Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lennie Lane appealed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment against him in a personal injury case. The superior court applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to find that Lane's criminal conviction for assaulting Annie Ballot established that he was liable to her in tort. Lane challenged the sufficiency of the of the evidence of his criminal conviction, and the application of collateral estoppel, arguing: (1) his conviction was not final because it was on appeal at the time the court relied on it; and (2) the verdict against him, "guilty but mentally ill," was not sufficient to establish the elements of the crime of which he was convicted. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lane v. Ballot" on Justia Law

The Department of Administration, Division of General Services accepted a 15-page response to a request for proposals for renovations to the Governor's House. The request stated that responses should not exceed 10 pages. Competing bidder Silver Bow Construction Construction argued this variance from the request obligated the Division to reject the 15-page response. Because the Division reasonably concluded that this variance did not give the 15-page response any substantial advantage, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decision to uphold the Division’s decision to accept this response.View "Silver Bow Construction v. Alaska Dept. of Administration" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied a death benefit claim filed by the decedent's same-sex partner because the death benefit statute grants benefits only to a worker’s "widow or widower" as defined by statute. The Board construed these terms by applying the Marriage Amendment to the Alaska Constitution, which defined marriage as "only between one man and one woman," thus excluding a decedent's same-sex partner. Because this exclusion lacked a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that this restriction on the statutory definition of "widow" violated the surviving partner's right to equal protection under the law. View "Harris v. Millennium Hotel" on Justia Law

The superior court terminated a mother's parental rights based on evidence of her chronic delusions and the danger these delusions posed to her child. On appeal, the mother argued that several aspects of the court's decision were not adequately supported. Namely, she argues that the Office of Children's Services (OCS) should have required an assessment of her psychiatric condition and monitored the course of her psychological therapy. The Supreme Court's review of the record revealed that the mother did receive a psychiatric evaluation at OCS's direction and that it would likely have been harmful to disrupt the positive relationship she had with her counselor. Therefore, the Court concluded that the record supported the superior court's conclusion that OCS fulfilled its duty to make active efforts to provide this mother with services designed to prevent the breakup of her family. View "Grace L. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

The Minto Tribal Court terminated the parental rights of Edward Parks and Bessie Stearman to their daughter S.P. At the termination hearing, the attorney for Parks and Stearman was not permitted to present oral argument to the tribal court. Parks did not file an appeal with the Minto Court of Appeals and instead brought suit against S.P.'s foster parents, the Simmondses, in the state superior court in an attempt to regain custody of S.P. The Simmondses moved to dismiss Parks's state lawsuit on the basis that the tribal court judgment terminating parental rights was entitled to full faith and credit under the Indian Child Welfare Act. The superior court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that full faith and credit should not be afforded because the tribal court had denied Parks minimum due process by prohibiting his attorney from presenting oral argument on his objections to tribal court jurisdiction based on his status as a non-tribal member. Although the superior court recognized that oral argument is not a per se requirement of minimum due process, the superior court concluded that the denial of oral argument in this case deprived Parks of a meaningful opportunity to be heard because Parks did not receive sufficient notice that his attorney would not be allowed to present oral argument to the tribal court. The Simmondses appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the superior court for further findings. On remand, the superior court reiterated its prior conclusion of a violation of minimum due process and further concluded that the due process error was not harmless because Parks's objections to the Minto Tribal Court's jurisdiction might have had merit. The Simmondses appealed again to the Supreme Court. Because Parks failed to exhaust his remedies in the Minto Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that his state court suit should have been dismissed. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for dismissal of Parks's suit. View "Simmonds v. Parks" on Justia Law

Schlumberger Limited conducts its business in Alaska through a wholly owned subsidiary, Schlumberger Technology Corporation. Schlumberger Technology's primary business is oilfield services, but it also owns all of Schlumberger Limited's associated companies incorporated in the United States and operates all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic businesses. Schlumberger Technology files a consolidated federal tax return for all of Schlumberger Limited’s domestic subsidiaries. For tax years 1998-2000, Schlumberger Technology filed Alaska corporate income tax returns that included only the domestic subsidiaries working in the oilfield services business. In September 2003, a Department of Revenue auditor concluded that Schlumberger Limited was engaged in a unitary business with Schlumberger Technology. Based on these conclusions, the Department issued a notice of assessment for additional corporate income taxes of $429,739 plus interest. Schlumberger Technology argued on appeal of the assessment that under the Internal Revenue Code, domestic corporations were taxed on their worldwide income, but entitled to claim a tax credit against their United States income tax liability for taxes paid to foreign countries. Foreign corporations, on the other hand, are taxed differently. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the application of Alaska's Net Income Tax Act (ANITA). ANITA incorporates certain provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, unless the federal provisions are "excepted to or modified by other provisions" of the act. ANITA required a corporation to report its income and the income of certain affiliates and to exclude "80 percent of dividend income received from foreign corporations." The Internal Revenue Code had a different formula; it required a foreign corporation to report only income "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States." Schlumberger Technology argued that since ANITA has no explicit exception for Internal Revenue Code (section 882), this sourcing rule was incorporated by reference. Thus, Schlumberger Technology argued that the foreign dividends paid to Schlumberger Limited should not have been included in its taxable income under ANITA. In response, the State argued that the provisions of ANITA applied to all business income of the taxpayer, not just income derived from sources in the United States. Upon review of the matter, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the Internal Revenue Code provision in question here was not adopted by reference because it was inconsistent with the formula provided by ANITA. The Court affirmed the decision of the Department of Revenue. View "Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Five voters owned homes in a borough and a home outside that borough. Two of the voters voted in the borough's 2010 election. All five voted in the borough's 2011 election. Although each voter was registered to vote, the borough's canvassing committee rejected the voters' ballots in each election on the ground that they were not borough residents. The voters appealed to the superior court and brought direct claims against the borough and a number of borough officials in their official and individual capacities. The court ruled that the voters were borough residents and legally qualified to vote in the 2010 and 2011 borough elections, and that the voters were to remain eligible to vote in future borough elections absent substantial changes in circumstances. The court denied the voters full reasonable attorney fees against the borough under AS 09.60.010(c), concluding that they did not bring constitutional claims, but awarded them partial attorney fees under Alaska Civil Rule 82. The borough appealed the residency determinations and the voters appealed the attorney fees awards. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decisions that the voters were borough residents and eligible to vote in the 2010 and 2011 borough elections, but vacated the order that the voters were automatically eligible to vote in future elections. The Court reversed the superior court's determination that the voters did not bring constitutional claims covered by AS 09.60.010(c), and remanded the case on the fee issue. View "Lake & Peninsula Borough Assembly v. Oberlatz" on Justia Law

Hiland Mountain Correctional Center inmate, Doctor Suzette Welton filed three appeals over the dismissal of her administrative appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In all three cases, Welton appealed decisions in Department of Corrections (DOC) grievance proceedings. In order to qualify for the administrative appeal procedure, Welton had to show that: (1) she was alleging a violation of her constitutional rights; that (2) the proceeding was adjudicative in nature; and (3) she produced a record capable of appellate review. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the superior courts that the underlying DOC grievance proceedings were not adjudicative proceedings, and they did not produce a record capable of appellate review. View "Welton v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A court granted a default divorce to Amie Sey after her husband Willie Jackson, who was incarcerated at the time, failed to appear telephonically at a hearing. Jackson filed a motion for relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), arguing that Sey had made misrepresentations and withheld information about marital property. The court allowed Jackson to conduct discovery in support of the motion, but it later dismissed the motion for lack of prosecution. The court also determined that the time to appeal or to request Rule 60(b) relief was long past. Jackson appealed, making several challenges to the underlying divorce decree. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of Jackson’s Rule 60(b) motion and remanded the case for consideration of its merits. View "Jackson v. Sey" on Justia Law

Ed and Kristina B. had one son before they separated. The superior court heard evidence about domestic violence on Ed’s part and Kristina’s medical and substance-abuse issues. The court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of the child to Ed. Kristina appealed many of the court’s findings of fact and legal rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the superior court for reconsideration of: (1) whether Kristina’s child support obligation should be reduced to reflect the significant cost of her court-ordered urinalysis testing; and (2) whether the restrictive visitation schedule was justified once Kristina has demonstrated a history of sobriety. The Court affirmed with respect to all other issues. View "Kristina B. v. Edward B." on Justia Law