Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of citizens sued two borough assembly members, alleging various violations of borough and state conflict of interest laws and the common law conflict of interest doctrine. After the borough took official action facilitating the assembly members’ defense, the citizens moved to enjoin the assembly members from using their official positions to defend the lawsuit or pursue personal financial gain. The superior court granted a preliminary injunction under the balance of hardships standard, concluding that the citizens faced the possibility of irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted and that the assembly members were adequately protected by the injunction. The assembly members filed a petition for review, which the Supreme Court granted. They argued that the superior court applied the wrong preliminary injunction standard and that the injunction violates their free speech rights. The Court agreed: the trial court should have applied the probable success on the merits standard because the injunction did not adequately protect the assembly members, and the injunction imposed an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The Supreme Court vacated the injunction in full. View "Alsworth v. Seybert" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a 1984 gravel lease, a later sublease, and overriding royalty payments under the sublease. The Supreme Court had vacated a judgment in favor of Alicia Totaro, the sublease’s overriding royalty interest holder, and remanded for a determination whether the original gravel lease between Herman Ramirez and Bill Nelson (d/b/a Cosmos Developers, Inc.), was an exclusive lease for purposes of gravel removal. The superior court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that Ramirez and Nelson intended the original gravel lease to be an exclusive lease. That finding led to the conclusion that the sublease from Cosmos to AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. was exclusive and that AAA Valley Gravel’s gravel extraction under the sublease triggered continued overriding royalty obligations to Totaro. Because AAA Valley Gravel had discontinued the overriding royalty payments to Totaro in 1998 when it purchased the property from Ramirez, the superior court entered judgment in favor of Totaro for nearly $1 million in past royalty payments, interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. AAA Valley Gravel appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by: (1) failing to rule that the original gravel lease’s failure to mention exclusivity rendered the gravel lease non-exclusive as a matter of law; (2) implying exclusivity in the original gravel lease as a matter of law; (3) placing the burden of persuasion on the exclusivity issue on AAA Valley Gravel; (4) finding that the original gravel lease conveyed an exclusive right to extract gravel from Ramirez’s property; (5) failing to find that the original gravel lease expired 10 to 12 years after its inception; and (6) failing to specify in the final judgment when the original gravel lease would terminate. Ramirez, nominally an appellee in this appeal, also contended that the superior court erred; Ramirez essentially joined in most of AAA Valley Gravel’s arguments. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "AAA Valley Gravel, Inc. v. Totaro" on Justia Law

Olive Kathryn Purcella (Kathryn) filed a petition in the Anchorage superior court to reform or terminate the Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust. The superior court held, after trial, that Kathryn had not shown by clear and convincing evidence that she did not intend to execute an irrevocable trust or that the trust was the product of undue influence, and denied her petition. Kathryn appealed, arguing that the factual findings on which the superior court predicated its ruling were in error. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella Trust" on Justia Law

Jean Kollander sought to modify the pension division in a qualified domestic relations order originally entered by the superior court in 1992. The federal pension administrator paid Jean's share of her former spouse's pension in accelerated lump sum payments from 2007 to 2008. In 2012 Jean brought a claim that she was instead entitled to lifetime monthly payments. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court found that her claim was barred by laches and awarded full attorney's fees and costs to her former spouse. Jean appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court's findings of unreasonable delay and prejudice were not clearly erroneous and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in applying laches. But because the superior court failed to apply Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82 in the award of attorney's fees, the Court reversed that award and remand for a determination of attorney's fees. View "Kollander v. Kollander" on Justia Law

A former inmate brought sued the Department of Corrections alleging that the Department negligently failed to protect him after he reported being threatened and that he was subsequently assaulted and seriously injured while in prison. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, concluding that the inmate had not shown that a genuine issue of material fact existed on the question whether the Department breached its duty to protect him from reasonably foreseeable harm. Specifically, the superior court concluded that the communication of the threat was too general to put the Department on notice that the inmate was at risk for the attack he suffered. The inmate appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the inmate presented evidence that raised a genuine issue of fact as to the foreseeability of the attack he suffered. View "Mattox v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Office of Children’s Services (OCS) became involved with Emma D. and her newborn son, Joey, following reports from Covenant House expressing concern about Emma’s homelessness, inability to care for an infant, and feelings of depression and aggression toward Joey. Emma D. has a history of mental health issues, particularly bipolar disorder, dating back to her early childhood. OCS took the then-six-month-old Joey into emergency custody during Joey’s hospitalization for respiratory syncytial virus and dehydration, during which he was also diagnosed with supraventricular tachycardia, a heart disorder that required regular attention and treatment. OCS staff subsequently made attempts to assist Emma in obtaining regular mental health treatment in order to reunite her with Joey. OCS staff had difficulty communicating and meeting with Emma; she failed to engage in regular treatment, maintain consistent visitation with Joey, or attend her appointments with case workers and service providers. The superior court terminated Emma’s parental rights 14 months after OCS assumed emergency custody. Emma argued on appeal that OCS failed to consider adequately her mental health issues and therefore its efforts were not reasonable. She also appealed the superior court’s finding that she had failed to remedy her conduct in a reasonable time. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding no reversible error in the superior court’s decision terminating Emma’s parental rights. View "Emma D. v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Harold Hawkins and Rosalind Attatayuk were married until 1981, when they dissolved their marriage. Hawkins was awarded the couple’s home in the dissolution and continued to reside on the property, which was federally owned. In 1993 Attatayuk applied for and received a restricted townsite deed to the land by allegedly fraudulent means. She brought a trespass action against Hawkins, alleging that she had undisputed title to the land. The superior court ruled on summary judgment that Attatayuk’s restricted townsite deed gave her title to the land. Because Alaska state courts did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate title or right to possession of restricted townsite property, the only issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether the superior court adjudicated title to the land in question. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the superior court did adjudicate title and, as a result, exceeded its jurisdiction. View "Hawkins v. Attatayuk" on Justia Law

A fire broke out at a mobile home owned by Leo Regner near North Pole. The North Star Volunteer Fire Department, the North Pole Fire Department, and the Fort Wainwright Fire Department responded to the fire but were unable to prevent damage to the mobile home. Regner sued the fire departments and several of their employees, alleging negligence. Regner voluntarily dismissed his claim against the Fort Wainwright Fire Department and its employee, and the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that they were immune from suit. The superior court granted complete summary judgment. Regner appealed only the superior court’s decision that he failed to make a sufficient showing of negligence to defeat summary judgment. Because the defendants did not move for summary judgment on the merits of Regner’s negligence claims and the merits of those claims were not otherwise addressed in the summary judgment proceedings, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Regner v. North Star Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc." on Justia Law

Members of Healy Lake Village Tribe who claimed to constitute the newly elected tribal council brought suit in superior court against Mt. McKinley Bank after the Bank refused to change the signatory authority on the Tribe’s accounts to reflect the alleged leadership change. A second group of tribal members, who also claimed to represent the Tribe based on a competing election, was granted intervention in order to contest the superior court’s jurisdiction. The superior court determined that the fundamental issue in the case was the determination of the legitimate governing body of the Tribe, which was an internal self-governance matter within the Tribe’s retained inherent sovereignty. The superior court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the group that brought the initial action appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court. Because determining the real party in interest would have required the superior court to decide matters solely within the Tribe’s retained inherent sovereignty, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Healy Lake Village v. Mt. McKinley Bank" on Justia Law

Robert Rude and Harold Rudolph were shareholders and former directors of Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI). They distributed a joint proxy solicitation in an attempt to be elected to the CIRI board of directors at CIRI’s 2010 annual meeting. Rude and Rudolph accumulated over one quarter of the total outstanding votes, but CIRI’s Inspector of Election refused to allow them to cumulate their votes. Thus, votes were split evenly between the two of them and neither was seated. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the language of the proxy form required the shareholders’ votes to be equally distributed between Rude and Rudolph unless a shareholder indicated otherwise. Therefore the Court affirmed the superior court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of CIRI on this issue. View "Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc." on Justia Law