie and Anna They stopped using drugs when they realized Anna was pregnant with their son Ian, but after the birth they went back to abusing drugs and alcohol, with periods of sobriety. Although Ian lived with his parents during his early years, by the time he was four, he and his two non-party siblings were living with Ian’s grandmother in Oklahoma while his parents lived elsewhere. According to Jamie, Ian was exposed to domestic violence by Jamie’s brother during that time. Jamie, Anna, and Ian moved to Alaska in 2004. Once in Alaska, Jamie and Anna had three more children. The couple’s relationship was chaotic and physically abusive, and apparently they were separated at the time of trial. All four children have special needs.The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) sought termination of Jamie’s, but not Anna’s, parental rights to Ian. In closing argument, Jamie asserted that termination of his parental rights was not in Ian’s best interests because OCS had not identified any permanent placement. But the superior court did not specifically address this issue in its findings when it ordered the termination of Jamie’s parental rights. Jamie appealed, arguing that the termination should be vacated because the decision does not clearly state that termination of Jamie’s parental rights was for purposes of freeing Ian for adoption or other permanent placement. The Supreme Court concluded that given the facts and circumstances of this case, the superior court did not err when it found that termination was in Ian’s best interests. View "Jamie H. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Graham R. and Jane S. had one child. A 2006 court order granted Graham sole legal and primary physical custody. In 2012 Graham traveled to California for heart surgery and took the child with him, cutting off contact with Jane and causing her to miss a number of scheduled visits. When Graham returned to Alaska Jane moved for sole legal and primary physical custody, and the superior court granted her motion after an evidentiary hearing. Graham appealed that order, arguing that it was barred by principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel; that the court erred in finding that his interference with Jane’s visitation rights was an act of domestic violence that constituted changed circumstances; and that the court erred in admitting evidence of his criminal convictions and of the child’s preferences. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s order modifying custody, concluding that there was no error in its decision not to apply res judicata or collateral estoppel; that there were changed circumstances justifying a modification of custody; and that any evidentiary errors were harmless. View "Graham R. v. Jane S." on Justia Law