Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Patricia Beals appealed the superior court's property division in her divorce from Appellee Mark Beals. She argued that the court incorrectly characterized a lot that she and Mark jointly purchase with cash obtained from refinancing the marital home as separate property. Mark owned the marital home before the parties married. In addition, Patricia argued the court erroneously valued the mortgage on the marital home at the time of separation rather than at the time of trial. Because the entire value of the jointly titled lot should have been characterized as marital property, and because the home's equity should have been valued as of the time of trial, the Supreme Court reversed. View "Beals v. Beals" on Justia Law

Christopher C. and Therese C.'s parental rights were terminated as to the couple's four children. The trial court relied primarily on evidence that neither parent had acquired the basic skills necessary to parent their children despite more than a year of training by the Department of Health & Social Services' Office of Children's Services. The Supreme Court after its review concluded that the trial court's findings were supported by sufficient evidence. Therefore the Court affirmed the termination of the parties' parental rights. View "Christopher C. v. Dept. of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services" on Justia Law

Yauna Taylor and Calvin Grimmett were both University of Alaska employees terminated through notices of nonretention; Grimmett was alternatively terminated for cause. The Superior Court found that the University violated Taylor's due process rights by nonretaining her without a hearing rather than for cause; the court upheld the nonretention for Grimmett, but set aside his for-cause termination because the University violated the objective prong of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The University appealed Taylor's case; Grimmett appealed his and the University cross-appealed. Upon review of both cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the University indeed violated Taylor's due process rights by using a notice with no hearing. In Grimmett's case, the Court found the University violated his due process rights to terminate his employment without a hearing. The Court reversed the Superior Court's decision to uphold Grimmett's nonretention and reversed the for-cause termination. Both cases were remanded to their respective tribunals for further proceedings on backpay remedies. View "Grimmett v. University of Alaska" on Justia Law

Appellant Tommie Patterson was involved in a motor vehicle accident. His insurance company paid his medical providers to the policy limit. Two years later, Appellant sued the insurance company, arguing it had shown bad faith following the accident. The company moved for summary judgment, which was granted. A month after that decision, Appellant filed a second lawsuit, alleging the company falsely advertised its services, breached his insurance contract, embezzled money from him, falsified documents and threatened to make him at fault for the accident. The company moved for summary judgment again, which was granted. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Appellant's embezzlement claim in the second lawsuit alleged a different cause of action than in the first, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment with regards to that claim. All other claims were barred by res judicata. Therefore the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Patterson v. Infinity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Office of Children's Services (OCS) placed a Native child in a non-Native foster home while working with the other towards reunification. Over two years later, the superior court terminated the parents' parental rights. The child's maternal grandmother and the tribe sought to enforce the Indian Child Welfare Act's (ICWA) placement preferences. The foster parents petitioned for adoption. The superior court found good cause to deviate from the ICWA preference, and that the grandmother was not a suitable placement for the child. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the tribe argued the superior court erred by applying the wrong standard of proof for the good cause determination; that the court's findings were not supported by sufficient evidence; and that the findings were not sufficient to support the good cause determination. The Supreme Court found that the ICWA implicitly mandated that good cause to deviate from ICWA's adoptive placement preferences be proved by clear and convincing evidence. To the extent prior cases held otherwise, they were overruled. Therefore the superior court was vacated here and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Native Village of Tununak v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Five years after divorcing, the parties in this case sought to modify their divorce decree. The Superior Court found that circumstances had not changed sufficiently for either to justify modification of the child custody agreement, but the court did allow changes in visitation, child support, life insurance and attorney's fees. The father appealed those changes. Because the child support modification was erroneously calculated, the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the Superior Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. The lower court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Martin v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Dennis P. Hutchinson, Jr. Trust held two residential properties; Appellee Wells Fargo Bank administered the trust. The beneficiary's mother and guardian, Appellant Jean Schultz, learned that insurance premiums on the properties in trust had increased significantly. She discovered that the insurance had not been purchased through local insurance markets, but purchased through the bank. The trust attorney unsuccessfully tried to contact the bank to discuss the increase in premiums, and resorted to suing the bank to force it to disclose documents and other information regarding the trust's administration. The superior court granted the trust approximately half of what it asked for, and declared neither side as the prevailing party, so no one was awarded attorney's fees. The trust appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the superior court misinterpreted the statutory authority belying its decision regarding the fees, and therefore abused its discretion. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "Schultz v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the custody and child support arrangement between Ronny M. and Nanette H. with respect to their two minor children, Ronny Jr. and Lavar, both of whom were born in Florida. Ronny and Nanette dated for several years after the births of their children but broke up in 2002 following a significant history of domestic violence by Ronny against Nanette. In 2002 the Florida Department of Children and Families became involved and set up a case plan that significantly limited Ronny's visitation rights. Ronny complied with the case plan and eventually worked his way up to unsupervised visitation with the children, but in 2007 he stopped seeing or contacting them altogether. In 2009 Nanette married and moved to Alaska with the children without informing Ronny. In 2010 Nanette filed a complaint in which she sought sole legal and primary physical custody of the children. Nanette also requested child support. Ronny opposed, requesting that the parties share joint legal custody and that he be awarded primary physical custody. The superior court awarded primary physical custody to Nanette and a modified form of joint legal custody to Nanette and Ronny. The superior court also granted Ronny summer visitation rights, provided that he pay for the travel expenses, and ordered Ronny to pay child support. Ronny appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's child custody and support award, but reversed and remanded regarding the allocation of visitation expenses. The superior court was affirmed in all other respects. View "Ronny M. v. Nanette H." on Justia Law

A driver caused injury to the passenger of another car in a two-car accident. The passenger brought suit for damages, including her insurer's subrogated claim for medical expenses. The driver made an early offer of judgment, which the passenger did not accept. The driver's insurer then made a direct payment to the subrogated insurer, thereby removing that amount from the passenger's potential recovery. The driver then made a second offer of judgment, which the passenger did not accept. After trial both parties claimed prevailing party status; the driver sought attorney's fees. The superior court ruled that the first offer of judgment did not entitle the driver to fees, but the second offer did. Both parties appealed, arguing the superior court improperly considered the subrogation claim payment in its rulings. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the subrogation claim payment had to be taken into account when evaluating the first offer of judgment and affirmed the decision that the driver was not the prevailing party based on the first offer of judgment. But because the nature of the payment on the subrogation claim was not clear, the Court vacated the decision that the second offer of judgment entitled the driver to attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings on this issue. View "Dearlove v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In 2007, a shareholder of Calais Company, Inc., Deborah Kyzer Ivy, filed a complaint against Calais seeking involuntary corporate dissolution. In May 2009, Ivy and Calais reached a settlement agreement in which Calais agreed to purchase Ivy's shares at "fair value" as determined by a three-member panel of appraisers. The appraisers disagreed over the fair value of the company. Calais sought to enforce the Agreement in superior court, arguing the two majority appraisers had failed to comply with the appraisal procedure mandated by the Agreement and the Agreement's definition of "fair value." The superior court ultimately declined to rule on the issue, concluding that interpreting the term "fair value" was beyond its scope of authority under the terms of the Agreement. Consequently, the court ordered Calais to purchase Ivy's shares based on the majority appraisers' valuation. Calais appealed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the superior court's final order and remanded for the court to remand to the appraisers with explicit instructions to calculate the "fair value" as defined by AS 10.06.630(a), as required by the Agreement. View "Calais Company, Inc. v. Kyzer Ivy" on Justia Law