Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Maxwell V. sued for custody of Terrance, the son he had with Stephanie W. The superior court granted him primary physical custody and joint legal custody. The Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed the first custody order in most respects, but remanded on two custody factors. On remand, the superior court again granted Maxwell primary physical custody. Stephanie appealed the second custody order. Two of her arguments, relating to discovery, were not preserved for appeal, were forfeited, and did not constitute plain error. The Supreme Court concluded Stephanie's third argument failed on the merits. She also challenged the superior court’s determination of two custody factors in light of the Supreme Court's remand instructions in first custody proceeding, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to consider Maxwell’s child support arrears in its stability determination, and that the superior court abused its discretion by holding against her, in the continuing-relationship determination, her allegations that Maxwell was manufacturing methamphetamine with Terrance present. The Supreme Court rejected Stephanie's additional arguments and affirmed the superior court's order in all respects. View "Stephanie W. v. Maxwell V." on Justia Law

A patient at a health clinic learned that a clinic employee, who was not authorized to access the patient’s medical record, had discussed the patient’s pregnancy with a clerical worker at the clinic. The patient complained to a supervisor, accusing the clinic employee of breaching medical confidentiality. Shortly afterward, the clinic operator fired the employee, citing a breach of confidentiality. The employee then sued the patient for defamation. The patient counterclaimed for invasion of privacy and abuse of process, the latter claim being based on the employee’s filing and withdrawing an earlier petition for a protective order. At some point the clinic investigated the patient’s complaint and determined that it was unsubstantiated. It was later revealed that the patient herself was the source of the employee’s knowledge about the patient’s pregnancy. At trial the patient claimed that she had an absolute privilege to accuse the employee of breaching medical confidentiality. The superior court rejected that argument and determined that the patient had only a conditional privilege. The superior court also denied the patient’s motion for summary judgment and made several challenged evidentiary rulings. After a three-day jury trial, the superior court granted a directed verdict on the patient’s abuse-of-process counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict for the employee on her defamation claim, awarding one dollar in nominal damages; the jury rejected the patient’s counterclaim of invasion of privacy. Finding the employee to be the prevailing party, the superior court awarded her partial attorney’s fees. The patient appealed the superior court’s ruling on conditional privilege, its denial of her motion for summary judgment, and its evidentiary rulings. She also argued the trial court erred in giving jury instructions, in its decision to grant a directed verdict on her abuse-of-process counterclaim, and in its award of attorney’s fees to the employee. She claimed various violations of her state and federal constitutional rights. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court did not err in any of its legal or evidentiary rulings or in its instructions to the jury, and it therefore affirmed the superior court in all respects. View "Greene v. Tinker" on Justia Law

Clifton Tweedy leased property from the Matanuska-Susitna Borough since May 1988. The property included a house that was built in 1968 and located less than 18 feet from the lakeshore. When Tweedy assumed the lease, the existing structure was exempt from the Borough’s 75-foot shoreline setback ordinance because it was constructed before any setback requirement existed. Shortly after he took possession of the property, Tweedy added a stairwell on the exterior of the house. In 2010 Tweedy applied with the Borough to purchase the property. Because structures on the property were located less than 75 feet from the shoreline, the sale required an exemption from the Borough’s setback requirement. The Borough Planning Director determined that Tweedy’s addition was unlawful and that the application could not be processed until Tweedy removed it. The Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment Appeals affirmed the Planning Director’s decision. Tweedy appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals" on Justia Law

The issues before the Supreme Court in this case arose from an attorney fee dispute arbitration conducted under the state Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. The two primary issues related to the appropriate standard of review when a party asserts an arbitration decision was procured by fraud and the possible application of non-statutory public policy grounds to vacate an arbitration award. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the federal standard for reviewing claims where an arbitration decision was procured by fraud, and concluded the arbitration panel’s decision that there was no fraud was not reviewable. Furthermore, the Court concluded that on the facts found by the arbitration panel, there was no basis to vacate the arbitration decision on public policy grounds. View "McAlpine v. Priddle" on Justia Law

When Appellant Todd Christianson was sued by a former employee for severe personal injuries suffered while working for appellant's landscaping business, appellant tendered his defense to his general liability insurer. It did not accept his tender - instead, it sent him a letter that told him he should defend himself, noting an exclusion for claims of employees. Appellant then began to incur defense expenses. No insurer on the policies obtained by appellant's insurance broker, Conrad-Houston Insurance (CHI), ever defended him in the lawsuit. Nearly four years after receiving the insurer’s letter, appellant sued CHI for malpractice. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the superior court applied the discovery rule and dismissed the malpractice lawsuit because it was filed after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had run. The superior court ruled that because the insurer’s letter put appellant on notice he might have a claim against CHI, the statute of limitations had begun to run more than three years before appellant sued CHI. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court.View "Christianson v. Conrad-Houston Insurance" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the assessed value of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System for property tax purposes. The parties disputed the method used to assess the pipeline's value as well as the specific deductions made for functional and economic obsolescence. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's valuation. View "BP Pipelines (Alaska) Inc. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

In 2009 Elisabeth Bachmeier defaulted on a loan secured by a deed of trust against her home, and a nonjudicial foreclosure was initiated. Bachmeier requested a reinstatement quote in order to halt the foreclosure. Alaska Trustee, the trustee under the deed of trust, replied with a quote which included foreclosure costs that were not attorney's fees or court costs, the only items the foreclosure statute expressly mentions as recoverable in a reinstatement amount. Bachmeier brought suit against Alaska Trustee, Routh Crabtree Olsen (the law firm aiding in the foreclosure), and Richard Ullstrom (an attorney employed by Routh Crabtree Olsen), alleging that the inclusion of the disputed foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and was a deceptive practice in violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). Bachmeier also argued that her deed of trust did not provide that all foreclosure costs could be recovered in the reinstatement amount. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The superior court concluded that the inclusion of the foreclosure costs violated the foreclosure statute and that the UTPA applied to nonjudicial foreclosures. Alaska Trustee appealed. The Supreme Court granted review to determine: (1) the scope of permissible charges to be included in the reinstatement amount given to homeowners facing nonjudicial foreclosure under AS 34.20.070(b); and (2) whether the UTPA applied to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. The Court held that because the beneficiary of a deed of trust has a right to be returned to its status quo ante when the borrower reinstates after a default, Alaska Trustee could include in Bachmeier's reinstatement amount all reasonable costs it incurred pursuing the foreclosure under the foreclosure statute, regardless of whether Bachmeier's deed of trust specifically provided for the inclusion of such costs. Furthermore, the Court held that the UTPA did not apply to nonjudicial deed of trust foreclosures. View "Alaska Trustee, LLC v. Bachmeier" on Justia Law

In 2010 the Alaska Judicial Council recommended that the electorate not retain a sitting district court judge. Susan Kruse and a handful of other voters1 challenged the constitutionality of AS 22.15.195, which granted the Council power to make such recommendations. The superior court concluded that the statute was constitutional but enjoined the Council from releasing new information about the judge in the 60 days prior to an election. On appeal, the Supreme Court also found that AS 22.15.195 was constitutional and does not limit the Council's dissemination of new information. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's ruling in part but reversed and vacated the superior court's injunction prohibiting the Council's public dissemination of new information in the 60 days preceding an election. View "Alaska Judicial Council v. Kruse" on Justia Law

The Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Employment Security (the Division) determined that Leo Blas committed fraud when he failed to report that he worked and traveled during weeks he claimed and received unemployment benefits. Blas presented no contrary evidence disputing these findings and this conclusion. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's decision to uphold the Division's decision to reduce and deny Blas' receipt of unemployment benefits and to disqualify him from receiving benefits for 52 weeks. View "Blas v. Alaska, Dept. of Labor" on Justia Law

Linda Moffitt filed suit as her mother's guardian and conservator and the successor trustee of her parents' living trusts, seeking to rescind or reform a deed they executed in 1995 and a contract they signed in 1998. The superior court dismissed Linda's claims, concluding that the statutes of limitations had run before Linda filed her lawsuit in 2005. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on whether the superior court properly applied the statutes of limitations. The Supreme Court concluded that Linda's mostly equitable claims were subject to the defense of laches, and the statutes of limitations did not apply to these claims. View "Moffitt v. Moffitt" on Justia Law