Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State of Alaska and the Municipality of Anchorage exempt from municipal property taxation $150,000 of the assessed value of the residence of an owner who is a senior citizen or disabled veteran. But the full value of the exemption is potentially unavailable if a person who is not the owner’s spouse also occupies the residence. Contending that the exemption program violated their rights to equal protection and equal opportunities, three Anchorage same-sex couples in committed, long-term, intimate relationships sued the State and the Municipality. The superior court ruled for all three couples. The State and Municipality appealed. As to two of the couples, the Supreme Court affirmed: same-sex couples, who may not marry or have their marriages recognized in Alaska, cannot benefit or become eligible to benefit from the exemption program to the same extent as heterosexual couples, who are married or may marry. The exemption program therefore potentially treats same-sex couples less favorably than it treats opposite-sex couples even though the two classes are similarly situated. The identified governmental interests do not satisfy even minimum scrutiny. The exemption program therefore violates the two couples’ equal protection rights as guaranteed by article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution. As to the third couple, the Court reversed the ruling in their favor because it concluded that the program did not exempt a residence from taxation unless the senior citizen or veteran had some ownership interest in it. If the senior citizen or veteran has no actual ownership interest, the program treats a same-sex couple the same as a heterosexual couple by denying the exemption to both couples, rendering marital status and the ability to marry irrelevant. Because the senior citizen member of the third couple had no ownership interest in the residence, that couple had no viable equal protection claim. View "Alaska v. Schmidt" on Justia Law

A prisoner recovered a medical malpractice judgment against the State of Alaska Department of Corrections. But when DOC paid the judgment, it deducted the expenses it had incurred for unrelated medical care provided to the prisoner by outside providers. The DOC then brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that DOC had the statutory right to reimbursement from the prisoner for medical expenses incurred on his behalf. In this appeal, the prisoner’s estate argued that only prisoners with access to the specified funding sources listed in the statute were liable for the cost of outside medical care. But the Supreme Court concluded that the statute entitled the DOC to reimbursement from a prisoner regardless of whether the medical care is provided inside the prison or made available through an outside provider. The Court also concluded that the common fund doctrine did not require the DOC to share the cost of the prisoner’s attorney’s fees for the medical malpractice action. View "Hendricks-Pearce v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Raymond Boulds and Elena Nielsen were unmarried cohabitants for 16 years and raised children together. When their relationship ended, they litigated child custody and property ownership. The court determined that the insurance death benefit and the 401(k) retirement account were not domestic partnership assets and belonged to Boulds alone. But the court determined that the union pension was a domestic partnership asset and was subject to division. Because Boulds appealed to the Supreme court, the superior court had not yet issued an order dividing the union pension. Boulds argued that federal law prohibited dividing his union pension with a non-spouse, and that the superior court misapplied Alaska law by examining only Boulds’s own initial intent to share the union pension with Nielsen for the benefit of their children. The Supreme Court concluded that federal law did not bar Nielsen from receiving a share of the union pension and that the superior court did not err in determining Nielsen was entitled to half of the union pension under Alaska law. View "Boulds v. Nielsen" on Justia Law

Byron Charles was convicted of a sex offense in the 1980s. In 1994 the Alaska Legislature enacted ASORA. The statute was expressly retroactive: ASORA accordingly required Charles to maintain sex offender registration. In 2006 Charles was charged with misdemeanor failure to register as a sex offender. At Charles’s failure-to-register trial, a Ketchikan police officer testified that he checked Charles’s 2005 registration and found that the listed address did not exist. Charles appealed, arguing only that the trial court’s finding of guilt was inconsistent with its finding Charles was credible, that the trial court erred in ruling on an evidentiary issue, and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction. He did not argue that applying ASORA to him would be an ex post facto violation. The court of appeals affirmed Charles’s conviction in 2007. In 2008 the Supreme Court issued its opinion in "Doe I," holding that applying ASORA to Doe violated the Alaska Constitution’s ex post facto clause. The issue before the Court in this appeal was whether the 2008 holding in "Doe v. Alaska (Doe I)" applied to Charles. The Court concluded that it did. "In doing so, we adopt for cases on direct review the federal retroactivity standard announced in 'Griffith v. Kentucky.'" The Court also concluded that Charles’s prior failure to raise the ex post facto issue did not bar him from doing so later: manifest injustice would have resulted if he could not challenge on direct review his conviction for violating a criminal statute that, under the Alaska constitution, might not be applied to him. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals’s 2007 decision that affirmed Charles’s judgment and reversed his 2006 judgment of conviction. View "Charles v. Alaska" on Justia Law

A group of citizens sued two borough assembly members, alleging various violations of borough and state conflict of interest laws and the common law conflict of interest doctrine. After the borough took official action facilitating the assembly members’ defense, the citizens moved to enjoin the assembly members from using their official positions to defend the lawsuit or pursue personal financial gain. The superior court granted a preliminary injunction under the balance of hardships standard, concluding that the citizens faced the possibility of irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted and that the assembly members were adequately protected by the injunction. The assembly members filed a petition for review, which the Supreme Court granted. They argued that the superior court applied the wrong preliminary injunction standard and that the injunction violates their free speech rights. The Court agreed: the trial court should have applied the probable success on the merits standard because the injunction did not adequately protect the assembly members, and the injunction imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The Supreme Court vacated the injunction in full. View "Alsworth v. Seybert" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a 1984 gravel lease, a later sublease, and overriding royalty payments under the sublease. The Supreme Court had vacated a judgment in favor of Alicia Totaro, the sublease’s overriding royalty interest holder, and remanded for a determination whether the original gravel lease between Herman Ramirez and Bill Nelson (d/b/a Cosmos Developers, Inc.), was an exclusive lease for purposes of gravel removal. The superior court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Ramirez and Nelson intended the original gravel lease to be an exclusive lease. That finding led to the conclusion that the sublease from Cosmos to AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. was exclusive and that AAA Valley Gravel’s gravel extraction under the sublease triggered continued overriding royalty obligations to Totaro. Because AAA Valley Gravel had discontinued the overriding royalty payments to Totaro in 1998 when it purchased the property from Ramirez, the superior court entered judgment in favor of Totaro for nearly $1 million in past royalty payments, interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. AAA Valley Gravel appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by: (1) failing to rule that the original gravel lease’s failure to mention exclusivity rendered the gravel lease non-exclusive as a matter of law; (2) implying exclusivity in the original gravel lease as a matter of law; (3) placing the burden of persuasion on the exclusivity issue on AAA Valley Gravel; (4) finding that the original gravel lease conveyed an exclusive right to extract gravel from Ramirez’s property; (5) failing to find that the original gravel lease expired 10 to 12 years after its inception; and (6) failing to specify in the final judgment when the original gravel lease would terminate. Ramirez, nominally an appellee in this appeal, also contended that the superior court erred; Ramirez essentially joined in most of AAA Valley Gravel’s arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. v. Totaro" on Justia Law

Olive Kathryn Purcella (Kathryn) filed a petition in the Anchorage superior court to reform or terminate the Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust. The superior court held, after trial, that Kathryn had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that she did not intend to execute an irrevocable trust or that the trust was the product of undue influence, and denied her petition. Kathryn appealed, arguing that the factual findings on which the superior court predicated its ruling were in error. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust" on Justia Law

Jean Kollander sought to modify the pension division in a qualified domestic relations order originally entered by the superior court in 1992. The federal pension administrator paid Jean's share of her former spouse's pension in accelerated lump sum payments from 2007 to 2008. In 2012 Jean brought a claim that she was instead entitled to lifetime monthly payments. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that her claim was barred by laches and awarded full attorney's fees and costs to her former spouse. Jean appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's findings of unreasonable delay and prejudice were not clearly erroneous and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying laches. But because the superior court failed to apply Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 in the award of attorney's fees, the Court reversed that award and remand for a determination of attorney's fees. View "Kollander v. Kollander" on Justia Law

A former inmate brought sued the Department of Corrections alleging that the Department negligently failed to protect him after he reported being threatened and that he was subsequently assaulted and seriously injured while in prison. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the inmate had not shown that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question whether the Department breached its duty to protect him from reasonably foreseeable harm. Specifically, the superior court concluded that the communication of the threat was too general to put the Department on notice that the inmate was at risk for the attack he suffered. The inmate appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the inmate presented evidence that raised a genuine issue of fact as to the foreseeability of the attack he suffered. View "Mattox v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved with Emma D. and her newborn son, Joey, following reports from Covenant House expressing concern about Emma’s homelessness, inability to care for an infant, and feelings of depression and aggression toward Joey. Emma D. has a history of mental health issues, particularly bipolar disorder, dating back to her early childhood. OCS took the then-six-month-old Joey into emergency custody during Joey’s hospitalization for respiratory syncytial virus and dehydration, during which he was also diagnosed with supraventricular tachycardia, a heart disorder that required regular attention and treatment. OCS staff subsequently made attempts to assist Emma in obtaining regular mental health treatment in order to reunite her with Joey. OCS staff had difficulty communicating and meeting with Emma; she failed to engage in regular treatment, maintain consistent visitation with Joey, or attend her appointments with case workers and service providers. The superior court terminated Emma’s parental rights 14 months after OCS assumed emergency custody. Emma argued on appeal that OCS failed to consider adequately her mental health issues and therefore its efforts were not reasonable. She also appealed the superior court’s finding that she had failed to remedy her conduct in a reasonable time. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no reversible error in the superior court’s decision terminating Emma’s parental rights. View "Emma D. v. Alaska" on Justia Law