Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case began in July 2008 when the Alaska Office of Children's Services (OCS) assumed custody of four-month-old "Dawn" from her parents. Dawn was found to be a child in need of aid (CINA). Dawn's parents were Native Alaskans and thus the protections and requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) applied. Native Village of Tununak (the Tribe) intervened in Dawn's CINA case and submitted a list of potential placement options for Dawn, including Dawn's maternal grandmother, Elise, who lived in the village. Throughout much of the case, the parents and Tribe agreed there was good cause not to place Dawn with an ICWA preferred placement, and Dawn was eventually placed with the Smiths, non-Native foster parents who live in Anchorage. The superior court terminated Dawn's parents' parental rights at a September 2011 trial, making Dawn eligible for adoption. The Tribe asserted that, given the termination of parental rights, there was no longer good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and objected to Dawn's continued placement in Anchorage. In November the Smiths filed a petition to adopt Dawn. At no point in the case did Elise file an adoption petition in the superior court. The superior court conducted a placement hearing following the Tribe's objection to placement with the Smiths. Following testimony by a number of witnesses, including Elise, the court found that there was continued good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences and again approved Dawn's placement with the Smiths. The court then granted the Smiths' adoption petition in March 2012. Dawn was almost four years old, and had lived with the Smiths for almost two and a half years. In separate appeals, the Tribe appealed both the superior court's order finding that there was good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences and the adoption order. The Supreme Court then issued an order staying the adoption appeal while it considered the adoptive placement appeal. In 2013, the Court issued a decision in the first appeal that examined Dawn's adoptive placement with the Smiths. The Court reversed the superior court's finding of good cause to deviate from ICWA's placement preferences. Four days after the Alaska Court issued its opinion in the adoptive placement appeal ("Tununak I"), the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl" (Baby Girl). There, the Supreme Court held that ICWA "section 1915(a)'s [placement] preferences are inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no 'preference' to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under section 1915(a) has come forward." The Alaska Court concluded that the decision in "Baby Girl" applied directly to the adoptive placement case on remand and to this adoption appeal. "We discern no material factual differences between the Baby Girl case and this case, so we are unable to distinguish the holding in Baby Girl. Because the Supreme Court's holding in Baby Girl is clear and not qualified in any material way, and because it is undisputed that Elise did not 'formally [seek] to adopt' Dawn in the superior court, we conclude that, as in Baby Girl, 'there simply is no 'preference' to apply[,] [as] no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward[,]' and therefore ICWA . . .preferences are inapplicable." The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's order granting the Smiths' petition to adopt Dawn and vacated its remand order in "Tununak I" requiring the superior court to conduct further adoptive placement proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska, Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Neighbor and owner of property near the Palmer Municipal Airport brought an inverse condemnation claim against the City of Palmer, arguing that the airport operation diminished his property value. The superior court entered summary judgment for the City of Palmer because the property owner failed to submit any expert testimony regarding damages. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court's decision because Alaska law permits property owners to testify about their opinion of the property's value before and after an alleged taking. View "Briggs v. City of Palmer" on Justia Law

Upon dissolution of their marriage, father Gary Houston and mother Meredith Wolpert, agreed to give primary custody to the mother and "open and liberal visitation" to the father. The father moved for modification of custody, alleging the mother had unreasonably restricted his visitation. The superior court found the mother had been uncooperative, but concluded it was in the best interests of the child to remain in the mother's custody with a specific visitation schedule for the father. The father appealed that decision, arguing the superior court abused its discretion when it did not award him custody. He also appealed the superior court's denial of his motion for attorney's fees and costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded there was no abuse of discretion in the custody decision, but the Court remanded the issue of attorney's fees for further findings. View "Houston v. Wolpert" on Justia Law

Through a prisoner grievance process, William Osborne unsuccessfully challenged the Department of Correction's (DOC) calculation of his sentence. Afterward, he filed an administrative appeal in superior court. Osborne argued the DOC incorrectly computed his sentence following a parole revocation - failing to credit time he spent in custody pending the revocation proceedings. The superior court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Alaska Supreme Court has previously held that the superior court did not have jurisdiction to consider such an appeal: the superior court lacks statutory appellate jurisdiction to review DOC grievance decisions, and an exception allowing the superior court to review alleged constitutional violations did not apply because the prisoner grievance process is not sufficiently adjudicative and does not produce a record capable of review. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's dismissal of Osborne's appeal. View "Osborne v. Alaska, Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

A worker was left a paraplegic after a 1976 work-related motor vehicle accident. He suffered a number of medical complications related to his injuries. In 2007, his employer controverted some aspects of his medical care, and he filed a written workers’ compensation claim. Shortly before the hearing on the claim, the employer withdrew most of its controversions. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board decided that some of the controversions were frivolous, unfair, or in bad faith. It imposed a statutory penalty and reported its findings about frivolous or unfair controversions to the Alaska Division of Insurance. The employer appealed, and the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission reversed the Board in part, deciding as a matter of law that the Board could not impose a penalty for some of the controversions. The Commission decided that other appeal points were moot. The worker appeals the Commission’s decision reversing the penalties and some attorney’s fees; the employer cross-appeals the Commission’s decisions about preservation of the controversion issues and mootness. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision that the controversion issue was properly before the Board, but reversed regarding the penalties issue. View "Harris v. M-K Rivers" on Justia Law

Williams Alaska Petroleum owned and operated a refinery, which ConocoPhillips Alaska supplied with crude oil. ConocoPhillips demanded that Williams tender a payment of $31 million as adequate assurances of Williams’s ability to perform if an ongoing administrative rate-making process resulted in a large retroactive increase in payments that Williams would owe ConocoPhillips under the Exchange Agreement. ConocoPhillips offered to credit Williams with a certain rate of interest on that principal payment against a future retroactive invoice. Williams transferred the principal of $31 million but demanded, among other terms, credit corresponding to a higher rate of interest. Williams stated that acceptance and retention of the funds would constitute acceptance of all of its terms. ConocoPhillips received and retained the funds, rejecting only one particular term in Williams’s latest offer but remaining silent as to which rate of interest would apply. Years later, after the conclusion of the regulatory process, ConocoPhillips invoiced Williams retroactively pursuant to their agreement. ConocoPhillips credited Williams for the $31 million principal already paid as well as $5 million in interest calculated using the lower of the two interest rates. Williams sued ConocoPhillips, arguing that a contract had been formed for the higher rate of interest and that it was therefore owed a credit for $10 million in interest on the $31 million principal. The superior court initially ruled for Williams, concluding that a contract for the higher rate of interest had formed under the Uniform Commercial Code when ConocoPhillips retained the $31 million while rejecting one offered term but voiced no objection to Williams’s specified interest term. On reconsideration, the superior court again ruled for Williams, this time determining that a contract for the higher rate of interest had formed based on the behavior of the parties after negotiation under the UCC, or, in the alternative, that Williams was entitled to a credit for a different, third rate of interest in quantum meruit. The superior court also ruled in favor of Williams on all issues related to attorney’s fees and court costs. ConocoPhillips and Williams both appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court was right the first time and that the parties entered into a contract for the higher rate of interest under the UCC.View "ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. v. Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

The father appealed the court’s determination of his child support obligations, its factual findings regarding child custody and visitation, its valuation and division of the marital estate, its denial of attorney’s fees, and its denial of a continuance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed on all issues. View "Limeres v. Limeres" on Justia Law

In January 2011, the Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS) took emergency custody of three children. The children had been in the care of their maternal grandparents, but before their removal had returned to their parents. OCS, under the impression that the children were being cared for by the parents at the time of removal, placed the children with the maternal grandparents. The day the trial to terminate the mother’s parental rights was to begin, the mother moved to have the grandmother joined in the proceeding as the children’s Indian custodian. The court denied both the mother’s motion to join the grandmother and the grandmother’s motion to intervene, finding that shortly after the removal the parents revoked the grandmother’s Indian custodian status by asking OCS not to place the children with her. The grandmother moved for reconsideration and argued that her due process rights were violated at the time of the removal. She argued that OCS did not provide her with notice of the right she was entitled to as the children’s Indian custodian, including notice of her right to intervene in the proceeding and of her right to be represented by counsel. The trial court rejected this argument, finding that although OCS breached its duty to provide the grandmother with notice required by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), because of the short time between the children’s removal and the parents’ revocation of the grandmother’s status as the children’s Indian custodian the grandmother had suffered no significant detriment to her rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and held that any error OCS may have made regarding the notice provisions of ICWA was harmless. View "Molly O. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Cody Lee and Stacey Dean (collectively, "Lee") and Barbara Konrad disputed a boundary between their lots in an Anchorage subdivision. Lee insisted that the boundary line was established by a 1992 survey, which Lee later marked with fence posts. Konrad argued that a survey she commissioned after purchasing her lot in 2008 disclosed the true boundary and that encroachment of fill material caused by Lee along the fenceline between the lots was a trespass. The superior court concluded that Konrad’s survey correctly identified the boundary line and that the fill material encroachment was a trespass. The court issued an order requiring Lee to remove the fill material and erect a retaining barrier to prevent future trespass; it declared Konrad the prevailing party and awarded attorney’s fees. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review were: (1) whether the superior court correctly determined the boundary between the lots; (2) whether the court erred by concluding that dirt and gravel encroaching onto Konrad’s property was a trespass; and (3) whether the court’s attorney’s fees award was an abuse of discretion. The Court concluded: (1) that because Lee and Konrad’s predecessors agreed to the boundary established by the 1992 survey, and marked that boundary with fence posts in 1999, the boundary between the lots was established by acquiescence; (2) the superior court correctly found that the fill material encroaching onto Konrad’s property after she purchased her lot was a trespass, but erred by ordering Lee to remove fill material that encroached onto the property before Konrad purchased it because this fill material was not a trespass as to Konrad; and (3) it was an abuse of discretion to order Lee to pay for construction of a retaining wall to prevent future encroachment. The Court vacated the award of attorney’s fees and remanded for redetermination of prevailing-party status and recalculation of attorney’s fees. View "Lee v. Konrad" on Justia Law

Sherry R. appealed the termination of her parental rights to her son Jake. She argued in appeal that the superior court’s erred in finding: (1) she failed to remedy the conduct that made Jake a child in need of aid (CINA); (2) the State of Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, Office of Children’s Services (OCS) made reasonable efforts to reunify her with Jake; and (3) termination of her parental rights was in Jake’s best interests. Finding that the record amply supported the superior court’s decision to terminate Sherry’s parental rights, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sherry R. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law