Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Daniel Brown was a City of Kenai employee who was accused of sexual harassment of female employees at the Kenai Recreation Center. But after a termination hearing, the Personnel Board of the City of Kenai stated that the basis for Brown’s termination was not sexual harassment but rather misconduct. Brown argued on appeal of that decision that the Board violated his right to due process by terminating him for misconduct without finding that he had committed the underlying acts of sexual harassment. He also argued that his termination violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court concluded that the Board had an adequate basis for its decision and that Brown’s termination did not violate the implied covenant of good faith or his right to due process. View "Brown v. City of Kenai, Personnel Board" on Justia Law

In 2008, Ekaterina Pouzanova drove past a stop sign and into an intersection in Anchorage and was broad-sided by a vehicle driven by Kuuipo Morton. Morton went to the emergency room and was diagnosed with lower back pain and a possible compression fracture. She continued to complain of pain in her back and neck in the months that followed, and she received some additional treatment for these complaints. Pouzanova did not contest liability for the accident, but she did dispute the extent of Morton’s injuries. Morton sued in district court for non-economic and punitive damages. She initially included claims for lost earnings and medical expenses as well but dropped them before trial. The district court dismissed the punitive damages claim on summary judgment, finding that the evidence could not support a finding of recklessness. During jury selection, Morton challenged three potential jurors for cause. The court declined to excuse the jurors, and Morton used three of her four peremptory challenges to replace them. At trial, the court allowed testimony about domestic violence in Morton's marriage as relevant to her claim for loss of enjoyment of life, including evidence of an incident in which she allegedly threatened her husband with a hammer. The jury returned a verdict of $5,000 for past non-economic loss and zero for future non-economic loss. Morton appealed to the superior court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The superior court found reversible error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the punitive damages claim; its refusal to grant the challenges for cause during jury selection; its failure to require the joinder of Morton’s husband as a third-party defendant for purposes of allocation of fault; and its admission of evidence of the domestic violence incident involving the hammer. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that a remand was in order because certain evidence of domestic violence should have been excluded under Alaska Evidence Rule 403. On two other issues, however, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision and held that the district court was correct: it correctly dismissed the plaintiff's punitive damages claim and correctly declined to require that the plaintiff's husband be joined as a third-party defendant. View "Pouzanova v. Morton" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a father’s motion to modify the custody arrangement of the parties’ two children. The superior court awarded primary physical and sole legal custody to the father after hearing testimony from a custody investigator and both parties. The mother appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion because it modified the custody order based on evidence that existed when the court denied another motion to modify custody five years earlier. But because there was new evidence of substance abuse and untreated mental health issues, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err by concluding there was a material change in circumstances and, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, did not abuse its discretion by awarding primary physical and sole legal custody to the father. View "Frackman v. Enzor" on Justia Law

Clifton Tweedy began leasing property from the Matanuska-Susitna Borough on Big Lake in May 1988. When Tweedy assumed the lease, the existing structure was exempt from the Borough’s 75-foot shoreline setback ordinance because it was constructed before any setback requirement existed. Shortly after he took possession of the property, Tweedy constructed a stairwell addition on the exterior of the house. In 2010 Tweedy applied with the Borough to purchase the property. Because structures on the property were located less than 75 feet from the shoreline, the sale required an exemption or variance from the Borough’s setback requirement. The Borough Planning Director determined that Tweedy’s addition was unlawful and that the application could not be processed until Tweedy removed it. The Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment Appeals affirmed the Planning Director’s decision. Tweedy appealed to the superior court, which also affirmed. Because the 75-foot setback applied to Tweedy’s property when he constructed the addition, the addition was unlawful when it was built and he was not entitled to an exemption or variance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tweedy v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough Board of Adjustment and Appeals" on Justia Law

Appellant Sheila Brandner appealed the Anchorage Municipal Board of Equalization's valuation of her home for the 2012 tax year. She argued the Municipal assessor's office used an improper appraisal method and that the Board overestimated the value of her property. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Board made a clerical error in the calculation of the value of Brandner's property. Therefore the case was remanded to the Board to adopt a final assessment consistent with the Board's intent. View "Brandner v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

A highly paid worker suffered a debilitating stroke while traveling for his employer. The employer did not think the stroke was work related, but it later accepted the claim and paid workers' compensation benefits. The statutory maximum compensation rate at the time of the injury was $700 a week. A little more than five months after the employee's stroke, an amended version of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act took effect. Instead of an absolute maximum compensation rate, the amended statute set a variable rate indexed to the statewide average weekly wage. The employee asked for an increased rate of compensation, arguing that the law in effect at the time he was recognized as being permanently and totally disabled should govern his benefit amount. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board, with one panel member dissenting, decided that the version of the statute in effect at the time of the injury was the applicable statute and consequently capped the employee's benefits at $700 a week for life. The dissenting panel member would have construed the statute as permitting increased benefits. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision. The employee appealed, arguing that the amount of his benefits did not fairly compensate him for lost wages during the period of his disability so that the date of his disability, rather than the date of his injury, should have been used to determine the version of the statute governing his claim. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision.View "Louie v. BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc." on Justia Law

Yelena R. and George R. were involved in an on-again, off-again relationship for more than a decade and had two children together. Yelena accused George of sexually assaulting her in 2011 while they were living together. After the Kodiak magistrate found Yelena’s testimony unpersuasive and denied her request for a long-term domestic violence protective order, Yelena took the children to Massachusetts without notifying George. A Massachusetts court ordered the children to be returned to Kodiak and this custody case followed. After a custody trial, the superior court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of the children to George and ordered supervised visitation between Yelena and the children. Yelena appealed that order and visitation restrictions. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the superior court had jurisdiction to make final custody decisions regarding the children. The Supreme Court concluded the superior court had jurisdiction, properly declined to apply Alaska's domestic violence presumption, adequately considered Alaska's “best interest” factors, and made no clearly erroneous factual findings. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding custody of the children to George. It was error, however, for the superior court to require supervised visitation without making adequate findings to support the visitation restrictions and by failing to establish a plan for Yelena to achieve unsupervised visitation. It was also an abuse of discretion to delegate to George the authority to end the supervision requirement. The Court affirmed the superior court’s award of custody to George, but remanded the case for further proceedings on the issue of Yelena’s visitation. View "Yelena R. v. George R." on Justia Law

In 2011 the superior court entered a 30-day involuntary civil commitment order for Mark V. after the court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Mark posed a "substantial risk . . . of harming others." Mark argued on appeal that the court erred in that finding. Because his period of commitment under that order has expired and Mark was soon released from custody, his appeal was technically moot. But he argued that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine nonetheless justified appellate review of the commitment order. The circumstances (including four civil commitment orders entered against Mark earlier in 2011 and the absence of any indication that the November 2011 commitment will result in any additional adverse collateral consequences) convinced the Supreme Court that the exception was not satisfied. The Court therefore did not reach the merits of Mark's appeal and dismissed it as moot. View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Mark V." on Justia Law

Tommie Patterson’s vehicle was struck from behind when he braked to avoid a car stalled in his lane of travel. He sued the owner of the stalled vehicle and subpoenaed her for trial, but she refused to appear. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court should have issued a warrant or an order to show cause to compel the appearance of this party. In addition, the superior court instructed the jury on Patterson’s products liability claim against Ford Motor Company (manufacturer of Patterson's vehicle), but this claim was erroneously omitted from the special verdict form. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Patterson v. Cox" on Justia Law

Jessica Milwicz negligently rear-ended a vehicle driven by Justin Pralle. Pralle sued. Milwicz admitted negligence but argued that she had not caused Pralle’s injuries. A jury agreed with her, and judgment was entered in Milwicz’s favor. Pralle appealed, arguing that the verdict was not supported by the evidence and that the superior court abused its discretion in its refusal to excuse several jurors for cause and its admission of expert testimony. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Pralle v. Milwicz" on Justia Law