Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Bachner Company and Bowers Investment Company were unsuccessful bidders on a public contract proposal. They filed a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic opportunity against four individual procurement committee members. The superior court found that the bidders failed to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding the committee members' alleged bad faith conduct. The superior court then held that the committee members were protected by qualified immunity and that the lawsuit was barred by the exclusive remedy statute. The bidders thereafter appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the bidders indeed failed to present a genuine issue of material fact regarding the committee members' alleged bad faith. Furthermore, the exclusive remedy statute barred the bidders' suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Bachner Company, Inc. v. Weed" on Justia Law

An indigent prisoner appealed two prison disciplinary actions to the superior court. For each appeal the superior court calculated a reduced filing fee. The prisoner failed to pay any filing fees and his appeals were dismissed. On appeal, the prisoner contended that he had no means of paying even the reduced filing fees and argued that the fee statute unconstitutionally deprived him of access to the courts. The Supreme Court agreed with the prisoner: as applied, the applicable statute prevented him from exercising his right of access to the courts in violation of the Alaska Constitution's due process provision. The Court reinstated the prisoner's appeals. View "Barber v. Alaska Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

A member of the military moved to a new post in Alaska in 2005. Two months later, he was deployed to Iraq. After 16 months of service in Iraq, he returned to Alaska in December of 2006. Shortly thereafter, he applied for the 2007 Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD), for his eligibility for 2006. The Department of Revenue denied his application. The service member filed an informal appeal and later a formal appeal with the Department, both of which were denied. The superior court affirmed the denial, concluding that the relevant statute required him to reside in Alaska for six months before claiming an allowable absence for military service and that the statute did not violate equal protection under the U.S. and Alaska Constitutions. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that because the service member was not eligible for the 2007 PFD, the Court affirmed the superior court's judgment. View "Heller v. Alaska Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on the doctrine of adverse possession and whether the presumption that a private drive across another's property was a permissive use and did not give rise to an easement. The presumption does not apply where a drive was not originally established by the other's property owner for his or her own use. Appellee Edward Shaw owned two lots of land; Appellants James Dault and Shala Dobson owned a non-adjacent parcel in the same subdivision. Shaw used a trail as access to his parcel. The trial crossed several parcels, including that owned by Dault and Dobson. Dault built a shed on his property where the trail had been. Shaw's house was not then occupied. When Shaw’s brother, Michael, discovered that a driveway was being constructed, he asked Dault about the project. Dault assured Michael that the new driveway would provide safer access to Shaw's property, but Michael expressed concern over the lack of a Borough permit. During a subsequent conversation, Dault said that he did not believe that he needed a Borough permit. Michael had by then discovered the grantor easements on some of the lots, including his brother's, and based on them, told Dault to remove the obstruction from the trail. After consideration of the parties various land interests and the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the presumption of a private drive as permissive use and did not give rise to an easement applied in this case because the drive at issue was constructed by the original subdivision developers for their own use. The Court concluded the trial court erred in finding that Shaw had a prescriptive easement to use the portion of the trial crossing Dault's lot. View "Dault v. Shaw" on Justia Law

The superior court awarded Kelly Matson sole legal custody and primary physical custody of hers and Kevin Co's two minor children. Co challenged the legal and physical custody awards and the visitation schedule. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the superior court engaged in a comprehensive review of the statutory best-interests factors, made clear and thoughtful findings of fact, and did not abuse its discretion, it affirmed the superior court's decision in all respects. View "Co v. Matson" on Justia Law

Michele Beach sued a clinic and its executive director, alleging that they had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by conducting an unfair investigation and unlawfully retaliating against Beach for her suggestions about improvements in security systems. Beach had worked for the clinic when the clinic's executive director concluded that prescription drug records had been systematically falsified and that Beach was responsible. The superior court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Beach appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court. View "Beach v. Handforth-Kome" on Justia Law

Conrad Brown and Tammy Wanner-Brown married in 1992, and divorced in 2011. A major issue of the divorce involved Conrad’s State of Alaska retirement medical benefits. Before the marriage, Conrad had briefly worked for the State at a time when all employees in his position were classified as Tier 1. After he married Tammy, he became re-employed with the State and completely re-earned his retirement benefits. Conrad was still classified by the State as Tier 1 because of his prior employment with the State. The superior court decided Conrad was a Tier 2 employee for purposes of valuing and distributing marital assets because "[t]he Tier 1 eligibility was earned prior to the marriage" and "[t]he marital assets . . . spent to allow the plaintiff to vest with the State of Alaska were no different for a Tier 1 than for a Tier 2." The court awarded Tammy the couple’s two rental properties and all of the marital debt, and ordered her to pay Conrad an equalization payment within a year. The court also ordered Tammy to refinance the two rental properties within one year to remove Conrad’s name from the titles and debt. Tammy appealed, arguing that: (1) Conrad’s retirement classification should have been Tier 1, not Tier 2; (2) the court miscalculated the value of the medical benefits even if they were Tier 2; (3) the court erred by not taking into consideration the cost of selling one of the properties even though the property division had the practical effect of requiring her to sell it; and (4) the court gave her an impossibly short time to refinance the loans on the rental properties. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the superior court erred by valuing Conrad’s retirement medical benefits as Tier 2 instead of Tier 1 and remanded the case back to the trial court to recalculate these benefits and reconsider its property division. The Court declined to reach Tammy’s other points on appeal. View "Wanner-Brown v. Brown" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Rollins purchased a beverage dispensary license (liquor license) in late 1990. She attempted to open a bar on a property she owned but was unsuccessful. Rollins appealed the superior court’s decision upholding the Alcoholic Beverage Control Board’s determination to deny her application for a waiver of the annual operating requirement for her liquor license. On appeal, Rollins argued that: (1) the Board’s decision was not supported by the evidence; (2) she was improperly assigned the burden of proof; (3) the hearing before the administrative law judge violated her right to due process; and (4) the Board’s selective enforcement of its statutes violated her right to equal protection. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Rollins properly bore the burden of proof on the issue of whether she was entitled to a waiver, that the record supported the Board’s decision, and that the Board proceedings did not violate her constitutional rights. View "Rollins v. Alaska Dept. of Public Safety" on Justia Law

Irma E. asked the State Office of Children’s Services to place her granddaughters with her, but OCS denied her request. Irma repeatedly asked the superior court to hold a hearing to review OCS's decision, but the superior court denied Irma’s requests for a hearing. Based on AS 47.14.100(m), the Supreme Court concluded that a family member who has been denied placement of a child in OCS’s custody is entitled to a review hearing to contest the OCS placement decision. View "Irma E. v. Alaska Dept. of Health & Social Services" on Justia Law

Cynthia and David Fernandez married in 1979 and had two children. In 1986 the parties divorced but continued to live together until 1997, when David left the home. David returned ifrom 2001 to 2007, when the parties separated a second and final time. In August 2010 David received a letter from the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) advising him that he was required to pay child support in the amount of $450 per month, based on a support order dating from November 1986, when the parties dissolved their marriage. David filed a motion in the superior court requesting relief from the child support order. Cynthia opposed the motion. The parties reached an agreement for Cynthia to pay David $33,000, based on the amount of equity David had contributed to Cynthia’s home when they lived together; Cynthia would attempt to get a second mortgage to fund the settlement, and if she was unable to secure financing, the parties would negotiate a payment plan. Cynthia was not able to obtain a second mortgage and immediately sought to return to "square one." After negotiations with David proved unsuccessful, the court set terms for the settlement, requiring Cynthia to pay David $250 per month, plus her Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) each year, until the amount of $33,000 was paid in full. Cynthia appealed that decision, arguing that the purported settlement agreement became a mere "agreement to negotiate" after she was unable to obtain a second mortgage and that the court lacked authority to set terms and enter a judgment of $33,000 against her. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the lower court's order. View "Fernandez v. Fernandez" on Justia Law