Justia Alaska Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Grandparents were permitted to adopt their grandchild without the consent of the biological father. The superior court found that the father's consent was not required because he failed significantly without justifiable cause to communicate meaningfully with the child for a period of at least one year. On appeal, the father did not challenge the superior court's finding that he failed to communicate meaningfully with the child for at least the year-long period; he argued that this failure was justified by: (1) his incarceration; (2) an agreement he allegedly had with the child's biological mother; (3) alleged interference by the grandparents; and (4) the totality of the circumstances. The father also argued that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to consider visitation rights and by awarding attorney's fees against him. Because the record did not support the father's argument that his failure to communicate meaningfully with the child was justified, the Supreme Court concluded the superior court did not clearly err in finding that this failure was unjustified. The Court therefore affirmed the superior court's finding that the father waived his right to consent to the adoption. Because the issue of visitation rights was not raised before the superior court, the Court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in failing to consider the issue. Finally, because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees against the father, the Court affirmed that award. View "David S. v. Jared H." on Justia Law

In 2001, Alaska State Troopers went to Bret Maness's home to take him into custody for psychological evaluation, pursuant to an involuntary commitment order that had been issued by the superior court. When the troopers arrived at his home, Maness threatened to kill the troopers then fled, first in his RV, and later on foot. During the pursuit, Maness was shot by an Anchorage Police Department officer and then arrested. Maness filed a civil action against many of the participants in the events leading to his shooting and arrest. In 2008 the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's grant of summary judgment with respect to all of Maness's claims except those based on excessive force. Maness then amended his complaint, adding numerous state tort claims to his excessive force claims. The superior court again granted summary judgment to the defendants, with the exception of the Anchorage police officer who actually shot Maness. Maness's excessive force claim against the police officer who shot him went to trial, where the jury delivered a verdict for the police officer. Maness then appealed the grant of summary judgment with respect to his claims against two of the Alaska State Troopers who attempted to execute the civil commitment order. He also appealed the superior court's award of attorney's fees to the defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the Superior Court properly granted the troopers summary judgment on the excessive force claims; and (2) the Superior Court properly granted summary judgment on the state tort claims. The Court vacated the fee award and remanded the case for further proceedings on attorney's fees. View "Maness v. Daily" on Justia Law

Two former police officers brought claims against the Municipality of Anchorage for racial discrimination, alleging a hostile work environment in violation of state law. The officers claimed damages for mental anguish, and the Municipality sought discovery concerning the nature of their mental anguish claims. But the officers refused to comply with these discovery requests, invoking the physician and psychotherapist privilege. The Municipality moved for an order to compel the officers to sign releases authorizing the disclosure of medical, pharmacy, and psychological counseling records, which the superior court granted. The officers then petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the order. Upon review, the Court concluded that the assertion of "garden-variety" mental anguish claims in an employment discrimination case does not automatically waive the physician and psychotherapist privilege. View "Kennedy v. Municipality of Anchorage" on Justia Law

Maryna and Kenneth Stanhope divorced in 2010. The superior court divided the marital property 50/50, awarding the marital home to Maryna on condition she remove Kenneth from the mortgage and make an equalization payment. Kenneth appealed the division of property, claiming the house was his separate non-marital property, or that the superior court did not divide the marital property 50/50. Finding no abuse of the superior court's discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Stanhope v. Stanhope" on Justia Law

Jack Morrell was a patron of appellee Jason, Inc.'s Chilkoot Charlie's bar where he had been drinking. He had a confrontation with Eric Kalenka shortly after he left. Morrell brandished a knife and used it to fatally stab Kalenka. Kalenka's estate sued Chilkoot Charlie's alleging the bar had continued to serve Morrell as a "drunken person" in violation of Alaska law, and therefore was liable in part for Kalenka's death. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether the Kalenka estate raised a genuine issue of fact of whether Morrell was a "drunken person" within the meaning of the statute. The Court concluded that the estate presented enough evidence to survive summary judgment. Therefore, the Court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment to Chilkoot Charlie's, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc." on Justia Law

Shareholders of a closely held corporation brought a derivative suit against a shareholder-director and the corporation's former attorneys for fiduciary fraud, fraudulent conveyance, legal malpractice, and civil conspiracy. After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court ruled all the claims were time-barred. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of most claims, but reversed its dismissal of two and remanded those claims for further proceedings. View "Gefre v. Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP" on Justia Law

The parties in this case divorced in 1992. The divorce decree did not divide their property. The husband received military retirement benefits; the wife filed a motion seeking a post decree equitable division of property. The husband opposed, arguing that the wife's claim was barred by: (1) the statute of limitations; (2) laches; and (3) estoppel. The superior court concluded that the wife could properly bring her motion, that her motion was not barred by the statute of limitations, and that laches barred only the retrospective division of the husband's retirement benefits. The husband appealed. Because the wife's claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, and because the superior court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the wife was entitled to a prospective division of retirement benefits, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court with respect to these issues. However, because the court erred in setting the effective date of the property division, the case was remanded with instructions to correct the effective date. View "Schaub v. Schaub" on Justia Law

In 2001, Union Oil Company of California entered into a contract to sell its oil to Tesoro Alaska Company. Under the contract the Tesoro took title at the North Slope, but agreed to use a pipeline company associated with Union to transport oil through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. The price per barrel was calculated as the West Coast market price less marine transport and pipeline tariff. The contract made no mention of whether the pipeline tariff was tied to the ultimate destination of the oil. At the time, the interstate and intrastate pipeline tariffs were the same. Tesoro shipped the oil to an in-state refinery and paid the tariff to the pipeline company. Union subtracted the tariff amount from the market price of the oil less marine transport and sent invoices to the buyer. Meanwhile, Tesoro successfully challenged the intrastate tariff as unjust and unreasonable and the pipeline company issued a refund, including 10.5% interest. Union claimed that it was entitled to the tariff refund under the contract. The superior court, on motions for summary judgment, awarded the principal amount of the refund to Union and the interest to Tesoro. Both parties appealed. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court held that the contract's pricing term was a netback price to the Los Angeles market referencing the interstate tariff. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's grant of summary judgment to Union and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Tesoro. View "Tesoro Alaska Company v. Union Oil Company of California" on Justia Law

Olga Villars sued her former husband, Richard Villars, for his failure to pay spousal support in 2010. Following a trial at which both parties appeared, the trial court ruled that the amount Richard owed Olga had to be reduced to account for (1) the smaller size of her household while her daughter was living with Richard, (2) the lower federal poverty level in California, where Olga had moved, (3) the substantial contributions for support Olga received from her second husband, and (4) Olga’s earned income. Olga appealed these rulings. Because the Supreme Court found that the trial court clearly erred in its calculation of the amount of support contributed by Olga’s second husband, the case was remanded for further consideration of that issue. View "Villars v. Villars" on Justia Law

The Nancy Lake State Recreation Area (“Park”) issued special use permits to owners of private property abutting the remote boundary of the Park that grant them the right to use all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) along the Butterfly Lake Trail to access their private property. The ATVs have damaged the Trail and the surrounding wetlands. SOP, Inc. sued to enjoin the Park from issuing these ATV permits. SOP moved for summary judgment, and the Park filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Superior Court denied SOP’s motion and granted the Park’s motion. SOP appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the permits created easements because the Park could revoke the permits at will. Easements are disposals of property; the Alaska Constitution prohibits the Park from disposing of property that the legislature has set aside as a state park. The Court concluded the permits were illegal and reversed. View "SOP, Inc. v. Alaska" on Justia Law