Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ed and Kristina B. had one son before they separated. The superior court heard evidence about domestic violence on Ed’s part and Kristina’s medical and substance-abuse issues. The court granted sole legal and primary physical custody of the child to Ed. Kristina appealed many of the court’s findings of fact and legal rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the superior court for reconsideration of: (1) whether Kristina’s child support obligation should be reduced to reflect the significant cost of her court-ordered urinalysis testing; and (2) whether the restrictive visitation schedule was justified once Kristina has demonstrated a history of sobriety. The Court affirmed with respect to all other issues. View "Kristina B. v. Edward B." on Justia Law

A mining company contracted with a consultant to help the company obtain new capital investments. The company later brought suit against the consultant, seeking a declaratory judgment that the contract violated Alaska securities law. The company also sought equitable rescission of the contract and cancellation of shares of stock and royalty interests granted under the contract. The superior court granted summary judgment to the consultant on two grounds: (1) the company’s suit was barred as a matter of law by AS 45.55.930(g); and (2) the company’s suit was barred as a matter of law by res judicata in light of a prior suit instituted by the consultant against the company in which the company did not raise its present claims defensively. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment on both grounds, finding questions of fact still existed. View "Girdwood Mining Company v. Comsult LLC" on Justia Law

A grandmother petitioned for visitation with her daughter’s four children. The superior court denied the petition, finding that the grandmother failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that visitation was in the best interests of the children. The grandmother appealed, arguing: (1) the superior court erred by applying the clear and convincing burden of proof; (2) the record did not support the superior court’s conclusion that the grandmother had not established ongoing personal contact with the children; and (3) the record did not support the superior court’s conclusion that the grandmother failed to prove visitation was in the best interests of the children. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court applied the correct burden of proof and that its conclusions were adequately supported by the evidence presented at trial. View "Hawkins v. Williams" on Justia Law

Michael Reilly and Jaime Vinette lived together and had a son, Barlow. Reilly stopped working in Alaska and moved to Butte, Montana, where he worked part time repairing and renting out homes and managing a bar. Vinette had custody of Barlow during the school year, and Reilly had custody for six weeks during the summer. Reilly moved to have his child support modified to reflect the fact that his income had fallen. Vinette countered that he was voluntarily underemployed. The superior court found that Reilly could work full time and that he was voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed. The court did not find Reilly’s testimony regarding the various reasons he alleged that prevented him from working as credible. The superior court imputed income to Reilly based on the average wage in southwestern Montana for career paths the court believed Reilly would be qualified to pursue. Reilly appealed, arguing that the imputation of income was improper, the amount to be imputed was calculated incorrectly, and the superior court erred in its written child support order by not including a visitation credit for his summers with Barlow. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s findings and orders, except that the Court remanded the child support order for a correction of a minor omission of visitation credit. View "Reilly v. Northrup" on Justia Law

Nathawn Johnson was convicted of and sentenced for, among other crimes, two counts of sexual assault in the first degree relating to his rape of S.S. One count resulted from penetration of the victim's mouth without her consent; the other count resulted from penetration of the victim's vagina without her consent. Johnson never argued to the trial court that the two counts should have merged for double jeopardy grounds. After Johnson made the double-jeopardy argument for the first time on appeal, the appellate court held that Johnson had not preserved the issue and the trial court did not err by not merging the counts sua sponte. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Johnson argued the court of appeals erred by not reviewing his late-raised double jeopardy argument. The Supreme Court agreed with that, but finding that Johnson's separate convictions did not violate his rights against double jeopardy, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Johnson v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Two sisters reported that they were abused by their grandparents while they were entrusted to the legal custody of the Office of Children’s Services (OCS). The sisters sued OCS, and a jury awarded them substantial damages, concluding that OCS was responsible for 95% of their damages and that their grandparents were not responsible for any of their damages. On appeal, OCS argued that the verdict should have been set aside. Because the evidence supporting the jury’s allocation of fault was so insubstantial as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that OCS was entitled to a new trial. View "State, Dept. of Health & Social Services v. Mullins" on Justia Law

Stephen O.'s parents were concerned that he had suffered a possible psychotic break. They reported his behavior to a mental health clinician. The clinician obtained an ex parte order to take Stephen into custody and transport him to the hospital in Juneau for examination and treatment. The police took him into custody, but due to bad weather he remained in jail for six days before he was transported for evaluation. After a contested hearing, the superior court found by clear and convincing evidence that Stephen was gravely disabled under AS 47.30.915(7)(B) and issued an order for a 30-day involuntary commitment. Stephen appealed that order. Because the superior court’s conclusion that the man was gravely disabled was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, the Supreme Court reversed and vacated the superior court’s 30-day involuntary commitment order.View "In Re Necessity for the Hospitalization of Stephen O." on Justia Law

Daniel Brown was a City of Kenai employee who was accused of sexual harassment of female employees at the Kenai Recreation Center. But after a termination hearing, the Personnel Board of the City of Kenai stated that the basis for Brown’s termination was not sexual harassment but rather misconduct. Brown argued on appeal of that decision that the Board violated his right to due process by terminating him for misconduct without finding that he had committed the underlying acts of sexual harassment. He also argued that his termination violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court concluded that the Board had an adequate basis for its decision and that Brown’s termination did not violate the implied covenant of good faith or his right to due process. View "Brown v. City of Kenai, Personnel Board" on Justia Law

In 2008, Ekaterina Pouzanova drove past a stop sign and into an intersection in Anchorage and was broad-sided by a vehicle driven by Kuuipo Morton. Morton went to the emergency room and was diagnosed with lower back pain and a possible compression fracture. She continued to complain of pain in her back and neck in the months that followed, and she received some additional treatment for these complaints. Pouzanova did not contest liability for the accident, but she did dispute the extent of Morton’s injuries. Morton sued in district court for non-economic and punitive damages. She initially included claims for lost earnings and medical expenses as well but dropped them before trial. The district court dismissed the punitive damages claim on summary judgment, finding that the evidence could not support a finding of recklessness. During jury selection, Morton challenged three potential jurors for cause. The court declined to excuse the jurors, and Morton used three of her four peremptory challenges to replace them. At trial, the court allowed testimony about domestic violence in Morton's marriage as relevant to her claim for loss of enjoyment of life, including evidence of an incident in which she allegedly threatened her husband with a hammer. The jury returned a verdict of $5,000 for past non-economic loss and zero for future non-economic loss. Morton appealed to the superior court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The superior court found reversible error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the punitive damages claim; its refusal to grant the challenges for cause during jury selection; its failure to require the joinder of Morton’s husband as a third-party defendant for purposes of allocation of fault; and its admission of evidence of the domestic violence incident involving the hammer. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that a remand was in order because certain evidence of domestic violence should have been excluded under Alaska Evidence Rule 403. On two other issues, however, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision and held that the district court was correct: it correctly dismissed the plaintiff's punitive damages claim and correctly declined to require that the plaintiff's husband be joined as a third-party defendant. View "Pouzanova v. Morton" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a father’s motion to modify the custody arrangement of the parties’ two children. The superior court awarded primary physical and sole legal custody to the father after hearing testimony from a custody investigator and both parties. The mother appealed, arguing the court abused its discretion because it modified the custody order based on evidence that existed when the court denied another motion to modify custody five years earlier. But because there was new evidence of substance abuse and untreated mental health issues, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err by concluding there was a material change in circumstances and, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, did not abuse its discretion by awarding primary physical and sole legal custody to the father. View "Frackman v. Enzor" on Justia Law